Stephen Ronan

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs brought a motion seeking production of the instructing letter and communications between defence counsel and their expert witness.

The plaintiffs argued that a factual assumption the expert was asked to make regarding the onset time of the deceased's chest pain contradicted the defendant doctor's discovery evidence, suggesting improper coaching.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly influenced the expert, and held that litigation privilege continued to protect the communications.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

The defendant doctors brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a plastic bulb syringe left in her vagina following a hysterectomy in November 2009, which was discovered and removed shortly thereafter.

The plaintiff did not commence the action until April 2015, arguing she did not know she had a cause of action until consulting counsel in 2013.

The court found that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim by December 2009 at the latest.

The motion was granted and the action against the defendant doctors was dismissed.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against them, the moving defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff did not provide costs submissions despite an extension of time.

The court noted the action had languished for years with little steps taken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had rejected without-costs settlement offers.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and the principle of reasonableness, the court awarded the moving defendants $25,000 in all-inclusive costs.

In a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations, explicitly limiting the claim to the Crown's several liability.

The Crown issued third party claims against the NGOs that operated some of the centres.

The plaintiff and the NGOs moved to strike the third party claims.

The court granted the motions, applying the principle that where a plaintiff limits their claim to the defendant's proportionate degree of fault, a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is legally untenable.