Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-0004-0000 DATE: 2024 02 20
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: His Majesty the King Ms. A. Stevenson, counsel for the Crown
– and – Loic Aurel Simeu Ms. S. Kimberg, counsel for the Applicant/Accused
HEARD: January 22, 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION- SECTION 11(b) CHARTER APPLICATION
Conlan J.
I. The Charges, the Trial, and the Verdicts
[1] The accused/applicant, Loic Aurel Simeu (“Simeu”), was charged with numerous criminal offences and tried jointly with one other accused.
[2] The trial in the Superior Court of Justice at Milton, Ontario, without a jury, commenced on November 28, 2022. It ended on December 13, 2023.
[3] On February 7, 2024, this Court released its reasons for judgment. Simeu was acquitted on three counts but found guilty of six charges – (i) human trafficking, (ii) procuring, (iii) advertising sexual services, (iv) receipt of a material benefit from human trafficking, (v) receipt of a material benefit from sexual services, and (vi) failure to comply with a release order.
II. The Application
[4] Simeu applies for an order staying the findings of guilt, under section 24(1) of the Charter, on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter, has been infringed.
III. The Total Delay between the Charge and the Conclusion of the Trial
[5] Simeu was arrested on March 30, 2021. The Information was sworn on March 31, 2021. The period of total delay between the charge date and the last day of trial is 32 months and 14 days.
[6] Simeu has been in custody since his arrest date.
[7] The period of total delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling (30 months) by 2 months and 14 days. The presumptive Jordan date was September 30, 2023.
IV. The Positions of Simeu and the Crown
[8] Because the within application was heard after the trial concluded, Simeu submits that the “total delay in the present case should be calculated to include the hearing of the 11(b) application”, and thus, “the total delay in this matter is 33 months and 23 days” (paragraphs 153-154 of the factum filed on Simeu’s behalf).
[9] Simeu submits further that “there is only 1 day of defence delay – November 28, 2022, the anticipated first day of trial when Mr. Forte [trial counsel for Simeu] was ill”, and that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case, and thus, “[t]he court should find that the total delay minus any defence delay and exceptional circumstances is 33 months and 22 days” (paragraphs 155 and 169 of the factum filed on behalf of Simeu).
[10] Alternatively, Simeu submits the following, taken from paragraph 170 of the factum filed on his behalf:
- In the alternative, should the court find that the total delay in this matter falls below the presumptive ceiling, the Applicant submits that the delay is nonetheless unreasonable. The defence made a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings and the case took markedly longer than it should have.
[11] The Crown submits that “[t]he total delay should be calculated to the end of submissions, not the end of the 11(b) application. The Applicant’s chart calculates this as 32 months, 14 days” (emphasis in the original – paragraph 6 of the Crown’s factum).
[12] The Crown submits further that “2 months and 7 days should be deducted as defence caused delay. This still leaves the net delay above the 30-month presumptive ceiling by 7 days. Therefore, it falls to the Crown to show the delay is reasonable because of the presence of exceptional circumstances” (emphasis in the original – paragraph 85 of the Crown’s factum).
[13] The Crown submits further that “there are exceptional circumstances, in the category of ‘discrete events’, that operate to bring the delay below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months, even if this court finds no defence delay at all” (paragraph 92 of the Crown’s factum).
[14] Finally, the Crown submits that “[i]f this Court accepts that defence delay and/or exceptional circumstances bring the remaining delay below the presumptive ceiling, the defence bears the onus of demonstrating the case is a clear one of unreasonable delay”, and that Simeu has failed to demonstrate that (paragraphs 120 and 133 of the Crown’s factum).
V. The Questions to be Answered
[15] As can be seen from the above, there are four questions to be answered:
(i) whether the period of total delay should end at the conclusion of the trial or should end on the date that the 11(b) application was argued;
(ii) whether the period of net delay (total delay minus defence delay) is still above the presumptive 30-month ceiling and, if so, by how much;
(iii) whether any further delay attributed to exceptional circumstances ought to be subtracted from the net delay and, if so, how much; and
(iv) whatever the final calculation of remaining delay is determined to be, whether that is unreasonable, keeping in mind that the onus of proof rests with the applicant if the remaining delay is below the presumptive 30-month ceiling.
[16] These four questions are consistent with the approach set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, summarized at paragraphs 34-41 of the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704.
VI. Question Number One – Calculating the Period of Total Delay
[17] On this question, the Court agrees with the Crown. The period of total delay in this case is 32 months and 14 days, from the date of the charge (March 31, 2021) to the end of the trial (December 13, 2023).
[18] The applicant has provided no authority for the proposition that the period of total delay ought to extend to the date that the 11(b) application was argued. This Court is not aware of any such authority.
[19] Simeu’s argument is contrary to paragraph 47 of Jordan, supra and contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7, at paragraph 3. Although K.G.K., supra focussed on verdict deliberation time and not on the time required to schedule and argue an 11(b) application, the clear principle articulated by Justice Moldaver remains: the Jordan ceilings apply to the end of the evidence and argument at trial, and no further.
[20] In R. v. Haniffa, 2021 ONCA 326, at paragraph 33, Juriansz J.A. cited K.G.K., supra and confirmed that “[t]he Supreme Court explicitly rejected the possibility that Jordan ceilings apply from the charge to ‘the conclusion of post-trial motions’”.
[21] Although Haniffa, supra supports this Court assessing, separately, whether the time taken for the within 11(b) application to be argued and decided was unreasonable (paragraphs 36-37), it could not be argued, responsibly, and it is not argued on behalf of Simeu, that there has been any unreasonable delay in adjudicating this application. The trial concluded about two months before the Court rendered its decision on the stay application. Two months to hear and decide an 11(b) application is not unreasonable.
[22] In addition, Simeu’s argument is contrary to common sense. It was Simeu who was responsible for the 11(b) application being heard after the end of the trial. Although Simeu’s counsel averted to the prospect of the within application being brought as early as August 2023, the service and filing of the application was not done until December 21, 2023, after the trial had already concluded. There was no option to hear the application before the trial ended, as no judge could have heard it without it being filed. It was heard as soon as possible (on January 22, 2024) after it was filed (on December 21, 2023).
VII. Question Number Two – Calculating the Period of Net Delay
[23] On this question, the Court agrees with the Crown that the one-week period between January 13, 2022 and January 20, 2022 should be characterized as defence delay.
[24] On January 13, 2022, in the Ontario Court of Justice, the Crown was ready to have the case be returned at assignment court in the Superior Court of Justice, and the Crown wanted that to occur, and the Crown specifically asked the presiding justice to make that order, and it was only because Simeu’s counsel was not present at court and Simeu asked for a one-week adjournment that the case was not immediately traversed to the Superior Court of Justice. All of that is clear from a review of the transcript of the January 13, 2022 appearance. None of that is disputed in Simeu’s materials filed in support of the within application, including the “Procedural History Chart” found at tab 7 of the Application Record. In fact, at page 13 of that chart, the applicant confirms that “[t]he Crown advised…that the matter should be adjourned to assignment court. The matter was remanded 1 week for counsel to attend”.
[25] That one-week period was “delay caused solely by the conduct of the defence”, one of the two types of defence delay that must be deducted from the period of total delay in order to determine the period of net delay. Jordan, supra, at paragraphs 61 and 63; R. v. J.P., 2021 ONCA 866, at paragraph 7.
[26] This Court disagrees with the Crown, however, that the two-month period between September 26, 2022 and November 28, 2022 ought to also be characterized as defence delay.
[27] It is true that, on January 21, 2022, at the first court appearance in the Superior Court of Justice, it was indicated on the record that (i) the court had available trial dates starting on September 26, 2022, and that (ii) counsel for Simeu was not available to start the trial on September 26, 2022, and that (iii) trial dates were then set commencing on November 28, 2022.
[28] The Crown submits that it was available for the trial to start on September 26, 2022, and in support of that the Crown points not to the transcript of the January 21, 2022 court appearance but rather to Ms. Stevenson’s calendar for the period of time in question (tab 46 of the Respondent’s Record and paragraph 84 of the Crown’s factum).
[29] The Crown relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in J.P., supra for the proposition that there was no requirement for anything to be put on the record at court on January 21, 2022 regarding the Crown’s availability to start the trial on the first available date offered by the court.
[30] With respect, this Court is not persuaded that J.P., supra supports the Crown’s position on this point. The facts in that case were very different than ours, as gleaned most specifically from paragraph 8 of the Court of Appeal’s decision. In our case, it cannot be said that Simeu clearly and unequivocally waived the period of time between September 26, 2022 and November 28, 2022. In our case, it cannot be said that Simeu failed to object to any characterization of the said two-month period as being the responsibility of the defence and, thus, that Simeu gave an implicit waiver of those two months, because there was no such characterization of the said two-month period expressed by anyone at court on January 21, 2022, including by the court itself. That distinguishes our case from the facts underlying the J.P., supra decision.
[31] Each case, and each period of time within each case, turns on its own facts. This Court does not suggest that there is always a requirement that, where the defence counsel states that they are unavailable, either the Crown or the court must state on the record that the Crown is available and/or that the period of time in question is being characterized as defence delay. On our facts, however, based on the evidence relied upon by the Crown (Ms. Stevenson’s calendar found at tab 46 of the Respondent’s Record), the Court does not find that the two months between September 26, 2022 and November 28, 2022 was defence delay.
[32] Finally, this Court agrees with the Crown that the lost first trial day of November 28, 2022 should be characterized as an exceptional circumstance, a discrete event, and not as defence delay.
[33] Thus, this Court finds that the period of net delay in this case is 32 months and 7 days (32 months and 14 days of total delay less 7 days of defence delay).
[34] That period of net delay is above the presumptive 30-month ceiling. The Crown has the onus to rebut the presumption that the said period of 32 months and 7 days is unreasonable. To rebut the presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two categories: (i) discrete events and (ii) particularly complex cases. If the Crown cannot rebut the presumption, then a stay will follow. Jordan, supra, at paragraph 47; Coulter, supra, at paragraph 37.
[35] The Crown does not argue that our case was particularly complex as that applies to the question of exceptional circumstances (paragraph 132 of the Crown’s factum).
VIII. Question Number Three – Exceptional Circumstances
[36] On this question, the Court agrees with the Crown. There were exceptional circumstances, discrete events, that must be taken into account. When they are taken into account, the period of remaining delay is below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.
[37] The within application can actually be decided without any reference at all to the COVID-19 pandemic. There are other discrete events, more tangible ones, that must be considered, however.
[38] In the event of an appeal from this decision, though, the Court should say something about the pandemic. In R. v. Agpoon, 2023 ONCA 449, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that (i) the pandemic falls within a category of discrete exceptional circumstances, and that (ii) there is a systemic perspective within which the pandemic must be seen, and that (iii) judges should avoid “complicated micro-counting” in determining delay and especially so in the context of the pandemic, and that (iv) the assessment of pandemic-related delay for Jordan purposes carries with it an important local perspective (paragraphs 19, 21, 22, and 26).
[39] During the entirety of Simeu’s case from the date that he was charged (in March 2021) until the date that he first appeared in the Superior Court of Justice (in January 2022), COVID-19 was impacting criminal proceedings in Ontario, including Halton Region. In fact, as late as January 2022, the moratorium on new jury selections in the Superior Court of Justice was being extended by Chief Justice Morawetz in a Notice to the Profession and Public Regarding Court Proceedings.
[40] As the criminal case management judge for the Superior Court of Justice in Milton, I know that the Superior Court in Milton has never been busier with criminal cases than it has been since 2022 (at least not since 2011). There are reasons for that not directly related to the pandemic, such as rapid population growth in Halton Region, but the explanation for the inundation of our court calendar with criminal cases is due in significant part to the pandemic. We are still playing catch-up in 2024.
[41] This Court is confident that the pandemic played a role in the delay between January 2022, when Simeu first appeared in the Superior Court of Justice, and late September 2022, when the court was first ready to try the case. Simply put, the case was competing for limited resources with many others that had also grown-up during the height of the blackouts and the closures. In addition, this Court is equally confident that the pandemic played a role in the delay in completing the trial between December 2022 and December 2023. When the trial judge and counsel have already been committed to other criminal cases on dates after the Simeu trial was expected to conclude, and those other criminal cases are also victims of COVID-19 and also need to be heard on an urgent basis, there is only so much rescheduling that can be done in order to accommodate continuation dates for Simeu and his co-accused.
[42] We all did the very best that we could. The point is that this trial would have concluded earlier but for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the within application can be disposed of without regard for the exceptional circumstance of the pandemic.
[43] In terms of the law as it pertains to exceptional circumstances generally, this Court accepts the following, taken from paragraphs 114-115 of the factum filed on behalf of Simeu:
In Jordan, the SCC explained:
Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise. So long as they meet this definition, they will be considered exceptional. They need not meet a further hurdle of being rare or entirely uncommon.
It is not enough for the Crown, once the ceiling is breached, to point to a past difficulty. It must also show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling. This might include prompt resort to case management processed to seek the assistance of the court, or seeking assistance from the defence to streamline evidence or issues for trial or to coordinate pre-trial applications, or resorting to any other appropriate procedural means. [emphasis added]
Thus, not only must a discrete exceptional circumstance be reasonably unforeseen, but the Crown must also show it took all reasonable steps to mitigate the delay before it arose.
[44] At paragraph 92 of its factum, the Crown points to at least five discrete events that amount to exceptional circumstances in our case. That clause of the Crown’s factum reads as follows:
The Respondent submits there are exceptional circumstances, in the category of “discrete events”, that operate to bring the delay below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months, even if this court finds no defence delay at all. These include but are not limited to:
- An adjournment for re-translation of the complainant’s statements;
- A significant under-estimation of the time required for trial;
- The difficulty re-scheduling a multi-accused matter post-Covid;
- Disruptions due to technical difficulties/accused’s arrival time;
- The unavailability of the Court due to other commitments/illness of the parties.
[45] To decide the within application, the Court need only deal with three of those items: (i) the redoing of the transcripts of the complainant’s police statements, (ii) the massive underestimation of the trial time by all concerned, and (iii) the incessant technical and interpretation difficulties experienced throughout the trial.
[46] On the first item, on day 8 of the trial, on December 8, 2022, the trial had to be interrupted until its resumption on February 21, 2023. The period of that interruption, 2 months and 13 days, in my opinion, must be deducted from the net delay.
[47] During the cross-examination of the complainant by counsel for Simeu, on December 8, 2022, it became clear that Simeu was being prejudiced by an inaccurate French-language transcript of at least one of the complainant’s prior police statements and an inaccurate English translation thereof. To remedy the issue, complete new transcripts had to be prepared, with the assistance of one of the in-court interpreters at trial.
[48] This Court finds that the inaccuracies in the transcripts and what was required to be done to remedy the problem amount to a discrete event - an exceptional circumstance. Until the complainant was being cross-examined by counsel for Simeu on these specific alleged inconsistencies in her story, nobody, including the Crown, could reasonably have foreseen the issue. This was something that, until the problem became evident on December 8, 2022, was outside of the Crown’s control. Immediately after the problem became evident, the Crown took swift steps to rectify it. Rather than contest Simeu’s trial adjournment request, or ask for more time to consider it, or ask that the request be formalized in an application, any of which would have delayed the remedial action even further, the Crown did not oppose the adjournment request. The Crown then cooperated, in fact all counsel did, in having the trial resume as quickly as it did.
[49] The Court disagrees with Simeu’s argument that the Crown ought to have taken steps to mitigate the fallout with the said transcripts at trial in light of what transpired on August 15, 2022, when a co-accused (who was not tried with Simeu) appeared at court to speak to a third-party records application that had been brought by that co-accused.
[50] Simeu’s argument is misplaced, in my view. The evidence filed on the application does not support a finding that what counsel for the co-accused was complaining about was at all the same issue, or a similar issue, that arose during our trial. Besides, from a plain reading of paragraphs 44 and 45 of the factum filed on behalf of Simeu, it appears that the presiding justice at court on August 15, 2022 ruled on the matter, subject only to a proper application being brought later by defence counsel, an application that was never brought.
[51] Once 2 months and 13 days is deducted from the period of net delay of 32 months and 7 days, the period of remaining delay is below the presumptive 30-month ceiling.
[52] On top of that, the lost first day of the trial, 1 day – November 28, 2022 (when counsel for Simeu was ill), must also be deducted from the period of net delay, taking the period of remaining delay down one additional day.
[53] On top of that, further, we have a situation where the trial lasted some 31 days. It was supposed to last 15 days, with a jury (before the re-election to judge-alone). It took twice as long to complete. All counsel are equally responsible for that significant underestimation of the trial time. If this Court attributed, say, 1/3 of that extra 16 days to Simeu (because there was a co-accused at trial, and because the Crown has to share some responsibility as well), or 5 days, the period of remaining delay would be another 5 days less.
[54] It would be fair to do so here, in my view, because this factor is interrelated with the final item – the incessant technical and interpretation difficulties experienced throughout the trial. In other words, the significant overrun in the trial time can fairly be characterized as a discrete event, an exceptional circumstance, because it was, at least in part, caused by the daily incidents of “down-time” due to problems with the interpretation equipment and the technology. Those problems were completely out of the control of the Crown.
[55] Simeu relies upon the decision of Justice Paciocco (as His Honour then was) in R. v. J.M., 2017 ONCJ 4. In that case, it was held that, although “technical difficulties will ordinarily be the kind of unexpected circumstance that leads to delay for which the state cannot fairly be held responsible”, on the particular facts of that case, Justice Paciocco concluded that “[t]he time lost may have been outside the control of the prosecutor, but…it was not outside the control of the state” (paragraphs 159 and 161).
[56] J.M., supra involved a different type of technical difficulty, however. As Justice Paciocco stated, “[m]ost of the delay in this case was spent, however, waiting for a technician to arrive to fix the problem” (paragraph 159). A lack of timely technical assistance is a more institutional matter that this Court can understand may be laid at the feet of the state. A lack of timely technical assistance was not the issue in our case, though. The issue in our case was multi-faceted – (i) problems with the equipment (the headset being worn by the co-accused and the system that allowed for the interpreters to be on Zoom and to interpret for the co-accused in the courtroom without other trial participants hearing and being distracted by the voice of the interpreter), and (ii) frequent complaints about the accuracy of the interpretation being done by one of the interpreters, Ms. Lavoie. In my view, those difficulties could not have been reasonably foreseen by the Crown or by the state.
[57] In addition, in J.M., supra, it was held that a major reason for the trial going longer than anticipated was “problems with the state of readiness of the prosecutor’s case”; “late disclosure”; late “revisions to the Crown case”; a late “tactical change in the Crown’s case”; in other words, generally, the Crown not having a good understanding of the state of its case going in. Thus, although Justice Paciocco observed that, where a trial goes longer than expected after a good faith estimate, that would ordinarily qualify as an exceptional circumstance, His Honour found on the particular facts before him that the Crown had not proven that exceptional circumstances outside of the control of the Crown were responsible for the problematic delay that had occurred (paragraphs 162, 163, 166, 167, and 168).
[58] This Court does not draw the same conclusion in our case, as the circumstances in our case are quite different than those confronted by Justice Paciocco, both in terms of (i) the type of technical difficulty experienced and (ii) the level of preparedness of the Crown.
[59] In summary, even ignoring the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court finds that the period of remaining delay in this case is 29 months and 19 days, at its highest (net delay of 32 months and 7 days, less 2 months and 13 days regarding the transcripts issue, less a further 1 day for November 28, 2022, less a further 5 days on account of the significant underestimation of the trial time coupled with the chronic technical and interpretation difficulties experienced throughout the trial).
[60] That period of remaining delay is below the Jordan ceiling. The onus, therefore, rests with Simeu to demonstrate that the delay is unreasonable. Jordan, supra, at paragraph 48; Coulter, supra, at paragraph 40.
IX. Question Number Four – is the Period of Remaining Delay Unreasonable?
[61] On this question, the Court agrees with the Crown.
[62] Thus far in these reasons, the Court’s decision reads like an arithmetical calculus.
[63] Taking a more bird’s-eye view of the case, has it taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have? R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, at paragraph 107. With respect, I think not.
[64] The applicant, at paragraph 180 of the factum filed on his behalf, points to two things that allegedly caused the proceeding to take markedly longer than it should have taken: (i) the loss of the December 2022 trial dates because of the transcripts issue discussed above in these reasons, and (ii) the “late-breaking and voluminous phone disclosure which changed the nature of the examination of the complainant and the Applicant”.
[65] The first item this Court has already dealt with. It was not reasonably foreseeable by any of the trial participants, including the Crown. It was truly an exceptional circumstance, a discrete event, that cannot be relied upon by the applicant to buttress the argument under this heading.
[66] The second item this Court disagrees with. The text communications between the complainant and Simeu were disclosed to counsel for Simeu about one year before the start of the trial. The complete French to English set of text communications between the complainant and Simeu, Exhibit 5 at trial, was provided to counsel for Simeu on October 3, 2022, nearly two months before the trial started. There is no evidence from trial counsel for Simeu, Mr. Forte, or from anyone at his office, or from Simeu himself, filed on the within application, to suggest that the October 3, 2022 disclosure date of Exhibit 5 had any impact at all on the length of the trial.
[67] The bird’s-eye view of this case is meant to pay homage to the overall meaning of the significant shift in the 11(b) jurisprudence that was intended by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan, supra. There can be no complacency in the system. Presumptive ceilings work against that danger of complacency. There is no room for a criminal prosecution proceeding at a leisurely pace. Presumptive ceilings work against that danger of a criminal case meandering, lazily, its way to conclusion. Everyone in the criminal justice system is expected to shed any temptation to take a lackadaisical approach to any given case. Presumptive ceilings work in favour of that expectation.
[68] There can be a finding of complacency, and there can be a finding of unreasonable delay, even where the presumptive ceiling has not been reached. Absolutely. Not here, though.
[69] This was a multiple-accused, multi-count prosecution involving very serious charges, police services in both Quebec and Ontario, extremely voluminous disclosure, and a 13-month long trial in Superior Court, in fits and starts, that took as long as it did for various reasons but not because of any complacency on the part of any trial participant, including the Crown.
[70] This Court shares the regret that the case did not conclude faster than it did, but the period of remaining delay in this case, below the Jordan ceiling of 30 months, is not unreasonable.
[71] The applicant relies on the decision of my colleague, Justice Harris, in R. v. Belle, 2018 ONSC 7728. The following appears at paragraphs 182 and 183 of the factum filed on behalf of Simeu:
In assessing whether this case has taken markedly longer than it should have, the Belle case is particularly instructive because it deals with Central West Region and an under-30-month-ceiling delay. There are a number of points in the court’s analysis that are relevant to the present case. First the court noted that “the jurisdiction is beset by chronic institutional delay,” and “[w]hen mistakes do happen in Central West Region, immediate steps to contain the damage must be taken.”
In assessing whether the delay is markedly excessive, the court noted, “[I]n a case with a missed first trial date like this one, we have a ready-made yardstick of the reasonable time requirements of the case: the delays to the first trial date. This is when the trial should have been heard and completed.” The court also applied a mathematical approach to assessing the magnitude of delay that would qualify as markedly excessive, “[T]he loss of the first trial date added 8 months, bringing the total delay to 28 months. The 8 months caused by the disclosure delay constitutes almost 30 percent of the total.
[72] With respect, the decision in Belle, supra has very little to do with our case. In that case, the chronic institutional delay that beset the jurisdiction (Brampton, Central West Region) reared its ugly head when it took eight full months to reschedule the trial after it went down because of late disclosure by the Crown (paragraphs 1 and 3). In our case, there was no late disclosure by the Crown, and the transcripts issue discussed above did not require the trial to be delayed by anywhere close to eight full months.
X. Conclusion
[73] For all of these reasons, this Court concludes that there has been no violation of Simeu’s right to be tried within a reasonable time. After accounting for exceptional circumstances, even excluding the pandemic, the period of remaining delay in this case falls below the presumptive Jordan ceiling, and that period of remaining delay is not unreasonable.
[74] Simeu’s section 11(b) Charter application is, therefore, dismissed.
Conlan J.
Released: February 20, 2024