A.A. Sanfilippo

The applicant sought to remove or pass over the respondent as the estate trustee of their late mother's estate.

The respondent, the deceased's spouse, had taken no steps to administer the estate in the four years since her death and failed to respond to inquiries.

The court found it clearly necessary to pass over the respondent to ensure the proper administration of the estate and the welfare of the beneficiaries.

The applicant, named as the alternate trustee in the will, was appointed as the sole estate trustee.

Following the determination of two estate litigation applications, the court assessed costs.

The court found that the estate trustee's application for directions on will interpretation engaged public policy considerations, entitling both parties to costs of $55,000 payable by the Estate.

Conversely, the respondent's application to remove the estate trustee did not engage public policy and was governed by the standard civil costs regime.

The respondent was ordered to pay $35,000 in partial indemnity costs to the estate trustee, who was also entitled to full indemnification of his remaining $20,000 in costs from the Estate.

The applicant successfully brought an application to remove the respondent as co-attorney for property for their mother.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the respondent's conduct did not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court fixed the applicant's total reasonable costs at $20,000, ordering the respondent to pay $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis, with the remaining $8,000 to be paid from the mother's assets to fully indemnify the applicant.

The applicant mother and her deceased daughter purchased a property as joint tenants in 1994.

The daughter lived in the property with her husband (the respondent) and children until her death in 2019.

Following the daughter's death, the mother claimed sole beneficial ownership by right of survivorship and sought occupation rent.

The respondent husband claimed the estate was the sole beneficial owner or, alternatively, a 50% owner as a tenant in common under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court found that both the mother and daughter contributed to the purchase and neither established a resulting or constructive trust.

Because the property was a matrimonial home, the joint tenancy was deemed severed immediately before the daughter's death under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The property is held by the mother and the estate as tenants in common, each with a 50% interest.

Claims for unjust enrichment and occupation rent were dismissed.

Following a trial in an estates matter where the applicants successfully established that a property was held in resulting trust for the deceased's estate, the applicants sought costs.

The court found no public policy considerations to deviate from the general civil litigation costs regime.

The respondents were ordered to pay the applicants' costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $160,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff, the deceased's spouse of 20 years, brought a dependant's support claim under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's Will left 40% of the residue of his estate to the plaintiff and 60% to three of his adult children.

The plaintiff argued this provision was inadequate to maintain her accustomed lifestyle and sought the entirety of the estate.

The court found that the deceased did not make adequate provision for the plaintiff's proper support.

After analyzing expert evidence on the plaintiff's lifestyle expenses and life expectancy, the court ordered a lump sum payment of $2,556,871.00 (or 40% of the final residue, whichever is greater) to provide for her housing and future needs, while preserving the deceased's testamentary intention to benefit his children.

The applicants sought a declaration that a residential property transferred by their late mother/grandmother to three of her children was held in trust for the benefit of other family members.

The respondents claimed the transfer was a gift.

The court found that the applicants' claim for an oral inter vivos trust failed because it violated the writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

However, the court held that the respondents failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust arising from the gratuitous transfer.

Consequently, the property was declared to be held in resulting trust for the deceased's estate.

Claims for partition and sale and for passing of accounts were dismissed.

The plaintiff, acting as estate trustee for her deceased mother, brought an action against her brother claiming the mother's estate had a beneficial interest in a property registered solely in the brother's name.

The mother had contributed $10,000 to the down payment when the property was purchased in 1980, and lived there until her death in 2018.

The court found that the brother failed to rebut the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust regarding the $10,000 contribution.

The court awarded the estate a 26% beneficial interest in the net sale proceeds of the property, amounting to $115,900.44, plus $10,000 in damages for the brother's improper disposal of the mother's personal property.

Claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were dismissed, and the action was found not to be statute-barred.

The parties sought to settle the judgment following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

They disagreed on the wording of a consent reduction for a past loss of housekeeping award and the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the wording of the order to reflect that the reduction was made pursuant to Rule 52.08 on consent.

Applying MacLeod v. Marshall, the court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to reduce the prejudgment interest rate on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% under Rule 53.10 to 1.3%, finding that 5% would overcompensate the plaintiffs given historical market rates.

The parties separated after a nine-year marriage with no children.

The applicant sought an equalization of net family property, spousal support, and a share in the post-separation increase in value of the matrimonial home, which was titled solely in the respondent's name.

The court found the applicant did not establish a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home and was only entitled to share in its value up to the date of separation.

The court valued the respondent's orthodontic practices at $675,000 and determined that funds advanced by the respondent's parents were loans, but discounted them to 10% of their face value due to the low likelihood of repayment.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $606,728.60 and spousal support of $2,228 per month for four and one-half years.

The defendant surgeon brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff suffered a ureter injury following a colon resection in 2012, but only discovered severe kidney damage in 2016, prompting the 2017 lawsuit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the kidney damage was a new, distinct injury or an inevitable progression of the ureter injury, and when a reasonable person would have known that a legal proceeding was an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) brought a motion to be added as a party and appointed as a representative of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in an action commenced by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians against Canada and Ontario.

Following case conferences, the parties and HDI consented to a timetable for the motion and terms for providing notice to potentially interested non-parties.

The court issued an order on consent setting out the timetable and the specific notice requirements.

A trial management conference was held to determine the procedures for an upcoming trial regarding an estate application.

The court directed that the trial proceed as a hybrid hearing, with most participants attending in person and one witness testifying virtually.

The court also issued procedural directions regarding the use of CaseLines, the marking of exhibits, and the preparation of a joint document brief.

The plaintiff brought a motion under s. 58(1) of the Construction Act to refer a construction lien action to an Associate Judge for trial.

The defendants opposed, arguing that because the claim amount fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the court was mandated to refer the matter to the Small Claims Court.

The court rejected the defendants' statutory interpretation, holding that s. 58(1) confers discretion to refer the action to either an Associate Judge or the Small Claims Court.

Applying the principles of proportionality and timeliness, the court exercised its discretion to refer the action to an Associate Judge.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

Following a 25-day medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs were awarded damages of $1,918,491.96.

The defendant had made a pre-trial offer to settle the issue of damages for $2,150,000, which the plaintiffs rejected.

The defendant argued for a distributive costs award, seeking costs for the portion of the trial dedicated to damages.

The court held that an offer to settle only damages does not trigger the strict cost consequences of Rule 49.10(2) and declined to make a distributive costs award.

However, applying Rule 49.13 and Rule 57.01, the court reduced the plaintiffs' costs by 30% to reflect their divided success and the unnecessary lengthening of the trial on the damages issue, awarding the plaintiffs $800,000 in partial indemnity costs.

Following a successful urgent motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation, the applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on offers to settle.

The court found that the offers to settle did not meet the timing requirements of Rule 49.10(1) and contained terms beyond the scope of the motion.

The court awarded the applicants costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $5,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff estate trustee brought a motion for default judgment to rectify title to a condominium property.

The deceased plaintiff had alleged that the defendants fraudulently transferred the property into joint tenancy, registered a forged power of attorney, and obtained a mortgage without his knowledge or consent.

The court found the instruments were fraudulent under the Land Titles Act and ordered them deleted from title.

The court also awarded $10,000 in punitive damages against the fraudulent actor and substantial indemnity costs.

In a medical malpractice trial against a single defendant neurologist for delayed diagnosis, the parties disagreed on the formulation of jury questions regarding causation and damages.

The trial judge ruled that the causation question must use the 'but for' test rather than 'caused or contributed', as the latter could confuse the jury in a single-defendant case.

The judge also ordered the jury to provide reasons for its finding on causation to ensure a rational analysis.

On damages, the judge ruled that mitigation and collateral benefits should be addressed in jury instructions rather than separate questions.

Finally, the judge removed the Estate's claim for past value of care from the jury due to insufficient evidence, but allowed the claim for past value of loss of housekeeping to proceed.

The plaintiff appealed an Associate Judge's order requiring her to attend three independent medical examinations, re-attend discovery, and restricting her counsel from communicating with defence experts.

The defendants cross-appealed the denial of a pleading amendment alleging the plaintiff was a 'sophisticated litigant' who might exaggerate her claims.

The Superior Court upheld the denial of the pleading amendment, the discovery re-attendance, and the neuropsychological examination.

However, the court set aside the orders for orthopedic and vocational assessments due to insufficient evidence and lack of jurisdiction for the Associate Judge to order an assessment by a non-health practitioner.

The restriction on counsel communicating with defence experts was upheld but varied to expire once the expert report is completed.