CITATION: Yan v. Ministry of Health, 2026 ONSC 519
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00729679
DATE: 2026012026
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: NATHALIE XIAN YI YAN
Applicant
AND:
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
Respondent
BEFORE: Koehnen J.
COUNSEL: Nathalie Xian Yi Yan on her own behalf
Kristina Yeretsian for the respondent
HEARD: November 28, 2025
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The Applicant, Nathalie Xian Yi Yan, seeks leave to continue this action against the Respondent Ministry of Health (the “Claim”) pursuant to subsection 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act[1] after being declared a vexatious litigant.[2] In addition, the applicant seeks default judgment on her claim. The respondent Crown opposes both motions. I turn first to the motion for default judgment.
[2] For the reasons set out in greater detail below, I dismiss the applicant’s motions. The noting in default has already been set aside by court order, as a result, default judgment is not possible. The applicant has not persuaded me that there are reasonable grounds for proceeding with her Claim. It is founded on vicarious liability of the Crown for the actions of the College where no such vicarious liability exists. Moreover, the claim amounts to an abuse of process. It is an attack on the disciplinary proceedings against her by the College. The applicant has already launched unsuccessful appeals from those proceedings. She has also launched two civil actions arising out of those proceedings, both of which have been dismissed. This is yet another attempt to relitigate her complaints about the disciplinary proceedings in another forum against another defendant when the correct forum in which to pursue the complaint was an appeal.
The Motion for Default Judgment
[3] Although the applicant noted the respondent in default, the noting in default was of no effect because section 25 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act[3] (the “CLPA”) provides that the Crown may not be noted in default except with leave of the court to be obtained on motion with notice to the Crown. No such motion was brought. Moreover, Morgan J set aside the noting in default by endorsement dated February 28, 2025.
[4] As a result, default judgment is not possible on the current state of the record.
The Motion for Leave to Continue The Action
[5] The Crown raises two procedural objections to the motion to which I give no weight in my determination.
[6] First, the named respondent is the Ministry of Health whereas the proper name respondent should be His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario. That is a minor technical irregularity which can be easily remedied by amendment if necessary.
[7] Second, the Crown submits that the claim is a nullity because notice was not provided pursuant to s. 18 of the CLPA. Section 18 provides that no claim for damages may be brought against the Crown unless, the Crown receives notice of the claim at least 60 days before the proceeding is commenced. I do not give any weight to that submission in my determination because the applicant says she tried to give notice but was not permitted onto the premises of the government office at which he attempted to serve. The evidence on this issue is somewhat unclear. It is preferable to deal with the issue on the merits rather than on procedural points.
[8] The more substantial of the issues at hand arise out of the nature of the underlying action. The action is one in which the applicant complains about the nature and manner of an investigation and disciplinary proceeding against her by the College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario (the “College”). This becomes abundantly clear from the paragraphs five and six of her responding factum to that of the Crown on this application where she summarizes her claim as follows:
- The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to supervise the [College], which engaged in unlawful and harmful practices:
i. Defamation and false allegations damaging the plaintiff’s reputation;
ii. Unjust fines, license suspension, and denial of appeal rights;
iii. Sabotaged investigations and dissemination of confidential information;
iv. Procedural and systemic misconduct on thousands of Chinese TCM practitioners.
- All of the following punitive and unlawful measures were imposed against the plaintiff in a manipulated ICRC process that concluded on December 14, 2018, and the decision was posted online since Oct. 1, 2018 by seven different URL address, causing further harm:
a. A nearly 3-year investigation conducted without transparency or procedural fairness;
b. Five investigation appointment issued within three month in 2016;
c. Eight allegations advanced without credible or substantiated evidence;
d. A $300 misconduct fine imposed despite no proven wrongdoing;
e. A 12-month proposed suspension of the plaintiff’s certificate of registration;
f. A punitive and disproportionated investigation cost order of $122,792.02;
g. Mandatory “re-education” and retraining conditions before reinstatement;
h. Manipulation, alteration, and fabrication of evidence by [College] staff and counsel;
i. Forged signatures appearing in official investigative or disciplinary documents;
j. A investigation report was written one week before the investigation launched;
k. Denial of the plaintiff’s right to appeal to [Health Professions Appeal and Review Board], preventing any external review;
l. One day of the hearing was not open to public;
m. No intervention or correction by the supervising Crown authorities, defendant, despite their statutory oversight responsibilities and clear evidence of systemic misconduct.
[9] Section 140(4) of the Courts of Justice Act[4] provides that a person who has been declared to be a vexatious litigant may continue a proceeding only if the proceeding to be continued is not an abuse of process and if there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding. The onus is on the Applicant for both elements of the test.[5]
No Reasonable Grounds for the Proceeding
[10] The Claim that sets out in detail the complaints the applicant has with the proceeding the College initiated against her. The claim alleges that the Crown “holds vicarious liability for the actions of its regulatory body, the College…”[6]
[11] The College is not a government entity. The profession of traditional Chinese medicine practitioners and acupuncturists of Ontario is a self-regulating health profession. The College regulates the profession to ensure the public is protected.[7] The Crown does not manage or operate the College and is not involved in its day-to-day operations and management.
[12] The College is established pursuant to section 5 of the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006[8] as a corporation without share capital with all the powers of a natural person. The Act also sets out its governance structure.
[13] The Claim alleges that the Crown has an obligation to oversee the relationship between the College and its members and appoint supervisors to oversee the management of the College.[9]
[14] The overall duties of the Minister are set out in section 3 Regulated Health Professions Act,[10] (the “RHPA”), as follows:
It is the duty of the Minister to ensure that the health professions are regulated and co-ordinated in the public interest, that appropriate standards of practice are developed and maintained and that individuals have access to services provided by the health professions of their choice and that they are treated with sensitivity and respect in their dealings with health professionals, the Colleges and the Board.
[15] In addition, section 5 of the RHPA gives the Minister the power to
(a) inquire into or require a Council to inquire into the state of practice of a health profession in a locality or institution;
(b) review a Council’s activities and require the Council to provide reports and information;
(c) require a Council to make, amend or revoke a regulation under a health profession Act, the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act;
(d) require a Council to do anything that, in the opinion of the Minister, is necessary or advisable to carry out the intent of this Act, the health profession Acts, the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act.
[16] The duties and powers are therefore ones of general oversight, not day-to-day management or responsibility for day-to-day management of the College or other bodies like it.
[17] Section 38 of the RHPA provides broad immunity as follows:
No action or other proceeding for damages shall be instituted against the Crown, the Minister, a College supervisor appointed under section 5.0.1 or his or her staff, an employee of the Crown, a College, a Council, or a member, officer, employee, agent or appointee of a College, a Council, a committee of a Council or a panel of a committee of a Council for an act done in good faith in the performance or intended performance of a duty or in the exercise or the intended exercise of a power under this Act, a health profession Act, the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a regulation or a by-law under those Acts or for any neglect or default in the performance or exercise in good faith of the duty or power.
[18] The closest that the statement of claim comes to a specific allegation of wrongdoing is found in paragraph two which states:
The plaintiff respectfully submits this claim against the defendant, alleging that the defendant has engaged in actions constituting breaches of trust, dereliction of duty, government negligence, regulatory misconduct, nonfeasance, and failure to perform a ministerial duty, while also establishing a double standard compared to other regulated professions, resulting in significant harm to the plaintiff.
[19] This amounts to only a bald allegation of bad faith. Rule 25.06(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading of bad faith contain full particulars.
[20] The closest the claim comes to pleading any particulars involves a list of other practitioners against whom the plaintiff raises a variety of allegations.[11] Those do not, however, constitute actionable allegations. There is no suggestion that the applicant raised complaints against these individuals before the College or the Minister. Nor is there any suggestion that the Applicant has standing to raise such complaints in the absence of any relationship between herself and the impugned practitioners. Moreover, there is substantial doubt about the extent to which the complaints warrant pursuit. By way of example, one complaint against certain practitioners is that “the driving distances between [their] clinics often exceed an hour, thereby posing a significant risk to the standards of practice, compromising medical record keeping and undermining ethical standards, patient and treatment post in We Chat etc.” [12]
[21] In the foregoing circumstances, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established a reasonable basis for proceeding against the Crown. Although it might be theoretically possible to correct some of these defects, I decline to grant the applicant leave to do so because, in my view, the claim is also an abuse of process as discussed below.
Abuse of Process and Res Judicata
[22] As noted above, the bulk of the plaintiff’s claim is devoted to complaints about the manner in which the College investigated and proceeded against her. The proper avenue for those complaints is by way of appeal the Divisional Court,[13] not by way of statement of claim to the Superior Court against the Crown.
[23] Indeed, the applicant pursued an appeal to the Divisional Court arising out of the College’s proceedings against her. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.[14] The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal which was also dismissed.[15] The Applicant then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada which was also dismissed.[16]
[24] The applicant also brought a prior civil proceeding against multiple individuals who were involved in the College’s investigation and proceedings. That claim was struck out under rule 21.01 1(1)(b). Once again the applicant appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal.[17] Once again the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada which was also dismissed.[18]
[25] The applicant then brought a second civil action against several respondents who were involved in the College’s investigation and proceeding which was dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01(1). Her subsequent appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was also dismissed.[19]
[26] This latest claim against the Crown is yet a further attempt to challenge the College proceeding against her.
[27] The entire issue of the propriety of the College’s proceeding against the applicant has already been determined by several courts and is therefore res judicata. This action is simply a further effort, albeit against a different defendant, to pursue the same fundamental complaint. Even if the circumstance of the Claim do not meet the formal requirements of res judicata, it amounts to an abuse of process.
[28] In Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79[20] the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that it amounted to an abuse of process to try to impeach one court’s finding through relitigation in a different forum. From the perspective of the administration of justice, relitigation of that sort is wasteful. It requires multiple uses of scarce judicial resources to address the same issue with nothing to suggest a more trustworthy result. In cases of true injustice, a litigant is free to establish that there was a fundamental injustice in the earlier proceeding. The applicant has not done so here.
[29] In the foregoing circumstances I dismiss the applicant’s motion for default judgment and dismiss her motion for leave to continue this action.
[30] Any party seeking costs arising out of this endorsement can deliver written cost submissions within two weeks of the release of the endorsement. The parties opposing costs will have 10 days to respond with a further five days for reply. Once all cost submissions have been posted on to Case Centre the party seeking costs should write to my judicial assistant at Kristina.archer@ontario.ca to advise her that all cost submissions have been posted.
Date: January 26, 2026
Koehnen J.
1Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43
2College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan & Bahadur v. Yan, 2025 ONSC 352 at para. 39.
3Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7, Sch 17
4Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43
5Falardeau v. Owen Sound Police Service Board, 2021 ONSC 6180, at para. 70; Riad v. Ontario College of
Pharmacists, 2015 ONSC 6736, at para. 42; Deep v. Canada Revenue Agency (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency), 2011 ONSC 5660, at para. 16; Hainsworth v. Attorney General of Canada, 2011 ONSC 2642, at
para. 11; Lindhorst v. Centennial College, 2016 ONSC 2678, at para. 4.
6Statement of Claim paragraph 2.
7College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Federation of Ontario
Traditional Chinese Medicine Association, 2015 ONSC 661 at para. 1.
8Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 27 at s. 5.
9Statement of Claim at paragraphs 11-12.
10Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 18
11See for example paragraphs 111-118.
12Statement of Claim at para 118.
13Section 70 of the Health Professions Procedural Code, (Schedule 2 to the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991; Nathalie Xian Yi Yan v. College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5464.
14Nathalie Xian Yi Yan v. College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5464
15Unpublished decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal dated October 10, 2023.
16Nathalie Xian Yi Yan v. College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and
Acupuncturists of Ontario, 2025 CanLII 1064 (SCC).
17Yan v. Hutchinson, 2023 ONCA 97.
18Nathalie Xian Yi Yan v. Edward Lawrence Marrocco, et al., 2023 CanLII 92317
(SCC).
19Yan v. Pritchard-Sobhani, 2024 ONCA 612.
20Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63