Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff, executor of John Stewart's estate, moved for production of bank records from Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) and the defendants.

The motion sought records of funds deposited by Stewart into a defendant's account, changes in signing authority, and subsequent transfers.

The defendants opposed, citing privacy.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering TD to produce records related to the initial deposit and signing authority changes, but denied the request for broader tracing records from the defendants, finding their relevance tenuous at this stage.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff due to the defendants' non-compliance with prior orders.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

The plaintiffs, owners of a commercial property, sued the defendants for environmental contamination allegedly emanating from a neighbouring gas station.

Pending trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion for an order under the oppression remedy of the Business Corporations Act requiring the defendants to pay $8,000,000 into court as security, or alternatively, a Mareva injunction freezing the defendants' assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs, as potential creditors with an unliquidated claim, did not qualify as complainants under the oppression remedy.

The court also denied the Mareva injunction, concluding there was no real risk of asset dissipation.

The applicant condominium corporation brought a motion for a compliance order against a tenant and the unit owners, due to over 200 complaints and 60 police visits regarding the tenant's disruptive and threatening behaviour.

The tenant sought a stay pending the outcome of eviction applications before the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The court dismissed the stay request, noting the condominium corporation's independent statutory duty to enforce compliance, and granted the order requiring the tenant to cease the non-compliant behaviour, with leave for the applicant to seek eviction if the behaviour continues.

The applicant medical officer of health obtained a without-notice order under section 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act to close the respondents' pub for defying COVID-19 public health measures.

At a come-back hearing, the self-represented respondent argued the orders were invalid, breached his rights, and that the pub was his residence.

The court dismissed the respondents' arguments, finding the drastic remedy of changing the locks was proportionate to their open defiance of the law.

The original orders were continued, and the respondents were ordered to pay $20,000 in costs.

The defendant was previously found in civil contempt for dishonesty, concealing assets, and breaching a Mareva injunction.

Having already served a 90-day sentence for a prior contempt finding, the court considered the appropriate sanction for this subsequent contempt.

Emphasizing that civil contempt aims at coercion rather than punishment, and noting the defendant's expressed remorse and ongoing counselling, the court declined to impose further immediate incarceration.

Instead, the court ordered the defendant to continue weekly counselling for two months and pay a $10,000 fine within 60 days, failing which a 90-day term of imprisonment would be imposed.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion under Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the interim recovery of their personal property from the defendant moving companies.

The defendants claimed a storer's lien under the Repair and Storage Lien Act (RSLA) for unpaid moving and storage fees, relying on a contract signed on the day of the move.

The court found substantial grounds that the binding agreement was the initial quotation, not the document signed under pressure on moving day.

The court also held the RSLA did not apply as the agreement was fundamentally for moving, not storage.

The court granted the plaintiffs interim possession of their property, conditional on a net payment of $700 to account for the value of services received, less credits and costs.

Following a successful trial for breach of contract regarding a real estate joint venture, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff had made a formal offer to settle that was lower than the trial judgment.

Applying Rule 49.10, the court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court found the claimed hours and rates reasonable and ordered the defendant to pay $45,757.27 in costs.

The plaintiff purchaser brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a commercial property after an aborted real estate transaction.

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to close on the agreed-upon date and did not secure the required mortgage assumption.

The court found triable issues existed regarding whether time remained of the essence following multiple extensions and whether the mortgage assumption would have been approved.

Balancing the equities, the court granted the CPL, noting the property's uniqueness to the plaintiff's development plan and that damages would not be a satisfactory remedy.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to enforce existing access orders for the child of the marriage and for a defined holiday access schedule, including police enforcement for access and an order for costs.

The Applicant Mother brought a cross-motion to vary the Father's access to remove overnight visits and to vary child support based on updated income.

The court found the Mother had a pattern of unlawfully withholding the child and had not properly brought her motion to change access.

The Father's motion for enforcement and a defined holiday schedule was granted, including police enforcement.

Child support was varied by consent.

The Father was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant was unsuccessful in her motions and the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicant had misappropriated funds contrary to a consent order and attempted to cover it up, which precipitated the motions.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at $24,817.63 for the family law proceeding and $29,443.41 for the civil proceeding.

The plaintiffs, a franchisee and its principals, moved for partial summary judgment seeking rescission of a franchise agreement due to alleged failures of disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim.

The court found that the franchisor's disclosure document was egregiously deficient, specifically lacking a materially complete form of lease (including the head lease) and proper cost estimates for a conversion-type franchise.

The court rejected arguments that disclosure was impossible due to an undetermined location or that franchisee sophistication waived disclosure obligations.

The deficiencies amounted to a failure to provide a disclosure document, entitling the franchisee to rescission under s. 6(2) of the AWA.

The court also determined which corporate defendants were "franchisor's associates" and dismissed claims for misrepresentation and breach of good faith due to lack of focused argument.

All damages issues were referred to a Master.

The Minister of Finance appealed an arbitrator's preliminary award concerning an automobile insurance policy.

Echelon General Insurance Company had attempted to cancel a six-month policy for non-payment, but the cancellation was invalid due to non-compliance with the notice requirements of s. 236 of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator ruled the policy expired at the end of its term, not extended by s. 236.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that s. 236(5) unambiguously states a contract of insurance remains in force until the statutory notice provisions for renewal or non-renewal are complied with.

The court found that Echelon's policy was not properly cancelled and therefore remained in force at the time of the accident, overriding common law contract principles regarding policy expiry.

The defendant employer brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim without leave to amend.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged statutory violations including the Criminal Code, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Human Rights Code, the Employment Standards Act, and privacy legislation, seeking substantial damages for termination and alleged harassment.

The court found the pleading failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts, and consisted largely of a lengthy and incoherent compilation of correspondence.

The alleged statutory breaches did not create independent civil causes of action and the Charter did not apply to private litigation.

The court concluded the pleading was radically defective and incapable of being cured by amendment.

Two purchasers of hotel condominium units in the Trump International Hotel in Toronto brought test‑case summary judgment motions seeking rescission and damages based on alleged misrepresentations and an alleged breach of an Ontario Securities Commission prospectus‑exemption ruling.

The purchasers relied primarily on an “Estimated Return on Investment” document that allegedly overstated revenues and understated expenses.

The court found the document contained multiple misrepresentations but held the plaintiffs’ claims nevertheless failed because their reliance on the estimates was not objectively reasonable in light of extensive contractual disclaimers, disclosure documents, and risk warnings.

The court further held the defendants did not breach the OSC exemption ruling and that statutory securities and condominium misrepresentation provisions were not engaged.

One plaintiff’s claims were also statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff shareholder brought a motion in a dispute between equal shareholders of a corporation operating a convenience store, seeking permission to sell the business, appointment of a receiver to supervise the sale, forfeiture of a $25,000 deposit under a prior court order, and an order striking the defendant’s statement of defence.

The court denied an adjournment request by the responding shareholder and accepted the recommendation of the court‑appointed monitor that the business be sold promptly to avoid further litigation expenses.

A receiver was appointed to conduct the sale and supervise operations, with the moving party permitted to control day‑to‑day business activities subject to cooperation with the receiver.

The court also ordered forfeiture of the $25,000 deposit in accordance with an earlier order.

However, the request to strike the defendant’s defence was refused given the defendant’s circumstances abroad and the expectation that issues could be addressed upon distribution of sale proceeds.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement over a narrow portion of the defendants’ driveway used for parking.

The motion argued that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 20 years of continuous use prior to conversion to the Land Titles system, that mistaken belief in ownership defeated the “as of right” requirement, and that the claimed easement area was excessive.

The court held that evidence from neighbours and prior occupants could establish the required period of open, continuous, and peaceful use and therefore raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court further held that mistaken belief in ownership does not defeat a prescriptive easement claim and that “knowing trespass” is not required.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicant sought declarations and mandatory relief arising from a cooperation agreement relating to a solar power rooftop project and associated FIT contracts.

The respondents refused to execute transaction documents required to complete a sale of project assets, citing a disputed right of first offer held by a related entity.

The court held that the cooperation agreement clearly required the corporate respondent to use commercially reasonable efforts to facilitate any transaction relating to the project, including asset or share sales.

A declaration was granted confirming that the respondent corporation was obligated to sign the documents, but the court declined to grant a mandatory order or injunction because the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm under the RJR‑MacDonald test.

The moving party sought an order under Rules 15.03(4) and (5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure declaring that his former lawyers had no right to assert a lawyer’s possessory lien over documents belonging to him.

The law firm had represented the moving party in two civil actions and claimed unpaid legal fees exceeding $150,000, asserting a lien over litigation documents after being discharged without cause.

The court held that the law firm was entitled to assert the lien given the material unpaid balance and the circumstances of discharge.

However, the court noted that a substantial portion of the accounts may be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and reduced the potential exposure accordingly.

The motion was conditionally resolved by permitting release of the documents if the moving party granted a collateral mortgage as security for up to $75,000; otherwise the motion would be dismissed.

A mortgagee moved for summary judgment for possession of mortgaged property and dismissal of the mortgagors’ counterclaim alleging breach of the mortgage contract.

The mortgagors had fallen into default after a missed payment but attempted to cure the arrears through uncertified cheques, which the mortgagee refused to accept while insisting on certified cheques.

The court held that the mortgage provision requiring certified cheques applied only where a cheque had been returned NSF, which had not occurred beyond the initial missed payment.

With the mortgage account now brought into good standing, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding possession.

The action for possession and the counterclaim were both dismissed, and the mortgagors were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs.