Superior Court of Justice

The plaintiff commenced an action against several lawyers who had represented respondents in his previous, unsuccessful application for judicial review.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyers engaged in deceitful tactics and sought damages.

One of the defendants requested the action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on the previous decision and that the allegations against opposing counsel disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The action was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff sued its former lawyer's estate and professional corporation for negligence and breach of contract after the lawyer allowed a construction lien to expire by failing to set the action down for trial within two years.

The defendants conceded the breach of the standard of care but disputed causation and damages, arguing the plaintiff failed to mitigate by not enforcing a related judgment and that the property lacked sufficient equity.

The court found the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in relying on the lawyer's advice that the lien was valid.

Assessing the complex evidence on the contaminated property's retrospective value, the court determined there was equity in the property and fixed damages at $472,000.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, sought a declaration of oppression against the condominium corporation under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, alleging failure to address noise complaints, security concerns, and maintenance disparities between different buildings within the condominium.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the corporation acted reasonably in addressing noise issues and that the applicant's other complaints regarding security and maintenance did not constitute oppressive conduct.

The court applied the two-part test for oppression remedy, emphasizing the objective reasonableness of expectations and deferring to the board's business judgment in balancing the interests of all unit owners.

The applicant sought an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement requiring the respondent to transfer title to the matrimonial home, and determining the adjustments to the purchase price.

The court found that the Minutes waived post-separation adjustments prior to the settlement date, but allowed post-Minutes adjustments for HELOC and mortgage default costs.

The court ordered the transfer of title upon payment of an agreed amount into trust, and directed a reference to an Associate Justice to determine the remaining disputed adjustments.

This was a costs endorsement following two family law motions concerning release of sale proceeds held in trust to a moving non-party with an ownership interest in the property.

The court reviewed the purposes of costs under the Family Law Rules, including partial indemnification, encouragement of settlement, sanctioning inappropriate conduct, and the primary objective of dealing with cases justly.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused against two opposing parties because their positions, while unreasonable, did not amount to bad faith.

However, one respondent's changed position between the two motions justified a higher costs burden, resulting in fixed costs of $10,000 against that respondent and $7,000 jointly and severally against the other two respondents.

The applicant trustee sought directions on the distribution of an intestate estate.

The deceased died without a spouse, issue, or parents, leaving his estate to be distributed among his siblings.

The respondent, a former foster child of the deceased's adoptive parents, claimed entitlement to share in the estate as a 'sister'.

The court held that under the Children's Law Reform Act and the Succession Law Reform Act, a foster child who was never legally adopted does not meet the definition of a 'child' or 'sister' for the purposes of intestate succession.

The foster child was therefore excluded from sharing in the estate.

The plaintiff commenced an action against 24 defendants, including police officers, Crown attorneys, defence lawyers, and judicial officers, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and other wrongs arising from his alleged work as a police agent.

The court reviewed the statement of claim under the summary procedure in Rule 2.1.01.

Finding that the claims against judicial officers were barred by absolute immunity and claims against several other justice system participants were legally untenable, the court struck those claims without leave to amend.

The balance of the statement of claim was struck with leave to deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim complying with the rules of pleading.

The applicants sought a declaration of possessory title over a three-foot strip of land abutting their cottage property.

The court found that while the applicants had actual possession of the disputed lands, they failed to establish an intention to exclude the true owners or that they effectively excluded them.

The disputed lands were open and accessible to the community, and the true owners frequently crossed and used the lands without restriction.

The application for adverse possession was dismissed.

The applicant, a lawyer, brought an application seeking a judicial inquiry into the conduct of opposing counsel, who had reported concerns about the applicant's mental health and competence to the Law Society of Ontario.

The applicant also sought to stay the Law Society's investigation.

The court summarily dismissed the application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01, finding it had no jurisdiction to order a judicial inquiry and that the Law Society is the proper forum for determining a lawyer's competence.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of 500 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail.

The court considered the six years the accused spent on strict bail conditions as a significant mitigating factor, reducing the fit sentence to two years less a day.

Finding the accused posed no danger to the community and had demonstrated significant rehabilitation, the court imposed a 17-month conditional sentence after deducting credit for pre-sentence custody.

The plaintiff, Shai DeLuca, an interior designer and public figure, sued the defendants, Foodbenders and its proprietor Kimberly Hawkins, for defamation.

The defendants had posted and reposted statements on Instagram, including calling DeLuca a "terrorist" and implying he aimed a sniper rifle at Palestinian children, and later calling him a "racist" and "killer." The court found the statements defamatory and rejected the defence of fair comment, primarily due to factual inaccuracies and the defendants' malice.

The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages and $10,000 in punitive damages, and granted a permanent injunction.

The plaintiffs sued their title insurer, FCT, after being denied coverage for alleged construction deficiencies.

FCT brought a third party claim against the tort defendants (the sellers/builders and municipality) for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to strike FCT's third party claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that FCT had not settled the plaintiffs' claim and therefore could not rely on the Negligence Act, common law, equity, or subrogation rights to claim contribution and indemnity.

The court also granted FCT's motion on consent to have the title insurance action and the tort action heard together or consecutively to avoid duplication.

The defendant moved to declare the plaintiff's construction lien expired and to dismiss the action in its entirety.

The plaintiff conceded the lien had expired but opposed the dismissal of its joined contract claim.

The court declared the lien expired and vacated the registrations but refused to dismiss the contract claim, finding insufficient evidence of prejudice or undue delay solely attributable to the plaintiff.

The contract claim was permitted to continue as an ordinary action under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following a successful anti-SLAPP motion that struck a defamation and malicious prosecution action, the moving parties sought damages under s. 137.1(9) of the Courts of Justice Act and costs.

The court found the struck action was brought for an improper purpose to intimidate and punish the moving parties.

The court awarded $25,000 in general damages to the father and $20,000 to the daughter for the stress and anxiety caused by the abusive litigation.

The moving parties were also awarded full indemnity costs for the struck action, while the responding parties were denied costs for the surviving counterclaim.

The accused, a personal support worker at a hospital, was charged with sexually assaulting two female patients.

For the first complainant, the court found that while the accused initiated a sexual relationship while caring for her, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was induced to consent by his abuse of a position of trust.

For the second complainant, the court found her evidence unreliable due to her severe confusion and hallucinations during her hospital admission.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The plaintiffs in three related class actions regarding administrative segregation brought a consent motion to vary the Distribution and Issues Protocol to address late claims.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Québec jointly approved the consent order, granting leave for certain class members to file late claims and setting out the process for distributing compensation to those claimants.

The applicant brought a motion to split the divorce claim from the other issues in the case pursuant to Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent opposed, arguing that a divorce would prejudice her pending claims in India, and relied on an affidavit from an Indian lawyer as expert evidence of foreign law.

The court found the expert evidence inadmissible because the lawyer was not sufficiently qualified and the opinion lacked reliability.

Finding no disadvantage to either spouse, the court granted the motion to split the divorce and awarded costs to the applicant.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter following his conviction for sexual assault at a second trial.

The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the judge due to scheduling issues.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework.

While the mistrial was an exceptional circumstance, the subsequent 9.5-month delay to schedule the second trial was largely systemic and unreasonable.

The court also found the accused suffered specific prejudice due to the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and supervised parenting time for the parties' five-year-old child, as well as child support.

The respondent father, who struggled with substance misuse and mental health issues, did not attend the trial.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making and primary residence, and ordered that the father's parenting time be supervised.

The court declined to impute income to the father for prospective child support due to his addiction and unstable work history, but ordered him to pay $3,114 in retroactive child support arrears.

The respondent father, sole owner of the matrimonial home, brought a motion under s. 23 of the Family Law Act to dispense with the applicant mother's consent to sell the property.

The mother had enjoyed de facto exclusive possession for seven years while the father paid all carrying costs, resulting in severe financial hardship for him.

The court harmonized the legal standards for selling a matrimonial home under the Family Law Act and the Partition Act, holding that the test for a solely owned home should be the same as for a jointly owned home: whether the party proposing the sale is acting maliciously, vexatiously, or oppressively.

Finding no such conduct by the father, the court granted the motion, dispensed with the mother's consent, and ordered exclusive possession to the father to prepare the home for sale.