Susan E. Galarneau

Following a family law decision concerning child access and support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful party sought costs after prevailing on all claims, including the dismissal of the opposing party’s motion to change.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, which presumes that the successful party is entitled to costs and permits full recovery where a party has acted unreasonably or in bad faith.

The court found that the responding party maintained unreasonable positions, refused to settle support issues despite ultimately conceding the calculations, and increased litigation costs.

Costs were therefore awarded on a full indemnity basis and fixed in a lump sum.

Following a family law motion concerning arrears of child support and spousal expenses, the successful party sought substantial indemnity costs of $10,000.

The responding party argued success was divided and proposed a reduced costs award.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including relative success, settlement offers, financial disclosure conduct, reasonableness of counsel’s rates and time, and the losing party’s reasonable expectations.

The court found the moving party was substantially successful and had made a reasonable offer to settle, but not one warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 inclusive of HST plus disbursements.

The applicant father brought a motion to change custody and access.

The court previously granted primary care to the father and ordered interim access for the respondent mother, who struggled with cocaine addiction.

The mother sought overnight access but admitted to a recent relapse and failed to participate in court-ordered hair follicle testing.

The court found that overnight access was not in the child's best interests due to the mother's ongoing substance abuse issues.

The court ordered continued daytime access, subject to the condition that the mother not be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, with the father having the discretion to cancel visits if he believed she was intoxicated.

Following a prior decision awarding costs to the applicant after success on a family law motion, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court emphasized that the respondent’s unreasonable conduct, including repeated failures to comply with disclosure orders, delay of proceedings, and misleading allegations, significantly increased litigation costs.

The court awarded costs on a full recovery basis and partially included preparation time related to a prior abandoned summary judgment motion that materially assisted the successful motion.

The court fixed legal fees and disbursements totaling $8,093.63 inclusive of HST, payable immediately by the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion for interim and retroactive child and spousal support, financial disclosure, and orders requiring the respondent to maintain medical, dental, and life insurance coverage.

The respondent sought an adjournment pending disclosure or, alternatively, an order setting interim support and disclosure obligations.

The court found the applicant’s pursuit of a B.Ed. program was reasonable and rejected the respondent’s argument that she was intentionally underemployed, imputing income to her at $20,000 annually.

Based on the parties’ incomes, the court ordered interim child support of $1,252 per month while the children primarily reside with the applicant and interim spousal support of $700 per month for a defined period.

Additional disclosure deadlines were imposed on both parties.

The respondent mother brought an interim motion seeking sole custody of the parties’ two children along with child and spousal support.

The court declined to grant interim sole custody, finding no evidence that the existing de facto joint custody arrangement negatively affected the children’s interests.

However, the court ordered the father to pay combined child and spousal support based on imputed incomes of $60,000 for the father and $12,000 for the mother, along with retroactive support and proportional payment of section 7 expenses.

Standard decision‑making and communication clauses were imposed to improve parental cooperation and guide joint decision‑making pending trial.

The applicant father brought an emergency motion seeking custody and primary residence of the child after alleging that the respondent mother repeatedly violated prior court orders and deliberately frustrated his access.

The court found the mother had repeatedly made unsubstantiated allegations of abuse against the father, withheld information necessary for the child’s care, and interfered with court‑ordered access.

The judge determined that the father had demonstrated consistent and cooperative parenting while the mother’s conduct undermined the child’s relationship with him.

Concluding that the mother was presently unable to facilitate the father’s role in the child’s life, the court found that the child’s best interests required an interim transfer of custody and primary residence to the father, with liberal access to the mother and a view toward future shared parenting.

The parties brought opposing motions regarding the mother's unilateral relocation to Toronto with their infant child.

The mother alleged she moved due to fears for her safety based on the father's abusive behaviour.

The father sought the child's return to Ottawa and orders for custody and contempt, arguing the mother was frustrating his access.

The court found the mother's allegations lacked credibility and that she relocated to frustrate the father's access rights.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the court ordered the mother to return the child to Ottawa within 21 days, maintained the father's unsupervised access, ordered a parenting capacity assessment, and ordered the father to pay interim child support.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a final child support variation order made after he moved to British Columbia.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and extended the time to appeal the original variation order.

The majority held that under sections 17(1) and 18(2) of the Divorce Act, a final order cannot be made against an out-of-province respondent unless they attorn to the jurisdiction or consent; otherwise, only a provisional order can be made.

The matter was remitted for a rehearing.