Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

A non-party former solicitor brought a motion for payment of his legal fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement (CFA) signed by his client in December 2020, or alternatively on the basis of docketed hours.

The court found the CFA void for failing to comply with numerous mandatory requirements under Ontario Regulation 195/04 under the Solicitors Act, and held that ss. 23–24 of the Solicitors Act did not permit the court to validate a non-compliant CFA.

The court awarded fees only for work performed prior to a capacity assessment completed March 16, 2021, after which the solicitor had knowledge of the client's incapacity to manage property; post-assessment docketed fees were allowed only at a 15% discount.

No disbursements were allowed as no supporting evidence was provided.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial where the plaintiff partially succeeded on his claim for $100,000 and successfully defended a $2 million counterclaim.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff, but reduced the claimed fees by $10,000 due to the plaintiff's late abandonment of general damages claims, which resulted in unnecessary expenditures of time.

The final costs were fixed at $70,876.32.

The Plaintiff sought repayment of a $100,000 loan from the Defendant.

The Defendant argued the loan was conditional on the sale of certain assembled properties and counterclaimed for $2 million in damages, alleging breach of a partnership agreement related to a land assembly project.

The court found no evidence that the loan was conditional and held it was due.

Furthermore, the court determined that no enforceable partnership agreement existed between the parties regarding the land development or sale, as essential terms were never settled or formalized in writing as intended.

The Plaintiff's action for the loan repayment was allowed, and the Defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the costs provision of a 2018 formal judgment.

The formal order, drafted by the defendants' counsel and approved by the plaintiff's counsel, awarded costs against only one corporate defendant, contrary to the trial judge's endorsement which awarded costs against multiple defendants.

The corporate defendant against whom costs were awarded subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The court found that there was no meeting of the minds between counsel regarding the costs liability and that the formal order contained an error arising from an accidental slip or omission.

The court set aside the costs provision under Rule 59.06 and ordered a rehearing on the issue of costs.

Costs endorsement following a motion by the plaintiff to strike certain paragraphs of the defendant's Statement of Defence.

The court found that success on the motion was mixed, with both parties succeeding on some significant issues and failing on others.

As neither party was substantially successful, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors following a default on a mortgage.

The defendants admitted the default but disputed the plaintiff's calculation of the amount owing, pointing to a double-counted fee.

The court granted summary judgment on the issue of default, finding no genuine issue for trial, but referred the determination of the exact amount owing to a Master pursuant to Rule 20.04(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants brought an urgent motion to remove, redact, and seal affidavits and exhibits filed by the plaintiffs to protect the confidentiality of minor students.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for the case management judge's recusal, which was dismissed.

The plaintiffs then sought an adjournment of the defendants' motion due to late filings.

The court granted the adjournment on the condition that the entire court file be sealed temporarily, balancing the urgency of protecting minors' privacy interests against the open court principle, particularly given the operational constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The statutory third party, Allstate Insurance, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, who had moved to Angola after commencing a motor vehicle accident claim.

The court found that the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and failed to establish impecuniosity, as the only evidence provided was a law clerk's affidavit.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $10,000 as security for costs.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on loans due and payable by the Defendants, who were engaged in a real estate business.

The loans, totaling $70,000 in principal, plus 12% annual interest, were evidenced by promissory notes.

The Defendants did not dispute the existence of the loans but raised concerns about the interest rate and the priority of these claims relative to a separate, related action (Piccioni v. Viktyuk).

The court found no real controversy regarding the 12% interest rate, as one defendant assumed it and the other definitively admitted it.

The court granted full summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, concluding that the issues of liability were distinct from the Piccioni action and that a priority dispute at the enforcement stage did not preclude judgment on the loans.

Enforcement of the judgment was stayed pending resolution of the priority issue.

W.S., a 20-year-old with significant mental health issues, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found her incapable of managing property.

The Board's finding was based on her inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of acquiring alcohol, leading to self-harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board committed an error of law by characterizing the decision to acquire alcohol as a decision in property management without other evidence of property management issues, and that the physician's assertion of W.S. "repeatedly running out of money" was uncorroborated.

The court emphasized that capacity to manage property must relate to financial matters, not solely to control behavior unrelated to property.

The Board's finding of incapacity was set aside.

The appellant, an out-of-province insurer, appealed an arbitrator's decision finding that the priority provisions in s. 268 of the Insurance Act applied to it for a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Ontario.

The appellant argued that applying the Ontario legislation would have an extra-jurisdictional effect.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, applying the reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that because the accident occurred in Ontario and the appellant had signed a Power of Attorney and Undertaking (PAU), it was bound by the priority provisions of the Insurance Act.

The applicant sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify him in an underlying action arising from an incident at a summer camp.

The underlying claim alleged that the applicant pulled the plaintiff's head back, kneed him, and punched him, pleading both negligence and assault and battery.

The insurer denied coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion.

The court dismissed the application, finding the duty to indemnify was premature and the duty to defend was not triggered because the negligence claim was entirely derivative of the intentional tort of battery, which fell squarely within the policy's exclusion clause.

Following a successful forfeiture application under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, the Attorney General of Ontario sought costs of $15,443.51 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Interested Party, Eric Mahama, did not oppose the costs claim.

The court found the requested costs to be fair and reasonable, considering the four-year duration of the forfeiture application and the contested nature of the original proceeding.

The full amount of costs claimed by the Attorney General was granted.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment, finalizing damage assessments and costs following a prior trial decision (K.M. v. Marson, 2018 ONSC 3493).

The court determined the plaintiff's past and future income loss, future loss of interdependent relationship, and management fees based on agreed-upon expert calculations and applied a 15% negative contingency.

Prejudgment interest was calculated, and a $50,000 advance payment by one defendant was credited against the total liability of both defendants, including associated prejudgment interest.

The total damages and prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff amounted to $2,748,513.09, with an additional $400,000 in costs.

A cross-claim for contribution and indemnity by the School Board against the individual defendant was also granted.

The plaintiffs and the principals of the defendant corporation were friends who entered into an oral agreement regarding a condominium unit to be used as a team house for a snowboarding program.

The plaintiffs alleged they had an option to purchase the unit, while the defendants claimed the plaintiffs failed to make required monthly payments and terminated the agreement.

The court found that an oral agreement existed, the doctrine of part performance applied to overcome the Statute of Frauds, and the defendants wrongfully terminated the agreement.

The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs based on the market value of the property less the amounts owed to the defendants, declining to order specific performance.

The applicant tenant, operating a Popeyes restaurant, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent landlord from proceeding with site servicing and parking lot construction work related to a plaza expansion.

The tenant argued the work would breach a lease provision prohibiting construction that materially interferes with its business operations or access.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the tenant failed to establish irreparable harm, as any losses could be quantified and compensated monetarily.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the landlord, who had contractual obligations and faced significant delays if the work was halted.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a landlord’s motion for security for costs and a motion to strike affidavit paragraphs, and the granting of the tenants’ motion to convert an application to an action, the successful tenants sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the effect of settlement offers that effectively waived costs if accepted.

The court found the tenants had achieved full success and that their claimed hours and hourly rate were reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motions.

Applying the principle of reasonableness articulated in appellate authority, the court rejected the landlord’s proposed reduced costs figure.

Substantial indemnity costs of $8,800 were awarded.

Appeal from an assessment officer’s decision awarding costs following settlement of a defamation action commenced under the Simplified Procedure.

The appellant argued the assessment failed to properly apply proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

The court held that the assessment officer appropriately considered the Rule 58.06(1) factors, including the significance of reputational harm and the defendant’s litigation conduct, and reasonably discounted the claimed fees.

The officer’s conclusions reflected no error in principle, and the substantial indemnity costs awarded for the assessment hearing were also upheld.

The plaintiff brought an undefended civil action alleging assault, identity theft, misappropriation of funds, interference with conjugal relations, and intentional infliction of emotional harm.

The defendants had been noted in default, requiring the court to assess deemed admissions under Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and determine whether the admitted facts established valid causes of action.

The court found that only the administration of drugs without consent constituted the tort of battery, while other allegations lacked sufficient particulars or legal basis.

The plaintiff’s credibility was found to be weak and his evidence largely unsupported.

The court awarded nominal damages of $5,000 for battery and $1,500 in costs.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing its claim for damages arising from an alleged breach of a settlement agreement related to engine repair work.

The appellant argued that the settlement required delivery of a completely rebuilt and reassembled engine and that the trial judge erred in excluding its former counsel as a witness and in finding no misrepresentation.

The court held that the Small Claims Court judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant had constructive knowledge of the engine’s disassembled condition through its employee.

The appellate court also upheld the exclusion of counsel’s viva voce evidence for policy reasons relating to solicitor-client privilege and the proper role of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.