CITATION: Pitt v. Blake, 2026 ONSC 510

COURT FILE NO.: FC101/19-01

DATE: March 9, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

Kathleen Rita-Mae Pitt

Danica Francis, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

Kirkland Odain Blake

In person

Respondent

HEARD: January 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16, 2026

TOBIN J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1The parties are before the court to vary some of the provisions contained in the final order of Hebner J. dated April 12, 2019 (the “Hebner J. order”) related to parenting and child support.

2The Hebner J. order:

a) placed primary care of the parties’ two children with the applicant (the “mother”);

b) gave each party final decision-making responsibility; the mother with respect to medical needs and religion, and the respondent (the “father”) with respect to education and extracurricular activities;

c) granted the father defined parenting time with the children; and

d) required the father to pay child support.

3In this trial of the father’s motion to change, he asks for sole decision-making responsibility and primary care of the children. He also asks that the mother’s parenting time be defined. He claims the mother is alienating the children from him and her care of them is deficient.

4The mother wants to redefine the father’s parenting time and require the children’s views and preferences be taken into “consideration for their attendance at parenting time” with the father.

5The mother denies engaging in any alienating behaviour. Instead, she suggests that the father should consider the effect of his actions upon the children, especially their older child.

6The mother also asks that child support be recalculated retroactively and going forward based on income to be imputed to the father.

The father was self-represented

7The father was self-represented at this trial.

8In the recent decision in Placca v. Umugiraneza, 2025 ONSC 7262, the court summarized a trial judge’s duties to self-represented litigants at paras. 7 and 8 as follows:

7. It is well-accepted that judges have special duties to self-represented litigants, in terms of acquainting them with courtroom procedure and the rules of evidence: Dujardin v. Dujardin Estate, 2018 ONCA 597, at para. 37, repeated in Gionet v. Pingue, 2018 ONCA 1040 at para. 30; Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2019 ONCA 1023 at para. 34.

8. The Ontario Court of Appeal provided some guidance in dealing with self-represented litigants in Grand River Conservation Authority v. Vidhya Ramdas 2021 ONCA 815, at paras. 18 – 21, outlining the following considerations:

a. Self-represented litigants are expected to familiarize themselves with the relevant practices and procedures pertaining to their case and respect the court process;

b. The Court has the duty to ensure that self-represented litigants receive a fair hearing;

c. The court’s obligations to self-represented litigants are outlined in the Canadian Judicial Council’s 2006 Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470, at para. 4.

d. The Court must permit the represented party and the self-represented party to explain how they understand where things stand in the litigation; and,

e. It is open to a judge to engage in active adjudication. However, a judge must not cross the line between assisting self-represented litigants in the presentation of their evidence and becoming their advocate.

9In summary, courts are directed to conduct a procedurally flexible hearing, that is fair to all parties. The self-represented party must be given an opportunity to be heard in an effective manner. The other party must not be prejudiced by any leeway given to the self-represented party.

10To assist the father in this case, at the beginning of the trial, I reviewed with him how the case would proceed. This included an explanation of the trial process, evidence the court could consider, and the law to be applied based on the legal issues argued.

11During the trial, the father was reminded how best to elicit the evidence he wanted the court to consider. He allowed me to ask questions of him so that the necessary evidence in relation to the issues raised would be placed on the record. He was given the opportunity to present all of the admissible evidence he wanted the court to rely upon. While the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form provided time limits for his examination-in-chief, cross-examinations and submissions, he was allowed to take all the time he needed to do so.

Facts

12The following is a summary of the facts related to the issues in dispute. Additional facts will be taken into account when each issue is addressed in these reasons.

13The parties began living together in January 2015 and married on February 18, 2015.

14They separated in July 2018.

15They are the parents of two children: TB, born […] 2017, now eight years old (T), and KB, born […] 2018, now seven years old (K).

16Following their separation, the mother brought a family law case against the father. That case was resolved with the granting of the Hebner J. order on April 12, 2019. This order gave effect to final minutes of settlement entered into by the parties.

The Hebner J. order

17The Hebner J. order provided, in part, as follows:

1. The children’s primary residence would be with the mother;

2. The father would have “reasonable specified access” (now called parenting time): on alternate weeks with T and K, and Mondays and Wednesdays from 4 p.m. until 7 p.m.;

3. The father was responsible for picking up and dropping off the children for his parenting time;

4. During his parenting time, the father was not to leave the children in the care of another person;

5. The parties were to “refrain from speaking ill of the other, nor disparage or denigrate the other… nor… permit others to do so.”

6. The parties were to consult with one another about major events concerning the children.

7. If after consultation the parties could not agree, the mother was to have final decision-making responsibility regarding the children’s medical needs and religious upbringing. The father was to have final decision-making responsibility regarding the children’s education and extracurricular activities;

8. The mother was to keep the father informed of the children’s educational activities, their health, and medical appointments.

9. The father was to pay the mother child support of $660.83 per month based on his estimated income of $48,000 per year.

Parenting time

18The parenting time terms contained in the Hebner J. order were not strictly followed by the parties.

19The father described having open visits. He would see the children regularly when the parties were getting along. If they were not getting along, he did not see the children. Sometimes, he did not see the children for a couple of weeks and other times, for a couple of months.

20In the spring of 2020, when the pandemic began, the father moved from London to Sarnia. He went there to start a business. When he moved, the mother moved into the father’s London residence. The mother would allow the father to stay overnight on weekends so that he could see the children.

21In December 2020, the father was charged with two counts of assault against the mother. He was restricted from having contact with her. Despite the no contact order, sometime during the summer of 2021, the mother went with the children to Sarnia to see the children’s paternal grandmother. She was visiting from Jamaica.

22During the 2021 Thanksgiving weekend, the father visited with the children. While visiting, the mother had a medical emergency that required her to go to the hospital. The children were left with the father. For reasons not explained by the father, he left the children alone. The mother had to arrange for the children’s maternal grandparents to go to her home and care for the children.

23The father did not have any parenting time with the children in 2022.

24In March 2022, the father was arrested and charged with assault. He was released pursuant to a release order dated March 14, 2022. Subsequently he faced four additional charges: obstructing justice by trying to dissuade the mother from testifying against him, and three counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.

25As he was not able to communicate with the mother, the father was not seeing the children as had been provided for in the Hebner J. order.

26The father tried to resume his parenting time by bringing the Motion to Change that is now before the court. This Motion to Change was issued on March 23, 2023. The relief sought included a request for police enforcement of his parenting time. He also sought a reduction of his child support obligation due to changes in his financial situation.

27On June 15, 2023, the parties signed a Consent Endorsement Request to change the Hebner J. order on an interim interim and without prejudice basis. The parties agreed that the father was to have parenting time with the children beginning on June 18, 2023, every other Sunday from 9:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. Beginning in August 2023, the father was to have parenting time on alternate weekends from Saturday at 9:30 a.m. until Sunday at 4:30 p.m. Parenting time exchanges were to take place at Merrymount Family Support and Crisis Centre (“Merrymount”), with the father being responsible for any costs. The father also agreed to ensure the children took their medications as prescribed by a family doctor. The consent endorsement request was filed along with a Form 14B Motion form. On October 3, 2023, Korpan J. granted the order in terms of the consent endorsement request.

28On July 7, 2023, the father entered into a common law peace bond for a term of 12 months. This concluded the criminal proceedings against the father. He was not convicted of any criminal offence for which he had been charged. A peace bond is not a finding of guilt, nor a declaration of innocence. It is simply a resolution of the charges: see Dawoud v. Baddar, 2026 ONSC 947, at para. 3.

29The father’s parenting time continued without incident until October 2023. After a parenting time weekend with the father in October 2023, T told the mother that the father had a gun. As a result, the mother paused the father’s parenting time. She wanted the Children’s Aid Society and police to investigate. Until December 2023, the father had “sporadic” visits. Beginning in December 2023, the father had no visits with the children until exchanges at Merrymount resumed in March 2024. The father was in Jamaica during part of this period.

30The CAS and police investigated. There was no gun in his house.

31Again, the father’s parenting time continued without incident, this time until July 7, 2024.

32His driver’s license was suspended because of enforcement steps taken by the FRO.

33The parties disagreed in their evidence why he was not able to see the children. The father’s evidence was the mother would not allow him to have the children, even though he had a driver to help him. The mother denies preventing the father from having parenting time.

34I accept the mother’s evidence because on August 7, 2024, the father sent an email to the mother stating his “… license had been suspended, I will not be able to do any driving or transit…” I note from this message that he did not mention having an alternate driver.

35In September 2024, the father’s driver’s license was reinstated.

36On September 16, 2024, the parties signed another Consent Endorsement Request on an interim without prejudice basis. The father was to have parenting time on alternate weekends from Friday until Sunday, and on Wednesdays from the school bus stop until 7:30 p.m. The father was to remain in his car when “dropping the children off” at the mother’s home. The Consent Endorsement Request also dealt with the father’s disclosure obligations at the time and child support.¹

37In January 2025, the father’s driver’s license was suspended again. Despite the suspension, the father did see the children sporadically. He picked them up at Merrymount on January 24, 2025. I accept the mother’s evidence that, on occasion after that date, the father would pick up the children at her home or the home of the maternal grandparents. On these latter occasions, the father had a third-party driver with him.

38The father’s driver’s license was reinstated in May 2025, as was his regular parenting time.

39During the summer of 2025, the parties agreed to expand the father’s parenting time. He had the children in his care every other weekend from Thursday evening after soccer practice until Sunday evening or Monday afternoon.

40In August 2025, the father had the children in his care for approximately three weeks, with “intermittent visits” with the mother, and one with the maternal grandparents.

T refuses parenting time with the father

41An incident occurred at the end of August 2025 that has affected the child T’s relationship with the father.

42August 27, 2025 was K’s birthday. The child asked, and the mother agreed, that he could spend his birthday with the father and return home the next day, August 28, 2025.

43On the evening of August 28, 2025, the mother went to pick up K. The child asked to stay one more night with the father. The mother agreed. T returned to the mother’s care at that time.

44The next day, Friday, August 29, 2025, K was to be returned. However, the father asked if he could take K to a trampoline park in London. The child wanted to go. The mother agreed. The parties agreed that the child was to be returned at 6 p.m. However, the parties did not agree on the arrangements for the child’s return.

45The child did not return that evening. The mother texted the father asking when he would be returned. In reply to the mother’s text, the father responded with complaints about the mother’s care of the children, that the children were “terrified” of her, and that she planned to prevent the children from seeing him.

46The father kept K the entire weekend.

47The father took K to school on Wednesday, September 3, 2025. This was the first day of school. The parties were before this court on September 3, 2025, on the mother’s motion for a temporary order to have the child returned. I ordered that the child be returned that day and that medications be administered to the child as prescribed by their current doctor. I found that the father had overheld the child without sufficient reason.

48The mother picked up K from school at the end of that first day.

49After that weekend, the mother wanted parenting time exchanges to resume at Merrymount.

50Another incident occurred shortly thereafter that caused the mother concern. One afternoon, the mother saw K leave the house. She followed him. She saw K go towards the father, who was waiting for him from his vehicle. It was not his parenting time. The mother prevented the child from leaving with the father. I accept the mother’s detailed evidence with respect to this event. I find the father had arranged with the child to have him meet him near the mother’s home and that the father tried to take the child without the mother’s consent or prior knowledge.

51Parenting time exchanges at Merrymount were not arranged to start until September 26, 2025. In the meantime, the father did not have parenting time with the children.

52On September 26, 2025, the mother brought the children to Merrymount for the supervised parenting time exchange. K went with the father. However, T refused to go with him.

53Merrymount’s supervised parenting time exchange notes of September 26, 2025, which were admitted into evidence on consent, state that T said:

• He wasn’t going

• Dad doesn’t give them medication

• Something about the father not bringing K back

• “Put that in your court papers”

• Telling K to go out the back door

• Asked father for his new address. It is for if Dad doesn’t bring K back

• He would say “Hi” to Dad but not go with him

54T has not gone on parenting time with the father since.

55The mother brings both children to Merrymount for the scheduled supervised parenting time exchanges. However, T refuses to go. Sometimes he will say hi to the father.

56This is the current state of affairs with respect to parenting time: K goes, T does not.

Medications

57The children have been prescribed medication by their family doctor. The father objects to the medications being given because he has not been kept informed or involved with respect to why the medications are needed and what medications are appropriate.

58T is under the care of Dr. Samim Al-Qadhi, a Paediatrician. In Dr. Al-Qadhi’s report of September 22, 2025, he listed T’s mental health conditions as: anxiety, school phobia, social anxiety and separation anxiety – age appropriate. He also wrote that T has ADHD, insomnia, and parasomnia.

59The report sets out the active medications the child is prescribed. The mother supports T taking the medications as prescribed by his doctor. However, as stated above, the father is against it. In response to my question to the father about giving the children their prescribed medications, he said he does give the medication with which he is provided. The mother’s evidence is that the father is not giving the medications. I accept there are times the father has not given medications. He gave evidence that when he had the children in his care in August 2025 he spoke with the doctor and agreed he could taper or reduce the medications given. The father’s evidence is that he sees none of T’s behavioural problems as described by the mother and school officials.

60In Dr. Al-Qadhi’s report it states that he recommends the child take the recommended medications.

61The mother is attempting to address her concerns regarding T’s behaviour and his medical needs. She has been able to access Vanier Children’s Services in London. T was seen virtually by a Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist through Vanier. The Tele-Mental Health Service Vanier-Western Hub report of Dr. J. Sukhern was admitted in evidence on consent. The doctor made a number of recommendations including a medication plan:

“For ADHD with comorbid ODD, stimulant monotherapy is preferred if possible…currently he is “better on medications but not great” which suggests partial response and the need to simplify and systemically reassess”

62The child K is also prescribed medication but no medical reports with respect to him were provided.

63The father wants the opportunity to be consulted and have input into addressing what, if any, medication regime is best for both children.

Child support

64Pursuant to the order of ten Cate J. dated June 9, 2025, the father is to pay the mother child support for the two children in the monthly amount of $523. This amount is based upon his imputed income of $34,424.

65The FRO schedule of arrears discloses that the father has made very few voluntary and regular child support payments. He has not made any voluntary payments as ordered by ten Cate J.

66The father is now in arrears of child support in the amount of $3,873.09.

67The father claims he has no income at this time. He operates a car detailing service that is closed during the winter months. At present he is supported financially by the person with whom he now resides and is using his savings.

68The mother asks that income be imputed to the father based on business income he earned a few years ago. The analysis of this issue will be addressed below.

Issues

69The issues to be addressed in this case are:

1. Has there been a material change in circumstances since the Hebner J. order was granted?

2. If there has been a material change in circumstances, what parenting time order is now in the best interests of the children?

3. Since the Hebner J. order was granted, what changes, if any, to the father’s child support obligation should be made and what ongoing child support order should be made?

Issue No. 1 – Has there been a material change in circumstances?

70The legislative authority to change a parenting order is found in the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 29 (the “Act”), which provides as follows:

29 (1) A court shall not make an order under this Part that varies a parenting order or contact order unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order.

71The court will not acquire jurisdiction to vary a parenting order unless it first makes an explicit finding that a material change in circumstances, since the previous order, has occurred: Persaud v. Garcia-Persaud 2009 ONCA 782, at para. 3.

72This means that before the Court can vary an existing parenting order, the Court must determine whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the date of that order. This is the threshold issue to be decided on a motion to change.

73What then constitutes a material change in circumstances? Change alone is not enough.

74A material change in circumstances is one in which:

(i) The change happened since the last order was made;

(ii) The change must be a fundamental one that has altered the child’s needs or affected the ability of the parent to meet those needs; and

(iii) The change was not reasonably contemplated when the original order was made, nor could it have been reasonably anticipated.

75Another way to consider this issue is that the onus is on the moving party to show that the circumstances have changed since the last order was made to such an extent that the current childcare arrangements are no longer appropriate.

76The original order is deemed to be correct.

77On a Motion to Change, the court may consider the reasons given when the original order was made, as well as the evidence of any change in circumstances. This will inform the determination of whether there has been a change, if it is material, and if it has been a change that was in the court’s reasonable contemplation: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 134 D.L.R. (4th) 321, at para. 17.

78If the court finds that the threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances has been met, the court may then consider the case on its merits and make an order that is then in the child’s best interests.

79In this case, both parties submit that there have been significant changes in the parties’ and children’s circumstances such that the Hebner J. order should be varied. I agree.

80The following significant changes have occurred and there is no evidence that they were contemplated when the Hebner J. order was made:

̶ T, now eight years old, is resisting in-person parenting time with the father.

̶ The parties are much less able to communicate effectively about the children and meet their needs.

̶ The children have been diagnosed with mental health and learning disabilities.

̶ The parties do not agree on the appropriate or preferred medical responses to these diagnoses.

81I find that in all these circumstances there has been a material change in circumstances since the Hebner J. order was made.

Issue No. 2 – What parenting-time order is now in the best interests of the children?

Position of the Parties

82The father, as the moving party, asks for sole decision-making responsibility with respect to the children and that their primary residence be in his care in Sarnia. He also asks that because the mother has alienated T, her parenting time be supervised for three months to allow the father to bond again with the child. Thereafter, the father proposes that the mother have parenting time on alternate weekends.

83The mother asks that the father`s parenting time take place every other weekend with supervised exchanges taking place at Merrymount. In the alternative, she asks that if parenting-time exchanges must occur at her residence, the father must remain in his vehicle and that the parties not speak to one another.

84The mother also proposes that the father be able to call the children every Wednesday. She asks that the “children’s views and preferences shall be taken in consideration for their attendances at parenting time” with the father. Another term she asks for is that during his parenting time, the father be the children’s primary caregiver and not leave them in the care of another person. The mother also wants the father to be required to ensure that the children take their prescribed medications.

85Finally, with respect to parenting issues, the mother asks that the parties be obliged to engage in child-focused communication through a parent communication application such as OurFamilyWizard.

Legal Considerations: Parenting Order

86Subsection 18 (1) of the Act) defines decision-making responsibility and parenting time as follows:

“decision-making responsibility” means responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including with respect to,

(a) health,

(b) education,

(c) culture, language, religion and spirituality, and

(d) significant extra-curricular activities;

and parenting time as follows:

“parenting time” means the time a child spends in the care of a parent of the child, whether or not the child is physically with the parent during that time;

87When making a parenting order, which includes decision-making responsibility and a determination of parenting time, s. 24 (1) of the Act requires the court to take into account only the best interests of the child.

88In determining best interests, s. 24 (2) of the Act provides that the court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

89Subsections 24 (3) and (4) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider related to the circumstances of the child. It provides as follows:

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

Factors relating to family violence

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

90The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. It is not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take an holistic look at the child, their needs and the persons around the child.

91An assessment of the best interests of the child must take into account all of the relevant circumstances with respect to the needs of the child and the ability of each parent to meet those needs.

92The court must ascertain a child’s best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. See: Gordon at para 69; Kirichenko v. Kirichenko, 2021 ONSC 2833, at para. 54.

93In allocating parenting time, s.24 (6) requires the court to give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

94In Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para. 34, the Court of Appeal held that a parenting-time plan requires a fact-specific analysis of what parenting time is in the child’s best interests: “It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children.”

The children

(i) T

95T is described by the father as a passionate, energetic, bright, loving, and caring boy. The child looked up to him.

96The mother describes T as smart. He is in grade three at a French immersion school and does well academically. Emotionally, he has issues. At school, he has trouble regulating his behaviour, he makes noise, he has difficulty staying in the classroom. According to the mother, he likes to “wander the halls to get his energy out”. The mother and child receive strong support from the school officials, especially the principal. At school, the attitude is that “the next day is a new day.” At school, the child is supported by the Vanier SCIP Program. The child’s school day is also modified and it ends at 2:50 p.m. instead of 3:30 p.m. The mother’s evidence, which is not contradicted, is that T “does not have as many issues” when he is allowed to leave early. The mother ensures that the child takes his prescribed medications. Socially he is having difficulties at this time. He does not have a best friend. This was not the case just two years ago.

97The mother is trying to arrange for in-home family therapy from Vanier.

98The Children’s Lawyer’s clinician who completed her s.112 investigation report, which is dated July 2, 2024, described T as smart, funny and athletic. He enjoyed adult attention and appeared to thrive on praise. He was clear that he did not like conflict and wished his parents would get along. He felt safe and protected with both parents.

99The maternal grandmother testified. She sees the children often and loves them dearly. She and her husband go over to the mother’s home every Tuesday and Thursday at approximately 7:30 a.m. and interact with the children before school. They are high-energy boys. She describes T as a sensitive boy. She describes T as acting differently when he is without his medications. “He is less tolerant. He loses it.”

(ii) K

100The father describes K as fun-loving and outgoing. He loves both parents. The father became emotional when talking about K He said that the child “is the glue that holds the family together…he was the one constant…he is my motivation.”

101The mother describes this seven-year-old child as loving and a jokester. He loves to show off what he has learned. At school he is a “popular dude” and does well.

102The clinician noted that K does not like it when his parents argue or when his brother and mother are fighting. He is a boy who feels loved and protected by both parents.

Bests Interests Considerations

103A consideration of the best interest factors found at s. 24(3) of the Act follows.

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability

104These early school-aged children require stability and predictability in their lives.

105The AFCC-Ontario Parenting Guide states that children of this age benefit from experiences that help develop their sense of competence. Participation in sports and school provides for this.

106These children in particular need to be shielded from any parental conflict.

107T requires the assistance of professionals and the support of his parents and school officials to address his emotional challenges.

108As biracial children, the children’s clinician stated:

As the children age and become more aware and affected by racism it will be important to their wellbeing that they have a strong sense of self and a community of support surrounding them and where they see themselves represented.

b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life

109T has a strong and positive relationship with his mother.

110At this time, T is not willing to spend time with his father. This is a recent development, that is, since September 2025.

111The clinician observed that T had a strong and positive relationship with the father when she conducted her investigation.

112K has a strong and positive relationship with both parents.

113Both children have a positive relationship with their maternal grandparents whom they see quite regularly. They spend overnights at their home at least once or twice a month. The maternal grandparents are quite involved in the children’s lives as they provide support to the mother.

114The father did not provide evidence of the children’s relationship with other persons who play an important part in their lives. In his 35.1 Affidavit of February 24, 2024, there were no such persons identified. At trial, his Plan of Care included help from his mother and his partner. However, his mother lives in Jamaica and she has had little contact with the children. The father’s partner with whom he has lived since August 2025 has a good relationship with K. They play games together such as math problems and board games. The father’s brother sees the children “from time to time.” The father has a cousin who lives in Sarnia. At one time, his cousin’s children played with T and K.

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent

115In the clinician’s report, the children both expressed their wish that neither parent speak negatively about the other and that they wanted both to support their relationship with the other parent.

116The father asserts that the mother is not willing to support his relationship with the children. He claims that T has been alienated from him by the mother. This has occurred because he claims the mother is not doing her duty to encourage and support their relationship. I accept that the mother did engage in immature and inappropriate behaviour using the Internet, including social media accounts, to disparage the father. This behaviour appeared to be aimed at convincing others of the father’s bad character and undermining his business reputation. This should not have occurred. However, I note that there have been no further examples of this behaviour in some time.

117However, and with respect, I disagree with the father’s assertion that the mother has engaged in alienating behaviour as alleged.

118The mother has agreed to the father having parenting time in excess of what is provided for in the Hebner J. order. She agreed to the father having an extended period of parenting time during the month of August 2025.

119Until September 2025, both children went on parenting time with the father without incident.

120K continues to go on parenting time without incident.

121The mother does not prevent the father from having lengthy telephone conversations with the children.

122Even now, while T has said that he does not want to go on parenting time with the father, the mother brings him to the supervised parenting-time exchange. There he has the ability to speak with his father, and the father hopes that he will go with him.

123The apparent reason for T’s resistance to going on parenting time now was the father’s overholding of K during the last weekend of August 2025.

124I find on the evidence that the mother is now supportive of the father’s relationship with both children.

125I also find that the father is not trying to undermine the children’s relationship with the mother. He too wants the children to have a positive relationship with her.

(d) history of care of the children

126Throughout their lives, the children have resided primarily in the mother’s care. She has been responsible for arranging for their education and healthcare.

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained

127The clinician observed that when she did her investigation, both children wanted to spend more time with the father and have him more involved in their lives.

128T’s views appear to have changed recently, to some extent. In his report, Dr. Sukhera observed that the child seemed fearful of the father. This conclusion is based upon his observation of the child and information from the mother and agency staff that the “father has made derogatory statements towards patients and has expressed his dislike that patient take medication.”

129K’s willingness to spend more time with the father is consistent with the views he expressed to the clinician.

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage

130The children are biracial and identify as Black. The father’s heritage is Jamaican.

131The mother has tried to expose the children to their Caribbean heritage but in a limited fashion.

132The clinician reported that the mother did not appear to “recognize the impact of racism and to be prepared to support the boys’ healthy development of self in this regard.”

133The father is better able than the mother to ensure the children are exposed to and develop a connection with their Jamaican heritage.

134The father is also aware that he and the mother have different cultures, and he wants the children to be aware of both.

(g) any plans for the child’s care

135The mother’s plan is to continue with the arrangements that have been in place since the Hebner J. order was granted. She will remain a stay-at-home parent. The children would reside in her care primarily and have parenting time with the father. She wants them to continue with their schooling and extracurricular activities. Also, she will pursue healthcare for the children as recommended by healthcare providers. Her plan also includes the support she has received from her parents and friends.

136The father’s plan is to move the children to Sarnia where he lives with his partner and her children. He wants to undertake an “immediate independent medical review of the children’s current psycho-tropic medicine regime.”

137In the alternative, the father is willing to move to London. He did not provide details of his plan should the children be placed in his care in London. It is not known where he would live or work and what school the children would attend.

138Both parties want to have sole decision-making responsibility with respect to the children.

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child

139The mother is both willing and able to care for and meet the needs of the children to the extent detailed in these reasons. She has done so since the Hebner J. order was granted with the help of her parents. The children are progressing academically at school, and their behavioral and medical needs are being assessed and addressed by professional healthcare providers. The mother is working with school officials and healthcare providers in dealing with T’s behaviour issues. As identified by the clinician, the mother will need to better understand and meet the children’s needs as biracial children who identify as Black.

140The father is willing and able with the help of his partner to meet the needs of the children. He asks that he does so in Sarnia. He has been able to provide for them while exercising parenting time with the children.

141The evidence did not disclose how the father would be able to care for the children if they were to reside primarily in his care in London.

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child

142While the father was facing criminal charges, he was restricted in his ability to communicate with the mother. The peace bond entered into by the father on July 7, 2023 restricted his ability to communicate with the mother for 12 months. He was only able to communicate with her through a parenting application to discuss the children, through legal counsel, or through a court order made after July 7, 2023, or through Merrymount to arrange parenting time.

143Subsequent to the expiry of the peace bond, both parties described their communication as poor. The father says he is not kept informed by the mother about the children. The mother asked the father to use the parenting application, OurFamilyWizard, so that she can keep him informed. He has not subscribed to this application.

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things

144Family violence is an issue in this case. As described above, the father was charged with a number of offences where the mother was the complainant. The father reported to the clinician that he “entered a guilty plea with the understanding that he would complete a PAR Program successfully and those charges would be stayed.” The peace bond described above was the final resolution of those criminal charges. These allegations of family violence have affected the mother’s ability to have in-person communication with the father. This is the reason the mother continues to request that there be supervised parenting-time exchanges.

Section 112 report

145On March 13, 2024, Henderson J. requested the involvement of the Children’s Lawyer. Kate Reid was appointed by the Children’s Lawyer to investigate and provide a report pursuant to s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O 1990, c. C-43. A disclosure meeting was held on July 3, 2024. The report prepared by the clinician is dated July 22, 2024.

146A Children’s Lawyer’s report is a fact-finding report. It is not an assessment pursuant to s. 30 of the Act. The report is one piece of evidence in this trial. It is to be carefully considered along with all the other evidence adduced in this trial. The court often gives great weight to this report because the Children’s Lawyer employs highly trained and experienced persons to conduct them.

147The weight to be given to the report and recommendations will depend on the other evidence provided at trial and whether the circumstances have changed since the release of the report.

148Neither party challenged the methodology employed by the clinician in undertaking her investigation and report.

149The investigation was conducted while the father was subject to the peace bond. Communication between the parties was restricted as described above.

150The clinician did not have the benefit of the information regarding the steps the mother has taken to address T’s emotional and behavioral challenges that took place subsequent to the release of her report. The assessor did not have the up-to-date medical information that was provided to the court during the trial.

151However, despite the release date, many of the clinician’s facts and observations are consistent with the evidence presented at trial. Some of these consistencies have already been addressed in these reasons.

152The parties continue to disagree about the children’s medicine regime.

153The parties continue to have different parenting styles.

154The father remains concerned about the mother’s mental health.

155The mother claims her mental health is not an issue. In this regard, the clinician gave evidence at trial that she did not observe that the mother suffered from any cognitive impairment. This too is consistent with the evidence presented at trial. The mother is able to identify and take steps to meet many of the needs of the children.

156In giving her evidence, she was able to respond directly to the questions asked. She did not appear to have any emotional or mental challenges while giving evidence.

Discussion

157I carefully considered the best interests factors in relation to the evidence and submissions of the parties. In making a decision regarding the parenting order to be granted in this case, I have taken an holistic look at the children, their needs, and the people in their lives.

Decision-making responsibility and primary care

158When I consider all the evidence presented and as set out above, I find that it is in the best interests of the children that the mother have decision-making responsibility with respect to the children and that they reside primarily in her care.

159This is not a case where joint decision-making responsibility can be ordered. The parties’ ability to communicate is not sufficiently effective to allow this. However, before the mother makes any significant decisions considering the children’s well-being, she must first consult with the father by advising him of her plan and the reasons why. The father is to be given time to consider and provide his input before the mother finalizes her decision. The father must be notified of the mother’s decision. The father must also be able to have independent contact with the children’s healthcare providers and school officials.

160This plan maintains a longstanding status quo that has provided certainty and stability for the children.

161The mother is able to identify and meet the children’s needs with the assistance of her parents and professionals.

162As the children will be residing in her primary care, she will need to implement and live with the decisions to be made.

163The father will continue to have responsibility for the upbringing of the children by having input into decisions to be made. He has the ability to give advice in a child -focused manner.

164The father’s plan is less certain than the mother’s. He works during most of the year. He did not provide adequate details of how he would manage the care of the children on a full-time basis while he was working, whether he resided in Sarnia or London. There was little evidence of the extent of the father’s partner’s ability to care for the children

165The mother’s plan keeps the maternal grandparents involved in the children’s care. They have been important persons in their lives and in their care.

166I agree with the clinician that it is in the best interests of the children that the father have more parenting time with the children.

167He will have the children in his care during the first three weekends each month. He will be able to pick the children up on Friday afternoon and return them on Sunday. If Friday is a PD day, he can pick the children up on Thursday. If Monday is a Statutory Holiday, he can return the children on Monday evening. This is consistent with the recommendation of the clinician.

168Special provisions for parenting time during holidays and other special events are addressed below.

169I will not order parenting time on Wednesday evening because the father has demonstrated that he is not able to exercise this while living in Sarnia.

170If the father had resided in London, I would have ordered that he have overnight access on Wednesdays until he took the children to school the next morning and that his weekend parenting time would end when he took the children to school on Monday (or Tuesday) morning.

171This plan allows the children to stay in the school where they have long attended and where they receive great support.

172The mother’s home will continue to be the children’s home base.

173The children are of an age, and the relationship of the parties is such, that it is not necessary that parenting-time exchanges take place at Merrymount. The children are capable of walking to and from the mother’s residence and the father’s vehicle. However, while T continues to resist attending parenting time, it is in the best interests of the children that the exchanges take place at Merrymount. This will give the mother an opportunity to demonstrate to third parties that she is taking active steps to ensure that T attends on parenting time. Once he has resumed his parenting time, then exchanges may take place at the mother’s home.

Resumption of T’s parenting time

174The mother must take active steps to encourage T to resume parenting time with the father: Jackson v Jackson, 2016 ONSC 3466, at para. 63. It is in his best interests that she do so. This will allow the positive relationship the child had with the father to resume.

175The mother must not leave it up to an eight-year-old child to decide whether he is to go for parenting time. Sometimes there are tasks a parent requires of a child that they do not like. But the parent must ask, and the child must do: like going to the dentist or in some instances going to school.

176The mother must do more than bring T to Merrymount to see if he will go. She must actively facilitate and encourage the child to attend. She may wish to enlist the help of the maternal grandparents in this regard. The father may be of help by ensuring the child knows that he will be returned home at the end of the parenting time and that he will be provided with his medications as ordered by the doctor.

177The mother’s responsibility in facilitating or encouraging the child to attend may include incentivizing the child. He may earn a reward when he goes with the father for parenting time. If necessary, the mother may need to let T know that there will be clearly stated disciplinary measure if he does not attend.

Holidays and other Special Occasions and Conduct

178The parties did not make submissions regarding holiday parenting time. The provisions contained in the Hebner J. order at paras. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue. These provisions related to Father’s Day and Mother’s Day, the children’s birthdays and Christmas holidays.

179Paragraphs 9–16 contained in the Hebner J. order shall continue. They concern conduct of the parties.

180The medical report from Dr. Sukhern shall forthwith be provided by the mother to Dr. Samim Al-Qadhi for his consideration in the ongoing treatment of T.

Issue No. 3 – Since the Hebner J. order was granted, what changes, if any, to the father’s child support obligation should be made and what ongoing child support order should be made?

The Hebner J. order

181The Hebner J. order provided the father was to pay child support to the mother for the two children in the amount of $305 bi-weekly (or $660.83 per month). This was based on the father’s estimated annual income of $48,000: $33,800 from salary and $14,425 from commissions. This amount was subject to prospective adjustment.

182Section 7 expenses were to be paid in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes.

183The order also required the parties to exchange Income Tax Returns, Notices of Assessment and proof of annual income by June 30 each year starting in 2019.

184The order states the table amount is “slightly lower” than the actual table amount of $725, because the father assisted the mother and children financially in other ways.

Position of the Parties

185The father asks that he be given credit for child support payments he made from March 2019 until December 2025 in the amount of $55,565. He also asks that his child support obligation be based on his actual annual income.

186The mother asks that income be imputed to the father based on 2020 corporate earnings and that retroactive and prospective child support be calculated and ordered accordingly.

Legal Considerations

187As the mother asks to retroactively increase child support, the court must consider the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, and in particular at para. 114, which provides as follows:

114 It is also helpful to summarize the principles which now apply to cases in which the recipient applies under s. 17 to retroactively increase child support:

a) The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

188Though this case was decided under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), the principles enunciated apply equally to cases brought under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.

Application of Legal Considerations

189The mother has met her onus in establishing that there has been a material change in circumstances.

190Under the Hebner J. order, the father’s child support obligation was based on an estimated income of $48,000 subject to prospective adjustment.

191The father’s actual total income in 2019 was $61,570.47.

192The father’s actual income results in a different order for support. This constitutes a “change in circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order”: Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, s. 14.

193The presumptive start date for retroactive child support is the date effective notice was given.

194In this case, the evidence does not disclose that the mother broached the topic of child support with the father before the commencement of legal proceedings. In this circumstance, the start date would be when formal notice was given. The mother’s response to motion to change is dated April 17, 2023. This would be the presumptive start date under Colucci. However, the court has jurisdiction to depart from the presumptive date if there is blameworthy conduct on the part of the payor.

195The father’s failure to provide disclosure that was complete and timely is behaviour that privileges his own interests over his children’s right to a proper amount of support; see DBS v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, at para. 106; Michel v Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at paras. 33, 34, 116 and 117.

196The appropriate start date could be the date the father was first required to provide financial disclosure of his actual 2019 income.

197However, in her pleadings, the mother asked for retroactive child support commencing July 1, 2020. Accordingly, this is the date that the father’s retroactive child support obligation began.

198Having determined that child support should be retroactively increased from July 1, 2020, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

Calculation of Retroactive Child Support

199The mother asks that income be imputed to the father because of his failure to disclose relevant financial information.

200The following disclosure was not provided by the father:

• Personal Income Tax Return for 2021, 2022, 2023 pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy, and 2024.

• Corporate tax returns for 5005416 Ontario Inc. from 2021 to and including 2024.

• Corporate tax returns for Blake’s Ultimate Detailing and Upholstery Service, Blake’s Detailing IP Holdings Inc., Blake’s Detailing Franchising Inc.

• An up-to-date financial statement.

201The father’s most recent Form 13 financial statement put in evidence is dated September 3, 2024.

202The father was ordered to provide financial disclosure by this court on May 29, 2023, and by ten Cate J. dated June 9, 2025. There has been incomplete compliance with respect to these disclosure orders.

203In Maerzke-Crupi v. Crupi, 2025 ONSC 6466, the court reviewed the disclosure obligations of a self-employed party at paras. 3, 4, 5 and 7 as follows:

3It is surprising that there should be any lingering doubt about an owner’s obligation to value their business, incorporated or unincorporated, or to have, if not a professionally prepared analysis of their income available to the court, then a comprehensible package of income and expenses from which a recipient (and a court) can draw reasonable conclusions about income where support issues are engaged. In Kraemer v. Kraemer[1], Lemon J. reviewed the authorities with respect to a business owner’s obligation to provide credible evidence about the value of their business interests and ordered the husband in that case to retain a Chartered Business Valuator (“CBV”) within 30 days. The husband had submitted that he had every right to defer valuing his business pending receipt of an expert opinion from his wife. To paraphrase Lemon J., it’s your asset; it’s your obligation. Strict deadlines for delivery of the husband’s CBV report were set. The same obligation applies to a self-employed litigant’s responsibility to present credible, often expert, evidence of their income.

4It is remarkable how often this issue still presents itself as if counsel and their clients were unaware when the obligation arises and on whom it rests whether at a conference or, worse, at a motion given that the Family Law Act is over four decades old. In Demchuk v. Demchuk, Clarke J. observed:

The new Act imposes a positive duty on both parties to disclose. If the purpose of disclosure is not to be frustrated, disclosure must perforce embrace not merely the existence of significant assets but also their extent or value. The speedy and equitable resolution of domestic disputes mandates that this information be completely and accurately disclosed. [Emphasis added.]

5Every family law litigant who owns or operates a business has an immediate obligation that arises when spousal parties separate to consider a valuation of their business interests and assess how that obligation is to be met. That may not require a valuation by a CBV (but usually will where there are multiple business assets involved) but it does require more than simply providing disclosure and leaving it to the recipient to sort through financial statements and income tax returns to arrive at some estimate of value.

7The same obligation applies to income analyses. In Sharma v. Sunak, McGee J. observed that it is the uncommon case that will not require some level of expert evidence to assist in determining income where an incorporated or unincorporated business is involved. The matter before this court is not an uncommon case.

204The next step to be considered with respect to the mothers retroactive child support claim is the calculation of the retroactive amount. This requires the court to determine the fathers income for child support purposes.

205As stated above, the father asks that child support be calculated based on his actual income and the mother asks that the income be imputed to him.

206The father had an obligation to provide disclosure on an ongoing basis from 2019. His failure to do so allows the court to impute income to him pursuant to s. 19(1)(f) of the Guidelines and to retroactively vary his child support obligation.

207I pause at this point to address briefly the father`s request to vary downward his child support obligation.

208The father’s ability to ask that his child support obligation be reduced as requested in his motion to change dated March 23, 2023 was suspended by the order of Hassan J. dated July 23, 2025. This order was made because the father failed to comply with disclosure orders. At trial, the father acknowledged that he had not provided further disclosure since the order made by Hassan J. was granted. Accordingly, the father’s request to reduce his child support obligations retroactively must be dismissed.

209In these reasons, I will consider the mothers request to vary upward the fathers child support obligation by determining what, if any, income could be imputed to him.

2020

210In her proposed draft order, the mother asks that the father`s 2020 child support obligation be based on his 2019 income of $61,570.

211The father’s actual total income in 2020 was $42,972. This income was made up of employment income of $38,160 and employment insurance benefits of $4,812.

212On November 29, 2019, the father resigned from his employment at Cintas in London. Subsequently he moved to Sarnia to start a car detailing business.

213The father did not persuade me that it was necessary or reasonable for him to leave his employment and start a business. While the father was free to make that decision, its negative impact on his child support obligation must not be borne by the mother and children. Consequently, I find it is appropriate in the circumstances to impute income to the father for child support purposes in 2020 in the same amount he earned in 2019, that is, $61,570.

214The table amount of child support payable on this income in 2020 was $939 per month or $5,634 for the six-month period beginning July 1, 2020. As stated above, the start date for retroactive child support shall be July 1, 2020, as that is what was pleaded by the mother in her Response to Motion to Change.

215The father did make child support payments in 2020. In her proposed draft order, the mother acknowledged receiving $7,930 from the father in 2020. Prorating that amount paid on a monthly basis means that the child support paid and attributable to the father for the last six months of the year is $3,965. The child support amount owed by the father to the mother in 2020 from July 1 to December 31 is $1,669.

2021–2025

216Based on the disclosure provided by the father, his reported total income has been as follows:

Year

Income Tax Return

Notice of Assessment/Reassessment

2021

Not provided

$20,000

2022

Not provided

$0

2023

Pre-bankruptcy – not provided Post-bankruptcy – not provided

$0 $0

2024

Not provided

$0

217The father made an assignment in bankruptcy dated January 25, 2023. At that time, he disclosed that he had assets valued at $3,551 and unsecured debts of $157,709. His income was stated to be zero and he had monthly expenses of $2,000. He agreed to pay $200 towards the bankruptcy.

218The father did not provide details of his 2025 income.

219The father’s evidence is that, at present, he is unemployed. His partner “covers everything now.” He also stated he is using savings but did not say how much he had or its source.

220The father’s business operates from May to November. When the business was operating, he said he earned approximately $2,000 per month.

221The father did provide the December 31, 2020 and the December 31, 2021 corporate tax returns for 5005416 Ontario Inc. This appears to be the corporation carrying on the car detailing business.

222The corporate returns include a balance sheet and income statement for the corporation. Based on these documents, the mother asks that annual income be imputed to the father in the amount of $227,732 in every year since 2021. She does so on the basis of “historical financial ratios, logical business inferences and conservative assumptions.”

223With respect, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate in the circumstances to impute this level of income to the father.

̶ The mother and counsel are not qualified to provide opinion evidence as to the income available to the father from the corporation. I am not persuaded that the mother’s analysis follows excepted valuation principles or fairly represents income available to the father for support purposes.

̶ The evidence at trial did not provide sufficient details of the expenses that were incurred by the business so that I could reasonably infer how much to attribute to income available to the father for support purposes.

̶ In 2023, the father’s financial circumstances were such that he was forced to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

̶ At the December 31, 2020 year end, the corporation had a net loss of $61,297, and for the next year the net loss was $16,734. These amounts appear inconsistent with the father being able to receive income from the business in the amount of $227,732.

̶ In 2020, the total shareholder equity of the corporation was ($61,297) and in 2021, the total shareholder equity was ($78,030).

̶ Since serving his September 2024 financial statement, the only asset the father acquired was a trailer valued at $1,500.

224These considerations do not constitute a valuation but in sum are more consistent with the father not being able to draw income in the amount that is proposed by the mother.

225I find that the appropriate amount of income to impute to the father for the years 2021 and ongoing is in an amount similar to that which he earned before leaving his job in 2019. Income in the amount of $62,000 a year will be imputed to the father.

226For the year 2021, the father’s monthly outstanding child support obligation to the mother for the two children was $945 per month, or $11,340.

227In 2021, the father claims he paid for the benefit of the mother money on account of a vehicle and rent. The amount the father provided on account of rent is disputed by the mother. In any event, these payments do not constitute child support in the circumstances of this case. I accept the mother’s evidence that the father paid child support in that year of $7,929.96. The amount therefore outstanding for that year is $3,380.

228For the same reasons, I make the same determination for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024. The father’s child support arrears for each of those years is $3,380.

229In 2025, the child support tables were updated. The amount of child support payable by the father based on an imputed income of $62,000 remained at $945 under the 2017 tables and the 2025 tables. The child support credit for 2025 to be given to the father according to the mother is $7,929.96. The amount outstanding therefore is $3,380.

230In making these calculations, I take into account that the mother has given the father credit for more child support payments than he claimed for himself. This is to his advantage.

2026 and ongoing

231Starting January 1, 2026, and on the first day of each subsequent month, the father shall pay to the mother child support for their two children in the amount of $945 based upon the table amount of child support payable on imputed income of $62,000.

232In future, the father will do himself a great benefit if he would provide timely, complete, and accurate financial information about his income. It is unfortunate for him that he did not do so in the past.

Order

233For these reasons, the following order shall issue under provincial legislation:

Decision-making responsibility

1. The father’s request for sole decision-making responsibility with respect to the children is dismissed.

2. The order of Justice Hebner dated April 12, 2019 shall be varied by vacating paras. 23 and 24 and replacing them with the following:

a) The mother shall have decision-making responsibility with respect to the children.

b) The parties shall make best efforts to work together to make decisions that are in the best interests of the children.

c) Before the mother makes any significant decisions concerning the children’s well-being, she must first consult with the father by advising him of her proposal and the reasons why. The father is to be given time to consider and provide his input before the mother finalizes her decision. The father must be notified of the mother’s decision.

d) The parties shall communicate through electronic means, either through a parent application such as OurFamilyWizard or Talking Parents, or by text or email. All communication between the parties shall be brief, informative, friendly, and child-focused.

Parenting time

3. The father’s request that the children reside primarily in his care is dismissed.

4. The order of Hebner J. dated April 12, 2019, shall be varied by vacating paras. 2 a.–e. and replacing them with the following:

a) The children shall reside primarily in the care of the mother.

b) The father shall have parenting time with the children during the first three weekends each month. He shall pick the children up on Friday afternoon and return them on Sunday. If Friday is a PD Day, he shall pick the children up on Thursday. If Monday is a Statutory Holiday, he shall return the children on Monday evening.

c) The father shall be responsible for the pickup and return of the children from the mother’s home or at some other mutually agreed-upon location. The father shall remain in his vehicle during exchanges, and the parties shall not expose the children to any adult conflict during any parenting time exchange.

d) The father shall have telephone or electronic parenting time with the children on Wednesday evenings between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. for a minimum duration of 15 minutes.

e) If either child or the children wish, they shall be at liberty to speak with the mother by telephone or electronically during the father’s parenting time.

f) The children shall be given their medication as prescribed by their healthcare provider including their pediatrician or psychiatrist.

g) The parties shall have parenting time with the children at such other time or times as they may agree to in advance.

5. The mother shall take active steps to encourage T to resume parenting time with the father.

6. While T continues to resist attending parenting time, it is in the best interests of the children that the exchanges take place at Merrymount. This will give the mother an opportunity to demonstrate to third parties that she is taking active steps to ensure that T attends his parenting time. Once T resumes his parenting time, then exchanges may take place at the mother’s home.

7. The medical report from Dr. Sukhern faxed on December 22, 2025, shall forthwith be provided by the mother to Dr. Samim Al-Qadhi for his consideration in the ongoing treatment of T.

Child support

8. The order of Hebner J. dated April 12, 2019, shall be varied by vacating paras. 29 and 32a and replacing them with the following:

a) The arrears of child support owed by the father to the mother from July 1, 2020 to and including December 31, 2025 is $18,569. This sum shall be paid at the rate of $100 per month commencing July 1, 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, until paid in full. The monthly sum to be paid on account of arrears may be varied on the basis of there being a material change in circumstances such as one or both children no longer being entitled to child support or there being a significant change in the father’s income for child support purposes.

b) Starting January 1, 2026 and on the first day of each subsequent month, the father shall pay to the mother child support for their two children in the amount of $945 based upon the table amount of child support payable on imputed income of $62,000. The father is to be given credit for any payments he made to the mother on account of child support since January 1, 2026.

Balance of the Hebner J order

9. The remaining terms contained in the order of Hebner J. dated April 12, 2019, shall remain in force.

Costs

10. If the parties wish to make costs submissions, they may do so as follows:

a) Each party shall serve and file a written submission on costs no later than 10 days after the release of these reasons for judgment.

b) The parties may serve and file a responding written submission on costs, no later than 20 days after the release of these written submissions.

c) A written submission shall be no longer than three pages together with any offers to settle and details of costs incurred.

d) Written submissions are to be typed with double spaces between the lines and characters of at least 12-point font size. These costs submissions are to be forwarded to LondonUFCAdmin@ontario.ca.

“Justice B. Tobin”

Released: March 9, 2026

CITATION: Pitt v. Blake, 2026 ONSC 510

Footnotes

1. 1The terms of the consent endorsement request were incorporated into the order of ten Cate J. dated June 9, 2025.