Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

This costs endorsement follows the court’s decision on an application regarding the enforcement of an agreed procedure in a Share Purchase Agreement between CLEAResult Canada Inc. and the respondents.

The court granted the application, allowing the appointed Independent Auditor to proceed with the expert adjudication of the Reverse Earn-Out Calculation.

The parties had agreed that the wholly successful party would be paid $60,000 in costs.

However, due to a lack of clarity in the applicants’ position regarding the auditor’s mandate, the court reduced the costs award to $45,000, to be paid by the respondents.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a Hague Convention application.

The respondent (mother) sought over $215,000 in costs after successfully defending the application.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, including reasonableness and the parties' financial circumstances.

Despite the respondent's full success on the underlying application and a rejected settlement offer, the court significantly reduced the requested costs to $50,761.01.

The decision emphasizes that costs awards must be proportionate and subject to the reasonable expectations of the parties, especially given their modest financial circumstances, and that success is not divided when pre-requisite findings are made but the ultimate relief sought is denied.

The applicant sought partition and sale of a jointly owned home, which she co-owned with the respondent, her former romantic partner.

The respondent, who continued to reside in the home, opposed the sale, arguing that the applicant had relinquished her interest years prior and that a forced sale would cause him significant hardship.

The court affirmed the applicant's prima facie right to partition and sale under the Partition Act, finding no evidence of malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct on her part.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the property, allowing the respondent a period of time to secure alternate accommodation and seek legal advice regarding potential claims, with the sale proceeds to be held in trust.

The plaintiff sought leave to discontinue a wrongful dismissal action in Ontario, which was a condition for proceeding with a related action in Florida.

The defendant consented to the discontinuance but sought costs for the action and the motion on an elevated scale, and that the discontinuance be with prejudice.

The court granted leave to discontinue with prejudice, awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the action (fixed at $7,500), but ordered each party to bear their own costs for the motion, finding both parties' conduct regarding the motion costs unreasonable.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident claim moved to strike the defendant's jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic created uncertainty about when in-person jury trials could proceed.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed it as premature.

The court noted that the case was not yet trial-ready, having not been pre-tried and with a recent medical report served.

Following a wait-and-see approach preferred in the Central East Region, the court held that the motion could be renewed if in-person hearings were suspended again or if the action was not scheduled for trial by April 1, 2021.

The plaintiff, a shareholder of a corporation that previously lost a mortgage enforcement action, brought a new action against the mortgagee and the mortgagee's lawyers alleging fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motions, finding that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the plaintiff had no privity of contract, the lawyers owed no duty of care to a litigation adversary, and the claims were barred by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process and frivolous and vexatious, as it attempted to re-litigate issues already decided in the prior mortgage action.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion to be appointed as her husband's litigation guardian.

She sought substantial indemnity costs against two respondents due to their counsel's failure to communicate, and partial indemnity costs against the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) for opposing the motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the respondents, finding their counsel's conduct unprofessional but not warranting an elevated scale.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs against the PGT, rejecting its argument for presumptive immunity as a statutory agency and finding it had pursued meritless arguments.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim, arguing the plaintiff was entirely at fault for failing to yield at an intersection where traffic lights were inoperative.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the plaintiff stopped before entering the intersection, which required a credibility assessment.

The court declined to use its expanded fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04 due to evidentiary issues, including the parties' failure to cross-examine witnesses on contradictory evidence as required by the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and problems with the plaintiff's expert evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, who previously obtained a judgment for damages arising from sexual assaults perpetrated by her former high school music teacher, sought an ex parte Mareva injunction.

The defendant's counsel had threatened that the defendant would collapse his $100,000 RRSP and donate the funds to charity if the plaintiff did not accept a $50,000 settlement offer.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding a clear risk of asset dissipation.

The court also exercised its discretion under Rule 40.03 to dispense with the requirement for an undertaking in damages, noting it would be grossly unfair to require it from a successful sexual assault plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully proving copyright infringement and being awarded statutory damages.

The Defendants argued for no costs or their own costs due to the Plaintiff's limited success and failure to accept their settlement offer.

The court awarded the Plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $30,000, finding that neither party's settlement offer triggered Rule 49.10 consequences and adjusting the Plaintiff's claimed costs for reasonableness and proportionality.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim, which alleged the defendants attempted to sell land to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had already purchased, appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face.

The court directed the registrar to give notice to the plaintiff that it is considering dismissing the action and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The applicant sought to lift a Writ of Execution filed by the respondent's former lawyers (Farrell & Boyle, represented by Elissa Boyle) against the respondent Meagan McKenney's interest in the matrimonial home.

The applicant argued the writ was an invalid encumbrance under s. 21(1) of the Family Law Act because he, as the spouse, did not consent to its filing.

The court found that Farrell & Boyle, having ceased to represent Ms. McKenney, were acting at arm's length when they obtained the judgment and filed the writ.

Consequently, the writ was not considered an encumbrance within the meaning of s. 21(1) of the Act, and spousal consent was not required.

The court also determined that Farrell & Boyle's interest, secured by the writ, had priority over the applicant's interest, which had not vested prior to the writ's filing.

The applicant's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought significant damages from Hydro One for power disconnection, alleging breaches of the Criminal Code and Electricity Act.

Both parties brought motions to strike pleadings.

The plaintiffs' motion to strike Hydro One's defence was dismissed as the defence complied with pleading rules.

Hydro One's motion to strike the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim and Reply was granted because the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, primarily relying on statutory breaches which are not standalone civil causes of action.

The court granted leave for the plaintiffs to file an amended Statement of Claim.

The applicant sought interim orders under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act to restrain the respondent from dissipating assets, alleging depletion of capital that would impair her equalization and retroactive support claims.

The respondent opposed, arguing the applicant failed to meet the burden of proof and the relief sought was excessive.

The court found that while reckless depletion was not proven, there was a real risk the applicant would be unable to collect on a significant judgment due to the respondent's financial arrangements and delays.

The court granted a more tailored interim order, preserving specific assets, requiring the registration of a certificate of pending litigation against a cottage, and mandating a $4 million bond or letter of credit, while allowing the respondent to conduct ordinary course business with reporting requirements.

Representative plaintiffs in a proposed national competition law class action sought court approval of partial settlement agreements with three defendants, approval of contingency fee agreements with class counsel, and approval of counsel fees and disbursements.

The court approved settlements totaling $13.63 million with Bank of America, Capital One, and Citigroup and found the agreements fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court also approved the contingency fee agreements but scrutinized a separate fee‑sharing agreement between class counsel and a rival law firm that had commenced competing class actions.

The judge held that the fee‑sharing agreement required court approval, was not fair or reasonable to class members, and may constitute champerty or maintenance.

Class counsel’s requested fee was reduced by 10%, and the court ordered that no payment be made to the rival firm under the unauthorized agreement.

The applicant sought payment of trust funds from the sale of a home she renovated and owned, while the respondent counterclaimed for $90,000 in unpaid services allegedly rendered to the applicant's dance studio companies.

The court found the applicant was the sole owner of the property and entitled to the sale proceeds.

The respondent's counterclaim was dismissed as he failed to establish a contractual basis for the claimed fees, having agreed to cease receiving payments when the business struggled.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident action, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act arguing that the plaintiff had failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

The plaintiff presented testimony from himself, family members, and an occupational therapist but called no physician to provide medical evidence.

The court held that Ontario Regulation 461/96 requires evidence from a qualified physician addressing the nature, permanence, and seriousness of the impairment.

Lay testimony may only corroborate, not replace, the required medical evidence.

Because no physician’s evidence was adduced, the statutory threshold was not met and the plaintiff’s claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred.

Following reasons granting the appointment of a receiver in aid of execution over a judgment debtor’s assets, the court determined costs of the motion.

The moving party sought full indemnity costs against the debtor and another respondent.

The court held that elevated costs were justified against the debtor because his conduct—including obstructing enforcement of the judgment, withholding financial information, colluding with others, and using corporate structures to avoid payment—constituted reprehensible behaviour aimed at frustrating enforcement.

However, no costs were ordered against another respondent who had not opposed the receivership application and whose asserted security interest remained to be determined.

Substantial indemnity costs of $53,126.62 were awarded against the judgment debtor.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $24,442.42 in damages for personal injury, the court determined the issue of costs.

The defendants argued the plaintiff should be denied costs under Rule 76.13 for failing to use the simplified procedure.

The court found it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have commenced and continued the action under the ordinary procedure, as the damages claimed were originally well above the $50,000 threshold.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $36,771.98, reducing the requested amount to account for duplication of efforts caused by the plaintiff's team approach to litigation.

Three municipal defendants brought a motion seeking to determine a question of law before trial and to strike the statement of claim without leave to amend for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

During oral submissions the moving parties sought leave, without notice, to amend their defence to plead the Limitations Act.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings and directed the applicants to file a more complete factum addressing the legal basis of their argument that no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff.

The motion itself was adjourned to permit further filings and responses.