Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused was charged with attempted murder and firearms offences following a drive-by shooting.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the firearm used and the getaway vehicle.

The court found that while the accused was involved as the driver of the vehicle, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite mens rea for party liability to attempted murder, as there was insufficient evidence he knew the shooter intended to kill the victim.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of the firearms offences.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and prostitution-related offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of sections 286.3 and 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision that declared the provisions unconstitutional.

The court declined to follow the prior decision, finding it plainly wrong in its conclusion that Parliament allowed the sale of sexual services.

Instead, the court followed other concurrent decisions upholding the provisions, ruling that the trial would proceed and the constitutional challenge would be fully litigated after the evidence is called.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude wiretap evidence obtained during a police investigation into the manufacturing and trafficking of converted firearms.

They argued that the police failed to demonstrate the existence of a criminal organization, failed to establish investigative necessity, and engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation that subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found that while there were insufficient grounds to establish a criminal organization and some misrepresentations existed in the affidavits, the investigative necessity requirement was met for the firearms offences.

After excising the misleading information, the court concluded that the authorizing judge could still have granted the authorizations.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the evidence, finding no deliberate attempt to subvert the prior authorization process.

The application was dismissed.

The offender, a 27-year-old man with intellectual delays and a traumatic upbringing, was found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his girlfriend's 8-year-old daughter, who had special needs.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court entered convictions only for sexual interference.

Emphasizing the Supreme Court's direction in Friesen that sentences for sexual offences against children must prioritize denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 4 years' imprisonment and imposed various ancillary orders, including a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after striking the victim with a baseball bat during a confrontation, causing the victim to fall down stairs and die.

The offender had a precarious medical condition, including a cerebral aneurysm, making incarceration potentially fatal.

The court accepted a joint submission from the Crown and defence, sentencing the offender to a 20-month conditional sentence of imprisonment after crediting 24 months for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused sought a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds in relation to multiple alleged sexual assaults and robberies against sex workers.

The applicant argued that the justice of the peace erred by undermining the presumption of innocence and misapplying the tertiary ground, and that new evidence regarding GPS or RF ankle monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the justice of the peace properly applied the presumption of innocence and was entitled to comment on the strength of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles from St-Cloud, the court found no error in the tertiary ground analysis and concluded that the proposed electronic monitoring did not constitute a material change affecting the detention decision.

The bail review was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on one count of criminal harassment and eight counts of breach of undertaking arising from communications made through a child communication book and a church website post.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant experienced reasonable fear, and also accepted the accused’s evidence that he honestly believed the undertaking did not prohibit use of the communication book used for child-related communication.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge improperly relied on the absence of prior consistent statements and erred in assessing the mens rea for breach of undertaking.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility, and that his findings regarding reasonable fear and honest belief were open on the evidence and entitled to deference.

No error of law was established.

In a first-degree murder prosecution involving an alleged domestic homicide, the Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking admission of ante mortem statements made by the deceased to friends regarding the nature of her relationship with the accused.

The defence opposed admission on the basis of the hearsay rule and the rule excluding bad character evidence.

The court held the statements satisfied the principled exception to the hearsay rule because necessity was established by the declarant’s death and threshold reliability could be assessed through available corroboration and cross-examination of witnesses.

The court further concluded that the probative value of the statements concerning the relationship, the deceased’s state of mind, and the accused’s potential motive outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The statements were ruled admissible at trial.

The accused applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder arising from a drive-by shooting that killed a bystander.

Because the charge was a s. 469 offence, the application proceeded on a reverse onus.

The court found no significant risk on the primary or secondary grounds, emphasizing the accused’s lack of criminal record, educational background, community ties, and voluntary surrender to police shortly after the incident.

On the tertiary ground, the court concluded that although the offence was extremely serious, the strength of the Crown’s case on the accused’s prior knowledge of the shooting was not overwhelming and multiple reasonable inferences remained available.

Given the proposed stringent surety plan and the accused’s circumstances, the court held that public confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release.

During a jury trial, the defence requested that the trial judge include a Vetrovec warning in the jury charge concerning the credibility of the complainant and another Crown witness due to their criminal histories and credibility concerns.

The court considered the governing principles regarding when a special caution to the jury about unreliable witnesses is appropriate.

The judge held that the complainant did not fall within a category of witnesses requiring such a warning because his credibility issues were apparent and could be assessed by the jury without special instruction.

However, the court exercised its discretion to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding the second witness, whose extensive criminal record included crimes of dishonesty and whose testimony conflicted with police evidence.

The jury would therefore be cautioned to scrutinize that witness’s evidence and consider whether it was confirmed by other evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief under $5,000 and breach of an undertaking arising from the slashing of vehicle tires.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence that the appellant had previously threatened the complainant and his family and made comments about the complainant’s vehicle tires.

No voir dire was conducted to determine whether this prior discreditable conduct evidence had probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect.

The appeal court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless properly assessed through a voir dire.

Because the trial judge relied on this evidence in assessing guilt, the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error.

The accused was charged with assault and manslaughter in relation to the death of his infant son, who suffered catastrophic brain injuries consistent with violent shaking or acceleration-deceleration trauma.

The Crown’s case was circumstantial and relied on medical evidence, witness testimony, admissions made to acquaintances, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

Expert evidence established that the injuries were non-accidental and occurred within a narrow time window during which the accused was caring for the infant.

Additional circumstantial evidence included prior rough handling of the infant, incriminating statements to a former partner, and flight from the jurisdiction after the incident.

Considering the cumulative effect of the evidence, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused inflicted the injuries causing death.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the verdicts were unsupported by the evidence and that the trial judge erred in credibility findings, the application of the W.(D.) test, and the dismissal of a Charter application under ss. 10(b) and 24(2).

The appellant also argued that the absence of video recording equipment in the police breath room should have led to adverse inferences against the Crown’s evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge made no palpable or overriding errors of fact and correctly applied the relevant burdens and standards of proof.

The court found that credibility findings and the assessment of the absence of video evidence were matters within the trial judge’s discretion and entitled to deference.

The convictions were supported by the evidence, and no miscarriage of justice was established.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding an unequivocal refusal, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to properly consider the impact of an officer’s misstatement regarding the right to counsel, the absence of a final warning, and the short time between demand and arrest.

The court held that refusal may be inferred from conduct and statements and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant constructively refused by repeatedly delaying and refusing to comply.

The officer’s incorrect statement about the right to counsel did not materially mislead the appellant and did not undermine the clarity of the demand.

The appellate court found the trial judge’s reasons sufficient and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to permit a late Charter application under s. 24(1) after an earlier s. 24(2) exclusion application had failed.

The proposed remedy sought to prevent the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity under the Criminal Code following a finding of a minor s. 8 breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion to control proceedings and enforce compliance with procedural notice rules governing Charter applications.

Given the late timing, non‑compliance with notice requirements, and minimal seriousness of the underlying breach, the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing to entertain the application.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under ss. 462.37 and 462.41 of the Criminal Code seeking forfeiture of funds representing proceeds of crime following the respondent’s guilty plea to fraud and money laundering involving approximately $2.8 million taken from his employer.

A third-party corporation claimed an interest in the proceeds as a secured creditor based on a collateral mortgage and judgment arising from municipal servicing work performed on lands purchased with the fraud proceeds.

The court held the third party had not received actual notice of a certificate of pending litigation affecting the property and qualified as a secured creditor, but only up to the stated principal amount of the registered mortgage.

Balancing the equities between the victim of the fraud and the innocent third party, the court exercised discretion to order partial return of funds corresponding to the proportionate benefit conferred on the offender’s property.

The remainder of the funds were forfeited.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of alleged post‑offence sexual activity with the deceased and related internet searches to support an inference of planning and deliberation.

The court considered jurisprudence on the use of post‑offence conduct evidence and the risk of prejudice, including guidance from appellate authorities regarding jury misuse of such evidence.

Although the evidence was potentially relevant, the court found that it was highly inflammatory and not consistent only with the ultimate conclusion of guilt.

The probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The Crown was therefore precluded from leading certain forensic evidence and from referencing the internet searches, subject to possible use in cross‑examination if the accused testified and put the timing of intercourse in issue.

The accused, charged with first degree murder involving the alleged use of a long gun, sought permission to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on potential bias relating to long gun ownership and gun control attitudes.

The defence proposed a series of voir dire questions aimed at uncovering juror views on long gun laws, gun regulation, and firearm ownership.

In support of the application, the defence called a retired police officer who conducted informal polling and internet research regarding public attitudes toward firearms.

The court held that the evidence failed to establish a widespread community bias regarding long gun ownership capable of creating a realistic potential for juror partiality.

Finding the polling evidence unreliable and insufficient under the test articulated in governing jurisprudence, the application to permit the proposed challenge for cause was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge refused an adjournment where no qualified Tamil interpreter was available for the accused.

The trial judge declined to proceed with a conditionally accredited interpreter who had recently been found unqualified in another case and refused the Crown’s last-minute adjournment request.

The appellate court held the trial judge was entitled to accept defence counsel’s representation that an interpreter was necessary and that his refusal to adjourn was a discretionary decision owed deference.

The court further held that trial judges are not required to conduct a fresh inquiry into interpreter competence where recent findings of inadequacy exist.

The Crown failed to demonstrate any error in the exercise of discretion.

The accused, a young person within the meaning of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, was charged with rape, sexual intercourse with a female under 14, common assault, and threatening death arising from an alleged sexual assault in 1971.

The complainant reported the incident nearly forty years later.

The prosecution relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony and evidence from witnesses recounting her prior complaint.

The court held that while the complainant’s narrative could support a finding of probable guilt, several evidentiary concerns and inconsistencies created reasonable doubt when considered cumulatively.

Applying the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.