Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the Bank of Montreal to provide answers to discovery questions regarding the disappearance of contents from their safety deposit box.

The Bank refused, claiming litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege over its internal investigation report, and also citing relevance and proportionality for other questions.

The court found that the Bank failed to establish that the dominant purpose of its investigation was litigation, thus denying the claim of litigation privilege.

Solicitor-client privilege was also deemed inapplicable.

The court ordered the Bank to answer most of the refused questions, finding them relevant to the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and breach of contract, including questions about the investigation process and a prior safety deposit box cleanup.

One speculative question was properly refused.

The Bank was also directed to serve an amended affidavit of documents.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation.

It sets a timetable for a forthcoming motion by the Attorney General of Canada regarding the taking of evidence from certain witnesses before trial.

The court also noted Ontario's expected late delivery of expert reports, discussed the parties' differing estimates for trial length and scheduled a follow-up conference, and provided guidance on addressing concerns about trial presentation software (CaseLines).

This case management conference addressed the plaintiff's proposed amended statement of claim and the defendants' request to vary the timetable for expert reports.

The court scheduled the motion to amend the statement of claim.

Regarding the expert reports, the court was prepared to consider an extension but required more specific information from the defendants regarding which reports needed expansion, why, and the estimated time required, rather than vacating the date outright.

A further case management conference was scheduled to address the expert report timetable.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured shoulder after slipping on broken glass near a donation bin located on municipal property.

The bin was owned by the defendant, who had placed it there without the city's permission.

The defendant was noted in default.

The court found that the defendant exercised sufficient control over the bin and surrounding area to be considered an 'occupier' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court awarded the plaintiff general damages, past and future income loss, and special damages, but dismissed her son's Family Law Act claim due to a lack of admissible evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a collateral mortgage, arguing that the defendant's enforcement action was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The defendant claimed a $4,000 payment was made in May 2010, which would have reset the 10-year limitation period.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court found the defendant's evidence of the payment—a single ambiguous bank book entry—insufficient to meet her onus of proving the claim was brought within the limitation period.

The plaintiff's motion was granted and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses a dispute regarding trial readiness in a personal injury action.

The plaintiffs sought to set a trial date, but the defendant objected, citing outstanding productions, unanswered undertakings, and refusals from discovery.

The court, in a case conference, found the case was not "trial ready" due to these unresolved interlocutory matters, including unquantified loss of income claims, unobtained employment files, and unserved expert reports.

Despite the four-year period since discoveries, counsel had not completed necessary steps.

The court emphasized the scarcity of trial dates and declined to book a date for an unprepared case, striking it from the trial list.

The plaintiffs, parents of the defendant Devon, brought a motion for summary judgment claiming a 50% interest in a property they co-resided in with the defendants.

The plaintiffs provided the $100,000 down payment, but title was taken solely in the defendants' names to secure mortgage financing, necessitating a gift letter.

The court found the defendants failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust, as the evidence showed the plaintiffs intended to acquire an interest in the property, not gift the funds.

The court granted summary judgment, declared the plaintiffs hold a 50% interest, ordered the property sold, and struck the defendants' counterclaim for damages.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, alleging misappropriation of funds.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt when the action was commenced, meaning the cause of action had vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.

The action was therefore a nullity.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired, precluding any curative order.

The defendant's cross-motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions refused at his examination for discovery and to serve a further and better affidavit of documents.

The underlying action involves a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff driver struck the defendant pedestrian and claims damages for exacerbation of pre-existing PTSD.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce various medical and counselling records, his ODSP application, and to answer questions regarding contributory negligence, but protected certain session notes due to privacy concerns.

The plaintiff was ordered to bear the initial costs of obtaining third-party productions.

The plaintiff builder brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant purchaser who failed to close a real estate transaction.

The court required the plaintiff to serve the motion materials on the defendant in accordance with Toronto best practice.

The court found the plaintiff met its onus to prove damages and mitigation efforts, awarding the difference between the contract price and resale price.

However, the court refused to enforce a 20% contractual interest rate, applying the Courts of Justice Act rate instead, and limited the recovery of carrying costs due to an unexplained 5-month delay in closing the resale.

This endorsement addresses the determination of reasonable legal fees for counsel representing a person under disability in an accident benefits claim.

The court had previously approved a global settlement of $1.3 million for the catastrophically injured applicant, Robert Jones, after initially declining a lower proposed settlement due to concerns about its adequacy and the absence of a proper management plan.

The primary issue in this endorsement was the reasonableness of the applicant's counsel's proposed contingency fee of 23% (or 26.57% by the court's calculation) of the settlement.

Applying the principles from Henricks-Hunter, the court found the contingency agreement was not fair when made and the proposed fees were not reasonable, considering the minimal risk assumed by counsel due to the undeniable catastrophic injuries, and the fact that the settlement achieved was at the low end of entitlement.

In a derivative action, the defendants brought a motion seeking repayment of legal fees paid by the plaintiffs' representative, John Drake, and the establishment of a protocol for assessing future legal accounts.

The court dismissed the requests for repayment and the imposition of a trust, but established a detailed payment protocol requiring court approval for all future legal invoices rendered to the plaintiffs to ensure they are reasonably incurred.

This motion in a negligence action addressed the defendant's request for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend medical assessments, complete questionnaires, and sign consent forms, as well as to adjourn pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff had refused to comply, relying on prior case law.

The court vacated the pre-trial and trial dates due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03(2.2) regarding expert report schedules.

The court ordered the plaintiff to sign consent forms and complete questionnaires, finding that section 105(5) of the Courts of Justice Act mandates answering relevant questions and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control the discovery process, distinguishing prior cases that suggested a complete code.

The motion for the assessments themselves was adjourned as premature.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the production of a reporting letter sent by the defendants' former solicitor regarding an asset sale transaction.

The plaintiffs claimed the letter was relevant to prove the existence of a $250,000 promissory note, which the defendants denied existed.

The defendants opposed production on the grounds of relevance and solicitor-client privilege.

The court found the letter relevant to the plaintiffs' claim and held that statements of fact within the letter regarding the delivery of the note were not protected by privilege.

The court ordered the letter to be produced to the court in a sealed envelope for redaction of any privileged legal advice before disclosure.

The defendant brought a threshold motion during jury deliberations in a motor vehicle accident trial.

The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, out-of-pocket expenses, and future health care costs.

The court applied the three-part test from Meyer v. Bright and found that the plaintiff suffered a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function due to chronic pain.

The defendant's threshold motion was dismissed, and the jury's award was upheld subject to statutory deductibles and collateral benefit deductions.

This decision assesses the costs of the Court Monitor, Crawford Class Action Services Inc., incurred during an investigation into alleged unlawful fees charged by lawyer Douglas J. Keshen under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA).

Previously, Canada's request for Keshen to pay the Monitor's costs and Keshen's request for Canada to pay his costs were both dismissed.

The court, applying principles of reasonableness, prudence, and proportionality, reduced the Monitor's total accounts from $578,419.69 to $400,000.00, citing issues such as disproportionate hourly rates, duplication of work between the Monitor and its legal counsel, and redundancies during the transition between legal firms.

Canada was deemed responsible for paying the assessed amount.

Two actions were tried together involving a commercial property.

In the first action, the mortgagee sought to enforce a mortgage and claim the balance owing.

In the second action, the mortgagor/landlord claimed rental arrears from the tenant and sought to invalidate the mortgagee's purported sale of the property to itself under power of sale.

The court found that the mortgagee acted in bad faith, failed to obtain a proper price, and violated the rule against a mortgagee selling to itself.

The power of sale was declared void, and the title was rectified.

The court also found that the mortgage had been paid in full through the receipt of rents, dismissing the mortgage action.

The tenant and subtenant were found jointly and severally liable for rental arrears accruing after the mortgage was paid out.

Counsel for the defendant Paterson Group Inc. requested that its costs of the Damages Trial be reserved to be determined at the time of the Liability Trial.

The co-defendant Tega Homes Developments Inc., against whom the costs claim would be made due to a cross-claim, consented to the request.

The court granted the request and ordered that the determination of Paterson's costs of the Damages Trial be reserved to the Liability Trial.

The plaintiff requested a telephone conference to settle the form of an order made at a previous motion.

The defendants' counsel of record had declined to approve the draft order because his retainer was terminated and the corporate defendant intended to act in person.

The court held that because the corporate defendant had not obtained leave to act in person and the lawyer had not been removed from the record, the lawyer had a professional obligation to approve the draft order as to form and content.

The court signed the draft order.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against her.

The plaintiff had advanced $250,000 to a co-defendant for investment purposes and alleged losses after the funds were traded and lost.

The moving defendant was a joint holder of a bank account through which some of the funds briefly passed, but there was no evidence she participated in the transfers, trading activity, or received any benefit from the funds.

The court applied the summary judgment framework under Rule 20.04 and the “full appreciation test” from Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch.

Finding no evidence supporting liability or a viable tracing claim, and determining the Fraudulent Conveyances Act claim was premature, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action against the moving defendant.