Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a traffic stop and subsequent search, alleging arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and racial profiling.

The court found that the police lacked statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act and reasonable suspicion for investigative detention, rendering the initial detention unlawful.

Furthermore, the court determined that racial stereotypes about Black criminality and dangerousness tainted the police's treatment of the accused throughout the interaction, leading to breaches of his ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court concluded that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, particularly the racial profiling, and the severe impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, warranted the exclusion of all seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Justin Europe, charged with human trafficking and related offences, sought to cross-examine the complainant about her prior sexual activity.

The Crown argued that s. 276 of the Criminal Code applied, requiring a formal application.

The court, applying the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, determined that s. 276 does not apply to human trafficking offences, following the precedent set in R. v. Williams, 2020 ONSC 206.

The court also rejected the common law requirement for a voir dire for such evidence.

While allowing questions about the complainant's involvement in the sex trade immediately prior to the alleged offences due to relevance to the "procuring" element, the court disallowed questions about her activities after the relationship ended, finding them to have marginal relevance.

The accused was convicted of possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, along with other offences.

The sentencing judge considered the principles of sentencing, aggravating factors (nature of fentanyl, criminal record), and limited mitigating factors.

The Crown sought a 7-year global sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or a custodial sentence of no more than an additional 2 years.

The court declined a conditional sentence due to the offender's criminal record and history of non-compliance with court orders.

A global sentence of 6 years incarceration was imposed, reduced by 1 year for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 years in custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The applicant, facing firearms charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to racial profiling during a police search and detention.

The court found that the safety search and subsequent search of his person, belongings, and vehicle were unlawful and tainted by unconscious racial bias, constituting breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

While the initial 10(b) rights during the Cannabis Control Act investigation were suspended due to brief roadside detention, the post-arrest delay in providing access to counsel was an unreasonable breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly given the serious nature of the racial profiling and the systemic issues it represents.

The firearm was excluded.

The accused, Roger Jaggernauth, was charged with attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The charges stemmed from a crossbow attack on Marlene Pimenta, his former partner, following a contentious separation and family law dispute over her financial investment in his home.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including Jaggernauth's strong motive, his solicitation of a "hitman" from a former biker club member (Paul Eakin), threatening utterances to his work supervisor (David Allan), and "heat conscious" after-the-fact conduct prior to being officially contacted by police.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jaggernauth orchestrated the attack with intent to kill and deliberately counselled murder.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of five constitutional questions (NCQs) raised by Indigenous respondents charged with various cannabis offences.

The respondents claimed their lands were not part of Canada, that cannabis laws infringed their traditional rights and economic well-being, and that the laws were part of genocide/apartheid, and that the Crown failed in its duty to consult.

The court summarily dismissed four of the five NCQs, finding them non-justiciable or without reasonable prospect of success (sovereignty, genocide/apartheid, economic well-being).

The fifth NCQ, regarding traditional use and trade of cannabis/hemp under s. 35 of the Charter, was not summarily dismissed, but the court ordered further case management due to delays in expert reports.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault against his intimate partner, who was pregnant, deaf, mute, and unconscious at the time of the attack.

The victim suffered life-threatening injuries.

The court considered the offender's substance abuse, remorse, and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a gross sentence of 7 years, reduced to 2 years, 6 months, and 11 days after applying credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs (fentanyl and xanax) causing the deaths of two people, and criminal negligence causing death.

The accused crossed the center line at high speed and struck the victims' vehicle head-on.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence and the need for general deterrence against the accused's significant mitigating factors, including his youth, lack of criminal record, severe childhood trauma that led to his opioid addiction, and his extensive rehabilitation efforts.

The court sentenced the accused to 5 years' imprisonment and imposed a 7-year driving prohibition.

The accused, facing charges of dangerous driving and trafficking large quantities of fentanyl, underwent a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that the passage of time, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a new release plan constituted material changes in circumstances warranting his release.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused was at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 or suffering severe harm from it in custody.

Furthermore, the proposed release plan lacked sufficient detail to address the significant secondary and tertiary ground concerns arising from the severity of the offences.

The court ordered the accused's continued detention.

The accused was found guilty of multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences after police located a sawed-off shotgun, ammunition, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana in his vehicle.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought one year.

The court considered the accused's youthful age, limited unrelated record, and strict bail conditions as mitigating factors, balanced against the aggravating factors of commercial drug trafficking and firearms possession.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, minus credits for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to adduce third‑party suspect evidence implicating other individuals in the killings.

The proposed evidence relied primarily on a witness’s recorded police statement alleging that one individual had confessed to committing the murders.

The court conducted a detailed hearsay analysis and held that the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the witness’s motive to fabricate, serious drug abuse, extensive criminal record, inconsistencies in her accounts, and the absence of meaningful cross‑examination.

The alleged confession was also inadmissible both as a declaration against penal interest and under the principled hearsay exception.

The court further declined to relax evidentiary rules for defence evidence because the statements were inherently unreliable.

Sentencing for two counts of possession of child pornography, criminal harassment, and breach of probation arising from sexually explicit materials involving children and persistent unwanted communications causing the complainant to fear for her safety.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, particularly given the offender's prior conviction for a sexual offence against a child, the disturbing content of a lengthy journal advocating sexual activity with children, and compelling psychiatric evidence of entrenched paraphilic interests and risk.

Applying proportionality, the court held the offender could not be sentenced on the basis of future dangerousness alone, but required a substantial penitentiary-equivalent sanction.

A global effective sentence of five years was imposed, realized through ten months' imprisonment after enhanced pre-sentence credit, followed by three years' probation and multiple ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample to an approved roadside screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial judge improperly relied on his silence to reject his credibility and erred in finding the police had articulable cause to stop his vehicle for suspected distracted driving.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge impermissibly linked the appellant’s pre‑trial silence to credibility findings, contrary to established appellate authority.

The court also found that the police lacked objectively discernible facts establishing articulable cause for the traffic stop, rendering the detention arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter.

Given the Charter breach and resulting investigative opportunity for unrelated offences, the court vacated the conviction and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The two accused were charged with multiple counts of robbery and use of an imitation firearm following three street robberies committed in less than an hour.

The Crown's case on identity relied heavily on the testimony of the driver of the getaway vehicle, an accomplice charged separately.

The court applied the Vetrovec principles to scrutinize the accomplice's evidence.

Despite inconsistencies in the accomplice's attempts to minimize his own involvement, the court found his identification of the accused reliable and corroborated by the victims' descriptions.

Both accused were found guilty as co-principals or aiders and abettors.

Four accused were jointly charged with offences relating to a loaded firearm discovered in a vehicle in which they were occupants.

Two accused faced additional counts of transporting, possessing, and controlling the firearm and related ammunition offences.

After the Crown closed its case, all accused sought directed verdicts of acquittal on the basis that the Crown had failed to establish a prima facie case of knowledge or control of the firearm.

The court held that mere presence in a vehicle containing a firearm, coupled with nervous behaviour and seat movements, was insufficient to establish knowledge or control beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly where another unidentified occupant fled the vehicle from the seat where the firearm was located.

Concluding that the circumstantial evidence could not permit a properly instructed jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court granted directed verdicts and acquitted all accused.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, criminal harassment, and two counts of breach of probation relating to his former intimate partner.

The complainant alleged the accused raped her after his parents stayed overnight at her home, and later harassed her with text messages.

The accused testified the sexual activity was consensual and the text messages were attempts to rekindle the relationship, supported by evidence from his father and a family friend.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and inconsistent, and the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on all charges.

The applicant, wanted in the United States for murder, sought a disclosure order against the Attorney General of Canada for information regarding the United States' involvement in his prior prosecution and conviction for the same murder in Jordan.

The applicant hoped to use this information to argue double jeopardy, abuse of process, and a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it was premature and that the extradition judge lacked jurisdiction to order disclosure from foreign authorities.

The court noted that double jeopardy issues and related disclosure requests are properly within the purview of the Minister of Justice during the surrender phase of the extradition process.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision granting bail to a young person committed for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued that under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the Criminal Code, only a superior court judge has jurisdiction to grant bail once a young person is committed for trial on a section 469 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the term 'proceeding' in sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act encompasses bail applications, and that the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over bail once the young person is deemed to have elected trial by judge and jury.

The provincial court judge's decision was quashed, and the young person was ordered into custody pending a proper bail hearing before a superior court judge.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

She argued the trial judge erred by using her pre-trial silence against her, failing to stay the proceedings due to a destroyed cell bay videotape, and rejecting her defence of involuntary intoxication from mixing prescription drugs with alcohol.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in drawing an adverse inference from her silence but applied the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings that the lost videotape was only marginally relevant and that the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a second trial for drug trafficking, the accused challenged the admissibility of 255 kilograms of cocaine found in his tractor-trailer and certain utterances he made to police.

The court found that the search of the trailer was a warrantless search for criminal evidence, not a valid regulatory inspection under the Highway Traffic Act, and thus violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court admitted the cocaine, finding the police acted in good faith, the accused had minimal privacy interest in the trailer, and society had a high interest in adjudicating the serious charge.

The court also ruled the accused's utterances were voluntary and admissible.