Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The offender was convicted of human trafficking, aggravated assault, procuring, and related offences after forcing a sex trade worker to meet a daily quota and severely assaulting her when she complained.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the offender challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum under s. 279.01(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and sought a conditional sentence.

The court found it unnecessary to decide the constitutional issue, as the appropriate sentence was five and a half years imprisonment, considering the gravity of the offences, the offender's lack of a related record, and the impact of incarceration on his children.

The court also ordered a $15,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture and $15,000 in restitution.

The Crown brought an application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to sentence the young person as an adult for the offence of manslaughter.

The young person, who was one month shy of 18 at the time of the offence, participated in a fatal attack on a friend.

The court considered the young person's significant Gladue factors, history of trauma, and rehabilitative progress while in custody.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence was sufficient to hold the young person accountable.

The application was dismissed, and the young person was ordered to be sentenced as a youth, with sentencing delayed to allow for the development of a release plan.

The accused, charged with multiple firearms and stolen vehicle offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 and s. 525 of the Criminal Code after being detained on the tertiary ground.

The accused proposed a new release plan involving his father, a correctional officer residing in New Brunswick, as a surety.

The court found that the new release plan constituted a material change in circumstances and that the Crown had not shown that continued detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was granted interim judicial release on strict conditions, including house arrest and significant financial pledges from sureties.

The offender was found guilty of human trafficking, procuring, and multiple violent offences including assault, forcible confinement, choking, and sexual assault against an 18-year-old victim.

The offender controlled the victim's sex work, took her earnings, and subjected her to severe physical and psychological abuse over a year.

The court considered the Tang/Miller factors for human trafficking and the offender's background.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 11 years imprisonment, including 9 years for human trafficking and 2 years consecutive for choking, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused applied for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and security video, to place the accused at the scene of the shooting or assisting the shooters.

The court dismissed the directed verdict applications, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court also ruled on several jury charge issues, declining to instruct the jury on co-principal liability, abetting, or the common unlawful purpose doctrine for second degree murder, and opting to provide an expanded instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The accused, S.B.S., faced a 13-count indictment including human trafficking, procuring, assault, administering a noxious thing, and receiving material benefit.

The accused admitted to two assault charges (counts 6 and 11) and a related assault charge (count 10).

The Crown invited an acquittal on one charge (count 7).

The court found the Crown failed to prove human trafficking (counts 1, 8, 12) and procuring (counts 3, 4, 9, 13) beyond a reasonable doubt for all three complainants, largely due to inconsistencies in complainant testimony and lack of sufficient control exercised by the accused over the complainants' movements or sex trade work.

The court also dismissed charges of receiving material benefit related to exploitation and procuring.

The accused, charged with assault and sexual assault, applied to vary his bail conditions to allow him to leave his residence without his surety.

He had been on strict house arrest for seven months without any breaches, despite 50 police compliance checks.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges, but found that his unblemished compliance and the delayed trial date justified a modest loosening of his conditions.

The application was granted, and the release order was amended to permit the accused to leave the residence on specific days with his surety's written permission.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit expert evidence regarding street gangs, specifically the rivalry between 'C3' and the 'Scarlettwood Crips'.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert to provide context and establish motive for the seemingly random shooting of an unarmed man.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and the officer was not properly qualified.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence was logically relevant to motive, necessary to assist the jury in understanding the context of the shooting, and that the officer was qualified.

The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to specific exclusions of certain highly prejudicial videos and appropriate jury instructions.

The defendant, M.W., pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a semi-conscious and vulnerable victim.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (victim's vulnerability, non-consensual sexual acts), and mitigating factors (guilty plea).

The judge determined an appropriate sentence of 18 months imprisonment, but applied credits for 181 days of pre-sentence custody (9 months equivalent), an additional 3 months for harsh conditions at Central East Correctional Centre (Duncan credit), and a further 3-month reduction due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic's impact on incarceration conditions.

The net sentence was 3 months, to be served intermittently on weekends, along with 2 years probation and ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, renewed his application for judicial interim release based on a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and new sureties.

The court acknowledged COVID-19 as a material change but found its impact on the tertiary ground of detention minimal given the specific measures at the detention facility and the lack of specific evidence of the applicant's heightened vulnerability.

The court also found the proposed new sureties unsuitable due to evasive testimony.

Ultimately, the court concluded that continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, considering the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, and the strength of the Crown's case.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.

The accused, charged with sexual offences and improper storage of firearms, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence.

Following his arrest, police conducted a warrantless search of his home and garage to locate firearms, during which they discovered a piece of clothing in a gun locker.

The police subsequently obtained a search warrant and seized the clothing.

The court found that the warrantless search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights, as he had not provided informed consent.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown applied for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge two respondents, Justin McGregor and Herve Kalonji, on various drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming the narrow scope of jurisdictional review for preliminary inquiry decisions.

The court reiterated that such decisions are reviewable only for jurisdictional errors (e.g., failing to consider all evidence, impermissible weighing), not for errors of law or sufficiency of evidence.

The judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly exercised her jurisdiction in concluding there was insufficient evidence for committal, despite some potential errors in her reasoning regarding the evidence.

The Crown applied under section 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code for an order allowing two child witnesses to testify via video link from outside the courtroom in a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence objected to the use of remote video technology, arguing the court had discretion to order a different accommodation, such as testifying behind a screen.

The court held that under section 486.2(1), the presiding judge has no discretion to alter the requested accommodation unless it would interfere with the proper administration of justice.

Finding no such interference, the court granted the Crown's application with specific conditions to ensure trial efficiency.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking to exclude cocaine discovered in the rear cargo area of his vehicle during a traffic stop.

The accused alleged that police arbitrarily detained him and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, breaching ss. 9 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found the stop was lawfully conducted under s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act for the purpose of investigating unlicensed driving and related road safety concerns.

The judge accepted the officer’s evidence that the cocaine was observed through the tinted rear window in plain view, rather than discovered during a physical search.

As no Charter breaches occurred, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Media organizations applied for access to previously sealed informations to obtain (ITOs) relating to a production order and search warrant issued during a criminal investigation.

The accused sought continuation of a publication ban, arguing that publication of intercepted communications referenced in the ITOs would compromise his right to a fair trial on an extortion charge.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that the accused failed to demonstrate a real and serious risk to trial fairness, given existing publicity, the passage of time before trial, jury instructions, and the challenge for cause process.

A third party mentioned in the ITOs argued that publication would damage his reputation, but the court held that third parties generally lack standing to seek publication bans absent exceptional circumstances.

The court concluded that the open court principle prevailed and lifted the remaining publication bans.

The Crown brought an application seeking admission of similar fact evidence across three robbery counts in a jury trial to establish identity.

The robberies occurred within eleven days at three banks located within one kilometre of each other and involved similar methods, including handwritten notes containing distinctive phrases such as “no ink”, brief interactions with tellers, and similar clothing and demeanour.

The court applied the two‑stage similar fact evidence test, finding a high degree of similarity rendering coincidence objectively improbable.

Evidence linking the accused to the acts included DNA found on clothing recovered after the third robbery and anticipated identification evidence from surveillance video.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect and permitted the jury to consider the evidence on each count when determining guilt on the others.

In a pre‑trial application, the Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence against one accused in a prosecution for aggravated sexual assault involving alleged non‑disclosure of HIV‑positive status during sexual encounters.

The proposed evidence included testimony from other individuals alleging similar encounters, statements from a roommate suggesting non‑disclosure practices, and chat log communications from the accused’s computer.

Applying the governing framework for similar fact evidence articulated in R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence inconsistent, partially related to outstanding charges in another jurisdiction, and largely directed to propensity reasoning.

Concluding that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value, the court ruled the evidence inadmissible, while noting the ruling could be revisited depending on the evidence at trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident during a work-related overnight stay at a rural property.

The complainant testified she believed she had been drugged and sexually assaulted after consuming alcohol and losing memory of the evening, awakening naked in the accused’s bed the next day.

The accused denied drugging the complainant and maintained that any sexual contact was consensual and initiated by the complainant.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given credibility concerns, the complainant’s lack of recollection, the absence of corroborating evidence of drugging, and post‑incident conduct inconsistent with the alleged assault, the court found that the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.