Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The applicant brought a motion to stay the respondent's actions and strike his pleadings due to his failure to pay over $150,000 in outstanding costs awards and a $10,000 fine.

The respondent argued he should not have to pay the applicant directly due to alleged fraud and claimed impecuniosity.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments, finding no evidence of impecuniosity and holding that allegations of fraud do not excuse non-compliance with court orders.

The court gave the respondent a final 14-day period to pay the outstanding costs and fine, failing which his pleadings in all related actions would be struck.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision, citing anticipated delays in scheduling civil jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion under Rule 48.04(1) but ultimately dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found that the plaintiff had not moved the action forward expeditiously prior to the pandemic and failed to demonstrate that any potential delay outweighed the defendant's substantive right to a jury trial, noting that civil jury trials were likely to resume by May 2022.

The applicant brought a motion for contempt against the respondents, a church and its elders, for breaching a court order that restrained them from holding gatherings of more than 10 persons in contravention of COVID-19 regulations.

The respondents did not oppose the motion.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear, the respondents had notice of it, and they intentionally breached it by holding a service with approximately 225 people.

All respondents were found in contempt, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing.

Following a decision in an estate litigation matter regarding the ownership of a painting, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant co-estate trustees personally.

The court found that the applicants had acted unreasonably by commencing the application instead of accepting the respondent's pre-litigation offer to pay the appraised value of the painting.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $203,589 for fees and $12,493 for disbursements, and ordered the applicants to pay these costs personally rather than out of the estate.

Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff brought a motion for judgment to determine the pre-judgment interest (PJI) rate applicable to general non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued for a 5% PJI rate, asserting that amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015, were not retroactive as PJI is a matter of substantive law, relying on the Divisional Court's decision in Carr v. Modi.

The defendant conceded the court was bound by Carr, despite believing the case law was wrongly decided, given a pending Court of Appeal decision in El-Khodr v. Lackie.

The parties agreed to issue judgment with a 5% PJI rate, with a mechanism to revisit the calculation if the El-Khodr appeal decision impacted it.

The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed amount.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The applicant pipeline company sought an urgent ex parte interim and interlocutory injunction restraining unknown protesters from trespassing on a valve installation site required for pipeline infrastructure work.

Protesters had occupied the site to oppose the reversal of oil flow in a major pipeline project, delaying scheduled construction and causing economic disruption.

The court accepted that the applicant had proprietary rights through an easement and that trespass ordinarily supports injunctive relief, but emphasized that political protest engages Charter values and that protesters should have an opportunity to be heard.

Balancing property rights, economic harm, and freedom of expression, the court granted a short-term ex parte injunction due to the difficulty of identifying or serving protesters.

The injunction was limited in duration and required the applicant to return to court on notice if it sought continuation of the order.

A group of farmers brought an application seeking a declaration that a Crown corporation administering agricultural support programs was bound by the two‑year basic limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 when attempting to recover program overpayments.

The applicants argued that, as a Crown agent rather than the Crown itself, the corporation could not rely on the statutory exemption from limitation periods applicable to Crown claims related to economic programs.

The court held that references to the Crown in s. 16(1)(j)(i) of the Act include Crown agents acting within the scope of their statutory authority.

As the debt claims arose from government economic programs administered by the corporation as a Crown agent, the exemption applied and the two‑year limitation period did not bar recovery proceedings.

The application was dismissed with costs.

Following a trial concerning an alleged fundamental breach of a commercial lease, the court issued a separate ruling addressing costs.

Although the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining judgment and defeating the counterclaim, the success was characterized as mixed because the damages awarded were significantly lower than claimed and several claims were dismissed.

The court also criticized both parties and their principals for unreliable evidence and a poorly drafted lease that unnecessarily complicated the trial.

However, the plaintiff had delivered a Rule 49 offer to settle that was bettered by the trial result.

Considering the offer and the factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs payable by one defendant to the plaintiff at $50,000 all inclusive.

Following execution of an ex parte Anton Piller order authorizing the seizure of computer hardware and smartphones, the parties disputed the method for returning the seized computers to the respondent.

The applicants alleged the devices contained confidential customer lists and email addresses that had been misappropriated.

They proposed removing the existing hard drives and installing new drives containing only non-confidential information copied by a forensic expert.

The respondent objected to replacing the hard drive on one computer containing business records and applications.

The court approved the applicants’ proposed deletion and hard-drive replacement process, subject to safeguards requiring forensic expert involvement, a report to the court, and restoration of operating systems and applications, and ordered return of the devices by a specified date.

Following a trial concerning alleged loans made by a parent to his daughter and her spouse, the plaintiff succeeded against the co-defendant spouse for two of three loans.

The court had found the spouse jointly liable for the majority of the claimed debt.

On the subsequent costs ruling, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after a Rule 49 offer to settle that produced a more favourable trial result.

While the court found the plaintiff largely successful and noted the defendant’s conduct had unnecessarily prolonged the trial, the claimed amounts were considered somewhat excessive.

The court fixed costs in the lump sum amount of $70,000 inclusive.

A homeowner brought an action against a contractor arising from a kitchen renovation project involving multiple unclear written and unwritten agreements.

The plaintiff alleged numerous deficiencies including an uneven floor, improperly installed cabinets, lack of structural roof support after removal of ceiling joists, and ventilation deficiencies.

The court found that the contractor breached aspects of the contract and performed some work negligently, including failing to provide structural support compliant with the Building Code.

However, the plaintiff failed to prove the cost of rectifying most alleged deficiencies, which is required to establish damages absent rescission.

Judgment was granted only for the return of a $5,600 window deposit that was paid but for which no windows were supplied or installed.

The plaintiff sought continuation of an ex parte interim injunction and a permanent injunction to prevent nearby blasting associated with residential construction, alleging vibrations would disrupt the alignment of satellite earth stations used for communications services.

The court applied the standard requiring a very strong probability of grave future harm before granting injunctive relief.

Expert evidence from the defendants indicated an extremely low probability of damage under the blasting plan, while the plaintiff’s evidence was largely speculative and lacked detailed technical analysis.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish a strong probability of harm on the balance of probabilities.

The motion to continue the injunction was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiffs’ law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer who previously acted for some defendants sharing office space with the plaintiffs’ counsel and being described as “of counsel.” The moving parties argued that the physical proximity and prior involvement in related matters created a risk of confidential information being shared.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court considered whether a reasonably informed person would conclude that confidential information would be used.

The court found the evidence showed separate practices, systems, and files, and that the lawyer’s involvement in the present matter had ended well before the office‑sharing arrangement.

The motion to remove the plaintiffs’ counsel was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 21.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of questions of law before trial.

They argued that the plaintiff farmer’s action for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision was barred under s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act because he operated an uninsured all‑terrain vehicle (ATV) on a public road, and that his claim for statutory accident benefits was barred by s. 30(1)(a) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court held that the ATV, used exclusively in farming operations, qualified as a “self‑propelled implement of husbandry” under the Highway Traffic Act.

As such, it was excluded from the definition of motor vehicle and from Ontario’s compulsory automobile insurance regime.

The plaintiff was therefore not barred from suing the negligent driver and his claim for statutory accident benefits was not foreclosed.

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside a transfer of real property from a judgment debtor and his spouse to the spouse alone as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred after a default judgment had been obtained and after the debtor failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The court considered the badges of fraud under section 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, including a transfer between close relatives for nominal consideration during circumstances of insolvency.

The respondents argued the transfer was intended to protect the transferee as a legitimate creditor.

The court held that the transfer constituted either a fraudulent conveyance or an improper preference and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The defendant solicitor moved for summary judgment dismissing a legal malpractice action brought by former clients arising from a motor vehicle accident claim.

The plaintiffs alleged the solicitor failed to pursue Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS), compromised tort claims, and improperly structured litigation relating to an unidentified driver accident.

The court held that the evidentiary record demonstrated no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiffs produced no evidence establishing entitlement to the alleged benefits or that the solicitor’s conduct caused any loss.

Applying the enhanced summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and the “full appreciation” test articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court concluded the claims were without merit and could be resolved on the motion.

The Attorney General sought forfeiture of $138,650 seized during a police search conducted in the course of a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The respondents asserted that the funds were legitimate family savings accumulated for education and housing.

The court rejected the respondents’ explanations as inconsistent and not credible, noting the storage method of the cash, the presence of a drug dealer’s fingerprint inside the safe where the majority of the funds were stored, and evidence linking the residence to ongoing drug trafficking.

The court also found that the respondents had misrepresented their financial circumstances and failed to disclose the cash assets while receiving government disability benefits.

The court concluded on a balance of probabilities that the funds were proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 and ordered forfeiture.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and an injunction against a salvage yard operation alleged to contravene municipal zoning by-laws and site plan requirements.

The respondents argued their use complied with the zoning by-law, that it was grandfathered prior to an interim control by-law under the Planning Act, and that municipal conduct and representations created estoppel or bad faith issues requiring trial.

The court held the matter could properly be determined under Rule 14 because the material facts were not in dispute and the central issue was legal interpretation of the zoning by-law.

Interpreting the by-law purposively, the court found that a lawful salvage yard required a principal building or structure and could not operate solely as open storage on bare land without site plan approval or building permits.

The respondents’ use was therefore unlawful and could not constitute a prior legal non‑conforming use.

Allegations of municipal bad faith and estoppel were unsupported by evidence and could not defeat statutory obligations.

A civil action arising from the 2003 purchase of residential property where the defendants allegedly failed to obtain a required certificate of approval for a septic system.

During a pre‑trial in a long‑standing action commenced in 2008 under the Simplified Procedure Rules, the court addressed ongoing delays and the addition of multiple third parties.

To ensure finality and advance the proceeding, the court ordered that the matter proceed to a summary trial with affidavits serving as examinations‑in‑chief and imposed strict procedural deadlines for document disclosure, expert reports, affidavits, requests to admit, and trial materials.

The court also fixed the trial date and limited cross‑examinations.