Superior Court of Justice

The defendant, Dr. Allan Wojciech Jackiewicz, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence during a surgery in January 2010, claiming they only discovered malpractice after a 2019 news article.

The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficient material facts by December 2010, and certainly by 2012-2013, to infer a plausible claim of liability, including knowledge of surgical complications, a non-consented procedure, and a 2010 news article about the defendant's professional misconduct.

The court ruled that the 2019 article provided no new material facts relevant to their specific claim and that the plaintiffs failed to act with reasonable diligence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The Applicant brought a motion seeking orders for their daughter, M.T., to return to her former school, Ingleborough Public School, and for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home.

The Respondent opposed both requests, preferring M.T. to remain at Havergal College and seeking more time to buy out the Applicant's share of the home.

The court deferred a final decision on M.T.'s schooling, ordering a Voice of the Child Report to ascertain her wishes, and temporarily directed M.T. to continue at Havergal.

Regarding the matrimonial home, the court ordered its sale, finding the Respondent's delay unjustified, and set out a detailed process for cooperation, including selecting a real estate agent and developing future housing plans, with a portion of sale proceeds to be held in trust pending equalization.

Costs were reserved for the schooling issue and not awarded for the home sale due to divided success.

The Applicant, Adele Cummings, sought leave to bring a motion to access $140,000 from her anticipated equalization payment to finance her upcoming trial.

The Respondent, Stephen Horwitz, opposed, arguing that leave should only be granted in exceptional circumstances after a settlement conference.

The court granted leave, finding that the Applicant's request constituted an exceptional circumstance due to her limited earning capacity, significant litigation costs, and the impact of the trial on her future financial security, emphasizing the importance of access to justice.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of Crown expert evidence in a criminal trial concerning firearm offences.

The Crown sought to introduce opinion evidence from Sgt. Peter Reinjtes regarding firearm classification, functioning, and comparison, specifically to link a seized firearm to one seen in a social media video, and to comment on the firearm's prevalence.

The defence conceded classification and functioning but contested the comparison and prevalence evidence.

Applying the Mohan framework, the court found the comparison evidence logically relevant and necessary to assist the trier of fact, particularly regarding unique markings and their significance.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion on the firearm's prevalence, deeming it unreliable due to a lack of normative data and reliance on anecdotal experience.

The assessment of the expert's duty to the court was reserved for further inquiry during the trial.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The respondent father argued he met the 40% shared parenting threshold under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines, warranting a reduction in support.

The court found the father failed to establish he met the threshold and ordered full guideline child support based on his income of $103,000.

Spousal support was denied due to insufficient funds.

The court also ordered the children to attend public school unless the mother's family continued to fund their private school tuition.

The applicant mother and her deceased daughter purchased a property as joint tenants in 1994.

The daughter lived in the property with her husband (the respondent) and children until her death in 2019.

Following the daughter's death, the mother claimed sole beneficial ownership by right of survivorship and sought occupation rent.

The respondent husband claimed the estate was the sole beneficial owner or, alternatively, a 50% owner as a tenant in common under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court found that both the mother and daughter contributed to the purchase and neither established a resulting or constructive trust.

Because the property was a matrimonial home, the joint tenancy was deemed severed immediately before the daughter's death under s. 26(1) of the Family Law Act.

The property is held by the mother and the estate as tenants in common, each with a 50% interest.

Claims for unjust enrichment and occupation rent were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a status hearing and a timetable order to set the action down for trial.

The defendants opposed, seeking dismissal for delay.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim by TD Insurance for foundation damage to the plaintiff's home, allegedly caused by construction at the Chinese embassy.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and the action for delay, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice due to lack of transparency, failure to obtain a confidentiality order, inappropriate venue, and remediation work done without notice to the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis for PCL and fixed amounts for the other parties.

The plaintiff insured brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim, for a further and better affidavit of documents, and to compel answers to undertakings, over seven years after setting the action down for trial.

The defendant insurer brought a cross-motion to compel answers to undertakings.

The court denied the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim, finding the proposed amendments would radically change the nature of the claim and cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court also dismissed the motions to compel answers to undertakings, finding both parties had waived or satisfied their rights.

The court ordered the defendant to produce two witness statements but found the remaining requested documents were protected by litigation privilege.

The applicant landlord brought an urgent application against its tenant for an order requiring compliance with environmental orders issued by a Toronto Environmental Officer following a fire on the leased premises.

The orders required removal of hazardous waste and submission of an environmental impact plan.

The tenant's vehicles were blocking access for the landlord to comply.

The tenant, appearing self-represented, advised the court that vehicles were being removed to allow access.

The landlord was satisfied with this, reserving its right to seek payment for remediation costs later.

The court adjourned the matter, allowing the landlord to bring it back urgently if access remained blocked.

The Applicant sought summary judgment to enforce child support provisions of a separation agreement, while the Respondent sought to stay the summary judgment and remit the matter to arbitration, and to appoint a specific arbitrator.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the matter, dismissed the Respondent's motion to adjourn the summary judgment, and granted the Respondent's request to stay the summary judgment application, remitting the matter to arbitration.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to appoint an uncertified arbitrator (William C. McDowell) and instead granted the Applicant's alternate request to appoint a certified family law arbitrator (Cheryl Goldhart), emphasizing the legal requirement for arbitrators to be properly credentialed for awards to be enforceable.

This urgent motion addressed a father's unilateral relocation of two of his three children, aged 11 and 13, from Marathon to Levack (over 700 km away) without the mother's consent or a court order, in violation of the amended Divorce Act.

The mother immediately sought an order for the children's return.

The court found the father's actions unlawful, ordered the immediate return of the children to the mother's care in Marathon, and temporarily established the mother's residence as the children's primary residence.

The court also granted the mother costs of the motion.

The accused, Fatah Kulmiye, applied to attend his trial for indictable offences by video conference.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court interpreted sections 715.24 and 715.233 of the Criminal Code, concluding that Crown consent is required for an accused to appear by video conference at a trial for an indictable offence.

The court found that section 715.24 does not provide broad discretion to allow remote attendance without Crown consent for proceedings expressly authorized elsewhere in the Code.

The application was denied, also considering the seriousness of the charges and the lateness of the application.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking $150,000 in security for costs from the applicant, citing his conduct, delay tactics, outstanding costs awards, and impecuniosity.

The court noted the applicant's reliance on ODSP and lack of assets other than his share of the matrimonial home sale proceeds.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court declined to order the requested security, finding it would unjustly prevent the applicant from presenting his case on the merits.

However, the court ordered outstanding costs to be paid from a joint account and required the applicant to post $5,000 in security for any future motions.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking contempt findings against the applicant father for numerous breaches of a final order concerning parenting time, communication, and child-related decisions.

The applicant filed a cross-motion seeking substantive changes to the final order, which the court dismissed as it was not authorized as a motion to change.

The court found the applicant in contempt of multiple paragraphs of the final order, including failing to delete compromising material, sending inappropriate messages via Our Family Wizard (OFW), unauthorized communications with the child through video games, interfering with the child's therapy, withholding the child's health card and passport, and disseminating information about court proceedings and disparaging the respondent on social media.

The court declined to find the applicant in contempt for non-payment of support/costs or for not progressing parenting stages.

The respondent was not found in contempt regarding video call issues.

The matter was set to proceed to the penalty phase for the applicant's contempt.

This endorsement from a case management conference addresses the owner's non-compliance with a previous order regarding insurance policies for a property subject to a forfeiture application.

The court ordered the owner to comply with the insurance requirements by a specific date and established a detailed timetable for the forfeiture application to proceed, including deadlines for records, cross-examinations, and factums.

The owner, who was self-represented, was cautioned about the consequences of non-compliance and urged to seek legal advice.

Ottawa Credit Exchange Limited (OCEL) brought a motion seeking the production of four categories of documents from the defendants, David Wu and Opus Fitness Investment Inc., related to a commercial dispute involving a management buyout and reorganization.

The defendants argued that the requested documents were not and had not been in their possession, control, or power.

The court dismissed OCEL's motion, finding that the defendants had no possession, control, or power over the documents sought, including emails from a personal account already searched, BBM messages from a company-owned device returned before litigation, and privileged communications with corporate counsel.

The Applicant, Simcoe Drug Mart Inc., sought an urgent interlocutory mandatory injunction to reinstate its lease for a pharmacy premises after the Respondent, Simcoe Medical Clinic Inc. (SMCI), terminated it due to non-payment of rent and re-leased it to a third party.

The court denied the injunction, finding no serious issue to be tried as the Applicant's key hearsay evidence regarding an alleged scheme was struck, and the Applicant failed to demonstrate "clean hands" by retaining funds belonging to the pharmacy.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favored the Respondent and the new tenant, given the Applicant's financial instability and the public interest in a stable pharmacy.

The applicant, Lise Cassan, sought dependent's relief from the estate of Jean-Guy Villeneuve, claiming they lived in a conjugal relationship from 2006 until his death in 2022 and that he financially supported her.

The estate disputed the cohabitation and support, arguing she maintained a separate apartment and he had other relationships.

Applying the Molodowich factors, the court found that the applicant was a dependent spouse who had cohabited continuously with the deceased for over three years and received ongoing, systematic financial support.

The court granted interim support of $2,000 per month to the applicant, pending final disposition.

Michael Renzi appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, breach of undertaking, and breach of probation, and the imposed sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding an alibi photograph and reached an unreasonable verdict given the totality of evidence, including phone and salon records.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge's verdict was reasonable, having carefully considered all evidence and credibility.

The sentence appeal, alleging the sentence was harsh and excessive, was also largely dismissed, though a probation condition regarding contact with the appellant's daughter was varied by consent to allow contact with her written and revocable consent.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and extortion, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court deducted 73 days of defence delay attributed to the late notice of the s. 11(b) application, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that a conflict in the Crown's office and a change in the assigned trial judge constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application was dismissed.