Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Sentencing for unlawful act manslaughter arising from the accused's trafficking of cocaine laced with fentanyl, which caused the death of the purchaser's brother.

The accused, a cocaine dealer, sold what he believed to be cocaine, but the substance was a mixture of cocaine and fentanyl.

The court found that trafficking in dangerous illegal drugs for profit, resulting in death, engages the paramount sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

After reviewing the sentencing range of three to eight years for drug-trafficking-predicated manslaughter, the court imposed a mid-range sentence of five years, less presentence custody credit, considering the accused's lengthy criminal record as an aggravating factor and the absence of intentional fentanyl trafficking as a mitigating factor.

The Crown brought a Dangerous Offender application following the offender's convictions for multiple violent offences against his intimate partner, including assault causing bodily harm, choking, and forcible confinement.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal record, which included 134 convictions, many involving violence against domestic partners and strangers.

Relying on psychiatric evidence and risk assessments indicating a very high risk of violent reoffending and intractable behaviour, the court found that the offender met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation under s. 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Concluding that a determinate sentence followed by a Long-Term Supervision Order would not adequately protect the public, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The offender pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 and money laundering after operating a $29 million Ponzi scheme called Debit Direct.

He sold fake point-of-sale debit terminals to hundreds of investors and transferred the funds to the Dominican Republic.

The court sentenced the offender to 7 years in prison, less pre-sentence custody, and ordered $26.9 million in restitution along with a matching fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking the victim with a baseball bat during a confrontation, causing the victim to fall down stairs and die.

The offender had a precarious medical condition, including a cerebral aneurysm, making incarceration potentially fatal.

The court accepted a joint submission from the Crown and defence, sentencing the offender to a 20-month conditional sentence of imprisonment after crediting 24 months for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The applicant, charged with murder, sought a second bail review after his initial application was denied.

The court considered new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances, including a new supervision plan with his parents as sureties, their relocation to Oshawa to distance him from the crime scene, substantial financial pledges, and significant support from family friends.

Additionally, the court considered the increased vulnerability of the applicant, who suffers from asthma and bronchitis, to COVID-19 in detention.

The court found the new plan sufficient to address public confidence concerns and granted bail with strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Sisto Seven Marquette, brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging breaches of his rights under s. 9 (arbitrary detention), s. 10(b) (rights to counsel), and s. 8 (search and seizure) following a roadside traffic stop.

He sought the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breaches.

It held that police questioning during the traffic stop was within permissible highway-related purposes, the right to counsel was superseded by the requirement to provide a breath sample forthwith, and subsequent searches of his vehicle and person were lawful incidents to arrest.

Allan Rajmoolie pleaded guilty to possessing a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, possessing a firearm while prohibited, and breaching recognizance.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4 to 4.5 years, while the defence sought 3.5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years (48 months), less 25 months for time served, resulting in a further 23 months to be served.

The court denied additional credit for harsh conditions of incarceration (Duncan credit), finding no adverse effect on the offender.

Ancillary orders for DNA sample and a lifetime firearm prohibition were also imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his wife and son.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, adequately explained his credibility findings, and reasonably addressed material inconsistencies in the testimony.

The defendant, Damion Lewis, applied to exclude evidence (a loaded .357 Magnum revolver and ammunition) obtained during a search incident to arrest, arguing breaches of his section 8 Charter rights due to unlawful scope and execution of the search.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Lewis for theft of mail, making the initial search lawful.

However, the manner of the search was deemed unreasonable because an officer pointed an assault rifle at the handcuffed defendant and threatened to shoot him if he moved.

Despite this serious Charter breach, the court, applying the *Grant* framework, declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The high reliability of the evidence and society's heightened interest in addressing gun violence in Toronto outweighed the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the defendant's Charter interests, especially since the arresting officer acted in good faith and the evidence would have been discovered inevitably.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit a photograph of the deceased victim in the vehicle.

The defence objected on the basis that the photograph was inflammatory and lacked probative value.

The court ruled the photograph was of little to no probative value and excluded it, instead permitting the Crown to use leading questions to establish the non-contentious facts regarding the victim's position and gunshot wounds.

The applicant sought the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to quash a completed criminal trial in which he had been required to represent himself after an adjournment request was denied.

The applicant argued that the denial of the adjournment and the requirement to proceed without counsel amounted to a denial of natural justice and jurisdictional error.

The court held that the trial judge’s decision to deny the adjournment was an exercise of judicial discretion within jurisdiction.

Because the merits of the case had been tried and findings were made on the essential elements of the offences, the proper remedy was an appeal rather than certiorari pursuant to s. 776 of the Criminal Code.

The application for certiorari was therefore dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings pending the provision of state-funded counsel following the denial of legal aid, relying on ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and seeking a Rowbotham order.

The court accepted that legal aid had been finally refused but held the applicant failed to establish indigence due to incomplete and unreliable financial disclosure, unexplained deposits, asset ownership, and lack of corroborating evidence regarding claimed financial limitations.

The court also concluded that the fraud prosecution, involving cheque transactions and documentary evidence, was not legally complex and could proceed fairly with a self‑represented accused supported by interpretation and trial management by the court.

As the applicant failed to satisfy the prerequisites for a Rowbotham order, the application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple robbery-related offences arising from an armed robbery of a restaurant involving masked perpetrators using imitation firearms and a knife.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including surveillance video showing the accused entering an apartment building with other perpetrators shortly after the robbery, possession of stolen liquor, and conduct consistent with concealing stolen property.

The accused testified and called defence witnesses claiming he attended the location only to deliver money to an acquaintance.

Applying the framework from R. v. W. (D.), the court rejected the accused’s testimony as not credible and found the defence evidence unreliable.

Considering the totality of circumstantial evidence, the court concluded the only rational inference was that the accused participated in the joint enterprise robbery.

The Crown sought a ruling that an accused’s inculpatory statement made to a police officer while awaiting medical treatment was voluntary and admissible.

The statement was made after the accused had earlier invoked the right to silence during a recorded interview and after consulting counsel.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, emphasizing gaps in the officer’s notes and inconsistencies in recollection.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness analysis and concluded that uncertainties about the unrecorded portions of the conversation and the officer’s unreliable recollection raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible and the Charter exclusion argument became moot.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after deliberately using a vehicle to intimidate and cut off a cyclist during a dispute arising from a drug transaction.

The collision propelled the cyclist into a building, causing fatal head injuries.

The court considered Gladue factors, including the accused’s Indigenous background, family circumstances, addiction history, and efforts at rehabilitation.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the deliberate endangerment of road users and the decision to flee the scene, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

Consecutive sentences were ordered for criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 1.568 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the established sentencing range for cocaine importation of roughly three to five years for quantities around one kilogram, noting the seriousness of the offence and the societal harm caused by cocaine trafficking.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and personal circumstances.

After considering the quantity of cocaine and the early guilty plea, the court determined that a fit sentence before credit would be just under 39 months.

Applying enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio for 176 days served, the effective sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment, along with a weapons prohibition order and a DNA order.

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder following the stabbing death of his roommate, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but argued for detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the proposed sureties could adequately supervise the applicant, mitigating the risk to public safety.

The court also held that a reasonable member of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released on strict conditions amounting to virtual house arrest.

The application for bail was granted.