Family and Matrimonial Law - SCJ

This costs decision follows an uncontested family law trial.

The court found that the applicant, Trina Joy Thornhill, engaged in bad faith litigation tactics, including the use of organized pseudolegal commercial arguments and malicious attacks on justice participants.

The court awarded full recovery costs to the respondent, Devon Williams, but reduced the amount claimed to a fair and proportionate sum.

The decision reviews the purposes and principles of costs in family law, the threshold for bad faith, and the court’s discretion in setting costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings and for other relief, finding such an order would be disproportionate given the circumstances.

While there was imperfect and late compliance with court orders, new counsel had recently produced substantial disclosure, and most outstanding disclosure was sufficiently explained.

The court ordered costs of $3,000 payable by the respondent to the applicant and made procedural orders to streamline the matter toward resolution or trial.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion prohibiting the respondent mother from removing their one-year-old child from Ontario to Israel.

The mother argued the child was habitually resident in Israel and commenced proceedings there.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine habitual residence and found that the child was habitually resident in Ontario, as the parties had demonstrated a settled intention to relocate to Canada.

The court assumed jurisdiction over the provincial family law claims but dismissed the Divorce Act claims as the parties had not resided in Canada for one year.

The mother was ordered to pay $15,000 in costs.

The applicant, self-represented, brought a motion for an ex parte final order in a complex family law matter during the COVID-19 court suspension.

The motion sought extensive relief including parenting arrangements, significant spousal and child support, and property division.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's materials (over 100 pages) to be voluminous, unfocused, and unsuitable for an ex parte final order given the complexity of the claims and the respondent's lack of active participation.

The court urged the applicant to retain counsel and directed that any future urgent motions must be brief, efficient, and focused, not exceeding 10 pages.

The respondent father brought an unserved 14B motion seeking sole custody, primary residence, child support, and section 7 payments from the applicant mother, and to stop his own child support obligation, citing urgency due to COVID-19 and wage loss.

The court, at the triage stage, dismissed the motion due to lack of service, insufficient information to determine urgency, absence of a proper Motion to Change, and lack of financial disclosure.

The court advised the respondent to obtain legal advice and re-file with proper materials and service.

The applicant brought an urgent ex parte 14B motion seeking access, police enforcement, and make-up visits for his daughter during the COVID-19 emergency period.

The court found insufficient information to assess the urgency, noting the applicant's affidavit lacked details on the child's age, status of proceedings, or existing orders, and that the respondent had not been served.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice, with directions for proper service and refiling.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion to strike the respondent's pleadings or for disclosure.

The court found the respondent's failure to produce basic financial disclosure over four years, despite multiple court orders, constituted bad faith and egregious non-compliance.

Applying section 24(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the applicant full recovery costs in the amount of $43,000, payable immediately.

The parties resolved all corollary issues for divorce except primary residence and decision-making responsibilities for their eight-year-old daughter.

The applicant mother sought to move the child's primary residence to Ancaster to live with her new partner, while the respondent father sought to keep the child's primary residence in St. Catharines where she had grown up.

The court ordered joint decision-making, finding the parents had a history of co-parenting despite their conflict.

The court ordered the child's primary residence to remain in St. Catharines with the father, finding that the move to Ancaster would cause significant disruption to the child's life and that the mother's negative behaviour towards the father raised concerns about her ability to facilitate maximum contact.

The applicant sought interim custody of the children and permission to relocate their ordinary residence from Guelph to Ottawa.

The respondent opposed the relocation and sought joint custody with primary residence in Guelph.

The court granted interim primary residence to the applicant but denied the relocation, finding it not in the children's best interests.

The judge noted the applicant's "self-help" move to Ottawa without notice and the negative impact on the children's relationship with the respondent.

The order stipulated that if the applicant failed to return to Guelph, the children's primary residence would shift to the respondent.

This endorsement addresses costs following a motion to change child support, which the respondent brought.

Although success on the underlying motion was divided, the respondent was deemed the more successful party, entitling them to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant's offer to settle was not more favourable than the outcome.

Considering the divided success, the reasonableness of the lawyers' rates and time spent, and the principles of costs, the court fixed costs at $2,150, payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property following an 18-year relationship.

The respondent father sought joint custody.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding the parties lacked the ability to communicate effectively for joint custody.

The father was ordered to pay child support of $940 per month and spousal support of $1,300 per month for 8.5 years, based on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.

The court also ordered an equalization payment of $21,309.05 to the mother via a pension roll-over.

The applicant mother sought supervised access for the respondent father at Merrymount and a restraining order.

The respondent father sought interim unsupervised access.

The court granted the mother's request for supervised access at Merrymount, finding it in the child's best interests, but allowed the father liberty to bring a future motion to vary the order to allow for supervision by his mother or other family members, or for unsupervised access after nine visits.

The court also noted a violation of Rule 14(20), para. 3 by the applicant's second affidavit but considered the relevant evidence.

The defendants and a statutory third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss a Family Law Act claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Glen Isaac.

The court considered the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and emergency, and the deceased being the author of his own misfortune.

The motion was granted, finding that the deceased's aggressive actions initiated the confrontation and led to his death, thus precluding the derivative claims.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change child support and sought retroactive section 7 expenses.

The court determined the applicable retroactive period for section 7 expenses, limiting it to three years prior to formal notice, consistent with *D.B.S. v. S.R.G.* The parties' respective incomes and proportionate shares for section 7 expenses were agreed upon.

The court then assessed various claimed expenses, allowing some (e.g., swim camp, swim club, physiotherapy, orthodontic expenses, psychological counselling) and disallowing others (e.g., clothing, recreational equipment, cycling expenses, cellphone, school tutoring) based on whether they qualified as special or extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines and previous court orders.

A net amount of $173.00 was ordered to be paid by the respondent to the applicant for section 7 expenses.

The applicant's requests to transfer RRSPs for payment of arrears and to transfer jurisdiction to Manitoba were dismissed.

No order was made as to costs due to insufficient evidence.

This trial concerned a mortgage action where the plaintiffs sought judgment against Hans Jorg Reichert on the covenant in a second mortgage.

The defendants, Hans Jorg Reichert and Marianne Reichert, claimed the property was owned by a trust, not Mr. Reichert personally.

The court found Mr. Reichert personally liable, noting that he was designated as the mortgagor and owner in the registered mortgage and related documentation, and his wife signed spousal consent, corroborating it as their matrimonial home.

The court granted judgment for the plaintiffs, including principal, interest, and costs incurred to maintain the first mortgage.

This decision addresses Byron Levy's request for reimbursement of child support contributions for his eldest daughter's college tuition, which were garnished from his wages.

The court found that Maureen Dorsett, the recipient of these funds, breached a trust by using them for rent instead of tuition or student loan repayment.

The court ordered Ms. Dorsett to pay the identified misapplied funds to the colleges or the National Student Loans Service Centre (NSLSC) and to provide further documentation for other disputed amounts.

The decision also clarified the remaining financial obligations of both parents for the daughter's education expenses under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The responding party moved at the outset of trial to dismiss the moving party’s motion to change spousal support obligations.

The moving party had failed to provide updated financial disclosure required under the Family Law Rules, including a current financial statement, tax return and notice of assessment, and financial information relating to his current spouse.

The court held that such disclosure was essential to determine whether a material change in circumstances existed under s. 37(2) of the Family Law Act and to assess the parties’ means under s. 33(9).

The court found the disclosure failures unjustified and noted the moving party had also ignored a prior direction from a trial management conference judge to provide updated disclosure.

Because the absence of disclosure prevented a fair adjudication of the motion to change, the court dismissed the motion.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' nine-year-old child from Grimsby to Ajax, Ontario, following her relocation to live with her common-law partner.

The parties previously shared joint custody with the child primarily residing with the mother.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that the proposed move would significantly disrupt the child's life, particularly her close relationship with her father, stepmother, half-sibling, and extended family in Grimsby.

The court concluded that the relocation was not in the child's best interests and ordered that primary residence remain with the father in Grimsby, with the mother having liberal access.

The applicant mother sought final custody of the child and orders permitting her to obtain a passport and travel internationally with the child without the respondent father’s consent.

The respondent’s Answer had been struck after he failed to post court‑ordered security for costs and he did not attend trial.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the child was thriving in the mother’s care in Canada and had a stable home environment.

Evidence of past misconduct and concerns regarding flight risk supported continuation of supervised access for the father when he visits Canada.

The court granted the mother sole custody and authority to obtain or renew the child’s passport without the father’s consent and awarded costs to the mother.

The applicant brought a motion to find the respondent in contempt of court for failing to comply with a prior consent order requiring him to hold proceeds from the sale of his insurance business in trust.

The respondent received a $100,000 installment early but failed to place it in trust, instead paying half to the applicant toward equalization and keeping the rest.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments that the order was a payment order exempt from contempt proceedings or that the terms were vague.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order and found him in contempt.