Tanya Kranjc

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and three years' probation imposed on the respondent following guilty pleas to domestic assault and breach of recognizance.

The respondent had served 276 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in granting the discharge and in refusing to make a DNA order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unique circumstances, including the minor nature of the assaults and the respondent's lack of a prior record.

During a criminal prosecution involving firearms offences, the accused brought a voir dire application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The court had previously found a breach of s. 8 because the search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura but police searched a green Honda Accord.

The Information to Obtain contained misleading information, relied on an untested confidential informant whose information was not corroborated, and resulted in a warrant that could not have properly issued.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court found the police conduct fell on the serious end of the spectrum despite the reliability of the evidence.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court concluded that admission of the firearms evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a s. 8 Charter voir dire in a firearms prosecution, the Crown sought to qualify a forensic document chemist as an expert in ink dating using the solvent loss ratio method to analyze a police officer’s note allegedly documenting information from a confidential informant.

The defence opposed the admission of the proposed expert evidence.

Applying the framework for novel scientific evidence, the court considered whether the technique had been tested, peer reviewed, subject to standards or known error rates, and generally accepted.

The court found the methodology lacked peer review, established standards, demonstrated testing, and general acceptance in the relevant forensic community.

The proposed evidence was therefore inadmissible and, in any event, had little probative value because the analysis could not determine the age of the ink.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from searches conducted pursuant to warrants for a residence and vehicle during a firearms investigation.

The reviewing court excised misleading portions of the Information to Obtain after finding that certain statements about a vehicle and police observations were inaccurate or reckless.

Applying the principles governing warrant review and the Debot criteria for confidential informant information, the court found that although the tip was detailed and compelling, the source was untested and the alleged criminal activity was not sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

After excision, the remaining record did not provide reasonable and probable grounds for the issuance of the search warrant.

The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s s. 8 Charter rights were infringed.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging his section 8 rights were violated by a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura, but the police searched a dark green Honda Accord bearing the same license plate.

The court found that the make and model of the vehicle were relevant identifiers, especially since license plates are easily transferable.

The court concluded that the failure to search the vehicle specified in the warrant was a substantive defect, rendering the search warrantless.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from the execution of a search warrant that authorized the search of a black Acura but resulted in the search of a Honda bearing the same licence plate.

The accused sought leave to cross‑examine the affiant on several issues relating to the confidential informant and the basis for the warrant.

Applying the principles from R. v. Garofoli, the court held that cross‑examination should be permitted only where necessary to enable full answer and defence and where a basis exists to believe it may discredit a precondition for the authorization.

Leave was granted only on the issue of reasonable and probable grounds relating to the discrepancy between the vehicle described in the warrant and the vehicle searched.

Cross‑examination on the informant’s past performance, the identity linkage between the accused and a nickname, and alleged drug trafficking information was refused due to lack of necessity and risk to informant privilege.