Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The respondent was convicted after a jury trial of assault by choking, assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and criminal harassment against the victim.

He was acquitted of uttering a threat to cause death.

The Crown sought judicial determination of facts for sentencing purposes and for a s. 752.1 assessment.

The respondent challenged the credibility and reliability of the victim's evidence on several material points, including who initiated contact, the frequency of meetings, and who informed the respondent of his mother's death.

The court conducted a thorough credibility assessment of both witnesses and made findings on the disputed facts, ultimately accepting the victim's evidence as more reliable and credible despite some inconsistencies.

The accused, Sylvie Marshall, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine into Canada.

The court, in its sentencing decision, determined that she imported a minimum of 8.5 kilograms of cocaine.

The court rejected her claims that she was compelled by threats from her former husband and that she was unaware of the illicit contents of the cans, finding her testimony inconsistent and lacking credibility.

While acknowledging the history of abuse she suffered, the court concluded it conditioned her actions rather than compelling them.

Considering aggravating factors, including the substantial quantity of cocaine and the involvement of her eight-year-old son, and mitigating factors such as her status as a first offender, her efforts towards rehabilitation, and her remorse, the court imposed a sentence of seven years imprisonment.

Daniel Fagan pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors (discharging the firearm in public) and significant mitigating factors (youth, first offender, guilty plea, remorse, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life).

The Crown sought 3-3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the gravity of discharging a firearm in public, imposing a custodial sentence of two years less a day (509 days after credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail terms), followed by two years of probation.

In a first-degree murder and attempted murder trial, the accused applied to exclude a surveillance video and audio recording, arguing it was more prejudicial than probative.

The court found portions of the recording to have probative value regarding the accused's mens rea, the timing of events, and animus towards the victim.

However, the court ruled that audio captured after 3:56:50, which depicted frantic calls for the deceased, lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial.

Consequently, the video and audio up to 3:56:50 were admitted, while the audio thereafter was excluded.

The accused, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied for an order allowing defence counsel to deliver an opening statement immediately after the Crown's opening.

The Crown opposed, arguing a lack of special circumstances, the risk of the defence not calling evidence, and that the proposed opening would be impermissible argument.

The court granted the application, finding that the jury would benefit from understanding the narrow focus of the defence (conceding actus reus but disputing mens rea) from the outset.

The judge reasoned that concerns about over-promising or impermissible content are inherent to all opening statements and can be adequately addressed by standard jury instructions, and that there was no realistic danger of the defence failing to call evidence in this case.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior physical altercations with his wife in a first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The accused was charged with starting a fire at his in-laws' home, resulting in his mother-in-law's death and injury to his wife, daughters, and father-in-law.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive and state of mind, providing context for the marital relationship.

The defence argued it had minimal probative value, lacked specific details, and carried significant prejudice by portraying the accused as a "domestic abuser" and feeding stereotypes.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the evidence had little to no probative value as it was not necessary to understand the relationship's dynamic and was too dissimilar to the charged offences to infer murderous intent.

While the prejudicial effect was minimal, the lack of probative value meant it did not outweigh the prejudice, thus rendering it inadmissible.

This decision addresses an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code by the defendants to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The complainant testified she was plied with drugs and alcohol and procured for sexual services.

The defendants sought to introduce cellphone location data showing the complainant at hotels providing sexual services independently prior to meeting them.

The court found the evidence relevant to challenge the procurement claim and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to restrictions on salacious details.

The application was allowed, permitting cross-examination on these activities.

The Crown applied for an order to produce the complainant's private medical and cell phone records to the defence prior to a trial for human trafficking offences.

The complainant was uncooperative and opposed the use of her records.

The court adjourned the application, ruling that the complainant must first be fully informed of her statutory rights to attend, participate, and obtain funded counsel before the common law O'Connor procedure could be applied.

The accused, facing charges of assault and sexual assault, brought a motion for a Rowbotham order, seeking state-funded counsel.

The court found that Legal Aid had refused his application and that he lacked the financial means to retain counsel, despite earning too much to qualify for Legal Aid.

Crucially, the court determined that representation by counsel was essential for the accused to receive a fair trial, given his limited education, lack of litigation experience, and poor oral communication skills, which would hinder his ability to make full answer and defence in an eight-day jury trial.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings unless the Ministry of the Attorney General arranged for counsel.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (a handgun and statements) obtained during a police investigation.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the accused and unlawfully seized and searched his satchel, violating his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court rejected the claim of racial profiling but found the police conduct to be overzealous and egregious.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the charges.

This criminal trial concerned charges of sexual assault, using an imitation firearm, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant, Zoe Pessoa, and the accused, Alpha McLeod, who claimed the sexual activity was consensual and arranged via an escort website.

The court found Mr. McLeod's testimony to be inconsistent and contradictory, disbelieving his account.

Conversely, the complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable, supported by consistent testimony and corroborating facts.

Mr. McLeod was found guilty on counts of sexual assault, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement.

The appellant, Dimitrios A. Maniatis, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, alleging two reversible errors by the trial judge: failure to resolve a material inconsistency between the complainant's and an independent witness's evidence, and material misapprehension of the independent witness's testimony regarding his ability to observe the incident.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies by attributing them to the complainant being asleep and the witness's initial misperception, and that it was open to the trial judge to accept the independent witness's evidence regarding his observations.

A jury found the accused guilty of child luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child, involving communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The court considered the circumstances of the offences, the accused's background (first offender, difficult childhood, mental health issues, low risk to reoffend, significant collateral consequences), and the parties' sentencing positions.

The Crown sought 30 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 14 months.

The court rejected the Crown's proposed sentencing range of three to five years for these offences, aligning with the view that a new range has not yet been definitively established post-Friesen.

It also found that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence, despite mitigating factors.

The Crown brought an application seeking reconsideration of the admissibility of evidence of prior discreditable conduct statements made by the accused to police in 2013.

The Crown argued that the accused's re-election to a judge-alone trial constituted a material change in circumstances justifying reconsideration.

The court found that while the evidence had some probative value, its prejudicial effect, particularly the danger of moral prejudice and undermining trial fairness, significantly outweighed its probative value, even in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was denied.

Defence counsel for Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Wright brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging that Crown counsel adduced impermissible bad character evidence ("snitches get stitches") during re-examination of a witness, thereby wounding trial fairness.

The Crown argued the re-examination was appropriate given the cross-examination.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the defence was prejudiced by a prior ruling limiting cross-examination on a witness's inconsistent statements, this could be remedied by allowing further cross-examination.

The court concluded that the "snitches get stitches" evidence, while potentially prejudicial, did not rise to the level requiring a mistrial, especially with proper jury instructions, and did not constitute a "catastrophic" defect to trial fairness.

The accused, G.D., faced historical sexual abuse charges.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to the complainant, his niece, during two telephone conversations, without proving voluntariness under the confessions rule.

The accused argued the complainant was a "person in authority" because he believed she was a parole officer and could initiate criminal proceedings.

The court examined the "person in authority" requirement, particularly in light of R. v. Hodgson, and concluded that for the confessions rule to apply, the recipient of the statement must actually be an agent of the state or capable of influencing the prosecution, in addition to the accused's reasonable belief.

Since the complainant was not acting on behalf of investigating authorities, her status as a private citizen meant the confessions rule did not apply.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to file their expert pathologist's report as a numbered exhibit, which the Crown opposed.

The report detailed the pathologist's critique of the Crown's expert and offered opinions on the timing of injuries, which could support the defence's theory.

The court denied the request, citing the convention against filing expert reports as exhibits, concerns about them acting as prior consistent statements, and the risk of overemphasizing expert evidence without the full context of cross-examination.

The judge also noted the imprecision of the scientific methods for aging injuries and the potential for misuse if the report was admitted without express caveats.

Sentencing following jury convictions for possession of prohibited substances and possession of MDMA/methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police stopped the accused for Highway Traffic Act concerns and discovered 1,077 ecstasy pills with an estimated street value between approximately $10,770 and $21,540, along with smaller quantities of other drugs.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record including drug offences, breaches of court orders, and domestic assaults, and had demonstrated poor compliance with community supervision.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount in serious trafficking offences and that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the offender’s history and the quantity of drugs involved.

A global penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years was imposed with ancillary DNA and forfeiture orders.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and that the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that there was some circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, such as the setting of multiple fires and the use of an accelerant.

The court also held that a failure to consider the whole of the evidence is not a jurisdictional error reviewable by certiorari when an accused is committed for trial under section 548(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder trial, the court considered whether the partial defence of provocation should be left with the jury.

The accused had armed himself with a hammer before confronting the victim, anticipating a violent response.

When the victim reached for a sword, the accused attacked him.

The court applied the air of reality test and found no evidence that the victim's reaction was sudden or unexpected by the accused.

Consequently, the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality and was not left with the jury.