Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The plaintiffs, purchasers of a dental clinic, sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce non-competition and non-licensing obligations against the defendants, the former clinic owner and his corporations.

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of a 15-kilometre non-competition clause and a five-year restriction on using the "Smile Stylist" brand name within the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), stemming from the defendants opening a new clinic within the restricted zone and misusing the former clinic's website for marketing.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a strong prima facie case for breach of the non-competition and branding covenants, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, and that the balance of convenience favored granting these injunctions.

However, the court denied the request for control over the "thesmilestylist.ca" domain and related accounts, as the licensing term had expired and the plaintiffs had rebranded, negating irreparable harm for that specific relief.

The defendants brought a second motion to strike the plaintiff's re-amended statement of claim in an action arising from a Ponzi scheme.

The court found that the plaintiff had addressed the deficiencies identified in a previous decision regarding the damages claimed against most defendants.

However, the court struck the claim against two defendants (the McKillips) without leave to amend, finding no material facts were pleaded to establish a duty of care.

The court also held that the defendants were precluded from raising new arguments about the duty of care that they could have raised on their first motion to strike, as serial attacks on a pleading constitute an abuse of process.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for the recovery of $45,000.

The individual defendant, an officer of a corporate client, withdrew the funds with only one signature, despite knowing the account required two signatures.

The bank mistakenly permitted the withdrawal and subsequently reimbursed the corporate client.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, holding that the individual defendant was not an innocent recipient and was unjustly enriched by the mistake of fact.

Summary judgment was granted for the principal amount plus interest, but the claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

The defendants brought motions across five Canadian jurisdictions to address overlapping multijurisdictional class actions regarding a data breach.

The parties reached a settlement to proceed only with the Ontario national class action and stay the actions in British Columbia, Alberta, Québec, and Nova Scotia.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved the consent order dismissing the stay motion in Ontario, allowing the action to proceed subject to bi-annual reporting requirements to the case management judges in the other jurisdictions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time for written submissions following the conclusion of evidence at trial.

The plaintiff's new counsel required trial transcripts, which would not be available until mid-December, as the trial had been split over a year due to a change of counsel.

The court granted the extension, finding it would be unfair to require the new counsel to prepare submissions without the transcripts.

The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed a Master's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment regarding the expiry of a limitation period in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred, while the plaintiffs argued the limitation period had not expired due to discoverability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the Master's conclusion that the evidence on discoverability was unclear and intertwined with issues of severity, causation, and damages.

The court held that the limitation period issue could not be justly decided on a summary judgment motion and should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial.

The applicant sought an order for the immediate sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home and an amendment to her application to reference the Partition Act.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing prejudice if sold before trial, and sought medical disclosure and an independent medical examination of the applicant.

The court granted the amendment and some medical disclosure by consent, and ordered the applicant to provide hospital records.

However, the applicant's motion for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home was denied, and the respondent's request for an independent medical examination was dismissed.

The court found that the trial was imminent, the applicant's financial hardship was not sufficiently proven, and the fair market value of the home was in dispute, making a pre-trial sale prejudicial to the respondent.

The applicants sought an oppression remedy and monetary judgment against the respondents, alleging a scheme where the individual respondent and related corporations duped the applicants into investing over $1.6 million in a modular home business.

The investment was diverted through a "shell game" of corporations, depriving the applicants of their promised equity interest and decision-making role.

The court found clear self-dealing and oppression, granting the applicants the requested relief, including a monetary judgment equivalent to their investment.

The plaintiff, Abdul Nabi, sought to register a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property legally owned by the defendant, Amar Qadeer, claiming beneficial ownership under an oral trust agreement.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence inconsistent and lacking documentary proof to establish a plausible claim to an interest in land, particularly in light of the Statute of Frauds.

The motion was dismissed as the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue and the equities favored the defendant, who had occupied the property as his family home since 2012.

During a personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought mid‑trial motions seeking orders requiring certain foreign witnesses to testify in person in Canada rather than by video conference and restricting the plaintiff to evidence previously disclosed under an earlier discovery order.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broader access‑to‑justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge held that credibility concerns alone did not justify refusing video evidence and found the balance of convenience favoured permitting the witnesses, located abroad, to testify by video conference with interpretation.

The court also declined to limit the plaintiff’s evidence to earlier will‑say statements, finding that continuing disclosure obligations and fairness required allowing updated affidavit evidence while preserving the defendants’ opportunity to challenge it.

The defendants moved under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging civil conspiracy, unlawful interference with economic interests, trespass, and breach of confidence arising from alleged GPS tracking of the plaintiff’s service vehicles to obtain customer information.

The court held that the pleadings for civil conspiracy lacked the required material facts and particulars but granted leave to amend.

The claim for intentional interference with economic interests was struck without leave to amend because the pleadings failed to allege unlawful means directed at a third party as required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the tort.

Allegations against individual corporate officers were struck as an abuse of process for failing to plead independent tortious conduct.

Claims for trespass to chattels and breach of confidence were allowed to proceed, while the trespass to land claim was struck with leave to amend.

The respondent university brought a motion to transfer an application from Ottawa to Guelph.

The underlying dispute concerned the university’s refusal to continue collecting and remitting membership fees to national and provincial student organizations after a student referendum discontinued membership.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court assessed the location of events, damages, community interest, and convenience of the parties and witnesses.

The court held that the moving party failed to establish that the proposed venue was significantly better than the applicants’ chosen forum.

The motion to transfer venue was dismissed and costs were awarded to the responding parties.

The insured applied for a declaration that his automobile insurer owed him a defence and indemnity after denying coverage on the basis that he permitted an unauthorized driver to operate his vehicle contrary to statutory condition 4(1) under O. Reg. 777/93 and the Ontario Automobile Policy.

The driver, the insured’s girlfriend, possessed only a G1 licence and was involved in a collision while driving alone on a 400‑series highway.

The court held that the proper test was whether the insured took reasonable and prudent precautions to ensure the statutory condition was not contravened.

Given that the insured had seen the driver produce a licence for identification and had previously ridden with her while she drove, and given the visual similarity between G1 and full licences, the insured acted reasonably and was not wilfully blind.

The insurer therefore remained obligated to provide defence and indemnity.

In a defamation action brought by a municipal councillor concerning a statement published by town council and later republished by a newspaper, the plaintiff sought to introduce similar fact evidence relating to a separate defamation action previously commenced and later discontinued by one of the defendants.

The plaintiff argued that the earlier litigation had been characterized as SLAPP litigation and was relevant to establish malice.

The court held that the prior action had minimal probative value in determining whether the impugned statement was defamatory or whether available defences applied.

The court further concluded that admitting the evidence risked sidetracking the jury trial into collateral issues unrelated to the pleadings.

The motion to admit the similar fact evidence was therefore dismissed.

In a certified class proceeding concerning the partial wind-up of a supplemental retirement plan, the defendant insurer brought a refusals motion seeking production of income information, tax assessments, and projected retirement income from the representative plaintiff and certain subclass members.

The defendant argued the information was necessary for its actuarial expert to quantify potential damages.

The court held that the requested information related to individual damage quantification rather than the certified common issues, which were limited to liability and the methodology for calculating damages.

Because the trial judge had not yet determined the methodology for assessing damages or whether aggregate damages could be assessed, ordering production was premature.

The court also held that obtaining information from absent class members would require leave under s. 15 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The motion was dismissed.

In a class proceeding, the plaintiffs sought directions for a modified trial procedure to determine the first certified common issue concerning the interpretation of licences of occupation and whether they established a fixed property boundary through a contour line.

The defendant argued the issue should proceed by way of a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits and expert reports.

The court considered the “full appreciation” test for summary judgment and the anticipated need for contested expert survey evidence.

Concluding that summary proceedings would not allow adequate assessment of the expert evidence, the court directed that the common issue proceed by a modified trial procedure with expert reports, an agreed statement of facts, limited discovery, and viva voce expert testimony.

Case management conferences were ordered to establish timelines and further procedural directions.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment under Rule 19.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after the defendant was noted in default in a motor vehicle accident action.

The court found the defendant entirely liable for the collision and accepted evidence that the plaintiff suffered chronic pain, orthopedic injuries, and depression that significantly impaired his ability to perform flooring installation work.

The court held that the plaintiff met the statutory threshold under s. 267.5(3) of the Insurance Act for a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

Non‑pecuniary damages were assessed at $65,000 before the statutory deductible, with additional awards for future housekeeping capacity, future medical expenses, and loss of future earning capacity.

Claims for past income loss and past housekeeping expenses were dismissed for lack of sufficient proof.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator’s ruling under ss. 45(2) and (3) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 after the arbitrator dismissed a motion seeking to strike or limit the respondent’s claims based on an exclusion clause in a distribution agreement.

The court held that the arbitrator’s decision was interlocutory rather than a final award because it did not dispose of the substantive dispute and instead required factual findings at a full hearing.

Under the Arbitration Act, interlocutory rulings in arbitration are not subject to appeal.

The court further found no error in the arbitrator’s conclusion that interpretation of the contractual limitation clause required consideration of the factual matrix.

The appeal and challenge to the arbitrator’s costs award were dismissed.

Following a reference under the Construction Lien Act regarding emergency flood remediation services, the court addressed outstanding issues of costs and interest.

The plaintiff had claimed a construction lien and additional storage charges, but the lien was found to be out of time and most of the monetary claims failed, with only a small portion of the services claim succeeding.

Applying s. 86 of the Construction Lien Act and proportionality principles, the court held that costs could not exceed what would have been incurred had the matter proceeded in Small Claims Court.

The court therefore capped costs at the Small Claims Court maximum and disallowed many claimed disbursements.

The claim for contractual pre‑judgment interest was rejected, and only post‑judgment interest at the court rate was awarded.

Following the dismissal of an action and related summary judgment proceedings, the successful defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs against the plaintiffs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and assessed the reasonableness of the claimed fees, hourly rates, and the nature of work performed.

The court emphasized that costs awards should relate to steps authorized by the rules and excluded various client communications and strategic consultations that were not directly tied to procedural steps in the litigation.

Significant reductions were applied to certain categories of claimed work, including general preparation and work associated with abandoned or unnecessary motions.

The court ultimately fixed global cost awards payable by the plaintiffs to each set of defendants.