Michael D. Hodgins

The parties sought to settle the judgment following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

They disagreed on the wording of a consent reduction for a past loss of housekeeping award and the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the wording of the order to reflect that the reduction was made pursuant to Rule 52.08 on consent.

Applying MacLeod v. Marshall, the court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to reduce the prejudgment interest rate on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% under Rule 53.10 to 1.3%, finding that 5% would overcompensate the plaintiffs given historical market rates.

Following a 25-day medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs were awarded damages of $1,918,491.96.

The defendant had made a pre-trial offer to settle the issue of damages for $2,150,000, which the plaintiffs rejected.

The defendant argued for a distributive costs award, seeking costs for the portion of the trial dedicated to damages.

The court held that an offer to settle only damages does not trigger the strict cost consequences of Rule 49.10(2) and declined to make a distributive costs award.

However, applying Rule 49.13 and Rule 57.01, the court reduced the plaintiffs' costs by 30% to reflect their divided success and the unnecessary lengthening of the trial on the damages issue, awarding the plaintiffs $800,000 in partial indemnity costs.

In a medical malpractice trial against a single defendant neurologist for delayed diagnosis, the parties disagreed on the formulation of jury questions regarding causation and damages.

The trial judge ruled that the causation question must use the 'but for' test rather than 'caused or contributed', as the latter could confuse the jury in a single-defendant case.

The judge also ordered the jury to provide reasons for its finding on causation to ensure a rational analysis.

On damages, the judge ruled that mitigation and collateral benefits should be addressed in jury instructions rather than separate questions.

Finally, the judge removed the Estate's claim for past value of care from the jury due to insufficient evidence, but allowed the claim for past value of loss of housekeeping to proceed.