Anita Fineberg

The appellant appealed the Brant County Roman Catholic Separate School Board's response to a freedom of information request, arguing that additional records should exist regarding meetings and investigations involving her and her son.

The Inquiry Officer found that the Board's search was not reasonable, as it failed to search files turned over to its legal firm, specific binders identified by the appellant, and personal notes of employees.

The Board was ordered to conduct a further search and issue a new access decision.

The appellant, a newspaper columnist, sought access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to the identities of individuals who requested copies of his property tax certificate.

The Town of Flamborough denied access under section 14, citing an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The appellant argued he needed the information to pursue a defamation lawsuit regarding an anonymous 'sham' newspaper article.

The Inquiry Officer balanced the competing interests and ordered the disclosure of the names, finding the appellant's need to exercise his legal rights outweighed the privacy interests, but upheld the exemption for one affected person's address.

The appellant, an archaeological researcher, submitted a freedom of information request to the Ministry of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation for access to archaeological reports prepared by a consultant.

The consultant objected to the disclosure, and the Ministry denied access under section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (third party information).

The Inquiry Officer upheld the Ministry's decision, finding that the reports contained scientific and technical information supplied in confidence.

The Officer concluded that disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the consultant's competitive position and result in similar information no longer being supplied to the Ministry, satisfying the requirements for exemption under section 17(1).

The appellant appealed the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services' decision to deny access to records relating to a named individual and a publication.

The Ministry claimed the records, which comprised 116 pages of information filed with the Intelligence Section of the Ontario Provincial Police, were exempt under the law enforcement and invasion of privacy exemptions.

The Inquiry Officer found that the records qualified for exemption under section 14(1)(g) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, as their disclosure could reasonably be expected to reveal law enforcement intelligence information.

The Ministry's decision was upheld.

The appellant submitted a freedom of information request to the Ministry of the Attorney General for all documents in his Family Support Plan (FSP) file.

The Ministry denied access to several pages, citing exemptions for advice and recommendations, law enforcement, solicitor-client privilege, and invasion of privacy.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the Ministry's decision to withhold records containing the personal information of an affected person (the appellant's former spouse) and records subject to solicitor-client privilege.

However, the Commissioner ordered the disclosure of certain FSP computer printouts, finding that they did not qualify for the law enforcement exemption under section 14(1) of the Act.

The appellant, a former employee of a non-profit housing corporation, sought access to OPP records regarding a fraud investigation into his activities.

The Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services denied access to portions of the records, citing various exemptions under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, including the invasion of privacy exemption.

The Inquiry Officer determined that most of the records contained the personal information of other individuals and that their disclosure would constitute a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 21(3)(b), as the information was compiled during an investigation into a possible violation of law.

The Inquiry Officer ordered the disclosure of a few records that contained only the appellant's personal information or could be severed, while upholding the Ministry's decision to withhold the remainder.

The appellant appealed the City of Stoney Creek's decision denying access to certain records and claiming no further responsive records existed.

The Inquiry Officer found that a draft letter prepared by the City's counsel constituted a 'record' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

However, both the draft letter and a legal opinion were found to be exempt from disclosure under the solicitor-client privilege exemption in section 12.

The Inquiry Officer also concluded that the City had conducted a reasonable search for responsive records, dismissing the appeal.

The Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services requested a reconsideration of Order P-1264, which had found that certain records were not excluded from the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under section 65(6)3.

The Inquiry Officer determined that the previous order contained a jurisdictional error because the Ministry did have a legal interest in the records, which concerned staffing, attendance, and training.

Consequently, the records met all requirements of section 65(6)3 and were excluded from the Act.

The relevant provision of the previous order was rescinded.

The appellant, through an agent, requested access to records held by the Ontario Human Rights Commission relating to a human rights complaint in which he was a respondent.

The OHRC denied access to various records, claiming exemptions for advice and recommendations, law enforcement reports, solicitor-client privilege, and invasion of privacy.

The Inquiry Officer ordered the disclosure of certain records that did not qualify for the claimed exemptions or did not contain the personal information of other individuals.

The Inquiry Officer upheld the OHRC's decision to withhold the remaining records, finding that they were either exempt under the claimed discretionary exemptions or their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The Inquiry Officer also found that the OHRC had conducted a reasonable search for records relating to the cost of the investigation.

A law firm requested access to OPP investigation records concerning criminal charges against a former employee of its client, who had commenced a wrongful dismissal action.

The Ministry denied access under several exemptions, including the personal privacy exemption.

The Inquiry Officer found that the records contained the personal information of the named individual and others, which was compiled as part of a law enforcement investigation.

As such, the information fell within the presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 21(3)(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and the Ministry's decision to deny access was upheld.

The appellant requested records from the City of Vaughan relating to charges laid against a dog owner after the appellant and her son were bitten by the dog.

The charges had been withdrawn when the appellant failed to attend court.

The City denied access to certain records, claiming solicitor-client privilege and unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the City's decision to deny access to most of the records, finding they were either prepared for use in giving legal advice or their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of the dog owner's privacy.

However, the Commissioner ordered the disclosure of portions of correspondence sent by the City prosecutor to the dog owner's counsel.

The appellant submitted a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to the Ministry of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation for a copy of a jobsOntario Community Action Fund application filed by a non-profit organization.

The Ministry granted partial access, denying parts of the record under sections 17 and 21 of the Act.

The Inquiry Officer found that some of the withheld information did not qualify as personal information or its disclosure would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The Inquiry Officer also found that the third party commercial information was not supplied in confidence and its disclosure could not reasonably be expected to result in the harms outlined in section 17(1).

The Ministry was ordered to disclose the non-exempt information.

The appellant requested information from the Town of Markham regarding a complaint about the use of their property.

The Town denied access, claiming the law enforcement exemption.

On appeal, the Inquiry Officer found that the records contained the personal information of both the appellant and the complainant.

The Inquiry Officer determined that the complainant's personal information was presumed exempt under section 14(3)(b) as it was compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law.

The Town was ordered to disclose the records to the appellant with the complainant's personal information severed.

The Inquiry Officer reconsidered Order P-792, which had ordered the Ministry of the Attorney General to disclose a memorandum.

Following two Divisional Court decisions that found the previous interpretation of section 19 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to be patently unreasonable, the Inquiry Officer determined she had jurisdiction to reconsider the order.

Upon reconsideration, the Inquiry Officer found that the memorandum was prepared by Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Branch 2 of section 19.

The previous order provisions requiring disclosure were rescinded.

The appellant requested records from the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services relating to an OPP investigation into complaints that a paper released by the appellant violated the hate sections of the Criminal Code.

The Ministry denied access to portions of the records under various exemptions.

The Inquiry Officer found that most of the records contained the personal information of other individuals compiled during a law enforcement investigation, and their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 49(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

However, two pages containing only the appellant's personal information did not qualify for exemption under section 13(1) as advice or recommendations, and were ordered to be disclosed.

The appellant appealed the Ministry of Natural Resources' decision to disclose records to a requester.

In an interim order, the Inquiry Officer directed the Ministry to provide representations on the factors it considered in exercising its discretion to disclose the records under section 49(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

After reviewing the Ministry's representations, the Inquiry Officer found that the Ministry exercised its discretion in accordance with established legal principles and upheld the decision to disclose the records.

The appellant, an unsuccessful candidate for Chief of Police, requested access to records related to the selection process from the Cornwall Police Services Board.

The Board denied access to meeting notes and consultant materials, claiming exemptions for closed meetings, advice and recommendations, and third-party information.

The Inquiry Officer found that none of the claimed exemptions applied and ordered the disclosure of the records, subject to severing the personal information of other individuals.

The Officer also found that the Board's search for responsive records was unreasonable and ordered a further search.

The appellant requested reconsideration of Order M-666, which upheld the Municipality's decision to withhold the identity of a farmer who shot the appellant's dogs.

The Inquiry Officer granted the reconsideration, finding a significant defect in the initial inquiry because the Municipality failed to disclose a relevant page of its Animal Control manual.

Upon reconsideration, the Inquiry Officer determined that the Animal Control Officer was not conducting a law enforcement investigation, meaning the presumptions under sections 14(3)(b) and 8(1)(d) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply.

The Inquiry Officer ordered the disclosure of the farmer's name, as it was relevant to a fair determination of the appellant's rights to pursue a civil suit, but upheld the withholding of the farmer's address and telephone number.

The requester appealed a decision by the Thunder Bay Police Services Board denying access to portions of a general occurrence report involving the requester and an affected person.

The Police claimed exemptions under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, including that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The Inquiry Officer found that the record contained the personal information of both the requester and the affected person.

After considering the factors in section 14(2) of the Act, the Inquiry Officer concluded that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected person's privacy due to the sensitive and confidential nature of the information.

The decision of the Police was upheld.

The appellant requested access to records relating to their complaints about a named individual's alleged building code and by-law violations.

The City of Timmins denied access to four records under the invasion of privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the City's decision, finding that the records contained the affected person's personal information compiled as part of a law enforcement investigation, triggering the presumption in section 14(3)(b).

The Commissioner also found that the public interest override in section 16 did not apply, as the appellant had already been provided with sufficient information regarding the City's response to the complaints.