Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

Judge-alone criminal trial on a direct indictment alleging sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving three complainants who described events occurring while they were under 16.

The court reviewed the reasonable doubt standard, the W.(D.) framework, delayed and incremental disclosure principles, and cautions against myth-based reasoning in sexual offence cases.

The evidence relating to two complainants raised reliability concerns preventing findings beyond a reasonable doubt on sexual purpose or commission of the offences.

The court accepted the evidence of one complainant beyond a reasonable doubt and entered convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, while acquitting on the remaining two counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including discharging a firearm at a police officer during a gas station shootout and engaging in a 10-hour armed standoff at his boobytrapped home.

The police seized a massive arsenal of firearms, ammunition, and explosives from the residence.

The court weighed the extreme gravity of the offences, the offender's prior firearms record, and the breach of prohibition orders against mitigating factors including guilty pleas and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 18 years in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct—specifically, an incident of physical abuse against another child—to cross-examine the complainant's mother if she testified for the defence.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to the mother's credibility, not for propensity reasoning.

The court found the evidence constituted other discreditable conduct and applied the balancing test from R. v. L.B. The application was dismissed, as the potential prejudicial effect of distracting the jury with a collateral issue outweighed the weak probative value of the evidence.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the retrial was 46 months.

After deducting 10.8 months of defence delay and 8.2 months of discrete exceptional delay, the net delay was 27 months.

As this fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in Jordan, the court found the delay was reasonable and dismissed the application.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to approve a settlement under s. 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act regarding $195,110 in seized currency.

The currency was seized from a safe during a drug trafficking investigation.

The parties agreed to a settlement where $39,022 would be paid to the respondent's mother, and the remainder forfeited to the Crown.

The court found the currency was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity and approved the settlement as a reasonable compromise in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were involuntary, uninformed, and the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish that his pleas were invalid or that he suffered prejudice.

The court rejected the appellant's credibility, noting he admitted to lying to the court during his plea allocution to achieve his goals.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm, the defence applied for a mistrial after the Crown disclosed two screenshots mid-trial.

The defence had already aggressively cross-examined key Crown witnesses, suggesting they were lying about the existence of these screenshots because they had not been disclosed.

The court found that the late disclosure significantly prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence, as the defence's tactical approach was based on the non-disclosure.

Concluding that no lesser remedy such as an adjournment or jury instruction would suffice, the court granted the mistrial.

The applicant, charged with fraudulent personation, brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was facially invalid because it failed to sufficiently connect him to the IP address used in the offences or establish that a search of his new residence would afford evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained a sufficient circumstantial basis linking the applicant to the IP address and establishing reasonable grounds to believe electronic devices would be found at his residence.

The warrant was validly issued, and no Charter breach occurred.

The applicant, charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was calculated at 48 months.

The court deducted 19 months and 21 days of defence delay, primarily attributed to a late adjournment caused by defence counsel's failure to notice a potential s. 276 issue in the disclosure.

The resulting net delay of 28 months and 9 days fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional event that justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending his appeal of a sexual assault conviction and a 15-month sentence.

While the applicant met the criteria for showing the appeal was not frivolous and that he would surrender into custody, the court found his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court noted the applicant's recent diagnoses of severe mental health issues and subsequent charges for attempted murder and assault while on bail.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed, but the court ordered the appeal hearing to be expedited.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order on charges including possession of a loaded firearm and drug trafficking, after breaching his initial bail conditions.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan involving his parents as sureties and GPS monitoring.

However, conducting a de novo review, the court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to meet his onus on both the secondary and tertiary grounds due to the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences involving a loaded firearm and fentanyl, and concerns about the proposed sureties' ability to supervise him.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care for a severe foot fracture, resulting in permanent injury, and unlawfully placed the accused in administrative segregation for 79 days without proper justification or review.

Concluding that the state's conduct was egregious and offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency, the court held that this was one of the clearest of cases where a stay of proceedings was warranted to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The Crown applied to disqualify a lawyer, Mr. Goldstein, from assisting in the defence of Ms. Willett, the wife of his former client, Mr. Willett, whose trial was severed from hers.

The Crown argued a realistic risk of conflict of interest due to Mr. Goldstein's duties to his former client (Mr. Willett, whose appeal was pending) and his current client (Ms. Willett).

Ms. Willett and Mr. Willett asserted a joint defence and waived confidentiality, having received independent legal advice.

The court found a substantial risk that Ms. Willett's defence could inculpate Mr. Willett, undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application to remove Mr. Goldstein was granted.

The applicant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Justice of the Peace to receive private informations without government-issued photo identification, arguing it infringed on his Indigenous identity and sovereignty.

The court found that the act of receiving an information and administering the oath is ministerial and not subject to judicial review.

Even if reviewable, the Justice of the Peace did not err in requiring reliable identification.

The court also noted the proposed prosecution was vexatious due to previous similar actions and the applicant's insistence on "Torah Law." The application for mandamus was dismissed.

The Crown brought a s. 521 bail review application to vacate a release order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Justice of the Peace had released the accused without a bail hearing because the original signed information was not physically present in court, despite a signed warrant being before the court.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace erred in principle and acted in excess of jurisdiction, as the existence of a signed warrant compels the conclusion that a signed information exists.

The release order was vacated.

Conducting a new bail hearing, the court released the accused on a $5,000 recognizance with a surety and conditions, noting the complainant had recanted.

The offender was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm and three counts of breach of probation after attacking his cellmate in a correctional centre over a dispute about food.

The victim suffered fractured ribs, cuts requiring stitches, and bruising.

The court found the custodial setting to be an aggravating factor, as the victim was defenceless in a confined space.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for the assault, less 2.5 months of pre-sentence credit, and concurrent 6-month sentences for the breaches, followed by three years of probation.

The accused applied for a bail review.

In this addendum to the original reasons, the court amended the terms of release on consent of the parties.

The accused was granted judicial interim release upon entering into a $50,000 recognizance with one named surety and subject to various conditions, including house arrest, a weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant, a physically disabled woman, died before the trial concluded, and her videotaped police interview was admitted into evidence.

The appellant argued that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to a four-year delay, that the videotaped statement was insufficiently reliable, and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding digital penetration.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's delay analysis, her admission of the hearsay statement under the principled exception, or her assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving, and that the refusal evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to a section 9 breach.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's acceptance of the officer's evidence was reasonable despite missing notes, and that the appellant's flight from police combined with other indicia of impairment provided objective reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The offender was convicted of four counts of fraud over $5000 after defrauding four victims of a total of $261,000 by falsely posing as a wealthy investor and philanthropist.

The court found the offender's cultivation and breach of the victims' trust to be a significant aggravating factor.

The offender was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment (reflecting 18 months less 6 months' pre-trial credit), followed by two years' probation.

The court also ordered restitution of $172,000 and imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the same amount, with a consecutive two-year sentence in default of payment.