William Eric Kay

Following a finding of oppression, the applicants sought costs of $46,000 for the oppression application and $3,900 for a related application.

The respondents argued that an award of costs was premature.

The court agreed with the respondents, finding that it was premature to order costs on the oppression application and the related application given outstanding issues.

No costs orders were made at this time.

Following an earlier decision granting an injunction restraining a landlord from terminating a commercial lease without cause, the successful tenant sought elevated costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis, alleging the landlord acted in bad faith.

The court held that the prior reference to “bad faith” concerned contractual conduct and did not amount to litigation misconduct warranting punitive costs.

Finding no unusual circumstances to depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event on a partial indemnity basis, the court declined to increase the costs award.

Because the applicant’s submissions seeking punitive costs lacked reasonable basis and caused unnecessary costs proceedings, the court reduced the amount payable by awarding the respondent costs of the costs process.

Following a trial in a wrongful dismissal action where the plaintiff succeeded and was awarded damages, the court addressed the quantum of costs and interest.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing that several defences maintained by the defendants until shortly before trial were baseless and vexatious.

The defendants argued that costs should remain on a partial indemnity scale and that certain claimed legal fees should be reduced, including work related to a previously settled summary judgment motion and time spent by a lawyer who did not appear at trial.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party, the court fixed costs at $47,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff was also awarded pre‑judgment and post‑judgment interest.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable to the respondent bank for conversion of funds.

The bank's cross-claim had been pleaded solely in conspiracy to defraud, which the trial judge dismissed.

However, the trial judge found the appellant liable on the unpleaded grounds of conversion and piercing the corporate veil, based on a presumptive indirect benefit as a shareholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it is fundamental to the litigation process that lawsuits be decided within the boundaries of the pleadings.

The Court also noted that piercing the corporate veil requires evidence of improper conduct akin to fraud or deceit, which was absent here.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for loss of opportunity to develop property.

The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge's reasons, finding no basis to consider the loss of opportunity a reality, and dismissed the appeal with costs.