Trevin David

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Crown argued the accused was awake but inattentive for 14 seconds.

The defence argued there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep at the wheel without prior warning.

The court found that the driving was objectively dangerous, but there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep and had no reason to foresee the risk of falling asleep.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hot tub at a cottage.

The Crown alleged that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity, while the accused testified that the complainant affirmatively consented to both vaginal and attempted anal intercourse.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused's evidence to be straightforward and believable, raising a reasonable doubt.

Conversely, the court found material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and conflicts with other witnesses' testimonies.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found several periods of delay were attributable to the defence, including time taken to retain counsel, scheduling conflicts for a joint preliminary hearing, and a late request for disclosure that delayed committal.

After deducting the defence delay, the remaining delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other serious offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to trial delay.

The total delay was approximately 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court calculated the net delay for each accused by deducting defence delay, including periods of counsel unavailability and a change of counsel.

The court found that the delay caused by a trial adjournment requested by the defence due to late disclosure of a cell phone extraction report was not attributable to the defence.

The net delay for both accused remained above the 30-month ceiling, and the court granted the stay of proceedings.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 4.6 kilograms of opium into Canada, concealed inside an air compressor shipped from Iran.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought three to three and a half years, citing the offender's status as a first-time offender and the recent cancer diagnosis of his wife as a collateral consequence.

The court found insufficient evidence to reduce the sentence based on collateral consequences and sentenced the offender to four years and six months imprisonment, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused applied under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to terminate a sealing order over materials related to an earlier search warrant that had been authorized but never executed.

The accused argued the earlier Information to Obtain was necessary to assess the credibility and reliability of confidential informant information and to prepare a Garofoli challenge to a later executed warrant that led to firearm charges.

The court held that Stinchcombe disclosure obligations in a Garofoli context are limited to materials placed before the authorizing justice for the warrant under challenge.

Because the earlier warrant materials were not before the issuing justice for the executed warrant and the accused failed to establish likely relevance, disclosure was not warranted.

The court further held that unsealing procedures cannot be used as a collateral method to obtain disclosure beyond the Garofoli framework.

The application to terminate the sealing order was dismissed.

The accused jointly applied under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been violated.

The overall delay between arrest and scheduled trial was approximately 999 days (nearly 33 months).

Applying the analytical framework from R. v. Morin, the court assessed waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

After deducting defence and neutral delay, the court found approximately 550.5 days (about 18.08 months) of Crown and institutional delay, which was only slightly above the guideline range.

Given the seriousness of the charges and the finding that most prejudice arose from the existence of the charges rather than delay itself, the court concluded the accused had not established a Charter breach.