Superior Court of Justice

The defendants brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (money and a handgun) obtained during a police interaction, alleging multiple Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, unlawful search and seizure, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found no arbitrary detention at the initial stages of the police interaction and determined that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful, based on reasonable grounds of Liquor License Act and Cannabis Control Act violations.

While minor breaches of the right to counsel (failure to "hold off" questioning post-arrest) and a failure to report seized items to a justice were identified, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the conduct, the minimal impact on the defendants' rights, and society's strong interest in the adjudication of serious charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This case concerns an application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee, which was challenged by the deceased's husband and daughter on grounds of undue influence and testamentary fraud.

The objectors alleged that the deceased's son and his wife fraudulently influenced the deceased to disinherit her daughter and significantly reduce her husband's inheritance by instilling false beliefs about the daughter's husband and the husband's financial well-being.

The court found no evidence that the son and his wife perpetrated or encouraged these alleged falsehoods.

The deceased's testamentary changes were determined to be her own decisions, made gradually over time, based on her long-standing concerns about protecting the family's wealth from her son-in-law, and after receiving independent professional advice.

The court dismissed the objections, declared the wills valid, and granted the application for the Certificate of Appointment.

This is a costs decision following a successful summary judgment motion brought by the applicant wife.

The court awarded the applicant $9,000 in costs, finding her fully successful on the underlying motion, which resulted in an equalization payment in her favour and the dismissal of the respondent husband's claims for spousal support and unequal division of Net Family Property.

The court considered the respondent's self-represented status, his lack of understanding of legal procedure and principles, and his chronic failure to provide disclosure, noting that self-represented parties are not exempt from cost awards.

The applicant's prior formal offers to settle, which closely matched the final outcome, further supported the cost award.

The plaintiff sought orders extending the time for service of her statement of claim and to set the action for trial in a solicitor's negligence claim against the defendant law firm.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay of over six and a half years in serving the claim to be extreme and inadequately explained.

The court also found significant actual prejudice to the defendant due to the passage of time, including likely loss of evidence and faded witness memories, and that allowing the action to proceed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss two separate actions for the plaintiff's failure to comply with a previous court order and for inordinate and inexcusable delay under Rules 60.12, 24.01(1), and 48.14.

The court found the plaintiff's non-compliance with the order to be complete and unequivocal, with no adequate explanation for the significant delay, particularly after an indulgence was granted.

The court determined that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, raising a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to a presumption of prejudice that the plaintiff failed to rebut, including concerns about the availability of medical records and witnesses.

Consequently, both actions were dismissed.

The defendant, Randy Gliddon, brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that permitted the plaintiffs to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property.

The defendant argued that the CPL was obtained without full and fair disclosure and that there was no triable issue.

The court found no material non-disclosure, noting that the plaintiffs' reliance on an alleged oral trust agreement between the deceased and the defendant, as evidenced by a lawyer's email, was sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the severance of joint tenancy.

The motion to set aside the CPL order was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

Following the dismissal of an application to enforce a letter rogatory from a U.S. court against a non-party, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent successfully resisted the application by demonstrating it had searched its records and that the request was overly broad and premature.

The court found the respondent acted reasonably and did not thwart a legitimate inquiry.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $32,053.03.

This case conference addressed a dispute arising from a settled personal injury claim where the plaintiff refused to sign a release containing a "no admission of liability" clause.

The settlement agreement was silent on the specific terms of the release.

The court found that, in the context of an insurance claim where liability was denied throughout, a "no admission of liability" clause is objectively implied by a settlement and is standard in the industry.

The plaintiff was therefore required to sign the release with the impugned clause.

No costs were awarded.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm against Renzo Gomez, who had already pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The central issue was whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

Despite a high-speed collision, the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 53-105 mg/100ml, the court found reasonable doubt.

This was primarily due to expert evidence highlighting inter-individual variability in the effects of alcohol and the consistent testimony of three witnesses (a police officer and two paramedics) who observed no signs of impairment in the accused.

The court emphasized that a high BAC alone, especially below 100 mg/100ml, does not automatically prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal prosecution, and that such a threshold is a matter for Parliament.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charges.

Tacora Resources Inc. brought a motion for an Approval and Reverse Vesting Order (RVO) and associated third-party releases under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The RVO was sought in respect of a Subscription Agreement with a group of investors, including certain noteholders and Cargill, Incorporated, aimed at deleveraging Tacora's capital structure and preserving it as a going concern.

The court granted the RVO and approved the broad third-party releases, finding them necessary to preserve valuable permits, licenses, and tax attributes, and that the transaction represented the best available outcome for all stakeholders, particularly given the lack of opposition.

The applicants sought an order requiring the respondent mortgagee to pay outstanding property taxes and a declaration that a Notice of Sale was invalid.

The applicants had defaulted on a first mortgage, which the respondent then purchased to protect its second-priority cross-collateral mortgage.

The cross-collateral mortgage stipulated that upon default and buyout, an 8% interest rate and a 10% administrative fee would apply to the entire principal.

The applicants argued this violated section 8 of the Interest Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 8% rate applied to the entire principal, not just arrears, and therefore did not constitute a prohibited penalty under section 8.

The Notice of Sale was declared valid and enforceable.

In a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding, the DIP Lender, Cortland Credit Lending Corporation, sought a case management order to schedule a threshold motion.

The motion aimed to determine the legal priority of Cortland's claims over those of Final Bell Corp., which had amended its claim to seek a constructive trust that could prime the DIP charge.

The CCAA Applicants supported the motion, arguing it would avoid further delays to the Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement approval.

Final Bell Corp. opposed, viewing it as an unfair mid-trial motion for partial summary judgment.

The court, exercising its broad discretion as the supervising CCAA court, granted the motion, directing that the threshold issue of legal priority be determined first to minimize costs and maximize efficiency, finding no prejudice to Final Bell Corp.

This was a child protection status review hearing under the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) concerning the child LCT.

The Applicant Agency and the Respondent Mother asserted that protection concerns no longer existed, while the Respondent Father maintained they did.

The parties sought a deemed custody order, with the Agency proposing joint custody, the father seeking sole custody and primary residence to him, and the mother seeking sole custody and primary residence to her.

The court found that the child was no longer in need of protection and granted sole custody and primary residence to the mother, with regular scheduled access to the father.

The court found the father's and paternal grandmother's evidence self-serving and unreliable, noting the paternal grandmother's "invisible litigant" behaviour and its negative impact on the child's relationship with the mother.

The applicant mother sought the return of her two children to the Dominican Republic under the Hague Convention after the respondent father retained them in Ontario following a summer visit.

The father opposed the return, citing exceptions under Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) and Article 13(2) (child's objection).

The court found that the children had suffered severe physical and psychological abuse while in the mother's care, establishing a grave risk of harm if returned.

The 14-year-old child strongly objected to returning, and separating the 8-year-old from his sister would create an intolerable situation.

The court also admitted fresh evidence showing the mother attempted to abduct the younger child during the proceedings.

The application was dismissed, and Ontario assumed jurisdiction over parenting.

The Applicant brought a motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to strike the Respondent's Answer and impose a penalty due to his wilful breach of court orders, specifically concerning financial disclosure and support payments.

The court found the Respondent in breach of multiple orders but declined to strike his Answer, instead imposing a $5,000 penalty, an ongoing daily penalty of $200 for continued non-compliance with disclosure, and ordering him to pay outstanding costs and support arrears.

The court also ruled that the Respondent could not seek further relief until compliance and allowed the Applicant to move for an uncontested trial on financial issues if breaches persist.

The applicant, Dillon Parris, commenced an application seeking the reversion of title to his former home and $80 million in damages for alleged breaches of his Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He claimed fraud by the respondents, The Corporation of the City of Brampton and Mayor Patrick Brown, for failing to revert title and profiting from this alleged fraud.

The respondents sought dismissal of the application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the application to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting a lack of connection between the respondents and the applicant's loss of property or subsequent issues.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought to vary an interim parenting order to implement week-about summer parenting time and change the child's school to accommodate his new out-of-town employment.

The respondent opposed both requests, citing her work schedule, the child's stability, and financial constraints.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no compelling change in circumstances to warrant varying the summer parenting time and determining that changing the child's school was not in the child's best interests, as it primarily served the applicant's convenience rather than the child's well-being.

The applicant sought a declaration that debts arising from a 2016 judgment survived the respondents' discharge from bankruptcy pursuant to sections 178(1)(d) and (e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, alleging fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence in the original pleadings or judgment to support claims of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, or obtaining property by false pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court determined the debt was a breach of contract, not fraud, and that the applicant was attempting to recharacterize the debt post-bankruptcy.

The defendant insurer, Aviva, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for unidentified motorist coverage.

Aviva argued that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable due diligence to identify the at-fault driver and did not comply with statutory notice requirements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the plaintiff's capacity to gather information immediately after the collision due to head trauma and whether equitable relief from forfeiture should be granted for the notice breaches.

The plaintiff, a home décor retailer, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant landlord for breach of a 10-year commercial lease.

The defendant failed to complete required work and provide possession of a larger premises, and was noted in default.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the lease was validly executed, specific performance of the lease, and damages.

The court found the lease valid and breached, granted specific performance, determining the property was "unique" due to the plaintiff's business needs and distributor agreements.

The court distinguished the case from the concerns raised in Argyll regarding long-term supervision of specific performance for commercial leases.

The claim for damages was adjourned until they fully crystallized.