CITATION: laberge gareau v. Laberge gareau, 2026 ONSC 4669

COURT FILE NO.: CV 19-00000039

DATE: 2026/08/13

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MICHELE JEANNE LABERGE GAREAU

Plaintiff (Defendant to Counterclaims of Jeanne Laberge Gareau and Joanne Marie Laberge Gareau)

– and –

JOANNE MARIE LABERGE GAREAU and JEANNE LUCY LABERGE GAREAU

Defendants(Plaintiffs to Counterclaims)

Brianna Johns, for the Plaintiff

Joseph Kennedy, for the Defendant, Joanne Marie Laberge Gareau

Jeanne Lucy Laberge Gareau, self-represented

HEARD: April 7, 8, 9, 10, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION

tysick, j.

overview

[1] This unfortunate case is about a dispute between a mother (“Michele”) and her two daughters (“Joanne” and “Jeanne”) over a family farm located in Verner, Ontario. I will use the parties’ first names for clarity in my decision given the common last names and out of no disrespect for the parties.

[2] The family farm consists of two properties, purchased by Michele at different times. Michele bought the first property (the “plaintiff’s property”) in 1979 and has lived there ever since. It is known municipally as 104 Millrand Road, Verner, Ontario. Michele is the sole owner of that property. In addition to being Michele’s primary residence, this property was used as a cattle farm. There is a house, a barn, and other outbuildings on the property.

[3] The other property (the “second property”) is adjacent to the first property and was purchased in 1996. When the second property was purchased, it was registered on title in trust for Joanne and Jeanne. The second property had a small rental house and several acres of land that were used for hay, pasture for the farm animals and cash crops.

[4] A small piece of the second property was severed in 2017 and transferred to Jeanne (“Jeanne’s property). What remains of the second property (the “remaining property”) is the subject of this dispute.

[5] Michele brings this action seeking a declaration that she is the beneficial owner of the remaining property having had no intention to create a trust in 1996 when the property was purchased and registered in trust for Joanne and Jeanne. Alternatively, she seeks a beneficial interest in the remaining property by way of constructive trust or a monetary amount as restitution for her contributions to the remaining property.

[6] Joanne argues that Michele’s claim is statute barred pursuant to s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 15 (the “RPLA”).

[7] Joanne also counterclaims seeking a sole beneficial interest in the remaining property by way of constructive trust or a monetary amount as restitution for her contributions to the entire family farm.

[8] Jeanne agrees that her mother should be sole beneficial owner of the remaining property. If that relief is not granted, she also seeks a declaration that she is the sole owner of the remaining property or, alternatively, has an equitable interest in that property.

factual background

[9] Many facts are not disputed. The central dispute concerns the value and extent of Joanne’s contributions to the farm. I will set out the uncontentious facts in this section and will resolve any factual disputes in the relevant sections below.

[10] The specific details surrounding Michele’s purchase of the second property are important. On September 13, 1996, Michele purchased the second property for $152,000.00 with a $96,062.23 mortgage bearing an 8% interest rate. The mortgage was paid off and a Discharge of Charge was registered on title on November 9, 2017.

[11] Michele retained the services of a real estate lawyer to assist with the purchase of the second property. The property was registered on title in trust for Joanne and Jeanne. They were, respectively, 12 and 10 years old at the time. Following the purchase, the lawyer sent a reporting letter to Michele dated September 20, 1996 with excerpts reproduced later in this decision.

[12] Joanne and Jeanne grew up on the farm, helping their mother with a variety of chores, much like many children growing up on a family farm. Jeanne left the farm after high school to pursue a nursing education in college and then university. She testified that she did return occasionally to help with farmwork. In the last few years, Jeanne has helped around the farm more frequently.

[13] Joanne inherited Michele’s love of farming and lived at the farm with her mother until she left sometime in 2015, after a breakdown in their relationship. Joanne assisted her mother with the farming business, helping with calving, hay season, maintenance of fences, construction of the sorting barn in 2007, manure spreading, plowing, welding, excavation and other day-to-day farm chores. While living with her mother, Joanne did not pay any rent, nor did she contribute to groceries.

[14] Joanne did not work solely on the farm. She was 41 at the time of trial and gainfully employed. Prior to that, she had consistent employment throughout her adult years, although not full-time. Starting in 2007, she worked part-time as an interviewer for Statistics Canada until 2016 when it became full-time. She would also occasionally work for other farms in the area on a casual basis both before and after this litigation commenced. This included renting out farm equipment that she owned. She also worked on weekends for a local bar for many years. And, finally, Joanne was a volunteer firefighter.

[15] It is not disputed that at some point in time, on at least one occasion, Michele said to Joanne something along the lines of “this will all be yours someday”, referring to the farm. Joanne testified that Michele said this multiple times, but she did not want to rely on Michele’s verbal promise, so she started to take steps to formalize it. Jeanne also testified that her mother would often say to both Joanne and Jeanne when growing up that the farm would all be theirs someday. Jeanne did not take these statements seriously.

[16] When the relationship between Joanne and Michele broke down in 2015, Joanne wrote a letter to her mother dated July 2, 2015. The letter sets out Joanne’s perspective about the farm at that time and was an attempt by her to put something concrete in place that would govern the farming partnership between the two. She floated the possibility of her purchasing, renting or leasing the farm and suggested the use of a mediator to reduce conflict. The following statements by Joanne in the letter are informative, (mistakes in the original):

On Sunday June 28 2015 you told me to pack my things, my cat and my horses and move out. You told me that you were not going to tolerate me anymore and that you wouldn’t sell or give me the farm. You said that you had put a lot of thought into this and that is what you wanted.

Because you own everything and i feel i have no security in the farm, I am always wondering if i continue to go on like this if someday it will all have been for nothing.

It’s like you said: you worked your whole life for this and you have every right to do what you want with it. I feel i am entitled to some form of compensation for my labour over the last 10 years.

[17] After the relationship breakdown, Joanne’s involvement with the farm became more limited. She still had two horses at the farm for awhile, so she went to the farm daily to tend to them until one died and the other was relocated. Joanne also assisted Michele with the hay in 2016 with her baler. In 2017, she only went to the farm for a brief time while her mother was on a trip.

[18] Joanne and Michele did try to work out their differences. At some point, Joanne drafted a proposed lease agreement between her and her mother wherein Joanne would rent the entire farm operation from Michele. The agreement was not dated, and the parties are not clear on when it was drafted. Regardless, Michele did not agree with the terms and the agreement was never executed.

[19] In 2016, Joanne and Michele engaged the services of their accountant, John Parsons, to assist in resolving their disagreement regarding the farming operation. By email dated October 6, 2016, Mr. Parsons outlined some steps that the parties could take to achieve the eventual goal of Joanne becoming a joint owner of the farmland (the fourth step), while Jeanne would also get part of the second property (the third step).

[20] The third step was completed; the fourth was not. Michele decided to sever a piece of the second property to give to Jeanne as her inheritance. When Michele first spoke to a lawyer about severing the property, she was advised that her signature was not required as the second property was owned in trust with Joanne and Jeanne as beneficial owners. Only Joanne and Jeanne had to sign the transfer documents. Michele testified that it was only upon learning that her signature was not required that she realized she did not beneficially own the second property.

[21] Joanne agreed to sign the transfer to Jeanne because Michele told her that the rest of the farm would be hers and, if she didn’t sign, Michele would drag her through “every court in the country”. The conveyance was finalized July 27, 2017. Jeanne’s property had the rental house and about 16 acres of land and was naturally divided from the rest of the second property by a creek. Jeanne tore down the rental house and built a new house where she currently lives with her teenage son Danny.

[22] Joanne’s claim for constructive trust relates to the remaining property; being what was left of the second property after the severance.

[23] What complicates matters is that Michele and Joanne started claiming a farming partnership for income tax purposes from 2014 onwards. The details from Joanne’s income tax returns are as follows:

(a) In 2014, Joanne was a 10% partner for income tax purposes resulting in a net loss to her of $718.88 that was then offset against her other employment income for the year.

(b) In 2015, Joanne was again a 10% partner, resulting in a net loss to her of $265.99, offsetting her other employment income.

(c) In 2016, Joanne was again a 10% partner, resulting in a net loss to her of $3,153.77, offsetting her other employment income.

(d) In 2017, Joanne claimed a 25% partnership interest resulting in a $15,000 net loss to her from the farming operation, offsetting her other employment income. That net loss included deductions for capital cost allowance on a 4-wheeler and other amounts for capital cost allowance and the purchase of some cows. These are under the category of expenses that the partnership did not reimburse her for.

(e) In 2018, Joanne claimed a 40% partnership interest resulting in a net income of $3,126.87 after the partnership expenses and Joanne’s non-reimbursed expenses were deducted.

[24] John Parsons sent another email to Michele dated April 15, 2018 with a “Proposed Transfer of Majority of Farming Operations to Joanne”. He spoke about putting the partnership at 75% to Michele and 25% to Joanne for 2017 and suggested putting it to 90% Joanne and 10% Michele for 2018 and onwards. He said he was keeping Michele as a partner since she owned the real property and most of the farm equipment.

[25] No one called John Parsons as a witness. Instead, the court was invited to rely on his emails for the truth of their contents.

[26] In the summer of 2018, Michele and Joanne’s relationship permanently broke down, and Joanne left the family farm for good. When she left, she gave Michele a cheque dated August 18, 2018 for $50,000.00 for the cow herd that Joanne had unilaterally sold. In cross-examination, Michele testified that Joanne’s sale of the cattle resulted in Michele having a high gross taxable farming income of $91,731.88 in 2018. This then led to Michele receiving a decreased pension the following year.

[27] Michele testified that the farming income over the years mostly consisted of the sale of cattle and some hay. She also testified that Joanne’s unilateral decision to sell all the cattle in 2018 impoverished the farm in that there were no cattle left to generate further income.

[28] With one exception covered later in these reasons, Michele paid all the property taxes, insurance and utilities for both the plaintiff’s property and the remaining property. She also covered the cost of maintenance to her house and any outbuildings. Joanne did help reconstruct a sorting barn after it was destroyed in a hurricane.

[29] At the time of trial, the remaining property was being used for hay. Given the title dispute, Michele was having difficulty getting farmers to rent the land. However, Michele testified that she did rent the land after the cows were sold. For instance, in 2023 Michele leased the plaintiff’s farm and a part of the remaining farm to tenants paying $65/acre in rent with a total payable of $10,075.00. She has also sold hay off the remaining farm. It was clear that after 2018, the remaining farm was generating income for Michele, and she was claiming this income for income tax purposes. Joanne filed a photograph of her mother baling hay on the remaining property after this action was commenced in 2019.

[30] Both parties agree that the market value of the remaining property has appreciated over time. Michele filed an appraisal report authored by Thomas Cole opining that the remaining property was worth $568,000.00 as of March 27, 2023. Joanne filed an appraisal report from Steele and Associates opining that the remaining property was worth $980,000 as of April 18, 2023. These appraisers were not called as witnesses and the court was again invited to accept their reports for the truth of their contents. What the court is left with are two differing appraisal reports showing dramatically different values for the remaining property as of 2023 and no evidence to assist the court in determining which is more reliable. At minimum, the remaining property had appreciated in value from 1996 to 2023 and was likely worth at least $568,000 at the time of trial.

The tRIAL

[31] Evidence was heard over four days. All parties testified and there was an agreed statement of facts. There were no other witnesses called. On consent, 93 exhibits were filed and all parties admitted authenticity of the exhibits and agreed that they could be used for the truth of their contents.

[32] Overall, I find that the parties did their best to be truthful. However, Michele was 83 at the time of trial and admitted that her memory was not good. She was not an accurate historian, often forgetting dates and details of events. She also tended to minimize Joanne’s contributions to the farm.

[33] Joanne was a credible witness, but her evidence was generalized and imprecise when testifying about some of her contributions to the family farm, thereby impacting her reliability.

[34] Jeanne was a credible witness but really could not give much evidence about Joanne’s contributions to the farm or her mother’s intention in 1996 when the second property was purchased.

[35] In submissions, Joanne argued that Michele’s claims for resulting trust and constructive trust should be dismissed as they were not properly pleaded in the statement of claim. As a result, Michele sought leave to amend her statement of claim. This was granted on consent on June 11, 2026.

[36] Joanne also advised at trial that she was no longer seeking a constructive trust interest in the plaintiff’s property as originally pleaded but was seeking a monetary remedy for her contributions to that property pursuant to an unjust enrichment argument.

issues

[37] The issues to be decided in this action can be divided into three sections: Michele’s claim, Joanne’s claim, and Jeanne’s claim.

[38] For Michele’s claim, the following questions need to be answered:

i) Is Michele’s claim statute barred by s.4 of the Limitations Act?

ii) Did Michele retain beneficial ownership of the remaining property from a resulting trust in her favour?

iii) If there is no resulting trust and Michele did not retain beneficial ownership, should she receive a remedy for her contributions to the remaining property, pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment? If yes, what is the appropriate remedy?

[39] For Joanne’s claim, the following questions need to be answered:

i) Should Joanne receive a remedy for her contributions to the remaining property pursuant to either the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel? If yes, what is the appropriate remedy?

ii) Should Joanne receive monetary compensation for her contributions to the plaintiff’s farm pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment?

[40] For Jeanne, the only question to be answered is whether Jeanne should receive a remedy for her contributions to the remaining property and, if yes, what is the appropriate remedy? Jeanne makes it clear that she only asserts this claim if her mother is not successful in her claim for full beneficial ownership of the remaining property.

analysis

Michele’s Claim

i) The Limitation issue

Positions of the Parties

[41] All parties agree that the ten-year limitation period outlined in s. 4 of the RPLA applies to the claims in this action. They disagree about when this limitation period started running.

[42] Michele argues that s.5(1) of the RPLA postpones the running of a limitation period while the party that would bring the claim is in possession of the property. Since Michele was still possessing the land up until trial, she says that the ten-year limitation period has not started running.

[43] Alternatively, Michele argues that the ten-year limitation period did not commence until 2017, when she discovered that she was not the beneficial owner of the remaining property. It was only then that Michele realized that she would need to take legal action to acquire legal ownership.

[44] Joanne argues that the limitation period for Michele’s claim commenced in 1996 when the transfer occurred. She says that Michele knew, or should have known, when she received her lawyer’s reporting letter that she needed to commence an action to change the title. She points to Michele’s education as an x-ray technician and her prior real estate purchases as evidence of sophistication such that she should have known what creating a trust meant.

[45] Joanne states that Michele was not still in possession of the remaining property because: a) she was just holding the property in trust for her daughters, b) Michele never resided on the remaining property and c) Michele was never assured by Joanne or Jeanne that she would receive possession of the farm. Joanne says that Michele never had actual possession with the intention of excluding the true owners, Joanne and Jeanne. Therefore, the limitation period was not extended pursuant to s.5(1) of the Act.

[46] Joanne also argues that the discoverability principle is not applicable because Michele had the requisite knowledge to know how title was taken in 1996. She also relies on the common law doctrines of delay and laches to preclude the claim.

[47] Jeanne supports Michele’s arguments on this issue.

Real Property Limitations Act

[48] The parties agree and the law is clear that the ten-year limitation period contained in s. 4 of the RPLA applies to Michele’s claim for a resulting or constructive trust in the remaining property.[1] The relevant portion of that section reads:

No person shall …..bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to ……bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to …. bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it.

[49] Section 5(1) of the RPLA can operate to postpone the commencement of the limitation period if the claimant has been in possession of the land.[2] The limitation period will not commence until the time of dispossession or discontinuance.

[50] Section 5(1) reads as follows:

Where the person claiming such land ….has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in receipt of the profits of the land, or in receipt of the rent, and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed, or has discontinued such possession or receipt, the right to make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover the land or rent shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of the dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were so received.

[51] Michele argues that she has been in continuous possession of the remaining property thereby suspending the commencement of the limitation period. Joanne argues that s. 5 does not postpone the limitation period because Michele never possessed the remaining property to the exclusion of Joanne and Jeanne, as is required for possessory title. They both refer to para. 25 of Arcon Property Holdings Ltd. v. Nelson, 2019 ONSC 2267 at para. 25 where the court set out a three-part test for possessory title. To prove possessory title, the claimant must show that: i) she had actual possession, ii) that she has the intention of excluding the true owner from possession, and iii) that she effectively excluded the true owner of possession.

[52] The Arcon decision is of limited assistance. The facts in Arcon involved a dispute over a right of way and an adverse possession argument. The case at bar is not an adverse possession case. It is a claim for beneficial ownership of land being held in trust. However, the three-part test is helpful in interpreting what it means to be in possession of the land as provided for in s. 5(1) of the Limitations Act.

[53] During submissions, I asked counsel about the potential applicability of the other part of s. 5(1) relating to the receipt of profits from the land. The section reads, “where the person claiming such land… has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in receipt of the profits of the land” (emphasis added). The parties had focused exclusively on the “in possession” part of this section and had not considered the “receipt of profits” aspect. Given its apparent application to the facts of this case, I invited the parties to submit further law on this issue. I have received none.

[54] In addition to the statutory postponement of the limitation period under s. 5 of the RPLA, the Ontario Court of Appeal has also confirmed that the discoverability principle applies to s. 4 of the RPLA. The limitation period will begin to run when the facts establishing the cause of action were known, or ought to have been known, by a reasonably diligent person: Brown v. Meunier, 2023 ONCA 223 at paras. 12, 14.

[55] In conducting a discoverability analysis, the limitation period will run when the claimant knows, or ought to have known, that a non-trivial loss has occurred and that a proceeding would be a legally appropriate means to remedy it: Gillham v. Lake of Bays (Township), 2018 ONCA 667, at para. 22.

Analysis

[56] I find that s. 5 of the RPLA postponed the running of the limitation period. Since 1996, Michele has been in continuous possession of the remaining property and has been in receipt of the profits of the land. Although she did not occupy a residence there, she has asserted control and physical possession of the remaining property as follows:

• She used the property to remove hay to feed her cattle and to sell to other farmers.

• She used the property to seed cash crops.

• She rented the property to other farmers to either seed or remove hay both before and after this litigation commenced, and

• She kept all profits generated from the remaining property through the sale of hay and rentals.

[57] Michele has never been dispossessed of the remaining property and has enjoyed all the profits from the property since purchasing it in 1996. Therefore, I find that s. 5 of the Limitations Act applies and the limitation period has not yet commenced.

[58] Even if I am wrong in my analysis under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, I find that Michele’s cause of action was only discoverable in 2017 and, therefore, the limitation period started running at that time and not in 1996. As will be further developed in these reasons, I accept Michele’s evidence that she did not understand the impact of the trust wording in the 1996 transfer until she was told in 2017 that her signature was not required to transfer a part of the second property to Jeanne. Indeed, she thought she had full beneficial ownership as per the reporting letter sent to her in 1996. I find that a reasonably diligent person having purchased the property and having received a similar reporting letter would have come to the same conclusion. It was only when trying to sever part of the second property to Jeanne that she discovered that she did not have the legal authority to do so. It is at that point that she realized that a non-trivial loss had occurred and obtained legal advice confirming that a proceeding would be a legally appropriate means to remedy it.

[59] Joanne argued that Michele knew about the title problem in 1997 when she consulted a local lawyer. In cross-examination, Michele agreed that she dealt with a lawyer in 1997 when finalizing a marital separation. She said that she believed that she discussed taking her daughters to court to change the trust on the deed. However, in re-examination it was clear that there were two consultations with this same lawyer: one relating to a marital separation in 1997 and one relating to the trust issue at the heart of this litigation in 2017 or 2018. I accept that Michele only discussed the issue of the trust with this lawyer when she consulted him about the title problem that became evident with the severance of the second property and not in 1997. Her evidence in cross-examination was confusing and, when clearer questions were asked in re-examination, her answers were much clearer. I accept those answers.

[60] In conclusion, the limitation period had either not commenced pursuant to s. 5 of the Limitations Act or it started running in 2017. Either way, Michele’s claim is not statute barred.

[61] I will note that Joanne’s factum does briefly raise the equitable defence of laches. Given my finding that the limitation period has not expired, the defence of laches is not tenable.[3]

ii) The Resulting Trust claim

Positions of the parties

[62] Michele’s position is that the court should find a resulting trust and declare that she is the sole beneficial owner of the remaining property. She argues that she never intended to create a trust when the second property was purchased in 1996 and that her lawyer’s reporting letter confirmed that she was the beneficial owner. Michele states that her actions after the purchase of the second property support this argument. She paid the downpayment, the mortgage with interest, and all the property taxes (except for one payment by Joanne in 2018). She also used the land as part of her family farm for hay, pasture and other crops. She argues that Joanne and Jeanne also thought Michele was the beneficial owner of the second property.

[63] Joanne argues that Michele was a sophisticated and educated purchaser and, therefore, knew what she was doing in creating the trust. Michele had a college x-ray technician diploma and had purchased real estate several times prior to 1996. She argues that Michele intended to create a trust and gift the second property to her daughters and that any suggestion now to the contrary is simply Michele changing her mind.

[64] Jeanne supports her mother’s resulting trust claim and agrees that Michele should have sole beneficial ownership of the remaining property.

The Law of Resulting Trust

[65] A resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party’s name, but that party, because he or she gave no value for the property, is obliged to return it to the original title owner: Pecore v. Pecore, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, 2007 SCC 17, at para. 20.

[66] There is a presumption that people do not intend to transfer property to others for no consideration and the onus is generally on the transferee to demonstrate that a gift was intended. The law presumes bargains, not gifts: Pecore, at para. 24. This is known as the presumption of resulting trust.

[67] However, this is not the case for transfers to minor children. In that situation, there is a presumption of advancement and the law presumes a gift. Advancement is a gift during the transferor’s lifetime to a transferee who, because of a special relationship, is dependent on the transferor. Based on a parent’s obligation to support dependent children, the presumption of advancement puts the onus on the transferor parent to lead evidence to rebut, on a balance of probabilities, the presumption that the transfer was intended as a gift. Although once limited to gifts between a father and a minor child, the presumption of advancement is now extended to gifts between a mother and child: Pecore, at paras. 27-43.

[68] When there is a presumption of advancement, the court should commence its inquiry with the applicable presumption and weigh the evidence led by all sides to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, the transferor’s actual intention. In the end, the presumption will only determine the result where there is insufficient evidence to rebut it: Pecore, at para. 44.

[69] Presumptions are of particular importance when a transferor is not available to testify about her actual intention. As pointed out by Rothstein J. in the companion case to Pecore, “intention is often difficult to ascertain, especially in cases where the transferor is deceased. The common law has developed certain rebuttable presumptions of law over many years to guide a court’s inquiry”: Madsen Estate v. Saylor, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 838, 2007 SCC 18, at para. 2.

[70] Indeed, it is only where there is an absence of evidence of the transferor’s actual intent, or the evidence is unclear, that there is a need for any presumption: Pecore, at paras. 5, 44; Andrade v. Andrade, 2016 ONCA 368, at para. 61, Lalli v. Lalli, 2026 ONCA 123, at para. 39. Put another way, if the transferor’s actual intent at the time of the transfer is clear, it is unnecessary for the court to resort to any presumption to determine the result.

[71] Contemporaneous evidence at the time of the transaction is critically important. However, evidence of intention that arises after the transfer is also admissible. The court must assess the reliability of this evidence and determine the weight it should be given: Pecore, at para. 59.

[72] Evidence from the transferee as to what they believed the transferor’s intention was at the time of transfer is not particularly helpful unless that belief is supported by evidence. It is the transferor’s intention that is paramount and not the belief of the transferee: Di Turi v. Di Turi-Seemann, 2025 ONSC 5000, at para. 63 relying on MacIntyre v. Winter, 2021 ONCA 516, 158 O.R. (3d) 321, and Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.

[73] In Pecore, a father placed assets in a joint bank account with his daughter. The court noted that there are several reasons why an individual would gratuitously transfer assets in that manner. Similarly, in cases where a parent transfers real property into the names of children, there may be multiple reasons for that decision. It may be for illegal purposes. It may be to avoid merger with title of another property. It may be to protect the asset from creditors. It may be to gift the property to the children and maintain a life interest. A review of the litigation relating to real property gifts by parents to children illustrates these multiple reasons. Most of the litigation involves cases where the parent transferor is no longer alive at the time of trial to testify concerning the original intention.

[74] A transferor may rebut the presumption of advancement even if there was an ulterior motive for the transfer: Andrade, at paras. 93-94. For example, if a transferor arranges title in such a way as to avoid merger under planning legislation, that does not prevent reliance on the doctrine of resulting trust. An intention to avoid merger does not necessarily indicate an intention to make a gift. The transferor’s actual intention is key. Determining actual intention requires a case-by-case evaluation of the evidence: Falsetto v. Falsetto, 2024 ONCA 149 at para. 18.

Analysis

[75] I accept that when Michele purchased the second property and registered the trust, she never intended to transfer beneficial ownership to Joanne and Jeanne. Instead, she was trying to avoid merger with the plaintiff’s property. Although she was educated and had purchased real estate before, I accept Michele’s evidence that she had a limited understanding of the wording of the deed and that she relied on her lawyer for that. I do not accept the argument that a person’s education and prior real estate ownership necessarily means that the person understands the legal effect of creating a trust.

[76] The real estate lawyer’s reporting letter dated September 20, 1996, supports Michele’s evidence of her understanding regarding the effect of registering the title of the second property in trust. The relevant parts are as follows (emphasis added):

Re: Title

Title to this property, being those parts of Lot 1, Concession 6, in the Township of MacPherson, being the remainders of Parcels 6611, 11623 and 11,624 Nipissing and that Part of Lot 12, Concession A, in the Township of Caldwell, being Parts 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, Plan 36R-3878, being Parcel 24 189 Nipissing are now registered in the name of Michele Jeanne Laberge Gareau. Having investigated the title to this property, I hereby certify that in my opinion you have a good and marketable title thereto free and clear of any prior registered encumbrances with the exception of those to which are herein referred.

Re: Trust

I wish to confirm that you have taken title on the Transfer in trust for Joanne Marie Laberge Gareau and Jeanne Lucy Laberge Gareau. As I explained to you, the Land Titles system does not recognize a trust and accordingly title is registered in your name as the beneficial owner. As I also indicated to you, there is a substantial risk that the trust relationship will not prevent a merger of title with your abutting lands, which may necessitate a severance application in the event you wish to deal with these lands in future. It is my understanding that you do not yet have title in your name of the abutting lands and accordingly I would strongly suggest that you review this whole situation with me or with another Solicitor prior to taking title, in order that we can avoid future Planning Act problems.

Re: Holdback

I am maintaining a holdback in the amount of $500.00 to be applied against any further disbursements which may not yet have been billed and also against the fees with respect to the proposed Trust Agreement. I will be preparing a trust agreement in the near future and will notify you when it is ready for signature.

[77] Michele testified, and I accept, that she relied heavily on this reporting letter and believed that she was the beneficial owner of the second property and had title free and clear. This understanding is reasonable. The reporting letter suggests the trust was created to avoid merger but may not be successful in that regard. Michele’s evidence that she never intended to create a trust is supported by the fact that she never re-attended at the lawyer’s office to sign a trust agreement.

[78] Michele testified that she always intended to maintain beneficial ownership of the second property. At the time of purchase, she was concerned that title to the second property might merge with title to the plaintiff’s property. She had contemplated registering one under the name Gareau and one under the name Laberge. However, her lawyer registered the second property in trust for Joanne and Jeanne. The evidence was unclear as to why this was done. Michele was the only witness called to address that issue and her memory was poor given that the transfer occurred 30 years ago. But Michele was clear in her evidence that regardless of why title was registered that way, she always thought she maintained beneficial ownership and never intended to gift it to her daughters. The only contrary evidence to that is the transfer itself.

[79] Michele’s purpose when purchasing the second property was to enlarge her farming operation. She always intended to possess the property and use it for pasture for the cattle and horses and to earn an income from the property through cash crops or rental to other farmers. There is ample evidence of this intention including the advancement of the downpayment, the payment in full of the mortgage, the use of the farm as pasture for the livestock and pets, the receipt of cash crop income and rental income from other farmers. This evidence supports that Michele’s intention at the time of the original transfer was not to gift the property to her children, but to retain full beneficial ownership herself.

[80] Further, Michele has always taken the position that she owned the farm throughout her conflict with Joanne. This is clear from Joanne’s letter to her mother in 2015 and in John Parson’s emails attempting to formalize the business relationship between Joanne and Michele. Although this is not determinative of Michele’s intent at the time of transfer, it does support her position that everyone operated under the understanding that she was the beneficial owner of the property.

[81] Joanne argues that by telling the children that “this will all be yours someday”, Michele was revealing her true intent in placing the property in trust. There are two problems with this argument. For one, Michele also said the same thing about the farming property held in her name only. Second, this demonstrates an intention to give in the future rather than having already given. Parents may tell their children that they will inherit property someday as an inheritance. This is not a statement revealing present intention to gift the property nor does it provide a guarantee that this inheritance will ever occur. Things may change. A parent may get remarried, thereby impacting a child’s expected inheritance. A parent’s debts may exceed the value of property leaving the child no inheritance at all.

[82] I accept Michele’s evidence regarding her intention at the time of the original purchase of the second property when title was placed in trust for Joanne and Jeanne. Her evidence was really the only evidence on this point aside from the deed itself, as Joanne and Jeanne were children at the time and not privy to Michele’s thought process.

[83] Accordingly, I find that when the second property was put in Joanne and Jeanne’s names as trust beneficiaries, Michele’s intention was to maintain beneficial ownership of the property. I find that any presumption of advancement has been rebutted on a balance of probabilities and Michele is the sole beneficial owner of the remaining property subject to any other equitable interests that I may find in favour of Joanne and Jeanne.

[84] Given my conclusion that Michele’s resulting trust claim is successful, it is unnecessary for me to consider her claim for a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment.

Joanne’s Claims

Positions of the parties

[85] Joanne claims that, even if Michele is the beneficial owner of the remaining property, Michele holds all or a portion of that equity in trust for her because of her contributions to the property. She also claims a monetary remedy for contributions that she made to the plaintiff’s property.

[86] Joanne says that the appropriate remedy is a constructive trust interest in the remaining property as this reflects the appreciation in the value of the land and Joanne’s contributions to that appreciation. In submissions, Joanne made it clear that she is not also claiming a constructive trust interest over the plaintiff’s property, just the remaining property.

[87] She also argues that the parties reasonably expected to share the farm as per their partnerships. From a policy perspective, Joanne argues that a daughter working with her mother on a family farm should share in the farm’s enrichment. Joanne says that even if she did receive benefits from her contributions, they do not reflect her reasonable expectation of receiving title to the remaining property.

[88] Joanne also submits that the court ought to find that equity dictates that she should have title to the remaining property for all her “sweat equity” put into the farm in reliance on her mother’s promise of getting the farm.

[89] Alternatively, Joanne argues that she should be awarded a legal interest in the remaining property pursuant to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. She says that her mother promised her the remaining property, she reasonably relied on it to her detriment, and equity should step in to remedy the injustice.

[90] Michele does not deny that Joanne contributed to the farm but disputes the extent. She questions Joanne’s estimate of her labour on the farm since Joanne was also working for Statistics Canada, a bar and she was volunteering as a firefighter. She points out the absence of any logs to support the hours Joanne claims to have worked on the farm.

[91] Michele also questions the quality of Joanne’s evidence of expenses paid. Joanne could not confirm whether all the receipts provided were applicable to the farm. There were also claimed contributions that were not supported by any receipts. For the vehicles and equipment purchased by Joanne, Michele says that Joanne kept those assets (except for the Kubota tractor) and deducted costs associated with them when filing her income tax returns. Therefore, she has not suffered any deprivation.

[92] Michele also argues that since Joanne never paid rent or groceries while living with her mother, she should not be entitled to a claim for unjust enrichment.

[93] Finally, Michele argues that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel does not apply given the vague nature of any representations made.

[94] Jeanne takes the position that Michele and Joanne had more of a partnership that was subject to dissolution. She says that most of Joanne’s contributions were to the plaintiff’s property and not the remaining property, as it is mostly fields. Therefore, Joanne should not get a constructive trust interest in the remaining property.

i) Unjust enrichment and constructive trust claim

The equitable concept of unjust enrichment

[95] Unjust enrichment remedies the injustice that occurs when one party makes a substantial contribution to the property of another without compensation. This doctrine has been applied to a variety of situations and has grown in its application becoming a common claim in family litigation. At the heart of the doctrine is the restoration of a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, at para. 31.

[96] Three elements must be satisfied to prove unjust enrichment: i) there must be an enrichment to the person with ownership of the property; ii) there must be a corresponding deprivation to the person contributing to the property, and iii) there must be no juristic reason for the enrichment. If these elements are proven, the action is established and the right to a remedy is made out: Peter v. Beblow, 1993 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 980 at para. 3; Kerr, at paras. 36-39.

[97] In the first part of the analysis, the claimant must show that she gave something to the other party which that party then received and retained. The benefit need not be retained permanently but must have enriched the recipient. It can amount to a benefit conferred which spares the receiving party an expense she would have had to undertake: Kerr, at para. 38.

[98] In the second part of the analysis, the claimant must show that she suffered a deprivation by the benefit conferred: Kerr, at para. 39.

[99] In the third part of the analysis, the claimant must prove no juristic reason for the enrichment. This part is the most nuanced. Moral and policy questions are engaged and the factors to be considered will vary with the particular facts of a case. The court should consider the legitimate expectations of the parties. The court may also consider whether public policy supports the enrichment. It may be relevant that there has been a mutual conferral of benefits, but only to the extent that this informs the parties’ reasonable expectations: Peter, at paras. 7-13; Kerr, at paras. 40-45, 109, and 116.

[100] In Romain v. Kennedy, 2026 ONSC 732 at paras. 72-74, Ellies J. outlined the two-stage process to determine whether there is an absence of a juristic reason. At the first stage, the claimant must demonstrate that there is no established category of juristic reasons to allow the recipient to retain the benefit conferred. These established categories include contract, disposition of law, donative intent, or other valid common law, equitable, or statutory obligations. Where the absence of such a reason is proven, the claimant will have made out a prima facie case of unjust enrichment. In the second stage, the recipient may then rebut the prima facie case by showing that there is another reason to deny recovery. It is at this stage that the reasonable expectations of the parties may be relevant. The court may also consider moral and public policy arguments at this stage to assess whether the enrichment is unjust.

[101] If the unjust enrichment claim is made out, the court must next consider the appropriate remedy. Monetary damages, such as a payment for services rendered based on quantum meruit, are preferred unless they are inadequate. Historically, courts have taken different approaches to calculating monetary compensation. Some resorted to a “value received” approach by assigning value to services rendered. Others adopted a more flexible approach based on a “value survived” approach.[4] In Kerr, at para. 72, the Supreme Court of Canada favoured a flexible approach in which the monetary remedy can be tailored to best match the extent of the enrichment unjustly retained.

[102] For monetary remedies, determining adequate compensation may be difficult, particularly where there has been a mutual conferral of benefits: Kerr, at para. 48.

[103] If there is a causal connection or link between the contribution made and the acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of the property in question, a constructive trust may be imposed for all or a portion of the property. Indirect contributions of money and direct contributions of labour may suffice provided a connection exists between these contributions and the property: Peter, at para. 3; Kerr, at paras. 46-53.

[104] The extent of the constructive trust interest must be proportionate to the claimant’s contributions. Where the contributions are unequal, the interest will be unequal: Pettkus v. Becker, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, at pp. 852-53; Peter, at para. 30.

Analysis

i) Was Michele enriched by Joanne’s contributions to the farm?

[105] Joanne has the onus of proving that her contributions to the farm enriched Michele.

[106] The biggest conflict between Michele and Joanne’s evidence related to Joanne’s contributions. In my view, Michele tended to minimize Joanne’s contributions. Joanne’s evidence was more balanced and where there is a conflict between the two, I would accept Joanne’s evidence of her contributions over her mother’s. There is no question that Michele worked tirelessly on her farm; I think Joanne agrees. However, Joanne also worked on the farm and assisted her mother significantly.

[107] Joanne broke down her contributions to the farm in a document she filed. Some contributions were supported by documentary evidence, but many were not. There were no details as to the dates or specific amounts for some of the totals nor any information about how they were paid. I find that this is not reliable evidence of the amounts claimed and I will only refer to documented expenses.

[108] The contributions claimed include:

Physical Labour

[109] Joanne claims that from the age of 18 until 2016 (15 years), she worked 30 hours/week on the farm, all year round. At an average wage of $10.00/hour, she values her labour at $234,000.00. Joanne testified that the time spent on the farm fluctuated over the seasons and that “it’s very hard to pin down hours”.

[110] Joanne testified that she physically assisted with the following tasks:

• Reconstruction of a sorting barn that was destroyed by a hurricane in 2006 or 2007.

• Haying.

• Calving.

• Installation and replacement of fencing; and

• Day-to-day farming chores.

[111] I find that Joanne did work on the family farm, thereby enriching Michele. Michele did not have to hire farm labour to assist with the chores around the farm and contractors to assist with capital projects, such as the construction of new buildings or new fencing. Even if Michele would have done the work herself, she was personally spared the task of completing the work Joanne did while living on the farm. I find that the proposed $10/hour average wage is reasonable. I am also prepared to accept that Joanne worked an average of 30 hours/week on the farm. During the hay and calving seasons, she likely worked more than that. During the winter, she likely worked less.

Purchase of Farm Equipment

[112] In addition to Michele’s two tractors, a third Kubota tractor was purchased in 2015 or 2016 for $44,000.00, with Michele paying $24,000.00 of the cost and Joanne contributing $20,000.00.

[113] Under the 2018 “Proposed transfer of Majority of Farming Operations to Joanne”, Joanne’s $20,000 Kubota contribution was to go towards Joanne’s purchase of Michele’s cattle. However, this agreement was never finalized, and Joanne ultimately sold the cattle, delivering the full proceeds to her mother. Therefore, she never paid for the cattle nor did she receive the profits from the sale of the cattle but still had a $20,000 investment in the tractor.

[114] Joanne also purchased a baler for $10,000.00 in 2016. According to Joanne’s evidence, that baler left the farm when Joanne left in 2018 and was only used on the remaining property in 2016. Michele’s enrichment for the use of the baler in 2016 is minimal and I heard no evidence to assist in quantifying the value of the contribution. The claim for the baler purchase is denied.

[115] Joanne also purchased a crowding tub for $1,600.00, which she did not take with her. She testified that another individual took that tub through an arrangement with her mother.

[116] I am satisfied that Michele was enriched by Joanne’s contribution to the Kubota tractor and the crowding tub in the total amount of $21,600.00.

Purchase of a bull

[117] There was confusing evidence about the purchase of bulls. Michele alleged that Joanne took Michele’s bull Sparky and lent Sparky to a neighbour. The neighbour never returned the bull. After that, Joanne purchased another bull. Joanne filed a receipt showing her purchase of a bull in 2016 for $2,500.00. This bull was purchased to replace Sparky. There was no evidence as to whether this bull was used on the farm, or what ended up happening to the bull. I note that Joanne purchased this bull after the breakdown in the relationship between Michele and Joanne. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the purchase of this bull by Joanne in 2016 enriched Michele in any way.

Purchase of a truck

[118] Joanne purchased a truck that she used on the farm. Although she said it was primarily purchased for use on the farm, it was also for personal use. Since Michele only had a car at the time, Joanne used the truck to haul supplies. She paid just over $16,000 for the truck in 2011 and still had it at the time of trial. I am satisfied that Michele was enriched by Joanne’s truck ownership as it allowed larger farm purchases to be transported to the farm without any associated delivery costs. However, given it was for personal use and Joanne still has ownership of the truck, I would apportion only half of the value of the truck to the calculation of enrichment.

Purchase of ATVs

[119] Both Michele and Joanne had four-wheelers on the farm. Joanne purchased a blue Yamaha ATV in 2004. This four-wheeler was used for leisure and farming purposes. She testified that she used it because it was newer and started better. Joanne also purchased a 2009 Honda four-wheeler for $4,500.00. There is no evidence that Joanne needed to purchase these ATVs for the farm; Michele already owned one that could have been used. Joanne testified that she preferred using her ATV because it was newer and started easier. Joanne took her ATVs with her when she left the farm and still had the Honda at the time of trial.

[120] I do not find that Michele was enriched by Joanne’s decision to buy her own ATVs. She may have used them on the farm, but that was her choice.

Other expenses

[121] Joanne filed receipts as proof of payment for many items, including fuel, diesel, pet food, a lawnmower and vet bills. Joanne’s evidence regarding these receipts was weak. She could not state for certain what they were for and who had paid for them. And, although she may have claimed them for tax purposes, it did not assist the court in understanding whether these expenses were for her benefit or the farm’s benefit. I do not find that Joanne has presented sufficient evidence to meet her onus to prove that these contributions led to Michele’s enrichment.

[122] Joanne testified that she paid $801.43 as the first installment of farm taxes for 2018. She also paid a $79.73 hydro bill for the farm in 2018. I am satisfied that Michele was enriched by these payments totaling $881.16.

ii) Has there been a corresponding deprivation?

[123] I have no difficulty finding that Joanne’s contributions resulted in a corresponding deprivation. She could have worked more hours for her employers if she was working less on the farm. She could have invested her money elsewhere, including in another farm.

iii) Is there a juristic reason for the enrichment?

[124] Starting with the first step of the juristic reason analysis, the court must consider whether there is an established reason for the enrichment. In my view, there is no established reason. There is no evidence that Joanne gave her time and money as a gift to her mother. There is evidence that her work and investment in the farm in 2018 were in line with John Parson’s suggested “Proposed Transfer of Majority of Farming Operations to Joanne”. However, that proposed agreement was never formalized by Michele and Joanne. Therefore, I find that there was no binding contractual relationship between them.

[125] Since there is no established reason for the enrichment, Joanne has made out a prima facie case, which is rebuttable if Michele proves another reason to deny recovery.

[126] The second step in this analysis is the most challenging in this case. The court is being asked to assess the value and expectation of a mother and child over the years as they worked together on a family farm. It raises public policy questions. It involves deciphering the legitimate expectations of a parent and child living together in these circumstances.

[127] At this second stage, the onus is on Michele to show why Joanne should be denied recovery for her contributions. Michele argues that there are other juristic reasons for Joanne’s contributions to the farm. When Joanne lived with her mother until 2015, she did not pay rent or contribute to the household groceries. Joanne lived with her mother for over 12 years after reaching the age of 18. In addition, Joanne deducted expenses from the farm when filing her tax returns. Her net losses reduced the amount payable in income tax for those years.

[128] I agree that these benefits account for some of Joanne’s contributions and that Michele has met her onus in rebutting Joanne’s prima facie case for full recovery. However, the question is whether the benefits provide a juristic reason for the entire amount of Michele’s enrichment. In my view, the mutual conferral of benefits was uneven. Michele benefited more than Joanne. The question of how much more is addressed in the remedy section below.

[129] Before leaving this section, I will comment on the public policy argument raised by Joanne. She argued that a daughter who works with her mother on a farm should share in the enrichment of the farm. Children routinely help their parents simply because they love them and appreciate them for all they have done. In the case of family farms, an adult child’s help may be even more pronounced, particularly during hay or calving season. This type of help should not always lead to a compensable legal claim. Jeanne’s contributions are a clear example of this. It is only when the help leads to unjust enrichment that equity should step in. From a policy perspective, this should be a high bar in the context of a parent-child relationship. If it were not, parents could be faced with litigation over the help received from their adult children in situations where help was not even requested.

If unjust enrichment is made out, what is the appropriate remedy?

[130] As outlined above, monetary damages are the preferred remedy for unjust enrichment claims. Given my findings above, a quantum meruit approach to the compensable contributions would include:

Labour - $234,000.00

Equipment - $21,600.00

Truck - $8,000.00

Tax and hydro bill - $881.16

TOTAL - $264,481.16

[131] From this amount, I must deduct the benefits conferred to Joanne. There was no evidence regarding the market value of room and board throughout the relevant time period so the court must determine the value. A court must do its best to assess a party’s damages on the available evidence even where difficulties in the quantification of damages render a precise mathematical calculation uncertain or impossible: TMS Lighting Ltd. v. KJS Transport Inc., 2014 ONCA 1 at para. 61.

[132] Joanne was born in 1984. She turned 18 in 2002. She lived with her mother until 2015. I find that Joanne enjoyed free room and board for thirteen adult years and would attach an average monthly value of $600.00 to that benefit representing $500.00 for rent and $100.00 for groceries. This would total $93,600.00 in benefit received by Joanne.

[133] Joanne also enjoyed income tax benefits from her claimed farming losses, however, there was no accounting evidence to quantify this and the court does not have the ability to do so.

[134] Joanne argues that a monetary remedy is not sufficient and that she should instead receive a constructive trust interest in the remaining farm but makes no claim for a constructive trust interest in the plaintiff’s property.

[135] Joanne worked on both the plaintiff’s property and the remaining property. There was no evidence to assist the court in breaking down her labour contributions between each property. There is no evidence about where on the farm the Kubota tractor was used. The crowding tub was on the plaintiff’s property only. The truck was used on both properties.

[136] Given the lack of a clear link between the contributions and the remaining property, I find that a constructive trust remedy is not appropriate. A monetary remedy can compensate Joanne for her contributions without having to determine how the contributions relate to the individual properties.

[137] After subtracting the benefits received by Joanne, the compensable total contribution by Joanne is $170,881.16. Accordingly, I order that Michele pay Joanne this amount as compensation for Michele’s unjust enrichment. Prejudgment interest on this sum at the applicable rate should be paid to the date of judgment.

(i) Joanne’s claim under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel

The Proprietary Estoppel Doctrine

[138] In Cowper-Smith v. Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 754, at para. 15, McLachlin C.J. clarified the test for a cause of action based on proprietary estoppel. To succeed, plaintiffs must establish that:

i) A representation or assurance is made to a claimant; on the basis of which the claimant expects he or she will enjoy some right or benefit over the property;

ii) The claimant relies on that expectation by doing or refraining from doing something, and his or her reliance is reasonable in all the circumstances; and

iii) The claimant suffers a detriment because of this reasonable reliance, such that it would be unfair or unjust for the party responsible for the representation or assurance to go back on his or her word.

[139] Proprietary estoppel avoids unfairness or injustice that would result to one party if the other were permitted to break her word and insist on strict legal rights. There must be an unambiguous promise which is taken seriously: Cowper-Smith, at paras. 16, 26.

[140] In terms of the remedy, if the representing party possesses an interest in the property sufficient to fulfill the expectation, proprietary estoppel may give effect to the equity by making the representation or assurance binding. The court has considerable discretion in crafting a remedy that suits the circumstances. The reasonableness of the claimant’s expectations must be assessed considering the detriment suffered: Cowper-Smith, at paras. 15, 48.

[141] A balance should be struck between vindicating the claimant’s subjective expectations and correcting a reasonable valuation of the detriment, which may be difficult or impossible to measure: Cowper-Smith, at para. 48.

Analysis

[142] In Cowper-Smith, the promise at issue was clear. A sister assured her brother that if he moved to Victoria to care for their aging mother, he could live in the family home permanently and eventually acquire the sister’s interest in the mother’s property. Not only was the promise clear, but so was the detriment. The brother left his employment, his lease, and his local contacts to move and care for his mother. The court remedied the situation by granting the brother an order entitling him to purchase the sister’s interest in the family home at fair market value.

[143] This case is distinguishable. There is no clear promise and there is no reasonable reliance on a promise.

[144] Prior to 2017, the promises made by Michele over the years were general and non-specific as to when Joanne or Jeanne or both would get the farm and what part of the farm specifically. In my view, the vague, non-specific representations made by Michele are insufficient to ground a proprietary estoppel claim.

[145] There was evidence of a discussion in 2017 between Michele and Joanne at the time of the severance of the second property. Joanne testified that Michele asked her to sign the transfer to Jeanne because Joanne would get the rest of the farm. Joanne could not provide specific wording used by her mother nor could she assign a timeline as to when the gift of the farm would happen. It was a promise to get the farm at some unspecified time in the future, possibly as an inheritance. Given the uncertainties surrounding this promise, I find that the plaintiff has not proven a representation or assurance on a balance of probabilities. There simply is not sufficient proof of an unambiguous promise.

[146] I note that there was proof of a possible intention by Michele to transfer property to Joanne as per John Parson’s email dated October 6, 2016. Step four anticipated transferring the farmland to Michele and Joanne as joint tenants. This never came to be. In the 2018 “Proposed Transfer of Majority of Farming Operations to Joanne”, it was anticipated that Michele would own the real property and farm equipment. In referring to a possible future transfer, John Parsons wrote, “Transfers of real property will need the involvement of a lawyer. When and if you decide to go that future step, if and when we get to that point,..” (emphasis added).

[147] There is evidence that at some point in time, Michele intended to give Joanne the rest of the farm. She admitted so during her examination for discovery on October 8, 2019. But the reality is that due to the broken down relationship, that never transpired.

[148] Even if I could find that any of the representations were sufficiently proven, I am unable to find a reasonable reliance on the representations. It was clear throughout the conflict between Joanne and Michele from 2015 to 2018 that Joanne did not reasonably rely on her mother’s promise and, in fact, took steps to formalize their business relations because of her lack of reliance. Even going back to 2013, Joanne testified that she would not invest in building a hay shed at that time out of fear of losing her financial investment.

[149] Joanne argues that she reasonably relied on her mother’s promise of getting the rest of the farm in 2017 when she was pressured into signing the transfer to Jeanne. Even if she did reasonably rely on this promise, there was no detriment sufficient to justify an interest in the remaining property. Since Michele had sole beneficial ownership in the remaining property pursuant to a resulting trust, Joanne was not giving up property that she beneficially owned when signing the transfer. Further, her work on the farm was very limited after the 2017 transfer except for some farming activity in 2018 until things ended poorly in August of that year. As such, there is not sufficient evidence of a reasonably relied upon representation in 2017 that would justify a remedy for proprietary estoppel.

[150] In conclusion, although I am satisfied that over the years Michele made statements to Joanne about getting the farm someday, I am not satisfied that such statements have been proven on a balance of probabilities such that I can be sure about what was promised and when. And even if the representations could be proven, I am not satisfied that Joanne reasonably relied upon them to her detriment. The claim for proprietary estoppel is dismissed.

Jeanne’s Claim

[151] Jeanne only claims an interest in the remaining property if Joanne is given an interest. Otherwise, she is content with her mother retaining sole beneficial ownership of the property and does not seek any restitution for her contributions over the years. Even if she were seeking a monetary amount for her contributions, I do not find that she is entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment.

[152] I find that Jeanne’s contributions to the remaining property were a voluntary gift to her mother, with no expectation of consideration. I also find that they were not significant enough to warrant a remedy in law. Indeed, these contributions may well have been motivated by the fact that she had already received part of the second property. Or, they may have simply been motivated by her love for her mother. Or, they may have been motivated by the possibility that she and/or her son may end up inheriting both farm properties, since the relationship between Joanne and her mother had broken down. All of these are reasonable motivations to help around the farm but do not give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment.

[153] Therefore, Jeanne has not proven on a balance of probabilities that she should be compensated for unjust enrichment as it relates to her contributions to the remaining property and her claim is dismissed.

Conclusion

[154] For the foregoing reasons, I hereby order and declare:

a) That Michele has sole ownership of the remaining property legally described as:

PIN 49063-0596, W ½ of W ½ Lot 1, Concession 6, MacPherson, save & except Part 2 on Plan 36R14079; Municipality of West Nipissing.

PIN 49063-0598, E ½ of W ½ Lot 1, Concession 6, MacPherson, being Part 3 on Plan 36R14079; Municipality of West Nipissing.

PIN 49063-0599, E ½ of W ½ Lot 1, Concession 6, MacPherson, save and except Part 1 on Plan 36R8537 & Parts 3 & 4 on Plan 36R14079; Municipality of West Nipissing.

PIN 49063-0601, E ½ Lot 1, Concession 6, MacPherson, being Part 5 on Plan 36R-14079; Municipality of West Nipissing.

PIN 49063-0602, E ½ Lot 1, Concession 6, MacPherson, save & except LT77171 & Part 12 to 15 36R3878 & Parts 5 & 6 on Plan 36R14079; Subject to an easement as in LT82439; Municipality of West Nipissing.

PIN 49063-0604, Firstly: Part of Lot 12, Concession A, Caldwell, Being Parts 10, 11 & 16 on Plan 36R3878; Secondly: Part of Lot 1, Concession 6 MacPherson, being Parts 12, 13, 14 & 15 on Plan 36R3878, save & except Parts 7, 8, 9 on Plan 36R14079; Municipality of West Nipissing, and

b) That Michele shall pay Joanne monetary damages in the amount of $170,881.16 for unjust enrichment, together with prejudgment interest at the rate set by statute to the date of judgment.

Costs

[155] If the parties cannot agree on costs, Michele may serve and file written submissions, not to exceed three pages in length double spaced, plus any relevant offers to settle within 30 days of this decision. Joanne and Jeanne may serve and file responding submissions with any offers to settle within 30 days of receipt of Michele’s submissions.

Tysick J.

Released: August 13, 2026

CITATION: laberge gareau v. Laberge gareau, 2026 ONSC 4669

COURT FILE NO.: CV 19-00000039

DATE: 2026/08/13

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MICHELE JEANNE LABERGE GAREAU

Plaintiff (Defendant to Counterclaims of Jeanne Laberge Gareau and Joanne Marie Laberge Gareau)

– and –

JOANNE MARIE LABERGE GAREAU and JEANNE LUCY LABERGE GAREAU

Defendants (Plaintiffs to Counterclaims)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tysick, J.

Released: August 13, 2026

1See Waterstone Properties Corporation v. Caledon (Town), 2017 ONCA 623 which confirms that claims for a declaration in respect of land and claims to the ownership of land advanced by way of resulting or constructive trust are also captured under s.4 of the Limitations Act.; and Ramcharran et al. v. Ramcharran et al., 2026 ONSC 390.

2Waterstone, at para. 34.

3See Fleury v. Fleury, 2001 CanLII 294 (ON CA) at para. 6 and Zurich Indemnity Company of Canada v. Matthews, 2007 CanLII 20801 (ON SC) at para. 26.

4See Kerr, at para. 49, for a discussion of this issue and the cases adopting each approach.