Stephanie Di Federico

The applicant brought a motion seeking two orders: to prevent the respondent from further drawing funds from a Royal Bank of Canada line of credit registered against the matrimonial home, and for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against an investment property (the "Toronto condo").

Both properties were solely in the respondent's name.

The court addressed a preliminary objection regarding the scope of the motion, allowing the CPL request due to urgency.

The court granted both orders, finding that the respondent's significant drawdowns on the line of credit threatened the applicant's potential equalization and trust claims, necessitating a preservation order under s. 12 of the Family Law Act.

For the CPL, the court found the applicant had a reasonable claim to an equitable interest in the Toronto condo, which the respondent had listed for sale, and the respondent failed to demonstrate there was no triable issue.

Following a successful motion for primary residence of the parties' children, the applicant sought full recovery costs of $13,882.05 based on an offer to settle and the respondent's unreasonable behaviour.

The court found the offer to settle was not severable and therefore did not attract full recovery costs under Rule 18.

While the respondent exhibited some unreasonable behaviour, it did not amount to bad faith.

Considering the respondent's impecuniosity and the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the applicant partial recovery costs fixed at $5,000, payable in monthly installments.

The applicant father brought a motion for temporary primary residence of the parties' two children and to change their school, contrary to a recent separation agreement that granted primary residence to the respondent mother.

The mother had suffered ongoing health issues and hospitalizations, leading the father to withhold the children.

The court applied the Hearn analysis to the separation agreement under the Divorce Act, finding that the agreement did not reflect the children's best interests at the time of execution due to the mother's health-related instability.

The court granted the father's motion, ordering the children to reside primarily with him and attend his proposed school.

M.A. brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of the child, U.M.A., to Worcester, Massachusetts.

R.K. opposed, arguing the Convention was inapplicable or, alternatively, that exceptions under Article 13 applied.

The court found that U.M.A., born in Canada and having never been to the U.S., was habitually resident in Canada.

Applying the hybrid approach from Balev, the court determined that the focal point of the child's life was Canada.

The Hague Convention application was dismissed, and the Ontario Court assumed jurisdiction for custody and access matters under the Children's Law Reform Act.