COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-50000131
DATE: 20240926
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
JUSTIN EUROPE
S. Rothman, for the Crown
M. Hayworth, for Mr. Europe
HEARD: August 19, 2024
REASONS FOR SENTENCE[^1]
SCHRECK J.:
[1] Justin Europe lived with L.G., a sex trade worker, for a period of about two months in 2018. He coerced her into working every day and imposed a “quota” requiring her to earn at least $1000 a day. He took all of her earnings. When she complained, he assaulted her so severely that she broke a rib. When she finally left him, he threatened her and her family with violence.
[2] Following a judge-alone trial, Mr. Europe was convicted of human trafficking (Count 1); procuring L.G. to provide sexual services for consideration (Count 2); receiving a material benefit from human trafficking (Count 3), receiving a material benefit from the sale of sexual services (Count 4), advertising an offer to provide sexual services for consideration (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 7) and threatening death (Count 8). The court must now determine an appropriate sentence.
[3] Mr. Europe is 37 years old. He is Black and grew up in a socio-economically challenged and racialized community in Toronto. He has a consistent employment history and supports four children with whom he lives together with his mother, two sisters and two nieces. He has a minor and unrelated criminal record.
[4] Because Mr. Europe has been convicted of having committed an aggravated assault while committing the offence of human trafficking, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for five years by virtue of s. 279.01(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. He submits that this infringes the s. 12 Charter guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment and has applied to have the mandatory minimum declared to be of no force or effect. If successful in this regard, he submits that the appropriate sentence in this case is a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
[5] The Crown submits that the court need not decide the constitutional issue because the appropriate sentence for Mr. Europe is at least five years and should in fact be seven years. In the alternative, the Crown submits that the mandatory minimum sentence is not unconstitutional. The Crown also seeks a fine in lieu of forfeiture, restitution and various ancillary orders.
[6] I have concluded that the appropriate total sentence in this case is imprisonment for five and a half years. As this exceeds the mandatory minimum sentence, it is unnecessary to decide the constitutional issue and I decline to do so. There will be a fine in lieu of forfeiture, although for an amount lesser than that sought by the Crown, as well as a restitution order and the requested ancillary orders.
[7] The following reasons explain these conclusions.
I. FACTS
A. The Offences
(i) Facts Supporting the Convictions
[8] The facts are set out in detail in my reasons for judgment, reported as R. v. Europe, 2023 ONSC 5490. Briefly, L.G., who was already involved in the sex trade, moved in with Mr. Europe in November 2018 believing that they would have a relationship. Once she did so, he required her to work every day, including times when she did not want to, such as when she was having her menstrual period. He imposed a “quota” requiring her to earn $1000 per day and made her hand all of her earnings over to him.
[9] One evening in December 2018, L.G. became upset about Mr. Europe taking all of her money. He responded by assaulting her, throwing her to the ground, kicking her in the ribs and stomping on her face. She broke a rib as a result and had to go to the hospital.
[10] L.G. left Mr. Europe after the assault but soon returned to him. He forced her to continue working despite being in pain from her injuries. She then left him permanently and arranged to have the police retrieve her belongings from the residence she had shared with Mr. Europe. Upon learning this, Mr. Europe sent her a text which said, “Rat me out and your family will have to move” and “if u lie on me to the cops … and I go 2 jail ppl will air out your house.” L.G. later showed the text messages to the police and made a statement which led to Mr. Europe’s arrest.
(ii) Victim Impact
[11] L.G. prepared a victim impact statement in which she reports suffering from long-term effects resulting from the aggravated assault committed by Mr. Europe, including aphasia and dyslexia. Her mental health has also suffered, and she experiences anxiety, insomnia, a fear of going outside and an inability to trust others. She described the effects of the offences on her in the following terms:
Your actions threw me into despair. The pain is multidimensional and I cannot navigate it. You cannot take it back and I cannot make it go away.
[12] L.G.’s mother, V.G., also prepared a victim impact statement. After Mr. Europe threatened L.G.’s family, the police attended her home in the middle of the night to warn them. V.G., her husband and four children living with them (one of whom was L.G.’s eight-year-old son) had to immediately relocate. The children were terrified and afraid to go home. L.G.’s son experienced fear and anger for a long time afterwards.
B. The Offender
(i) Personal History and Family
[13] A presentence report (“PSR”) was prepared in this case. Mr. Europe is a 37-year-old Black man. He grew up in Toronto with his parents and siblings. Although he had a stable home life, the neighbourhood in which he lived was heavily affected by violence and poverty. Mr. Europe completed high school but experienced racism while attending school.
[14] Mr. Europe was the victim of a shooting in 2012. He believes that this incident, as well as negative interactions with the police during his youth, have caused him to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). However, he has never been formally diagnosed with this condition.
[15] Mr. Europe’s employment history includes a number of different jobs, including general labourer, construction and landscaping. He completed training as a plumber but was unable to find work in that field. He has been employed as a skilled machine operator since 2021.
[16] Mr. Europe has five children, the oldest of whom is 16, with three different women. He is not currently in a relationship with any of the mothers of his children. Four of them live with him, his mother, his two sisters and two nieces. Mr. Europe’s oldest child lives with his mother in Alberta. Mr. Europe is currently involved in family law proceedings with respect to three of the children.
(ii) Comments on the Offences
[17] Mr. Europe told the author of the PSR that he and L.G. had a “normal relationship” and that “the whole situation has been ‘misinterpreted.’” He acknowledges having threatened L.G. and told the author of the PSR that he regrets having done so.
(iii) Criminal Record
[18] Mr. Europe’s criminal record consists of convictions in 2013 for failing to comply with an undertaking, failing to comply with a recognizance, dangerous driving and possession of a controlled substance. The only custodial sentence he received was for failing to comply with an undertaking for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for one day in addition to 24 days of presentence custody.
(iv) Time Spent on Bail
[19] Mr. Europe was arrested on the charges before the court on January 23, 2019 and released on bail on February 4, 2019. He was initially subject to house arrest with electronic monitoring. On May 21, 2019, his bail was varied to permit him to be outside his home while in the company of a surety. On August 26, 2020, the electronic monitoring was terminated, and Mr. Europe was permitted to leave his home without a surety to attend school. A further variation on March 11, 2021 allowed him to work. On December 19, 2022, Mr. Europe was arrested on other charges and was released on a global bail on December 30, 2022 on house arrest. A trial on those charges is set for November 2024.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Relevant Sentencing Principles
(i) The Fundamental Purpose of Sentencing
[20] Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the “fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society….” This is to be accomplished through the imposition of just sanctions that have one or more of several objectives enumerated in s. 718(a) to (f), including denunciation, general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation. As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 58, the various objectives “will not necessarily point toward the same sentencing disposition” and that the court must “prioritize and blend the different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender.”
[21] While there will rarely be only one possible fit sentence, s. 718.1 of the Code provides that any sentence that is ultimately imposed “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 30.
(ii) Sentencing for Human Trafficking and Related Offences
[22] While the offence of human trafficking can be committed in a variety of ways, it is most commonly applied to those who are colloquially referred to as “pimps.” Mr. Europe and others like him derive benefit from women whom they directly or indirectly harm and they contribute little or nothing in return. They are parasites. I adopt what was said by my colleague, K.L. Campbell J., in R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749, at para. 52 to the effect that these types of offences “typically are involved in the exploitation, degradation and subordination of women” and are essentially “a form of slavery” in which the services of sex workers are treated as “an endlessly available commodity to be simply bought and sold in the marketplace.”
[23] What pimps share with drug traffickers is that they profit by exploiting the vulnerabilities of others. However, pimping has the added evil of almost always having at its root misogynistic attitudes and the implicit assumption that women are but objects or commodities that exist for the benefit of men. For all of these reasons, it is well established that denunciation and deterrence are primary objectives in sentencing human trafficking offences of this sort.
B. The Sentencing Range
[24] My colleague, DiLuca J., recently considered a number of sentencing decisions in this area in R. v. McEwan, 2023 ONSC 1608, at para. 80 and concluded that the cases he reviewed “establish a range of four to eight years, with a cluster of cases between five and six years.” See also R. v. S.M., 2023 ONCA 417, at para. 28; R. v. Mussie, 2024 ONSC 4807, at para. 48; R. v. Myers, 2023 ONSC 1015, at para. 27.
C. Aggravating Factors
[25] The human trafficking sentencing caselaw has developed a list of factors that are helpful to consider when determining the appropriate sentence and which are enumerated in Lopez, at para. 53, as well as other cases. These are, for the most part, potential aggravating factors. The fact that any of them may be absent is not a mitigating factor.
[26] Not all of the factors in Lopez apply in this case and there are some about which I have no evidence. In this case, Mr. Europe exercised a fairly significant degree of coercion with respect to L.G. and received a significant amount of money from her. L.G. is not underage. Although she was vulnerable, this was not because of any physical or mental disability or any addiction issues. The exploitative relationship lasted for about two months. Mr. Europe inflicted significant violence on L.G., as evidenced by the aggravated assault conviction. In addition to this, the offences had a significant and lasting impact on the victim.
[27] Mr. Europe’s criminal record is, in my view, dated, fairly minor and unrelated. I do not view it as an aggravating factor.
[28] The fact that Mr. Europe does not accept responsibility for the human trafficking offences is not an aggravating factor. It is simply the absence of a mitigating factor.
D. Mitigating Factors
(i) Personal Circumstances
[29] With respect to mitigating factors, Mr. Europe has a supportive family, which is relevant to his prospects for rehabilitation. He is Black and has suffered the effects of racism, although there is no clear connection between this and the commission of the offences: Morris, at para. 97.
[30] Mr. Europe has taken limited responsibility for at least one of the offences, which has some minor mitigating effect.
(ii) Bail Conditions
[31] Mr. Europe spent a significant amount of time subject to strict bail conditions. Recognizing the effect of time spent subject to strict bail conditions is sometimes referred to as “Downes credit” after the decision in R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para 33. However, it is not really a “credit” but, rather, a mitigating factor to be considered: R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, 153 O.R. (3d) 145, at para. 108. There is no mathematical formula for determining the effect of this mitigating factor: R. v. Dodman, 2021 ONCA 543, 494 C.R.R. (2d) 22, at para. 10. In this case, I have considered this factor but decline to assign a particular number to its mitigating effect: R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, at paras. 52-53; R. v. Hussey-Rodrigues, 2024 ONSC 2671, at para. 48.
(iii) Children
[32] As noted earlier, Mr. Europe has custody of four of his children. He submits that if he receives a custodial sentence, it is likely that his children will be placed into foster care. However, he has adduced no evidence in this regard. It appears that he is involved in family court proceedings with the mother of three of the children, so it seems that she remains involved with the children in some way. Furthermore, as noted by the Crown, the evidence at trial shows that Mr. Europe was content to reside with L.G. for two months while his children were presumably cared for by someone else.
[33] All of that said, I have no doubt that a custodial sentence for Mr. Europe will have a significant negative impact on his children and that this is a significant factor to consider for the reasons explained in R. v. Spencer (2004), 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 47 (C.A.), at para. 47:
The fact that Ms. Spencer has three children and plays a very positive and essential role in their lives cannot diminish the seriousness of her crime or detract from the need to impose a sentence that adequately denounces her conduct and hopefully deters others from committing the same crime. Nor does it reduce her personal culpability. It must, however, be acknowledged that in the long-term, the safety and security of the community is best served by preserving the family unit to the furthest extent possible. In my view, in these circumstances, those concerns demonstrate the wisdom of the restraint principle in determining the length of a prison term and the need to tailor that term to preserve the family as much as possible. Unfortunately, given the gravity of the crime committed by Ms. Spencer, the needs of her children cannot justify a sentence below the accepted range, much less a conditional sentence.
See also R. v. Bascoe, 2023 ONCJ 206, at paras. 30-36.
E. The Section 12 Charter Challenge
(i) Overview
[34] Section s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
279.01 (1) Every person who recruits, transports, transfers, receives, holds, conceals or harbours a person, or exercises control, direction or influence over the movements of a person, for the purpose of exploiting them or facilitating their exploitation is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of five years if they kidnap, commit an aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault against, or cause death to, the victim during the commission of the offence; or
(b) to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years in any other case.
[35] The four-year mandatory minimum penalty in s. 279.01(1)(b) has been found to violate s. 12 of Charter and has been declared to be of no force or effect: R. v. Jean, 2020 ONSC 624, 451 C.R.R. (2d) 344, at para. 44; R. v. Gardner, 2020 ONSC 5954, at para. 61; R. v. Antoine, 2020 ONSC 181, 459 C.R.R. (2d) 154, at para. 74; McEwan, at paras. 58-71. However, Mr. Europe is subject to s. 279.01(1)(a) because he was found to have committed an aggravated assault during the commission of the offence of human trafficking. To my knowledge, s. 279.01(1)(a) has not been challenged.
[36] It is well established that a mandatory minimum sentence will violate s. 12 of the Charter if it would result in a grossly disproportionate sentence for the offender or other persons in reasonably foreseeable situations: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, at para. 65; R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, 477 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 40-41. Because of this, the analysis requires the court to consider not only the application of the mandatory minimum in the case before it, but in “situations that may reasonably be expected to be caught by the mandatory minimum, based on experience and common sense”: Nur, at para. 74. In this case, Mr. Europe submits that the five-year minimum would be grossly disproportionate if applied to him as well in reasonably foreseeable situations.
(ii) Is the Mandatory Minimum Sentence Grossly Disproportionate in This Case?
[37] Mr. Europe submits that a five-year sentence would be grossly disproportionate in this case because he suffers from PTSD and because of the effect such a sentence would have on his children. I do not agree. Five years is well within the four-to-eight-year range identified in McEwan, even without consideration of the aggravated assault conviction. Once the aggravated assault is considered, it is clear that the appropriate sentence in this case exceeds five years.
[38] With respect to Mr. Europe’s PTSD, there is no evidence of this other than his own self-diagnosis. More importantly, even if Mr. Europe has PTSD, an offender’s mental condition can only be a mitigating factor where it plays some role in the commission of the offence: R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 201, at para. 128; R. v. Husbands, 2019 ONSC 6824, 451 C.R.R. (2d) 117, at para. 83, aff’d 2024 ONCA 155, 170 O.R. (3d) 486; R. v. Ellis, 2013 ONCA 739, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 228, at para. 117; R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, 93 O.R. (3d) 643, at para. 38. There is no evidence of any such connection in this case.
[39] With respect to Mr. Europe’s children, as was made clear in para. 47 of Spencer, cited earlier in these reasons, this factor cannot justify a sentence below the accepted range.
(iii) Should the Court Consider Reasonably Foreseeable Situations?
[40] This leaves consideration of reasonably foreseeable situations. The Crown submits that I need not consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence on this basis as striking it down would have no impact on the sentence to be imposed in this case. Courts have often taken this approach: R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130, at para. 18; R. v. Chambers, 2013 ONCA 680, 295 C.R.R. (2d) 314, at para. 46. However, courts should be cautious about declining to consider constitutional challenges to mandatory minimum sentences on this basis because such sentences can affect the applicable sentencing range by creating an “inflationary floor”: R. v. Delchev, 2014 ONCA 448, 323 O.A.C. 19, at paras. 18-19.
[41] In this case, Crown counsel relies on the sentencing range established pursuant to s. 279.01(1)(b) and invites the court to consider the aggravated assault conviction as an aggravating factor, which was the approach taken in R. v. A.S., 2017 ONSC 802, at para. 37. He accepts that the mandatory minimum in s. 279.01(1)(b) has been declared to be of no force or effect and has not created an “inflationary floor.” I agree with this approach. Based on this, I see no utility in considering the constitutional issue on the basis of reasonably foreseeable situations and decline to do so.
[42] The Crown submits that a seven-year sentence is appropriate. In my view, a sentence of this length is not required. While there are a number of aggravating factors, Mr. Europe does not have a significant or related record and the two-month duration of the human trafficking, while not insignificant, was not as long as often seen in such cases.
F. The Appropriate Sentence
[43] In my view, a six-year sentence would ordinarily be appropriate in cases of this nature. However, there are two factors which justify reducing the sentence in this case. The first is that Mr. Europe was charged with these offences in January 2019, over five years ago. There are numerous reasons why the proceedings took as long as they did, but none of them relate to any effort by Mr. Europe to delay the proceedings.[^2]
[44] Delay can be a mitigating factor in sentencing. As noted in R. v. Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243, 150 O.R. (3d) 224, at para. 115, “delay in sentencing causes prejudice to the offender and to society. The offender is unable to begin rebuilding a life, rehabilitation is impacted, and the offender lives with the anxiety of an uncertain future.” As in R. v. J.W., 2020 ONSC 5748, at para. 24, “[t]he offender is in a different place in his life than he was then.” See also Hussey-Rodrigues, at para. 49. Related to this is the time Mr. Europe has spent subject to strict bail conditions, as discussed earlier.
[45] The second is the impact the custodial sentence will have on Mr. Europe’s children. As noted in Spencer, at para. 47, these circumstances “demonstrate the wisdom of the restraint principle in determining the length of a prison term and the need to tailor that term to preserve the family as much as possible.”
[46] Having regard to all the factors, in my view the objectives of deterrence and denunciation are adequately met by imposing a sentence of five and a half years.
G. Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture
(i) Overview
[47] The Crown seeks a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $20,000 pursuant to s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code. The Crown submits that the money Mr. Europe took from L.G. is clearly the proceeds of crime and since it is apparently no longer available, the requirements of the section are met, and the court has no discretion with respect to whether the order should be made.
[48] It is true that once property has been determined to be the proceeds of crime and is no longer available for forfeiture, the court has only a limited discretion to decline to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture: R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392, at paras. 26-27; R. v. Abdelrazzaq, 2023 ONCA 112, 165 O.R. (3d) 721, at paras. 49-56. The amount of the fine is to be equal to the value of the property said to be the proceeds of crime: Lavigne, at para. 35; R. v. Schoer, 2019 ONCA 105, 371 C.C.C. (3d) 292, at paras. 95-96. However, this presupposes that the court has been able to quantify the value of the property.
(ii) Quantum
[49] In this case, the Crown seeks a fine in the amount of $20,000 based on L.G.’s evidence at trial. When asked during her testimony how much money she turned over to Mr. Europe, she said, “I don’t want to put a number on it … I would say over 20,000, could be more.” The Crown submits that since I accepted her evidence in this regard, I have already made a finding that the value of the proceeds of crime in this case was $20,000.
[50] This is not entirely accurate in my view. My acceptance of L.G.’s evidence on this point was in the context of considering whether Mr. Europe could rely on the statutory defence in s. 286.2(4)(a) to the offence of receiving a material benefit from the sale of sexual services, that is that he received the money in the context of a legitimate living arrangement. I concluded that he could not rely on the defence for two reasons. The first was that that it was statutorily unavailable by virtue of s. 286.2(5)(a) and (d). The second reason was described in para. 63:
Second, I accept L.G.’s evidence that she handed over all of her earnings to Mr. Europe and that this amounted to over $20,000. While I have not heard any evidence of what the rent was at the condominium L.G. and Mr. Europe lived in, I have no doubt that L.G.’s fair share of the living expenses would have been significantly less than what she gave to Mr. Europe.
[51] I accepted that L.G.’s best estimate was that she provided something over $20,000 to Mr. Europe and concluded that whatever her fair share of the living arrangements would have been, it was something less than what she gave him. I did not make a finding that the entire amount was the proceeds of crime.
[52] That said, I accept that Mr. Europe did profit from his crime and that he was in the possession of its proceeds. As noted, I have a very limited discretion with respect to imposing a fine, and I cannot impose a fine lower than the value of the proceeds of crime. However, I do have a discretion with respect to determining the value of the property: R. v. Dieckmann, 2017 ONCA 575, 355 C.C.C. (3d) 216, at paras. 89-91; R. v. Taylor, 2013 SKCA 33, 414 Sask. R. 15, at paras. 22-24.
[53] Based on this record, I conclude that the value of the proceeds in this case for the purpose of making an order pursuant to s. 462.37(3) is $15,000. While the amount may actually be much higher, this is the amount I am able to “safely award”: Taylor, at para. 24. There will therefore be a fine in lieu of forfeiture in that amount.
(iii) Time to Pay and Imprisonment in Default
[54] Mr. Europe shall have five years from the time the is released from custody to pay the fine. Section 467.37(4)(a)(ii) requires me to impose term of imprisonment in default of payment of between six and 12 months. I impose a term of eight months.
H. Restitution
[55] The Crown seeks a restitution order pursuant to s. 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The order will be made in favour of L.G. in the same amount as the fine in lieu of forfeiture and Mr. Europe shall have the same amount of time in which to pay it. To be clear, any amount paid in restitution is to be deducted from the fine and any amount paid towards the fine is to be used to satisfy the restitution order.
III. DISPOSITION
A. The Section 12 Charter Application
[56] The application is dismissed.
B. Sentence of Imprisonment
[57] The sentences are as follows:
• Count 1 - human trafficking: 5 ½ years (66 months);
• Count 2 – procuring: 2 years (24 months), concurrent;
• Count 3 - receiving a material benefit from human trafficking: 2 years (24 months) concurrent;
• Count 4 – receiving a material benefit from the sale of sexual services: 2 years (24 months), concurrent;
• Count 5 – advertising sexual services for consideration: 1 year (12 months), concurrent;
• Count 7 – aggravated assault: 3 years (36 months), concurrent;
• Count 8 – threatening death: 1 year (12 months), concurrent.
[58] By my count, Mr. Europe has spent 24 days in presentence custody, for which he is entitled to a credit of 36 days, or approximately one month and one week. For the seek of simplicity, I am prepared to round this up to two months. The sentence that remains to be served is therefore 64 months.
C. Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture and Restitution
[59] Mr. Europe is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $15,000.00 within five years of his release from custody with a period of imprisonment of eight months in default.
[60] Mr. Europe is ordered to make restitution in the amount of $15,000.00 to L.G. within five years of his release from custody. Any amount paid towards restitution is to be deducted from the fine and any amount paid towards the fine is to be applied to the restitution order.
D. Ancillary Orders
[61] Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, there will be an order that Mr. Europe be prohibited from possessing any of the items enumerated in s. 109(2)(a) for a period of 10 years and the items enumerated in s. 109(2)(b) for life.
[62] Pursuant to s. 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code, Mr. Europe is ordered to provide a sample of his DNA for inclusion in the national databank.
[63] Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Europe is prohibited from communicating directly or indirectly with L.G. during the custodial portion of his sentence.
Justice P.A. Schreck
Released: September 26, 2024
COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-50000131
DATE: 20240926
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
JUSTIN EUROPE
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
P.A. Schreck J.
Released: September 26, 2024
[^1]: An abbreviated version of these reasons was delivered orally in court on September 19, 2024. In the event of any inconsistency between those oral reasons and these written reasons, the written reasons should be taken as correct.
[^2]: The history of the proceedings are described in my ruling on Mr. Europe’s unsuccessful application pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, reported at 2024 ONSC 4867.