Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The applicant, F.N., sought bail after being charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following the poisoning of two young children with sodium nitrite, resulting in one fatality.

The court considered the three grounds for detention under the Criminal Code, with particular focus on the tertiary ground, which assesses whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite the applicant presenting strong sureties and a reasonable release plan, the court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be formidable, given the applicant's access to the chemical and familiarity with the victims' household.

The gravity of the offence, involving the deliberate poisoning of defenceless children, was deemed extremely high.

The application for bail was dismissed, as the court concluded that a reasonable, informed member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released under these circumstances.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges arising from repeated sexual abuse allegations made by his daughter over many years during her childhood.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant credible and reliable despite discrepancies in timing, relying in part on detailed evidence about the family home and a distinctive tattoo on the accused that strongly corroborated her account.

The court rejected suggested motives to fabricate based on support for a spouse's complaint and family conflict over sexual orientation.

The Crown proved incest, the charged historical sexual offence against a young person, and sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, Andre Cunningham, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including attempted murder and firearms offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace made two material errors in principle during the initial bail hearing: misapprehending evidence regarding the applicant's alleged gang affiliation and misinterpreting the mother's testimony about identifying her son in surveillance video.

Despite these errors warranting a new de novo bail hearing, the court conducted its own assessment of the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the proposed surety plan inadequate given the applicant's history of non-compliance while living with sureties, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic but found it did not override the primary considerations for detention, especially without evidence of an outbreak in the facility or the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities.

Consequently, the applicant was ordered detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused, Stephen Lewis, charged with sexual assault, sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding a ten-year-old statement about an unrelated alleged assault by her former common-law spouse.

The Crown opposed this, arguing it was irrelevant and prejudicial.

The court dismissed the defence's application, finding the proposed cross-examination lacked probative value and carried significant prejudicial effect, potentially distracting the jury with collateral issues.

This decision addresses two applications for certiorari brought by the Crown, RCMP, and Ottawa Police Services to quash lower court rulings that ordered the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs in drug-impaired driving cases.

The Superior Court considered the impact of recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) on the relevance and disclosability of these logs, particularly in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Stipo.

The court found that the Code amendments constituted a significant change in circumstances, but ultimately concluded that the amendments do not alter the requirement for disclosure of rolling logs where the DRE's opinion is not corroborated by toxicological results.

However, where toxicological analysis does corroborate the DRE's call, the rolling log is no longer relevant to challenge the DRE's opinion.

The court indicated it would quash the disclosure orders in the specific cases at hand because the DRE calls were corroborated by toxicology, but declined to issue a mandamus order.

The defendant, F.E., was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of C.K., a person with a mental disability in a relationship of dependency.

The Crown presented evidence including C.K.'s videotaped statements, medical findings of sexual activity and a sexually transmitted disease, and DNA evidence of F.E.'s semen and C.K.'s DNA on a towel.

The defence argued inconsistencies in C.K.'s statements and presented testimony from F.E.'s wife (A.C.) and son (L.C.) denying the incidents.

The court found C.K.'s testimony credible, explaining inconsistencies due to fear and dependency, and found the DNA evidence to be powerful corroboration.

The court rejected the defence witnesses' credibility, finding them motivated by shame and a desire to protect F.E. F.E. was found guilty on both counts.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 4.6 kilograms of opium into Canada, concealed inside an air compressor shipped from Iran.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought three to three and a half years, citing the offender's status as a first-time offender and the recent cancer diagnosis of his wife as a collateral consequence.

The court found insufficient evidence to reduce the sentence based on collateral consequences and sentenced the offender to four years and six months imprisonment, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with robbery following a home invasion where three individuals stole electronics and a wallet.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically a single partial fingerprint found on a solarium door frame that matched the accused.

None of the victims or co-accused could identify the accused.

Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the fingerprint during the robbery, as there were other plausible explanations for its presence.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant, charged with aggravated assault, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on alleged breaches of her section 8 and 10 rights.

The court found that a police officer conducted an unreasonable strip search in the field without a caution, violating section 8.

The court also found a section 10(b) breach when a portion of the applicant's telephone call with duty counsel was inadvertently recorded.

However, the court dismissed the remaining Charter claims, including the allegation that videotaping the applicant using the toilet in a holding cell violated section 8.

The court declined to order a stay of proceedings, instead excluding utterances made during the search and the recorded portions of the call with counsel under section 24(2).

The applicant, Ian Bush, sought a stay of proceedings due to an alleged breach of his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court considered the total delay, defence delay, and exceptional circumstances, including the agreement to switch trial dates for a triple murder trial and an attempt murder trial to avoid prejudice from pre-trial publicity.

The court found the switch in trial dates constituted an exceptional circumstance and that the total delay was within the presumptive ceiling or justified by transitional exceptions.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied to introduce similar fact evidence of three murders (the "Garon murders") committed by the accused, Ian Bush, in 2007, at his trial for the attempted murder of Ernest Côté in 2014.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to prove intent, arguing striking similarities between the acts.

The defence conceded the probative value but argued overwhelming prejudice.

The court, applying the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, denied the Crown's application, finding that the highly inflammatory nature and gravity of the triple murders would overwhelmingly prejudice the jury, outweighing the probative value, and that a limiting instruction would be ineffective.

The applicant sought to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence obtained through police surveillance, arguing that observations made in a condominium parking garage and common areas constituted warrantless and unreasonable searches under section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and that the police conduct fell within the implied license doctrine, thus upholding the search warrant's validity.

The appellant, Xueming Yang, appealed his conviction for 'over 80' and failing to stop at a red light, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant claimed counsel failed to interview a key witness and file a Charter application regarding arbitrary detention.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

It concluded that even if a Charter application had been pursued, there was no reasonable possibility of acquittal because the police officer had reasonable grounds for the traffic stop, and the appellant's credibility was significantly undermined by his immigration motivations for the appeal and inconsistent testimony.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases following a preliminary inquiry as per R. v. Jordan.

The court identified 13 months of defence-caused delay, including unavailability of counsel, re-election for a preliminary inquiry, conflict of interest by original counsel, and rejection of earlier trial dates.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that they took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The sole ground of appeal argued that the trial judge improperly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by diminishing the weight of the defence evidence because the defence version was not put to Crown witnesses during cross-examination.

The appellate court held that trial judges retain discretion in determining how to address a breach of the rule, including considering the failure to cross-examine when assessing credibility.

The court found that defence counsel had the opportunity to seek recall of witnesses after the issue was raised but chose not to do so.

The trial judge’s treatment of the issue was a permissible exercise of discretion and did not amount to reversible error.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from incidents involving his intimate partner, as well as the resulting intermittent custodial sentence and probation order.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly relied on the rule in Browne v. Dunn when assessing credibility.

The court held that the trial judge was largely correct in finding that several aspects of the appellant’s testimony had not been properly put to the complainant in cross-examination and was entitled to reduce the weight of that evidence.

Any minor factual errors were insignificant and did not materially affect the reasoning or outcome.

The sentence was also found to be within the appropriate range given the seriousness of the injuries and the domestic context.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a reasonable doubt about whether the accused’s breath samples were analyzed by an approved instrument.

The doubt arose from a calibration certificate referring to an “Intoxilyzer 8000” while the qualified technician’s certificate referred to an “Intoxilyzer 8000C,” which is the approved Canadian instrument.

The Crown also sought to introduce fresh expert evidence clarifying that the distinction relates only to software and that the calibration certificate is standard for both models.

The court held that the trial judge’s conclusion was open on the evidence and that the alleged misapprehension of evidence was not material.

The proposed fresh evidence was rejected because the Crown failed to meet the due diligence requirement under the Palmer test.

The appeal from acquittal was therefore dismissed.

Sentencing for possession of crack cocaine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, together with multiple breaches of recognizance and probation.

The offender was arrested outside an Ottawa bar with significant quantities of cocaine and crack cocaine concealed on his person.

Although aggravating factors included a prior criminal record, youth involvement with violent offences, and commission of the offences while on probation and bail, the court treated serious police Charter breaches during the arrest and search as a mitigating factor.

The court imposed a global sentence reflecting denunciation and deterrence but granted substantial credit for police misconduct and pre‑sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court reanalyzed the delay and found that several periods had been mischaracterized by the trial judge, including delay attributable to the Crown’s failure to disclose an expert toxicology report and institutional delays related to scheduling and transcript availability.

The court concluded that approximately 15 months and 10 days of delay were attributable to the Crown or institutional causes, exceeding the guideline for provincial court trials.

The appellant demonstrated both actual and inferred prejudice from the delay.

The conviction was therefore stayed for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Sentencing following a jury conviction for fraud over $5000 arising from a tax refund scheme involving falsified charitable donation receipts.

The offender, a tax preparer, filed 26 fraudulent returns over three taxation years, generating approximately $129,381 in improper refunds, though his personal gain was estimated at about $31,500.

The defence sought a conditional sentence while the Crown requested a custodial term.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary objectives for mid‑range fraud of this scale and that a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the principles of sentencing under ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

A custodial sentence followed by probation was imposed.