Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CR-23-00000056-0000 Date: 2025-11-28 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: His Majesty the King — and — Jeremy Folk, Defendant
Counsel: J. Mazin, for the Crown Self-represented Defendant P. Rochman, appearing as amicus curiae
Heard: October 10, 2025
The Honourable Justice J. R. Henderson
Reasons for Sentence [^1]
Introduction
[1] The defendant, Jeremy Folk ("Folk"), is before me today for sentencing on his conviction for the offence of manslaughter with respect to the death of Rob Davies ("Rob").
[2] After a judge alone trial, I found that Folk committed the unlawful act of trafficking in a controlled substance, namely cocaine and fentanyl, and that his unlawful act caused Rob's death. Accordingly, I found Folk guilty of unlawful act manslaughter as defined in the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Circumstances of the Offence
[3] As to the circumstances of the offence, I found that Matthew Grout ("Matt"), his brother Rob, and their friend, Sheldon Gittens ("Sheldon"), were socializing together at Rob's residence in Brantford, Ontario, in the late afternoon of June 13, 2020, when they decided they wanted to buy some cocaine.
[4] The defendant, Folk, was known to Matt as a drug dealer from whom Matt had previously purchased recreational quantities of cocaine. Therefore, Matt contacted Folk and made arrangements to purchase approximately two grams of cocaine from him. Matt also made Folk aware that he intended to share the cocaine with his brother and his friend.
[5] Matt, Rob, and Sheldon drove to Folk's residence, where Matt paid $180 to Folk in exchange for what Matt believed to be cocaine. The purported cocaine was provided in a plastic bag that contained just less than two grams of a white powdery substance. I accepted Matt's evidence that it looked like cocaine to him.
[6] The three friends then returned to Rob's residence where they each consumed the substance that Matt had purchased from Folk. They all had an adverse reaction. After they each ingested a line of the substance, all three of the friends passed out or lost consciousness. Rob never regained consciousness and died that evening.
[7] The substance that Folk sold to Matt was in fact a mixture of cocaine and fentanyl. The opinion of the experts in this case, which I accepted, was that Rob's death was caused by toxicity from a combination of fentanyl and cocaine.
[8] As to the parties' belief about the nature of the substance, I find that Matt made it known to Folk that he wished to purchase cocaine, and that Folk intended to sell cocaine. No other substance was discussed or mentioned. Folk was a cocaine dealer, not a fentanyl dealer. Therefore, I find that Folk believed that the substance he sold to Matt was cocaine, and that Folk was unaware that the cocaine was mixed with fentanyl.
Personal Circumstances of the Offender
[9] Folk is currently 45 years of age. He was approximately 40 years of age at the time of the offence. The presentence report ("PSR") shows that Folk has not followed a wise or conventional path with respect to the law, education, relationships, or employment. He was raised by a single mother, and he had little contact with his father. He was exposed to substance abuse and domestic violence as a child.
[10] Folk's criminal activity started at an early age. His criminal record shows that he has 14 convictions in Youth Court in 1996, 1997, and 1998, for a variety of offences including assault, break and enter, and robbery. I note that he was sentenced to 14 months in secure custody in 1998 for a robbery conviction.
[11] Regarding his education, the PSR indicates that Folk had behavioural problems and a modest learning disability that affected his schooling. He left school in grade nine. However, to his credit, he obtained his high school equivalency diploma as an adult.
[12] Folk's criminal activity continued in his adult years. Between 2001 and 2010, he was convicted of 21 criminal offences, including nine convictions for failing to comply with court orders. Most of the other convictions were for crimes of violence such as assaults and uttering threats. To Folk's credit, there is a gap in his criminal record. He has had no criminal convictions since 2010, approximately ten years prior to this offence in 2020. Moreover, since Folk was released on bail in 2020, he has abided by the terms of his judicial interim release.
[13] I also note that, with respect to his criminal record, there are only two convictions that are drug related and both of those were possession charges that were dealt with in Youth Court in 1996 and 1998. He has no drug convictions as an adult.
[14] Further, the PSR discloses that Folk has a history of unstable relationships. He has four children with three separate women. At present, he lives with his common-law partner in a relationship that has been ongoing since October 2021. I note that Folk's current support system is limited to his partner and his mother, although his mother is not in good health at present.
[15] I find that Folk's work history is almost nonexistent. I accept that he has a minor health problem as he suffers from diverticulitis. He has not been employed since at least 2010, and his only legitimate income has been from the Ontario Disability Support Program ("ODSP").
[16] In summary, I find that Folk has had a troubled and unstable life. His difficulties stem in part from a difficult upbringing, a modest learning disability, and some health issues. As a result, Folk is relatively uneducated, he has few marketable skills, and he chose to regularly break the criminal law for much of his life up to 2010.
[17] Further, the evidence at the trial shows that, as of 2020, Folk was a known cocaine dealer in Brantford. Thus, I find that Folk intentionally chose to supplement his ODSP income by illegally trafficking in cocaine.
Positions of the Crown and Defence
[18] The Crown's position is that Folk should be sentenced to six years in jail, less credit for presentence custody. Amicus counsel suggested that I should consider a jail sentence in the range of a high reformatory term, such as two years less a day.
[19] In making my decision today, I must first consider the principles and objectives of sentencing for a case like this, and then consider the appropriate range of sentence.
The Principles and Objectives of Sentencing
[20] In any criminal case that involves trafficking in dangerous illegal drugs that results in a death, the paramount objectives of the sentence are individual deterrence, general deterrence, and denunciation.
[21] In recent years, courts at all levels have recognized that there is an opioid crisis in Canada. Fentanyl is an extraordinarily dangerous drug, and even a small amount of fentanyl can cause death. Consequently, those who have been caught trafficking in fentanyl in even modest quantities have been sentenced to lengthy penitentiary terms.
[22] Moldaver J. commented on this crisis in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 96, as follows:
Beyond its mere potential to cause harm, however, fentanyl has had – and continues to have – a real and deadly impact on the lives of Canadians. Indeed, trafficking in fentanyl is so deadly that various courts have described it as a national crisis, reflective of an increased understanding of the gravity of the harm it causes.
[23] Regarding cocaine, although it is not an opioid, I find that cocaine is also an illegal and dangerous drug. Cocaine can also cause death, although the amount of cocaine required to cause death is not always predictable. Moreover, cocaine street dealers often traffic in an adulterated product. That is, cocaine is often cut or mixed with other substances in order to maximize the profits of the dealer and the dealer's suppliers.
[24] The other substances that are cut into street level cocaine can be other hazardous substances, such as fentanyl. In many cases, the consumer of the purported cocaine does not know how dangerous the product has become because neither the consumer, nor in some cases the dealer, is aware of the composition of the substance that is being sold. Therefore, I find that trafficking in any dangerous illegal drug, whether it is cocaine, fentanyl, or any similar substance, creates an exceptional risk of harm, or death, to the consumer.
[25] For those reasons, it is necessary in this case to impose a sentence that will generally deter other people in the community from trafficking in fentanyl or cocaine, should they otherwise be tempted to do so.
[26] Regarding denunciation, in my view the sentence in this case must be harsh enough to act as a statement by this court on behalf of the public that society as a whole collectively condemns the offence that was committed.
Victim Impact Statements
[27] I have read the victim impact statements in this case, and I heard three of those statements read in open court. Those statements confirm that Rob Davies was a well-loved and important member of his family. His mother, spouse, sister-in-law, and his two daughters have all suffered from the loss of their loved one.
[28] I was particularly moved by the statements from his two daughters. They are both bright young women who expressed themselves very well. The pain and anger they feel is very obvious and understandable. Moreover, I accept that the emotional effect of losing their father in this manner will stay with them for the rest of their lives.
[29] To Rob's family and friends, I want you to know that I have some understanding of what Rob meant to you. In my view, the loss of a life through the commission of a criminal offence is one of the most profound tragedies one can imagine. No sentence that I impose can possibly provide compensation for the loss of a life. I simply hope that the fact that we are bringing this matter to a conclusion will provide some closure for you.
The Range of Sentence
[30] The range of possible sentences for this type of case has evolved over the past few years. I have reviewed a number of recent sentencing decisions for unlawful act manslaughter convictions that are predicated on a drug-trafficking offence. I have also been referred to sentencing decisions, based on similar facts, that arose out of convictions for the offence of criminal negligence causing death.
[31] I accept that the intention element of manslaughter is slightly higher than the intention element for criminal negligence causing death. However, I find that where the offence is predicated on illegal drug trafficking that results in the death of the consumer of the drug, the moral blameworthiness for the two offences is very similar. Therefore, to assist me in determining the range of possible sentences in this case, I have considered previous sentencing decisions for both manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death, knowing that a manslaughter conviction should attract a slightly greater sentence.
[32] In R v. Adams, 2023 ONCJ 63, Hilliard J. provided a helpful summary of previous sentencing decisions at paras. 16-24. In R v. Brazier, 2023 ONSC 6315, at paras. 45-51, Boswell J. referenced the Adams decision and noted that sentences in previous cases ranged from 18 months to ten years in jail. He further observed that the lowest sentences were imposed in cases in which the offender entered a guilty plea in circumstances where the offender had mistakenly shared fentanyl with a friend, believing it to be cocaine.
[33] In my opinion, the cases referenced in Adams and Brazier cover two distinct sets of circumstances, namely those in which the offender is a drug dealer who sells drugs for profit, and those in which the offender shares or gives drugs to a friend or acquaintance. It is clear that where the offender sells drugs for profit, the offender's conduct is more blameworthy, and therefore a greater sentence is required.
[34] In the present case, Folk's conduct falls into this more blameworthy category of offence. The relationship between Matt and Folk was by all accounts that of drug dealer and drug purchaser. Although Matt and Folk appeared to be on friendly terms, the purchase and sale of the drugs in this case was strictly a business transaction.
[35] Accordingly, for the purpose of setting the range of sentence in this case, I find that cases such as R. v. Rodgers, 2020 ONCJ 495, in which the offender gave a friend a synthetic drug, and R. v. Simpson, 2022 NSSC 301, in which the offender provided his ex-girlfriend with an unknown substance that turned out to be fentanyl, are not relevant.
[36] After considering the remaining decisions, I conclude that the range of possible sentences for unlawful act manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death where the offence is predicated on drug trafficking by the offender for profit, is three years to eight years in jail. To be clear, even though the decision in R. v. Allison, [2018] O.J. No. 7268 (C.J.), is sometimes referred to as a ten-year sentence, I regard it as a six-year sentence for criminal negligence causing death as there were other convictions that resulted in a separate consecutive sentence of four years in jail.
[37] At the low end of the range is the case of R. v. Ebel-Savage, 2019 ONSC 5688, in which the sentencing judge imposed a three-year sentence for criminal negligence causing death. In that case, the court accepted that the offender did not know that the cocaine she sold contained fentanyl, although she was wilfully blind to that fact. There were several mitigating factors that the court took into account in making a sentencing decision as the offender was 59 years old, had recent health challenges, and had entered a guilty plea to the charge. I also note that Ms. Ebel-Savage's criminal record was less extensive than Folk's record.
[38] At the high end of the range is the Adams decision. In that case, after a trial, the offender was sentenced to eight years in jail for the offence of manslaughter with a concurrent sentence for trafficking in fentanyl. Hilliard J. found that Mr. Adams had intentionally trafficked in fentanyl, resulting in the death of a 17-year-old girl. The offender had an extensive criminal record that included over 90 criminal convictions. Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse and the conduct of a focused trial. However, this case does not neatly fall into the category of trafficking for profit because there was no evidence that the offender received any monetary compensation for the fentanyl he provided. Therefore, this decision suggests that the upper limit of the sentencing range could, in certain circumstances, exceed eight years.
[39] Also at the high end of the range is the Brazier decision in which the offender was found guilty of manslaughter after a trial. He intentionally sold fentanyl and cocaine to a young person shortly after that young person had been released from a rehabilitation facility. The offender's PSR was not favourable. He had an extensive criminal record, although he had no prior drug offences. The sentence in that case was eight years in jail.
[40] In the mid-range are several cases in which the offender was sentenced to five or six years in jail. In Allison, as I mentioned, the offender pled guilty to criminal negligence causing death and was sentenced to six years in jail on that count. The court found that the offender carried both fentanyl and cocaine in his pockets and mistakenly provided fentanyl rather than cocaine to the buyer. Mr. Allison had a more extensive criminal record than Folk, but the sentencing judge took his guilty plea into account as a mitigating factor.
[41] In R. v. Walker, 2019 ONCJ 132, the offender pled guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The victim died as a result of the combined toxicity of four separate drugs that he had consumed, two of which were heroin and fentanyl that had been sold to him by the offender. The offender was 23 years of age, had no prior record, and entered a guilty plea, all of which were mitigating factors. An aggravating factor was described as the offender's single-minded pursuit of a drug sale profit. Harpur J. found that five years in jail was a fit custodial sentence but discounted that sentence by one and a half years because the offender was providing assistance in the prosecution of another individual.
[42] In R. v. Hasiu, [2021] O.J. No. 7384 (C.J.), the sentence was six and a half years for manslaughter caused by the offender intentionally selling fentanyl to the victim. Aggravating factors included the offender's lengthy criminal record and the fact that the offender deliberately misled the victim as to what he was selling. However, the judge took into account several mitigating factors, including the offender's guilty plea, his significant addiction issues, his longstanding employment history, and his community supports.
[43] In R. v. Norn, 2024 ONSC 6370, the offender was found guilty of manslaughter after a trial. He had entered a guilty plea to trafficking, but the manslaughter charge was litigated. The offender was 19 years of age at the time of the offence with no criminal record. Although the focus of the sentencing decision was on rehabilitation, the sentencing judge was skeptical as the offender had been found in possession of approximately ten grams of fentanyl after his conviction on the offence before the court, and before sentencing. In that case, both the offender and the purchaser were aware that the offender was selling, and the purchaser was buying, fentanyl. The sentence was six years in jail.
[44] On the basis of those decisions, I repeat that for cases of unlawful act manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death predicated on drug trafficking where the offender is trafficking in illegal drugs for profit, the range of sentence is three years to eight years in jail.
The Appropriate Sentence in This Case
[45] In Folk's case, I find that in consideration of the circumstances of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentence should be in the mid-range for offences of this type.
[46] The single most significant aggravating factor is Folk's lengthy criminal record. For much of his life, commencing in his youth, Folk regularly committed criminal offences or acted outside of the law. That fact alone moves the sentence out of the low end of the range.
[47] I recognize that there is a ten-year gap in Folk's criminal record immediately prior to this offence, and there has been a further five years since the offence was committed during which Folk complied with his bail terms. That is to Folk's credit; it limits the effect that his past criminal record has on his sentence today. However, I still regard his criminal record as an aggravating factor.
[48] Also, in determining the appropriate sentence, I have taken into account the fact that this sentence is for a manslaughter conviction, and thus it should attract a greater sentence than a conviction for criminal negligence causing death.
[49] There are also several mitigating factors here. I take into account the fact that Folk was not a fentanyl dealer; there is no evidence that Folk ever intentionally sold fentanyl. Thus, the sentence will not be at the highest end of the range.
[50] That being said, as I have mentioned, trafficking in cocaine is in itself an inherently dangerous activity. As I stated earlier, cocaine is often cut with an unknown hazardous substance that presents a high risk to the consumer. I find that recklessly trafficking in cocaine that may or may not be cut with an unknown dangerous substance is only a small step below intentionally trafficking in fentanyl.
[51] Furthermore, Dr. Tyler Hickey, the forensic pathologist in this case, testified that Rob's death was caused by an overdose of a combination of fentanyl and cocaine. Dr. Hickey could not determine which drug was the more significant cause of death. Thus, the fact that Folk did not intentionally traffic in fentanyl is only a slight mitigating factor.
[52] Further, I have considered Folk's personal circumstances including his troubled upbringing, his learning disability, and his ongoing health problems. I take into account that he is currently trying to deal with the health problems of his ailing mother.
[53] I accept that Folk expressed remorse for his actions in court and apologized for his conduct. I also note that the author of the PSR implied that the charge before the court has had a positive effect on Folk as he quit drinking after he was charged with this offence. These are all mitigating factors.
[54] In coming to my sentencing decision, I agree with the Crown that the facts in this case are close to the facts that occurred in the Allison case. In Allison, as I discussed, the sentence was six years for criminal negligence causing death. Like this case, both the dealer and the purchaser in Allison believed that the product being sold was cocaine, but through confusion or mistake, the product that was sold contained fentanyl. The primary difference between the Allison decision and the present case is that Mr. Allison had a more significant criminal record than Folk. Also, even though he intended to sell cocaine on the occasion in question, Mr. Allison was also a fentanyl dealer, unlike Folk. In the Allison decision, however, the court took into account the offender's guilty plea as a mitigating factor; that factor is not present in our case. Therefore, I find that the sentence for Folk should be slightly below the sentence imposed in Allison.
[55] For all of those reasons, I find that the appropriate sentence for Folk in this case is five years in jail, less credit for presentence custody.
Presentence Custody
[56] Folk is entitled to credit for the time that he has been incarcerated on this offence prior to today's sentencing date. I am told that Folk was in presentence custody for two days. Therefore, Folk will receive credit for three days presentence custody, using the rate of one and a half to one.
Conclusion and Sentence
[57] On Folk's conviction for the offence of manslaughter, the sentence is as follows:
Folk is sentenced to five years in jail, less three days credit for presentence custody.
Folk shall not own or possess any weapons or firearms pursuant to s.109 of the Criminal Code for life.
Folk shall forthwith provide a DNA sample as this is a primary designated offence.
Under s.743.21 of the Criminal Code, Folk is prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, while he is in custody with Matt Grout, Dawn Grout, Sheldon Gittens, or Rick Ramasir.
J. R. Henderson, J.
Date Released: November 28, 2025
[^1]: This decision was given orally on November 28, 2025. At that time, I indicated that written reasons would follow. These are those reasons. They may vary in the precise language used. Where there is a variation between the oral and written reasons, the written reasons prevail.

