Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States for alleged tax fraud, brought an application for the presiding judge to recuse himself.

The recusal application was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias arising after the Crown provided the court with ex parte information concerning public safety and public interest privilege.

The judge appointed amicus curiae to represent the applicant's interests during a closed hearing to determine disclosure of the information.

The judge dismissed the recusal application, finding that the procedures adopted balanced the competing interests and ensured fundamental fairness, such that an informed person would not conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Crown applied for an order permitting six witnesses to testify by videoconference at the accused's fraud trial.

Three witnesses resided in the United States and three resided in Canada outside Ontario.

The accused opposed the application for one US witness on the basis of solicitor-client privilege, and opposed the Canadian witnesses on the basis of credibility and memory issues.

The court granted the application, finding that privilege issues should be dealt with separately and that credibility issues could be assessed equally well over video.

The court concluded the statutory tests under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code were met.

The Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of a complainant who relocated to the United States and refused to testify at trial.

The statements included a sworn video statement to police and testimony from a preliminary hearing.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that necessity was established due to the witness's unavailability and refusal to testify.

The court held that the sworn video statement met the threshold for reliability based on procedural and substantive factors, including extensive corroborative evidence.

The video statement was admitted for the truth of its contents, while the preliminary hearing testimony was ruled admissible only at the instance of the defence to challenge credibility and reliability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80', arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to find a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, misapprehended evidence, and failed to conduct a proper s. 24(2) analysis.

The appellant claimed his right to consult a third party (his wife) regarding counsel was infringed.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police provided adequate opportunity for the appellant to consult his wife and did not interfere with his right to counsel of choice.

The court also held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The appellant, a rap artist, appealed his conviction and sentence for uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

The charge arose from a YouTube music video containing lyrics and images directed at the complainant, a music promoter.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised 14 grounds of appeal, including issues related to the complainant's credibility, disclosure of a Facebook message, cross-examination on his criminal record, and the trial judge's handling of various procedural matters.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, handling of disclosure, or sentencing.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed two summary convictions: one for breaching a bail recognizance and another for breaching a probation order.

Both charges stemmed from the appellant posting the names of criminal complainants on his blog.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal against the bail breach conviction, finding the trial judge erred by not applying the subjective mens rea standard established in R. v. Zora, and ordered a new trial.

However, the court dismissed the appeal against the probation breach conviction, holding that the appellant was barred from collaterally attacking the probation order and failed to provide evidence that his guilty plea was involuntary or uninformed.

Aruran Suthakaran was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court considered the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission (gun violence in a public place with transferred intent), the offender's character (no prior record, strong family support), and jury recommendations (10 years parole ineligibility).

Despite the jury's recommendation, the court imposed a 12-year period of parole ineligibility, emphasizing the need for denunciation and deterrence for gun-related crimes, while acknowledging the offender's strong rehabilitation prospects.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and mandatory DNA order were also imposed.

The court addressed a joint request from the Crown and defence for a ruling on the authority to conduct a criminal trial virtually via Zoom, allowing the accused to participate remotely.

The court found it had jurisdiction under s. 650(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, in conjunction with ss. 715.22-715.24, to permit the accused's absence from the physical courtroom under proper conditions, especially given the accused was represented by counsel and had provided a clear waiver.

The decision distinguished conflicting lower court jurisprudence regarding virtual appearances for self-represented versus represented accused and for pleas versus trials.

Robert Lepp sought to vary his judicial release order, challenging a broad prohibition on mentioning complainants online (Term 6) and restrictions on internet use (Term 7).

The court, applying R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, found Term 6 to be opaque, overbroad, and not necessary for public protection, striking it entirely.

Term 7 was varied to allow unsupervised internet use for employment and legal purposes, and supervised use for other purposes, recognizing Lepp's rights as a self-represented litigant, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Non-contact terms (Terms 4 and 5) were also adjusted to remove one complainant's name while re-introducing another's due to new charges.

The applicant, S.B.S., convicted of drug offenses and serving a sentence, sought a bail review of his continued detention on new charges including human trafficking, breach of recognizance, and drug trafficking.

He proposed a stringent release plan with three sureties and electronic monitoring, citing his nearing parole eligibility and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, arguing an unacceptable risk to public safety.

The court found that the applicant had not met his onus to establish that continued detention was not justified on the secondary ground, citing the egregious nature of the new allegations, his prior flagrant breach of recognizance, and the inadequacy of the proposed surety plan.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and threatening death.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, accepting the complainant's testimony of non-consensual intercourse and forceful restraint, supported by physical evidence.

The court found the accused not guilty of uttering a death threat, as the alleged statement lacked context and credibility.

The accused brought an application to adjourn his joint jury trial for drug importation, scheduled to commence in less than three weeks, in order to retain counsel of choice.

The accused had previously discharged counsel and had been warned multiple times that the trial would proceed with or without counsel.

The court dismissed the adjournment application, finding that the accused had not acted diligently or in a bona fide manner to retain available counsel, and that the application was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the system to achieve a de facto severance from his co-accused.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended medical evidence regarding his uncontrolled diabetes and erred in finding no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the appellant to prove he did not waive his right to counsel of choice, rather than on the Crown to prove a valid waiver.

The appeal was allowed in part; the refusal conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered, but the impaired driving conviction was upheld using the curative proviso.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving after a police officer followed his ATV from a public road onto a private driveway to conduct a random sobriety check under the Highway Traffic Act.

The officer had no prior suspicion of impairment.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice held that police lack statutory or common law authority to conduct random sobriety stops on private property without articulable cause.

The court found the stop violated the appellant's right against arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, excluded the evidence under section 24(2), and entered an acquittal.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

The accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the Superior Court's administrative decision to transfer his manslaughter trial from Brampton to Kitchener due to a severe courtroom shortage.

The accused argued the transfer order was subject to judicial review and violated administrative law principles of procedural fairness.

The court dismissed the applications, holding that the Chief Justice and Regional Senior Judges have statutory authority under the Courts of Justice Act to transfer cases within and outside a region.

The court further held that administrative decisions made in the course of criminal proceedings are not subject to judicial review, and that the accused failed to establish grounds for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, and breach of probation.

At trial, the sole issue was the identity of the driver, with the defence arguing that a passenger was driving.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the third prong of the W.(D.) framework regarding credibility and reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed credibility analysis and factual findings.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude cocaine and cash seized from her purse following an arrest for suspected drug-impaired driving after a motor vehicle collision.

Police arrested the accused based on observations of lethargy, erratic driving, and witness accounts but without evidence of alcohol or drug use.

The court held that the officer had only a suspicion or hunch rather than reasonable and probable grounds, rendering the arrest arbitrary and the subsequent search unlawful.

The warrantless search of the purse could not be justified as incidental to arrest.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the seized drugs and cash and entered acquittals.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing approximately 2.963 kilograms of cocaine into Canada after the drugs were discovered concealed in suitcase linings at Pearson International Airport.

The Crown sought a seven‑year custodial sentence while the defence requested a five‑year sentence, relying on mitigating factors including the offender’s age, lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and role as a courier.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges established by appellate jurisprudence for large multi‑kilogram cocaine importations and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary objectives in drug importation cases.

While recognizing several mitigating factors, the court found they did not justify departing from the established six‑to‑eight‑year sentencing range.

A custodial sentence at the low end of that range was imposed together with mandatory ancillary orders.