Alexandra Jane Beatrice Stevenson

The accused, Loic Aurel Simeu, brought an application under section 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, alleging an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the charge date (March 31, 2021) to the conclusion of the trial (December 13, 2023) was 32 months and 14 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court identified 7 days of defence-caused delay.

It also found several exceptional circumstances, including a 2-month and 13-day interruption due to the re-translation of inaccurate complainant statements, 1 day for counsel's illness, and approximately 5 days attributed to a significant underestimation of trial time coupled with chronic technical and interpretation difficulties.

After deducting these periods, the remaining delay was calculated to be 29 months and 19 days, falling below the Jordan ceiling.

The court concluded that, from a holistic "bird's-eye view," the delay was not unreasonable, despite the case taking longer than anticipated, and dismissed the application for a stay.

The accused, J.A. (K.A.), brought two Charter applications under sections 10(b) (right to counsel) and 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) to exclude evidence in a human trafficking case.

The court found multiple violations of the right to counsel by police officers, including failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice and failure to hold-off questioning.

However, applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the evidence (false name, cellular telephone content) should not be excluded, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the charges and the minimal impact on the accused's Charter interests.

The section 8 application regarding "red boots" was dismissed, as the court found no standing for the accused and no reliable evidence of police search or seizure.

An accused (K.A.) in a human trafficking case sought an adjournment of a section 10(b) Charter application voir dire, citing unpreparedness due to communication difficulties while in custody amidst COVID-19 restrictions.

The Crown and co-accused opposed the request.

The court, balancing the risk of delay against the accused's right to make full answer and defence, reluctantly granted the adjournment to ensure a fair hearing on the important Charter application, which involved potentially inculpatory evidence.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order following revocation of bail at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on multiple sexual assault charges and a threat charge.

The preliminary hearing judge had revoked bail on the basis of committal to trial and concerns related to public protection.

The reviewing court held that committal for trial alone does not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify revocation of an existing release order.

The court further found that the preliminary hearing judge erred by conflating the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention and by relying on factors unsupported by evidence of breach.

The detention order was set aside and the applicant was released on bail with strict conditions including house arrest and supervision restrictions.