Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused was found guilty by a jury of sexual interference and child luring against his intimate partner's 10- or 11-year-old daughter.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse involving a breach of trust.

The court rejected the defence's request for a conditional sentence, finding it manifestly unfit given the gravity of the offences.

The accused was sentenced to a total of 6.5 years in custody (5.5 years for sexual interference and 1 year consecutive for child luring), less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with various ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order.

The applicant, facing charges of fraud over $5000 for allegedly defrauding victims of $20 million, sought a bail review after being detained on primary and tertiary grounds.

He argued the initial justice erred in relying on his unwillingness to surrender from Indonesia and that new Charter applications and an enhanced release plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error in the initial decision and concluding that the new evidence and reshuffled sureties did not amount to a material change in circumstances.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and firearms offences following a targeted shooting where the victim was shot at 28 times but survived.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell tower data, and the accused's subsequent use of the rental vehicle involved in the shooting.

The court applied the test for circumstantial evidence, assessing whether guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's identity as the driver during the shooting, noting inconsistencies in the phone records and alternative reasonable inferences.

The accused was found not guilty on all charges.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal harassment against her former domestic partner.

The trial judge had convicted the self-represented appellant after rejecting her evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.(D.) test and provided insufficient reasons regarding the elements of the offence, specifically whether the complainant was repeatedly followed and whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, broke into a home while intoxicated and briefly touched the buttocks of a 13-year-old victim in her bedroom.

He was convicted of break and enter to commit an indictable offence and sexual interference.

The court found the Kienapple principle did not apply to stay the sexual interference charge, as the offences protect different societal interests.

Weighing the aggravating factor of a home invasion against significant mitigating factors including the offender's pro-social background and rehabilitation prospects, the court rejected the Crown's request for a seven-year sentence and imposed a concurrent 15-month sentence followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80 care and control' after being found asleep in his parked vehicle, which was blocking a commercial driveway.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis that the vehicle's position created a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, satisfying the third limb of the test for care and control.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his limited participation in the fatal beating of a victim.

The court considered the offender's background, including his exposure to systemic racism as a Black man, but found it to be of limited mitigating significance given the gravity of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of three years and 355 days.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction trial judge's decision to exclude a toxicology report due to late disclosure under s. 7 and s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The accused argued the late disclosure prevented him from making an informed decision about applying for the provincial ignition interlock program.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that there is no constitutionally protected right to drive or to participate in the discretionary interlock program.

The Charter violation was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application challenging decisions by correctional authorities to reclassify him from medium to maximum security and to transfer him to a maximum security institution in Saskatchewan.

He argued the evidence relied upon by correctional authorities was insufficient, that disclosure was inadequate, and that Gladue principles and community connections weighed against the decisions.

The court reviewed both public and sealed affidavit evidence pursuant to Mission Institution v. Khela and found the correctional authorities lawfully withheld certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act while providing sufficient summaries for procedural fairness.

The court held that the decisions to reclassify and transfer the inmate were reasonable, transparent, and supported by reliable evidence.

The habeas corpus application was dismissed.

The defence brought a pre-trial application seeking an order to make an opening statement to the jury immediately after the Crown's opening address, rather than at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the discretion should not be exercised, especially since the defence would not undertake to call evidence.

The court balanced the risks of an early statement against fairness issues and the special circumstances of the case, including the defence's intention to concede guilt on a secondary count to focus the jury on the primary count of second-degree murder.

The court granted the application, finding an early, targeted opening by the defence appropriate.

The applicant sought Charter relief arising from a brief roadside stop during a police search for escaped youths.

The court held the officers had articulable cause to stop the truck to determine whether its occupants were the missing youths, and that the detention was justified under the common law investigative detention power.

After the officers observed the driver switch seats with a rear passenger, the court found there were fresh grounds for a regulatory detention and licence inquiry under the Highway Traffic Act.

Although the Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach and abandoned reliance on the applicant's admission, the application was dismissed.

Sentencing following convictions for multiple sexual offences against a minor in a familial relationship.

The offender sexually abused his common-law stepdaughter over a prolonged period between the ages of 10 and 18, escalating from touching to sexual intercourse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives in cases involving sexual abuse of children and rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence.

Aggravating factors included abuse of trust, the victim’s age, and the devastating impact on the victim and family.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed despite mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and advanced age.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

In a voir dire during a criminal prosecution for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought a ruling that the accused’s videotaped police statement was voluntary and admissible.

The defence argued the statement was improperly induced because police referenced the accused’s family being in trouble due to the intercepted drug package.

Applying the confessions rule and the contextual approach from leading Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court considered whether police conduct amounted to a threat or promise capable of overbearing the accused’s will.

The court found no quid pro quo or inducement linking the accused’s cooperation to leniency for himself or his family.

The videotaped statement was therefore found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from his cellular phone following his arrest.

Police seized the phone from a relative in the parking lot of the police detachment shortly after the accused surrendered and conducted a cursory search of text messages without a warrant.

The court held that the seizure and search were lawful as searches incidental to arrest, given the temporal and geographic proximity to the arrest and reasonable grounds to believe the phone contained evidence of the offence.

The search was limited and focused on relevant messages.

In the alternative, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) following the Grant framework.

The accused was sentenced after a jury conviction on eight counts of tax evasion under the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act arising from failure to report approximately $1.5 million in income from a foreign exchange trading education business and failure to remit GST between 2003 and 2006.

The total tax evaded was approximately $475,000.

The court emphasized that general deterrence is the primary sentencing objective for tax evasion offences because the integrity of the taxation system depends on voluntary compliance.

Despite the offender’s lack of prior record and personal hardships following the charges, the court found significant aggravating factors including deliberate concealment of income and breach of trust regarding GST funds.

A custodial sentence was imposed along with a fine of 150% of the taxes evaded.

The accused police officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from injuries sustained by an individual during a G20 demonstration at Queen’s Park.

The Crown alleged the officer struck the individual with a shield and baton or used excessive force while moving him.

The court considered three theories of liability based on eyewitness testimony and video evidence.

The judge found significant reliability and credibility issues with the key identification witness and concluded the video evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused struck the individual or used excessive force.

The Crown failed to establish any theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application concerning the forfeiture and destruction of devices seized during a criminal investigation involving materials potentially subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed the draft order submitted on consent by the parties and determined that it should issue with modifications requiring a detailed report describing the manner in which the seized devices and forensic images were destroyed.

The court held that judicial supervision over materials seized from a law office includes oversight of their ultimate destruction in order to preserve confidence in the protection of solicitor-client privilege.

The parties were invited to make written submissions regarding the proposed amendments before the order would be finalized.