Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiff landlord claimed $425,000 for breach of a commercial lease but was awarded only $5,719.37 at trial.

In this costs decision, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of over $73,000, arguing complexity and a lease clause.

The defendant argued it was the successful party, having offered a settlement close to the final award, and sought costs in its favour or no costs for the plaintiff.

The court applied Rule 57.05(1) due to the judgment being within Small Claims Court jurisdiction, finding the case not complex enough to warrant Superior Court costs.

The court also noted the plaintiff's unreasonable refusal of a reasonable settlement offer and the defendant's deficient offer.

Ultimately, the court exercised its discretion to order no costs to be paid by or to either party.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a self-represented individual, sued after the defendant complained to a community organization about his alleged harassing behavior.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (character and integrity of mentors in a volunteer organization).

While the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit, the defendant had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege).

Furthermore, the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The action was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded full indemnity costs and damages for bad faith.

The Moving Defendants brought a motion to compel a non-party insurer, Co-Operators General Insurance Company, to produce the complete insurance policy and investigative materials related to a bankrupt co-defendant, Dino & Chris Electric LTD (DCE).

The court dismissed the motion for the insurance policy, finding it not relevant to the material issues in the main action and that fairness considerations favored the non-party.

However, the court granted the motion for investigative materials, ordering Co-Operators to produce a list of documents and copies for judicial inspection to determine their relevance and fairness for disclosure to the Moving Defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The defendant opposed, arguing prejudice due to document purging and a missing surveyor.

Applying the *Reid v. Dow Corning Corp.* test, the court found the plaintiff's explanation for delay less than compelling but accepted inadvertence for missing the deadline.

Crucially, the court determined there was no actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend the action, as necessary documents still existed and the surveyor's testimony was not essential.

The motion was allowed, and the plaintiff was given a new deadline to set the action down for trial.

The applicant sought to enforce various terms of a consent order dated June 15, 2018, concerning equalization payments, child support arrears, section 7 expenses, and spousal support arrears.

The matrimonial home had been sold, and proceeds were held in trust, but the parties disagreed on the amounts to be disbursed.

The respondent disputed the calculation of post-separation advances and interest, and attempted to renegotiate the agreement through a release.

The court clarified the terms of the consent order, accepting the applicant's calculations for advances and ordering the immediate release of funds from the sale of the matrimonial home, including accrued interest, to satisfy the outstanding obligations.

The respondent was found in breach of the consent order, and costs submissions were ordered.

This costs endorsement followed a three-week jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $2,570,181 for general, aggravated, economic, special, and punitive damages arising from historical sexual assault.

The court addressed the plaintiff's entitlement to substantial indemnity costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights and the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to substantial indemnity costs throughout the proceedings, rejecting the defendants' argument for partial indemnity prior to the offer date.

While the court reduced the quantum of legal fees claimed due to perceived duplication and 'heavy-handed' process, it upheld the principle of substantial indemnity.

The court also determined that the default prejudgment interest rate of 5% applied to non-pecuniary damages, rejecting the defendants' argument for a lower rate based on the Insurance Act, as the case did not involve a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs following two motions where the respondent's motion for security for costs was dismissed, and the applicant was granted supervised access.

The respondent argued for reserving costs to the trial judge or sought her own costs.

The court, applying Family Law Rules, found the applicant to be the more successful party and rejected deferring the costs decision.

Considering the importance of the security for costs issue and the parties' reasonable behaviour, the court awarded the applicant $9,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable upon the trial judge's decision on trial costs.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

The court determined costs arising from three related procedural motions in a partnership dispute among lawyers.

One motion compelled the departing partner to attend cross‑examination on an affidavit filed in a pending summary judgment motion; another sought a further and better affidavit of documents; and a third sought removal of a lawyer as solicitor of record.

The court addressed whether a represented lawyer‑litigant could recover costs for personal legal work performed on the file.

Applying authority including Fong v. Chan, the court held that a represented litigant who is a lawyer cannot recover personal time at counsel rates without proof of opportunity cost.

The court further emphasized the principle of reasonableness in costs and reduced the amounts claimed, awarding limited costs on the first two motions and none on the solicitor‑removal motion.

Following dismissal of a civil action alleging assault, unlawful arrest and detention, and breaches of Charter rights against several police-related defendants, the successful defendants sought costs of a ten‑day trial.

The plaintiff opposed the amount, arguing the bill of costs was excessive, that some issues were not fully successful, and that personal financial hardship should mitigate the award.

The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, the defendants’ partial indemnity rates, the existence of a prior offer to settle, and the defendants’ complete success on the core liability issues.

Finding the bill of costs reasonable and modest given the complexity and duration of the proceeding, and noting the absence of evidence supporting impecuniosity, the court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff managed a resort under an oral commission-based agreement and sued following termination of the relationship.

The court determined the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than a dependent contractor and therefore not entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

The defendants breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions on revenues received prior to termination, and were also liable for modest damages for conversion of personal property and for unjust enrichment relating to additional services performed as the defendants’ de facto Canadian agent.

The court rejected claims for further commissions, punitive damages, and most conversion damages.

The defendants succeeded on a counterclaim for possession of two boat motors.

In a medical malpractice action brought by a self-represented and incarcerated plaintiff, the court addressed several procedural motions in case management.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim, compel answers to discovery questions, obtain production of hospital employment documents, strike portions of an affidavit, and require production of audio recordings from discovery.

The court granted the motion to amend and the motion to strike specified affidavit paragraphs on consent.

Motions seeking further answers to questions, additional productions from the hospital, and production of audio recordings were dismissed for lack of relevance or because the requested materials were not in the defendants’ possession.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and conspiracy by a lawyer and his firm in relation to prior mortgage enforcement litigation involving the plaintiff’s property.

The court found no credible evidence supporting allegations that the lawyer had an improper relationship with another defendant or intentionally acted against the plaintiff’s interests.

The court also held that the plaintiff provided only assertions rather than cogent evidence capable of supporting the claims and that the action had no reasonable prospect of success.

Additionally, the claims were statute‑barred under the applicable limitation period and were further undermined by delay and laches.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the moving defendants.

The plaintiffs sought to continue an interim ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendant father’s assets in a civil action alleging long‑term physical and emotional abuse and seeking $7.65 million in damages.

The defendant moved to set aside the injunction, denying the allegations and disputing claims that he intended to dissipate assets.

The court applied the test for Mareva injunctions requiring a strong prima facie case, assets within the jurisdiction, and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The evidence supporting the abuse allegations consisted largely of contradictory affidavits and lacked independent corroboration, raising credibility issues that could only be resolved at trial.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case and therefore set aside the interim Mareva injunction.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court after a motion judge dismissed their motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations.

The action alleged that the defendants disseminated defamatory communications to customers and stakeholders and intimidated customers in an effort to disrupt business relationships.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It found a conflicting decision regarding the sufficiency of pleadings and whether material facts may be supplied only after examinations for discovery.

Concluding that the issues raised a serious question about the correctness of the order and warranted appellate consideration, the court granted leave to appeal on all issues.

In a medical negligence action arising from alleged negligent chiropractic treatment, the plaintiffs moved to strike portions of the statement of defence referring to a professional complaint made to the College of Chiropractors, sought a “lesser and better” affidavit of documents excluding the complaint materials, and requested that the defendant be examined for discovery in Toronto.

The court interpreted s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 as barring the admissibility of documents prepared for regulatory proceedings but not the pleading of facts such as the timing of a complaint.

The court held that the defence’s reference to the timing of the plaintiff’s complaint did not plead a prohibited “report, document or thing” and could remain.

The court further declined to order a revised affidavit of documents, holding that admissibility issues and use of prior inconsistent statements should be determined by the trial judge.

The request to compel discovery in Toronto was also dismissed, with the court criticizing the motion as strategic and improper.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a subrogated fire loss claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The fire occurred after a contractor left staining materials in a plastic bag on a deck, allegedly causing spontaneous combustion.

The defendants argued the claim was discovered immediately after the fire in August 2008, making the September 2010 action out of time.

The court held the claim was not discoverable until the investigation revealed that stain-soaked rags likely caused the fire, which occurred on September 25, 2008.

Because the statement of claim was issued within two years of that date, the action was timely and summary judgment was refused.

Following two unsuccessful defence motions seeking to adjourn a scheduled construction lien trial and introduce a late expert report, the court addressed costs consequences.

The court found that the motions were tactical attempts to delay the proceedings and manipulate the Rules of Civil Procedure after a trial date had already been scheduled.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the defendants for both motions as a sanction for litigation conduct intended to frustrate the plaintiff’s claim and waste court resources.

The court reduced certain hourly rates claimed but fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis for each motion.

The defendants were ordered to pay fixed costs totaling $6,309.12 for the June motion and $5,761.02 for the August motion.

The moving party brought a motion opposing confirmation of a solicitor‑client assessment report and certificate that reduced legal accounts from approximately $147,553.94 to $116,000 plus interest and costs.

The motion alleged errors in docket entries, improper fees charged after the solicitors were removed from the record, and procedural unfairness before the Assessment Officer.

The court held that a motion opposing confirmation under Rule 54.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is in the nature of an appeal and that intervention is warranted only for error in principle, jurisdictional error, or clear misapprehension of evidence.

After reviewing the materials and the lengthy reasons of the Assessment Officer, the court found no such error.

The report and certificate were confirmed and the motion dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct limousine company and driver as defendants after initially naming the wrong company and a John Doe driver.

The proposed defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The court considered whether the amendment constituted the correction of a misnomer under s. 21(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Finding that the statement of claim clearly intended to sue the owner and driver of the limousine involved in the accident and that the insurer for both entities had knowledge of the claim, the court held the amendment corrected a misdescription rather than adding a new party.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to refuse the amendment, finding no inordinate delay and no prejudice to the responding parties.