Andra N. Preda

This costs endorsement follows a four-week jury trial concerning a motor vehicle accident, where the plaintiff's jury awards for general damages and past loss of income were reduced to zero due to the statutory deductible and collateral accident benefits under the Insurance Act.

The defendant, deemed the successful party, sought substantial indemnity costs totaling over $400,000.

The plaintiff argued for a modest award, citing the defendant's late admission of liability and the jury's initial verdict.

The court, exercising its broad discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiff.

However, it also rejected a "modest" award, concluding that partial indemnity was appropriate.

The court meticulously adjusted the defendant's claimed fees and disbursements, disallowing certain items like surveillance costs and excessive expert fees, ultimately awarding the defendant $131,980.35 in partial indemnity costs.

The court also dismissed the defendant's request for production of the plaintiff's adverse costs insurance policy, affirming its irrelevance and that Rule 30.02 does not apply when the law firm, not a party, is the policyholder.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $35,000 in general damages and $20,000 in past loss of income for injuries sustained in a rear-end motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion.

The court found that while the plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment from chronic pain, she failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that her ongoing complaints were caused by the accident rather than pre-existing severe degenerative disc disease.

Furthermore, the court found that the impairment was not 'serious' within the meaning of the Insurance Act, as she was able to work and perform most tasks of daily living.

The threshold motion was granted, barring the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages.

During a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought to qualify an anesthesiologist as an expert in chronic pain.

The court permitted the expert to testify regarding his diagnosis, observations, and prognosis of the plaintiff's chronic pain.

However, applying the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, the court restricted the expert from opining on whether the accident caused the pain or whether the impairments met the statutory threshold for damages, reserving those ultimate issues for the jury.

In a personal injury jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought to use demonstrative evidence, including medical illustrations, charts, and photographs, during their opening statement.

The defendants objected on the grounds of authenticity, accuracy, and prejudice.

The court ruled that most of the proposed demonstratives, including photographs and a subjective prescription chart, could not be used in the opening statement as their admissibility remained in dispute.

However, the court permitted the use of a factual physician chronology chart, finding it contained admissible evidence that could be proven without prejudice to the defendants.

The defendant Carlos Sosa brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff, Frank Clarke, opposed the motion, arguing that issues of contributory negligence, including Sosa's speed, lookout, and potential alcohol consumption, required a trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that complex factual disputes, conflicting expert evidence requiring detailed mathematical assessment, and credibility issues could not be justly and fairly determined on a paper record, especially given the presence of a jury notice.