Tanya Pagliaroli

The Receiver of The Lion's Share Group Inc. brought a motion to appoint an interim receiver over the property of the debtor pursuant to section 46 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Receiver argued that the debtor owed over $23 million under various promissory notes and personal guarantees, and that an interim receiver was necessary to prevent the dissipation of assets.

The debtor opposed the motion, arguing he was not personally liable under the guarantees and that the transactions in question were in the ordinary course of business.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Receiver was likely to succeed on the bankruptcy application and that there was an immediate need to protect the estate given the debtor's recent transactions and the complex web of related entities.

Following a successful trial where the plaintiff recovered a $1.5M fee and defeated a counterclaim, the plaintiff sought costs of $680,152.55.

The defendant argued the plaintiff's offer to settle was served 1.5 hours late and thus did not trigger the mandatory cost consequences of Rule 49.10.

The court applied a holistic approach under Rule 49.13, finding the offer provided adequate time to assess risk in an all-or-nothing case.

The court exercised its residual discretion and awarded the plaintiff its requested costs.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions refused during her examination for discovery in a wrongful dismissal and whistleblower retaliation action.

The questions sought the identities of confidential informants who provided the plaintiff with information about her termination and an internal investigation.

The court upheld the plaintiff's refusals regarding her termination, finding the identities irrelevant.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to disclose the source of her information regarding the HR director's presentation, as the communication did not meet the Wigmore criteria for common law privilege.

The moving party, in the midst of complex family trust litigation, sought leave to withdraw admissions made in a previous affidavit and to file three new affidavits.

The moving party argued the admissions regarding multi-million dollar shareholder loans were made inadvertently due to confusion and reliance on her former, now-deceased counsel.

The responding parties opposed, arguing the admissions were formal and the new evidence was an attempt to repair her case mid-hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the admissions were likely inadvertent, raised a triable issue, and caused no non-compensable legal prejudice to the responding parties.

The court emphasized the need to decide the case on its true merits rather than a solicitor's or party's mistake.

Limited partners in a real estate partnership commenced an action alleging misconduct by accountants, a lawyer, and others in relation to unauthorized corporate changes and mortgages affecting partnership property.

After the action had been set down for trial, certain defendants indicated they would bring motions for summary judgment arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged losses were those of the partnership.

The plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a cross‑motion for summary judgment in response.

The court considered modern principles favouring broad access to summary judgment following Hryniak v. Mauldin and whether permitting the motion would promote a proportionate and efficient resolution.

Given that the defendants’ proposed motions could require extensive evidentiary responses and potentially raise broader issues, the court concluded that allowing the plaintiffs to bring their own motion could streamline the litigation.

Leave was therefore granted.

Several defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

A partner in the firm was both a potential witness and had a substantial financial interest in the plaintiff company through share ownership and mortgage financing.

The court considered the governing principles for disqualification of counsel, including the framework in MacDonald Estate v. Martin and the discretionary factors relating to a lawyer-witness scenario set out in Essa (Township) v. Guergis.

While the partner was likely to be a material witness and had a financial stake aligned with the plaintiff, the court concluded there was no real risk to the proper administration of justice and that the plaintiff’s right to counsel of choice should prevail.

The motions to remove counsel were dismissed.