W. Bruce Drake

The appellant employer appealed the dismissal of its motions for summary judgment in three wrongful dismissal actions.

The employer argued that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement prior to the commencement of the actions.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in law by failing to analyze whether the parties had agreed on the essential terms of the settlement.

The Court concluded that the parties had reached an agreement on all essential terms, including the payment of legal fees, and intended to resolve the matters.

The appeal was allowed, summary judgment was granted, and the actions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution against the respondents.

The trial judge had found that the appellant failed to establish the elements of malicious prosecution, specifically that the respondents, rather than the Crown, made the decision to prosecute.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the law or apprehension of the evidence, noting that her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a decision finding the respondents acted reasonably under a Dock License Agreement and were entitled to reimbursement for municipal taxes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondents acted reasonably.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, declaring that the respondents were not entitled to a lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act because they never received possession of the vessel for storage, as the appellants continued to occupy it as their home.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent was constructively dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the removal of 90% of the respondent's duties was sufficient to constitute constructive dismissal.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the alternative position offered was demeaning, excusing the respondent from accepting it, and that age was a factor in the change of duties, justifying a Wallace extension.