COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-0286-000
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
P. Quilty & A. Lee, for the Crown
Crown
- and -
PRITAM SINGH
L. Kalra, for the Accused
Accused
HEARD: June 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 2026
at Thunder Bay, Ontario
Mr. Justice F. B. Fitzpatrick
Reasons For Judgment
Introduction
[1] I am about to read written reasons for judgment in this matter. My written reasons are my reasons for decision and will be entered as the next exhibit in this trial. During the course of reading this judgment, I may not read certain portions of the various paragraphs from the cases cited for the purposes of brevity in delivering this judgment. The full text of the cited decisions appears in the written reasons.
[2] Pritam Singh stands charged with operating a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, was dangerous to the public and as a result caused the death of Terrance Quirt, contrary to s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”).
Agreed Facts
[3] In this matter, pursuant to s. 655 of the Code , the parties formally admitted to the following facts for the purpose of dispensing with proof thereof:
On Friday, December 2, 2022, the accused, Pritam Singh, was operating a Kenworth tractor trailer (the “Kenworth”) eastbound on Highway 102 (the “102” or “Hwy 102”) in the District of Thunder Bay.
At the same time, Terrance Quirt was operating a Freightliner snow plow (the “Freightliner”) westbound on the 102.
Shortly before 9:55PM, there was a collision between Mr. Singh's tractor trailer and the snow plow being driven by Mr. Quirt. Mr. Quirt was killed as a result of the collision.
Facts Not in Dispute
[4] The collision occurred on the 102, just west of the Kaministiqua River. It occurred approximately 4 kilometers east of the place where the 102 terminates and intersects with the Trans Canada Highway, Provincial Highway 11/17. This intersection is locally known as “Sistonens Corners”. For a driver coming from the West, and traveling eastbound on the 102, leaving from Sistonens Corners and heading to Thunder Bay on the 102, the driver experiences an upward climb and then a downward 6% grade and curves to the right as the highway goes towards the Kaministiqua River. It had been snowing for some time in the location of the crash site, and indeed all throughout Northwestern Ontario to the Manitoba border and beyond. It was not seriously disputed, and I find on the evidence, the 102 was partially snow covered in the entire section of the highway that Mr. Singh travelled before the Kenworth came into collision with the Freightliner.
The Elements of the Offence and the Issue for Trial
[5] Counsel agreed there are three essential elements to the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle under s. 320.13(3) of the Code which the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction of Mr. Singh in this matter:
Mr. Singh was operating a motor vehicle at all material times;
Mr. Singh was operating the motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public; and
The operation of the motor vehicle caused Mr. Quirt’s death.
[6] Agreed facts 1 and 3 above indicate the parties are agreed that the Crown need not prove element 1 and element 3 of the essential elements of the offence. The critical issue for the trial, as acknowledged throughout the proceedings by both counsel, is whether the Crown, on the evidence presented has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that on December 2, 2021 shortly before 9:55 p.m., Mr. Singh was operating the Kenworth in a manner dangerous to the public and whether that driving represented a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances.
[7] Counsel agree the leading cases on dangerous driving causing death come from two authorities from the Supreme Court of Canada, first in R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, and then R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26.
[8] Recently, in the decision of R. v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 2118 (no relation to this case), Nishikawa J. provided a useful summary of these aforementioned authorities at paras. 120-125 as follows:
120 In respect of the actus reus of the offence of dangerous driving, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, viewed objectively, the accused was, in the words of the section, driving in a manner that was "dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place": R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at para. 41; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 28.
121 In Beatty, at para. 46, Charron J. held that the court must conduct a meaningful inquiry into the manner of the driving because it is the manner of the driving, and not the consequences, which is at issue. She went on, in the same paragraph, to caution that "[t]he court must not leap to its conclusion about the manner of driving based on the consequence."
122 The trier of fact must also be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's objectively dangerous conduct was accompanied by the required mens rea. In making the objective assessment, the trier of fact should be satisfied on the basis of all the evidence, including evidence about the accused's actual state of mind, if any, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused's circumstances.
23 In Roy, at para. 36, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that in respect of the mens rea for the offence of dangerous driving, the questions to be answered are as follows:
(a)whether a reasonable person, in light of the circumstances, would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible; and
(b)whether the accused person's failure to do so is a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.
124 The presence of objective mens rea is determined by assessing the dangerous conduct as against the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver. If the dangerous conduct constitutes a "marked departure" from that norm, the offence will be made out. What constitutes a "marked departure" from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver is a matter of degree. A mere departure or carelessness is not sufficient. The lack of care must be serious enough to merit punishment.
125 If the trier of fact is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the objectively dangerous conduct constitutes a marked departure from the norm, the trier of fact must consider evidence about the actual state of mind of the accused, if any, to determine whether it raises a reasonable doubt about whether a reasonable person in the accused's position would have been aware of the risk created by this conduct. If there is no such evidence, the court may convict the accused.
[9] In submissions, the Crown argued Mr. Singh’s driving was dangerous in all of the circumstances. Further, the Crown submitted that the marked and substantial departure of Mr. Singh’s conduct that night related solely to the speed at which he was driving the Kenworth in the snowy and dark conditions in which he found the 102 as he was driving the tractor trailer towards the ultimate crash site.
[10] There is no other conduct upon which the Crown relies. The Crown argued it was clear on the evidence the question of the speed of a transport trailer being driven on a partially snow-covered highway, in an area of a downward grade of 6% heading into a relatively sharp curve, constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver.
[11] There was no question that no other potentially dangerous driving conduct on the part of Mr. Singh – such as him operating a cell phone, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, weaving in and out of traffic, or tailgating – was being relied upon by the Crown at this trial.
[12] There was no issue that the posted speed on the relevant section of the 102 was 90 km/h.
The Trial Evidence
[13] Relying on the recent direction of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Brown v. Meaney, 2026 ONCA 445, at para. 42, I will now briefly summarize what I saw as the most significant trial evidence in this 7 day trial, which addressed the key issues of the speed at which Mr. Singh was driving and the circumstances of the conditions which confronted him in the last 4 kilometers he drove the Kenworth before colliding with the Freightliner.
[14] The Crown called five witnesses, the defence two. Both parties called expert opinion evidence witnesses. Mr. Singh testified in his own defence.
[15] In my view, the evidence of the four non-expert Crown witnesses (two civilians and two OPP officers) was relevant only to the issue of the weather conditions on the 102 east of Sistonens Corners and West of the Kaministaqua River on the evening of December 2, 2022.
The Crown Evidence
Vikramjit Singh
[16] The first Crown witness was Mr. Vikramjit Singh (“V.S.”) (no relation). V.S. was operating a tractor trailer westbound on the 102 that evening. His truck was equipped with a dashboard camera. The video from the camera was entered as exhibit 2 at trial. The video was 3 minutes in length. It was admitted it was a true depiction of the events shown and there had been no alterations or enhancements to the video. It was agreed the time stamps on the video was not the actual Eastern time in question. I will discuss the dash cam video evidence separately.
[17] V.S. was travelling behind the Freightliner at the time of the collision. V.S. testified he was driving at about 40 to 50 kilometers per hour for the 10 or 15 minutes he had been following the Freightliner. In cross examination, V.S. testified the road conditions were “Ok but not great”. V.S. was driving defensively. He testified visibility was “OK”. He did not recall experiencing any fog or mist.
Wendy Kainula
[18] Wendy Kainula was the second Crown witness. She has lived in Thunder Bay her whole life. She had been in a car most of the latter part of the day on December 2, 2022 on the way back from Winnipeg to her home near Thunder Bay. While Ms. Kainula was unclear about the exact time it had taken her to go from Winnipeg to Thunder Bay that day, I take judicial notice from my own experience that in perfect conditions, and staying on the Trans Canada Highway until Sistonens Corners before turning to the 102 to do the last leg to Thunder Bay, that is usually about an eight hour drive. That night, Ms. Kainula’s daughter had done the majority of the driving. The daughter drove from Winnipeg to her home at Shabaqua Corners, where Highway 11 rejoins Highway 17. The daughter was dropped off. Ms. Kainula drove the last 40 kilometers or so from Shabaqua Corners to her home.
[19] Ms. Kainula has a specific recollection of passing a snow plow that evening at 9:34 p.m. She made some specific observations concerning how she encountered the snowplow. Ultimately, neither party relied on those observations. What was significant in my view, was her observations about how fast she was driving and what the weather had been like that she had experienced. Ms. Kainula testified the weather was bad that evening. The driving snow caused her to use her low beams. She testified the visibility was poor. She testified the car she was driving did not exceed 80 km/ hr that evening at any point between Winnipeg and Thunder Bay.
DC Vanessa Pole
[20] The third Crown witness was O.P.P. Detective Constable Vanessa Pole (“DC Pole”). DC Pole was the first officer on scene after the collision. She had been working a marked car patrol in the area. She was around the Mokomon area about 16 km or so from the collision scene when she received a call about it at 9:56 p.m. that evening. She arrived on the scene at 10:08 p.m. She had stopped to place a barrier across the entrance to the 102 at Sistonens Corners to keep any further traffic from the collision site. DC Pole testified she had not exceeded 75 kilometers per hour driving to the scene with roof lights deployed due to the poor road conditions. She described the 102 as slippery and snow covered.
[21] In cross examination, she was shown a photo taken by a civilian who attended on the scene before she arrived. She agreed the photo (ultimately marked Exhibit 25 at trial) more accurately demonstrated the amount of snow on the 102 in the immediate area of the collision than another photo taken by the Crown expert witness Robert Morris who had arrived on the scene at 11:27 p.m. about an hour and twenty minutes after DC Pole had first arrived.
Sergeant Timothy Penfold
[22] The fourth Crown witness was O.P.P. Sergeant Timothy Penfold. He was the officer who ultimately decided to lay the charge against Mr. Singh. He attended at the scene the night of the crash.
The Dash Cam Video
[23] The dash cam video from V.S.’s truck speaks for itself. It was three minutes long. It shows the crash occurring at 1 minute and five seconds into the video. It therefore shows the last minute and five seconds of the Freightliner travel before the collision. It also depicts two other tractor trailers headed eastbound passing the Freightliner about 20 seconds into the video, and therefore about 45 seconds before the collision. A third tractor trailer headed eastbound passes the Freightliner 40 seconds into the video and therefore about 25 seconds before the collision. The snowy conditions are shown in the video. The lights of Kenworth are seen approaching downhill on the 102 at 56 seconds into the video. The Kenworth can be seen to start jackknifing at about 1 minute and two seconds into the video and the collision occurs three seconds later.
The Crown Expert Evidence – Constable Robert Morris
[24] O.P.P. Constable Robert Morris was qualified to give expert opinion evidence on collision reconstruction. He has been accepted to give expert evidence on fourteen occasions in both the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Justice. He also gave fact evidence as he attended on scene that night and did physical measurements from which he gave opinion evidence as to what occurred to the Kenworth in the few minutes before the collision.
[25] Several photographs of the collision scene were introduced through Constable Morris. The photos show the extent of damage to the Kenworth, the Manac trailer it was pulling, and to the Freightliner. The photographs speak for themselves concerning the damage caused by the collision. Constable Morris described, in broad terms, the extensive damage caused to both vehicles involved in the collision and the Manac trailer.
[26] Constable Morris had reviewed the dash cam video and relied upon it to provide his opinion evidence to the Court. Of greatest significance was his testimony concerning data retrieved from the Electronic Control Module (ECM) from the Kenworth. The reliability of the data retrieved was a hotly contested issue in this trial.
[27] ECM’s are central onboard computers that are now standard equipment in all motor vehicles sold in the world. For complex vehicles such as the Kenworth, an ECM continuously monitors all the various sensors present in the truck. The ECM is capable of producing reports which presents various data from various sensors operating in the truck. The reports are on a loop so they continuously overwrite data that is constantly being monitored in the vehicle. The engine in the Kenworth was manufactured by an American company, Cummins Inc. Cummins calls its ECM units Engine Control Units (ECU). Cummins produces proprietary software that operates the ECU’s for its engines.
[28] An officer working with Constable Morris was able to retrieve several data reports from the Kenworth on February 10, 2023. In cross examination, Constable Morris explained that the delay in obtaining this data was caused by the fact that at the time of the accident, he was the only OPP accident reconstruction officer for the Northwest Region. The Northwest Region for the OPP goes from approximately White River in the East, to the Manitoba Border in the West, and to Hudson’s Bay in the North, including all the fly in First Nations Reserves in this very large part of Ontario. Constable Morris intimated he was doing a great deal of accident reconstructions in the time after this accident. He has since gotten some help from additional officers.
[29] For this case, the report which was of greatest importance to the Crown’s case was a Sudden Vehicle Speed Deceleration Report (“SVSDR”) produced by the ECU in the Kenworth. Constable Morris explained this report is generated by the ECU when the engine experiences a sudden deceleration that exceeds 11.27 km/h in a one second interval. Constable Morris testified these reports are generated on occasions of hard braking or collision. The data retrieved from the Kenworth had three such reports. Constable Morris opined that one such report, report 2, had recorded the total kilometers on the engine at the time of the report (2,293,593 km) and the outside air temperature surrounding the Kenworth, zero degrees at the time of the report. These two data points coincided with conditions he observed with the Kenworth on the night of the collision.
[30] It was Constable Morris’ opinion that this SVSDR accurately reported several key pieces of data concerning the operation of the Kenworth in about a 65 second period leading up to the collision. According to Constable Morris, the SVSDR recorded the speed of the vehicle in km/h, the rotations per minute of the engine, the percentage load that was being placed on the engine, the throttle percentage that was being applied, and whether the brakes were being applied at any particular time.
[31] In the last sixteen seconds before the deceleration event that triggered the creation of the SVSDR, the report indicated the following data concerning the vehicle speed, the engine speed, the engine load, the throttle percentage, and the brake status. Constable Morris testified brake status referred to whether the brakes were applied, “ON” as opposed to not applied, “-”. I reproduce the report here.
Time (Seconds)
Vehicle Speed (km/hr)
Engine Speed (rpm)
Engine Load (%)
Throttle (%)
Brake Status
-16
91
1378
100.0
99.8
-15
93
1412
99.6
100.0
-14
96
1446
100.0
100.0
-13
98
1492
85.2
89.3
-12
100
1518
100.0
98.6
-11
103
1557
100.0
99.3
-10
105
1578
53.1
69.9
-9
106
1598
41.8
98.9
-8
107
1402
0.0
0.0
-7
107
1378
0.0
0.0
On
-6
107
1361
0.0
0.0
On
-5
105
1327
0.0
0.0
On
-4
103
1321
0.0
0.0
-3
101
1291
0.0
0.0
On
-2
100
1248
0.0
0.0
On
-1
98
1237
0.0
0.0
On
0
95
1177
0.0
0.0
On
1
82
1189
17.6
0.0
On
2
63
802
0.0
0.0
On
3
43
956
0.0
0.0
4
45
722
21.5
0.0
5
13
702
14.1
0.0
6
1
691
10.9
0.0
On
7
1
638
77.7
0.0
On
8
0
747
5.9
0.0
On
9
0
704
14.8
0.0
On
10
0
700
15.2
0.0
11
0
701
16.0
0.0
[32] Constable Morris emphasized the importance of the ECU in relation to the governor that was present on the Cummins engine. In Ontario, all transport trucks are required to operate with a device, a governor, that is supposed to limit their speed to 105 kilometers per hour. The governor prevents a truck’s accelerator from impacting the engine once the speed of the truck exceeds 105 km/h. Obviously, gravity can allow a truck, even with a governor to exceed 105 km/h as the vehicle travels down an incline, but the governor ensures that the accelerator does not contribute in anyway to a truck exceeding the 105 km/h limit.
[33] Based on the data from the SVSDR, it was Constable Morris’ opinion that excessive speed in the snowy conditions present on the 102 that night caused Mr. Singh to lose control of the Kenworth, thus causing the Manac to fishtail, and sweep across the entirety of the highway until it came into collision with the Freightliner. Constable Morris was clear he did not see it as his role to express an opinion as to what occurred was a circumstance by which it could be said the actions by Mr. Singh constituted an offence.
[34] In cross examination, Mr. Singh’s counsel put to Constable Morris the following text contained in one of the SVSDR reports pulled from the Kenworth (not the report upon which he relied):
Cummins does not intend for the Electronic Control Module (“ECM”) and/or the Electronic Control Unit (“ECU”) to be used for purposes of accident reconstruction nor did Cummins design the EMC/ECU for purposes of accident reconstruction. The ECM/ECU does not retrieve sudden deceleration event information with requisite specificity for accident reconstruction. As such, the Power Spec software is not intended to retrieve data from the ECM/ECU for purposes of accident reconstruction. Furthermore, only authorized personnel should use the Power Spec software to retrieve data from the ECM/ECU. Cummins does not guarantee the accuracy of ECM/ECU data retrieved and interpreted by unauthorized third parties. Nor will Cummins interpret ECM/ECU data that is retrieved by third parties.
[35] Constable Morris opined this language was the manufacturer’s attempt to shield itself from legal liability. It was not sufficient to have him discount in any way the readings and data from the SVSDR. Constable Morris indicated he had been involved in training sponsored by or provided in conjunction with Cummins which permitted the OPP access to the software necessary to access the data on ECU’s from Cummins engines. Further, Constable Morris was aware of a study where an actual Cummins engine was tested, and the physical results observed by the testing agency were compared to the ECU data to consider the efficacy of the ECU data. In Constable Morris’ opinion, those tests demonstrated the accuracy of the ECU data despite the caveat type language inserted in the reports by Cummins.
[36] Constable Morris was also cross examined on several aspects of his opinion report provided to the defence concerning the actual location of the collision relative to the Kaministiquia River and the series of bridges in that area. In his view, the stretch of highway where the accident occurred constituted one bridge. He testified in cross examination that the Kenworth had not been subjected to a mechanical inspection by a licenced mechanic as a part of the OPP investigation following the collision. Nevertheless, it was Constable Morris’ opinion that the Kenworth was suffering no mechanical defects that in any way caused or contributed to the collision.
[37] He was also cross examined on a number of accident reports for a ten-year period occurring in the area of the collision on Hwy 102. In Constable Morris’ opinion, the six accident reports shown to him for the approximate ten-year period were no significance to his opinion. He was asked about the construction and design of Hwy 102 in the area of the collision but indicated he was not qualified to give such opinion evidence.
The Defence Evidence
The Defence Expert Evidence – Barry Raffery
[38] The defence first called an expert opinion evidence witness, Barry Raffery. Mr. Raffery was qualified to give expert opinion evidence concerning accident reconstruction, identification of collision scene evidence, vehicle dynamics, and interpretation of crash data retrieval reports. Mr. Raffery has been qualified on many past occasions to give such expert opinion evidence before Ontario Courts.
[39] Mr. Raffery was retained on this file in October 2024. He visited the scene on May 30, 2025. Mr. Raffery gave evidence concerning the layout of Hwy 102 and provided the Court with a particularly useful diagram of the area noting the location of various road signs, the distances between particular points, and the grade of the hill leading down to the area of the collision. The diagram indicated the location of a 6% grade sign at the crest of the hill leading down to the area of the collision. As well, the location of two signs indicating a right curve in the road in the area of the collision were shown on the diagram.
[40] Mr. Raffery testified as to his opinion of exactly where the collision occurred. He opined the Freightliner was pushed eastward upon colliding with the Manac trailer. He discussed his view that the area contained three distinct bridges as opposed to one as described by Constable Morris. He noted that there was no signage indicating that the bridge deck areas would tend to freeze before the roadway. In cross examination, he asserted this was common knowledge for drivers in Ontario.
[41] Mr. Raffery reviewed the dash cam video. It was his opinion that the movement of the Manac trailer as it came into collision with the Freightliner was better described as a “swing out” rather than a “jackknife”. He opined that once a trailer begins that action of swinging out, there is no way to have it correct, short of stopping the vehicle.
[42] Mr. Raffery testified concerning an analytical tool used to assess accidents called a causation triangle. This assesses three major areas concerning a collision: the environment, the driver, and the vehicle. In respect of this tool, Mr. Raffery was of the opinion a mechanical inspection should have been conducted on the Kenworth post accident. However, Mr. Raffery testified he could not say if a mechanical issue caused the Manac to swing out immediately before the collision. He did opine that environmental issues such as the slippery conditions on the bridge deck where the accident occurred could have contributed to the collision.
[43] Mr. Raffery opined on the use of the ECM in the Kenworth to assess issues related to the collision at issue. It was Mr. Raffery’s opinion that the caveat set out by Cummins, that the ECM could not be used for accident reconstruction, was accurate and should be respected. In his words, the data cannot be accepted as “gospel”. He noted the ECM makes assumptions about physical aspects of the vehicle in generating data which may not necessarily be present in the vehicle due to mechanical issues or changes to the vehicle from its original state coming from the manufacturer. In his view, there was absolutely no way to calculate the exact speed of Mr. Singh’s truck in the seconds leading up to the collision. From his review of the OPP investigation concerning the state of the Kenworth, he could not see any indication that the software for the ECM had been updated to the most recent version.
[44] Mr. Raffery reviewed the driver logs for the Kenworth in the hours before the collision. He advised the Court how these logs are complied using GPS data connected to the movement of the truck. This is to be contrasted with the ECM which relies on drive train evidence in the vehicle to generate its data.
[45] It was Mr. Raffery’s opinion that the ECM data was unreliable for the purposes of calculating the speed of the Kenworth at any material time. The best mechanical evidence available was the driver logs from which an average speed from point to point could be ascertained. Using the driver logs, Mr. Raffery was able to calculate that the Kenworth was traveling an average of 60km/h during the four minutes leading up to the collision. Mr. Raffery preferred the accuracy of GPS data to that generated by the ECM. He did admit he was not precisely sure how accurate the GPS used in the Kenworth was with respect to the precise location of the vehicle at any particular time.
[46] In cross examination, Mr. Raffery acknowledged it was likely the Kenworth would be traveling at a higher rate of speed once it entered the downhill portion of the 102 in the last half kilometre or so before the collision. Mr. Raffery also testified that the Freightliner was hit by the entire force of the Kenworth despite the tractor portion, in effect, sliding by the Freightliner at the point of impact.
[47] Mr. Raffery has not done any independent testing on ECM units or done any training on the accuracy of ECM units, nor reviewed any academic articles other than the one that was ultimately shown to Constable Morris in re-examination. He testified that someone who had had such training and reviewed such articles would perhaps be in a better position than him to opine on the accuracy of ECM units.
[48] Mr. Raffery was clear he was not an expert in road design.
Pritam Singh
[49] Mr. Singh testified in his own defence. Mr. Singh is 36 years old. He obtained a licence to operate tractor trailer type vehicles in July 2022. He had enrolled in a driver training school and had received 35 days of training before he obtained his licence. He testified that he had not much experience as a long-haul truck driver at the time of the accident. He had travelled the relevant portion of Hwy 102 maybe 20 times since obtaining his licence in July 2022.
[50] On the day in question, Mr. Singh was team driving with another experienced driver. It was the second occasion where Mr. Singh had driven a tractor trailer in snowy conditions. The trip was from Caledon to Winnipeg and then back to Caledon. At the time the truck reached Winnipeg, Mr. Singh was sleeping. He took over at Dryden.
[51] The weather conditions were stormy as he drove the Kenworth from Dryden to Sistonens Corners. That 321 kilometre part of the trip took about 4 hours. Mr. Singh testified he was driving according to the snowy conditions. There was snow on Highway 17 in that part of the journey. In that portion of the trip, the truck was going anywhere from 60 to 90 km/h at any given time.
[52] Due to the weather conditions, Mr. Singh decided to stop at Sistonens Corners. He testified that heavy snow was falling at that time. There is a large parking lot as Petro Canada operates a Petro Pass card lock fuel station there. A lot of trucks were parked there at the time.
[53] Mr. Singh was shown a copy of the driving logs that had been previously entered as an exhibit at the trial. He testified that the logs are not created manually by the driver but rather as the result of the motion of the truck. Once a truck goes more than 7 km/h, the log records the driver as being “on duty”.
[54] Mr. Singh confirmed the drivers log showed the Kenworth leaving the Sistonens Corner Petro Pass area at 9:46 p.m. Eastern time. Mr. Singh described the road conditions as, “snow on the road and as I mentioned that there were tire marks on the road, on some area of the road there was snow, but some areas were cleared, not properly but driveable track.”
[55] Mr. Singh described in detail his actions and the actions of the Kenworth in the last four kilometers before the collision. There was no particular urgency or schedule he was on that caused him to leave when he did. He decided to take Hwy 102 as his employer had directed him to switch out the tractor trailer with another one at a Walmart in Thunder Bay. He testified that visibility was clear, no fog. He testified he was driving according to the conditions. His speed varied from 50-60 to 70-80km/h. He described his travel as follows:
A. When I was driving uphill, I had to apply accelerator because the truck was experiencing a lot of friction or load. Going uphill, my speed was 65. While driving uphill and negotiating the snow, I saw the downhill sign, I tried to apply the brake. The speed which I have mentioned, 70, 75, it should be covered but - it should have been covered but instead it started increasing, then I saw the curve sign. When I saw that sign, all these things were happening in such a quick succession. As I was trying to apply the brake and logically the speed should have reduced but the last time when I saw my odometer - or speedometer I saw it 80, 85, and increasing but it was not slowing down even after applying the brake. So, when I reached the bend coupled with downhill I was holding my steering wheel with force and while I was trying applying brake on the curve I looked at my back side mirrors – side mirrors to the back and I observed that my trailer swing right first and then to the left.
[56] Mr. Singh took note of the downhill grade sign and the two signs indicating the right curve. He was not aware he was approaching a bridge. At the time of the collision, he was not aware of any mechanical issues with the truck including with regard to the steering or the brakes. He described the travel of the Kenworth in the time it was traveling downhill towards the area of the collision as follows:
A. So, I looked at my speedometer when I was going up, and I noted the speed then after negotiating the uphill I applied my brakes which were not producing the desired result and that's how I observed the change in speed. So, I noticed the speed at 75, started applying the brake and all these events were happening with such a speed in a spur of moment that I was trying to control with an intention that somebody may not be hurt, but it happened.
[57] In cross examination, Mr. Singh agreed that a person driving a tractor trailer is required to take extra responsibility to drive safely and cautiously because of the size and inherent dangerousness of a tractor trailer. He testified he was applying the accelerator as he climbed the hill before reaching the downward portion leading to the bridges in the area of the Kaministiquia River. Going up the hill portion, he testified his speed was anywhere from 50 to 65km/h. Mr. Singh was aware the speed limit on that portion of Hwy 102 was 90km/h. He agreed it is appropriate in a snowstorm for drivers to go slower than the speed limit. Mr. Singh testified that usually in winter, drivers would use Hwy 11/17 to travel from Sistonens Corners to Thunder Bay and then on to southern Ontario. In the evening in question, he was taking a shorter route because of the company direction to change out the truck at a Walmart in Thunder Bay. He did acknowledge it was always up to the driver on which route to take on any given trip.
[58] Mr. Singh agreed the Kenworth sped up as it crested the hill and started downward toward the collision site. He did not apply the brakes as the truck passed the 6% grade sign. He admitted the truck could have been going at least 80 km/h at that point. However, he said he was going 70 km/h when he began to apply the brakes, but elsewhere in cross examination when it was put to him that the truck was traveling 107 km/h at 7 seconds before the collision, he agreed it was possible but he then referenced the governor on the truck which prevented it from going more than 105 km/h. Mr. Singh testified he was not looking at his odometer as he was going down the hill in the seconds before the collision. He maintained he was driving at a slow speed when travelling down the hill immediately before the collision.
[59] In re-examination, Mr. Singh agreed that if a driver does not touch the accelerator or brakes, a tractor trailer will speed up when going down a hill.
The Law
[60] Earlier in this decision, I summarized the law concerning the essential elements the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction for a charge of dangerous driving causing death. In R v. Tabanao, 2024 ONCA 85, at para. 26, Sossin J.A. adopted R v. Jamanmardi, 2019 SCC 54, at paras. 19-21, to make clear that in cases involving dangerous driving causing death, the standard is a marked and substantial departure with respect to the fault element.
[61] Dealing with the evidence in this case, two additional areas of law are engaged. They are principles regarding: (1) the use of video evidence and (2) concerning the assessment of the testimony of an accused arising from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case, R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742.
[62] First, I deal with the law concerning video evidence.
[63] The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, is the leading authority on the use of video evidence for the purpose of establishing identity. Cory J., writing for the majority, states the following at para. 21:
The video camera ... is never subject to stress. Through tumultuous events it continues to record accurately and dispassionately all that comes before it. Although silent, it remains a constant, unbiased witness with instant and total recall of all that it observed. The trier of fact may review the evidence of this silent witness as often as desired.
[64] Cory J. frames his analysis by noting the potential weaknesses of eyewitness evidence, and how the courts have long recognized the frailties of identification evidence given by independent, honest, and well-meaning eyewitnesses. However, at para. 28, he also discusses what use a trial judge can make of video evidence:
Not only is the tape (or photograph) real evidence in the sense that that term has been used in earlier cases, but it is to a certain extent, testimonial evidence as well. It can and should be used by a trier of fact in determining whether a crime has been committed and whether the accused before the court committed the crime. It may indeed be a silent, trustworthy, unemotional, unbiased and accurate witness who has complete and instant recall of events. It may provide such strong and convincing evidence that of itself it will demonstrate clearly either the innocence or guilt of the accused.
[65] In terms of how the trier of fact should weigh the video evidence, Cory J. noted the following at paras. 29 and 30:
The degree of clarity and quality of the tape, and to a lesser extent the length of time during which the accused appears on the videotape, will all go towards establishing the weight which a trier of fact may properly place upon the evidence.
Although triers of fact are entitled to reach a conclusion as to identification based solely on videotape evidence, they must exercise care in doing so... [The jury] should be instructed to consider carefully whether the video is of sufficient clarity and quality and shows the accused for a sufficient time to enable them to conclude that identification has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[66] In R. v. Hudson, 2020 ONCA 507, 391 C.C.C. (3d) 208, which was an identity case involving video evidence, Tulloch J.A. (as he then was) wrote the following at para. 47:
In light of the frailties of eyewitness evidence, which have been observed in countless cases, and the necessary cautions that a trier of fact must take when assessing such evidence, whenever there is reliable and continuous video surveillance evidence, it may be powerful and probative evidence for the trier of fact. [Citations omitted.]
[67] As Mr. Singh testified in this matter, the principles from the Supreme Court of Canada in the leading case, W.(D.), are engaged. At pages 757-58 of the reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the W.(D.) framework as follows:
The trial judge should instruct the jury that they need not firmly believe or disbelieve any witness or set of witnesses. Specifically, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury that they must acquit the accused in two situations. First, if they believe the accused. Secondly, if they do not believe the accused’s evidence but still have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt after considering the accused’s evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole. See R. v. Challice (1979), 1979 CanLII 2969 (ON CA), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 546 (Ont. C.A.), approved by R. v. Morin, supra, at p. 357 [[1988] 2 S.C.R.].
Ideally, appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.
Secondly, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Thirdly, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.
[68] The accused’s version of events is not to be considered in isolation as if the Crown has led no evidence. The evidence that supports the accused must be assessed in the context of all the evidence.
[69] Dealing with the second step of the test, Binnie J. wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 152, at paras. 10-13:
The precise formulation of the W.(D.) questions has been criticized.
As to the second question, some jurors may wonder how, if they believe none of the evidence of the accused, such rejected evidence may nevertheless of itself raise a reasonable doubt. Of course, some elements of the evidence of an accused may raise a reasonable doubt, even though the bulk of it is rejected. Equally, the jury may simply conclude that they do not know whether to believe the accused’s testimony or not. In either circumstance the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
[70] W.(D.) clarifies that a criminal trial is not a credibility contest where the trier of fact must choose whether to believe one side or the other. Cory J. stated, in W.(D.) at p. 757, that:
It is incorrect to instruct a jury in a criminal case that, in order to render a verdict, they must decide whether they believe the defence evidence or the Crown’s evidence. Putting this either/or proposition to the jury excludes the third alternative; namely, that the jury, without believing the accused, after considering the accused’s evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole, may still have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
[71] The third step of the W.(D.) analysis is engaged where the totality of the defence evidence is rejected. This then leaves the evidence to be assessed on whether the Crown has discharged its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[72] In R. v. Woollam, 2012 ONSC 2188, leave to appeal dismissed, 2013 ONCA 711, Durno J. reiterated, at para. 52, that:
W.(D.) does not mandate an examination of the evidence favouring the defence in isolation from the rest of the evidence. In assessing W.(D.), Crown or defence witnesses, the trier of fact must consider their evidence in the context of all of the evidence, including whether it was internally consistent, whether it was consistent with other evidence called, the witness' demeanour and whether their evidence accords with logic, common sense and human experience.
Positions of the Parties
The Crown
[73] The Crown submits that the dangerous operation in this case was the speed at which Mr. Singh drove the Kenworth given the snowy conditions on Hwy 102 at the area of the collision. The fact of the collision, including exactly how it happened, is irrelevant to the question of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the essential elements of the offence. As there is no dispute that the first and third elements have been proven, the sole focus is Mr. Singh’s manner of driving and not whether other factors contributed to the collision or whether the driver of the Freightliner was at fault. The issue to be decided is whether Mr. Singh’s driving was dangerous in all the circumstances and whether his driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances. The Crown argues there is no evidence of mechanical malfunction concerning the Kenworth and further that there is no evidence of improper road design.
[74] The Crown submitted the ECM data was reliable as to the speed of the Kenworth in the last sixty seconds or so before the collision. The ECM is a measuring device. There was no evidence that it was unreliable or that it had malfunctioned. In this case, a person driving a tractor trailer is expected to exercise a greater degree of care because of the size and danger of a tractor trailer. Driving that would not otherwise constitute a marked departure for the driver of a car may constitute a marked and substantial departure for the driver of a tractor trailer unit like the Kenworth.
The Defence
[75] Mr. Singh is not arguing that Mr. Quirt, the driver of the Freightliner, had anything to do with the collision at issue.
[76] Mr. Singh’s position is that the Crown has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his driving on December 2, 2022 was dangerous to the public. As such, it has also not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his driving was a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances.
[77] The road conditions at the time were partially snow covered. The dash cam evidence is reliable to indicate the weather conditions. The evidence of Wendy Kaniula was not helpful as it appears from her evidence, she passed the Freightliner at 9:34 p.m. and it is agreed the collision occurred at 9:58 p.m.
[78] Mr. Singh submitted the ECM data from the Kenworth was unreliable. He argues that the Constable Morris’s evidence regarding the reliability of the data report (indicating speeds in excess of the speed limit in the seconds before the crash) should not be accepted. His position is that the caveat on use of the data by the manufacturer Cummins cannot be ignored. Mr. Singh submits that the ECM data is uncorroborated with any other evidence in this trial.
[79] Mr. Singh’s evidence that he was traveling below the speed limit and at most 80km/h should be taken to demonstrate that he was not driving dangerously that night. Counsel pointed to other evidence that the officers who were going to the scene that night travelled at 80 km/h as well. There was no evidence that Mr. Singh experienced any issues while driving from Dryden to Sistonens Corners on the night in question. His decision to stop at Sistonens Corners because of road conditions is evidence that he was alive to the difficult road conditions that evening. He was under no exterior pressure to continue the journey while waiting for the weather to clear at Sistonens Corners.
[80] Mr. Singh argues that because there was no thorough mechanical inspection done, and given his evidence that he did pump the brakes as he was traveling down hill before the collision, raises an issue about a possible mechanical failure. This could have contributed to the swing out of the Manac and therefore raises a reasonable doubt about proof that Mr. Singh’s driving was dangerous.
[81] Mr. Singh submits that, at its highest, what occurred was a momentary lapse in judgment. There was no evidence about what caused the Manac to swing out.
[82] Mr. Singh argues that while a very tragic accident occurred, this fact does not serve to attract criminal liability. The Crown has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and Mr. Singh should be acquitted of the charges at issue.
Discussion
[83] Has the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Mr. Singh’s driving was dangerous in all the circumstances and (2) whether his driving amounted to a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances? In my view, Mr. Singh’s acts of driving in the last 60 seconds or so before the collision is the most significant factor in regard to the Crown discharging its burden of proof.
[84] To begin, I find that there was nothing inherently unsafe about the design or condition of the relevant portion of Highway 102 at the site of the collision, aside from the snowy conditions which had nothing to do with road design or maintenance. There was no expert evidence tendered on the subject of road design or maintenance of the highway that evening. I have evidence from the dash cam, which I will discuss below, that shows that at least three tractor trailer units were able to successfully negotiate that portion of Hwy 102 immediately before the collision. I am not prepared to draw any adverse conclusions from the evidence tendered by the defence about the number of collisions on that particular stretch of highway. Nor do I place any weight on the hearsay comments of the author of a report from the City of Thunder Bay used to limit truck traffic on the portion of Highway 102 within the limits of the City. It was agreed that the collision occurred well away from the western boundary of the City of Thunder Bay. I was not left in any reasonable doubt about the essential issues in this case arising from the evidence concerning the state of Highway 102 overall, aside from the question of it being partially snow covered.
[85] There is no issue that road conditions that night were less than ideal because of the snowfall and the temperature hovering around the freezing mark. While I accept that the road in the area of the collision was partially snow covered, this does not mean that a reasonable driver would not have to slow down and exercise additional caution because of the snowy conditions. It is clear from the photographs of the scene, the testimony of the three officers on scene, the dash cam video, and the evidence of V.S. and Ms. Kainula, that a substantial amount of snow had fallen throughout the day and there was more than a “light dusting” of snow on the road in the area of the collision.
[86] I agree with the Crown that driving at an excessive speed alone in the context of this type of partially covered highway could represent an act of driving dangerous to the public and a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected from a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances. This is because the road was slippery and vehicles do not perform as well as when the pavement is dry.
[87] The grade sign at the top of the hill in the area of the collision should have alerted Mr. Singh that extra caution was required for the downhill portion of road over which he was about to travel. The two signs indicating right curves ahead should have alerted Mr. Singh to exercise additional care when proceeding down a significant grade in snowy conditions. I find the road signs are an obvious and important direction to drivers that cannot be ignored.
[88] Mr. Singh moved the Kenworth from a rest stop at Sistonens Corners at about 9:46 p.m. As he had been sitting there with his truck for over an hour, this should have put him on high alert to pay particular attention to how his large, long and heavy vehicle was handling snowy conditions that he had just avoided driving in.
[89] The dash cam video was very important evidence in this matter. It is of good quality and I find it to be reliable. It is an important witness of the time frame significant to this matter. From my review of the dash cam video, I draw several conclusions of fact. First, I find the weather at the time was less than ideal. This was confirmed by the evidence of Ms. Kainula. I accept her observations that caution was required and driving at less than the speed limit was called for by the conditions experienced between Sistonens Corners and Thunder Bay on Hwy 102. While the visibility was “clear”, snow was falling, as can be seen on the video. It is also noteworthy that a plow was being deployed: plows do not get deployed in Northwestern Ontario when pavement is bare. As noted earlier in the judgment, I find that Highway 102, in the area of the collision, was partially snow covered.
[90] Second, the video shows that at least three other tractor trailer vehicles were able to successfully negotiate the east bound hill leading down to the Kaministiquia bridge area in the minute or so before the accident. This is significant because it indicates that the road conditions were not impassable or impossible to negotiate by any large vehicles traveling at an appropriate speed. The speed at which these trucks can be seen passing V.S.’s truck on the video indicate that they were traveling about the same speed as the Freightliner and travelling under the posted 90 km/h speed limit. I accept V.S.’s evidence that the Freightliner was travelling at about 60km/h immediately before the crash. I also accept Constable Morris’ observation evidence that the odometer of the Freightliner had “frozen” at 45 k/h when he inspected the collision site. Constable Morris testified that it was his experience that when vehicles suddenly lose power as the result of a collision, the odometer can be stuck at the speed the vehicle was travelling as the collision occurred. While Constable Morris testified this evidence is not absolutely conclusive, it is consistent with V.S.’s testimony about relative speed of his truck and the Freightliner. I therefore find the Freightliner was travelling well below the posted speed limit of 90 km/h at the time of the collision.
[91] Third, at 55 seconds of the dash cam video, the lights of the Kenworth can be seen above and to the left coming towards the Freightliner. This is consistent with the diagrams shown of the area in that the Kenworth was in process of negotiating the downward curve to the right immediately before the collision. The “descent” is evident from the movement of the headlights from the time they first appear until the point of collision.
[92] At 1.02 seconds of the video, the Kenworth is clearly seen in the process of the “swing out” as the cab is visible with the headlights shining to the left. This is consistent with the physical evidence Constable Morris identified in the damage to the guardrail posts and Mr. Singh’s evidence that he had lost control immediately before the collision.
[93] The collision is shown 3 seconds later at the 1.05 mark in the video. The Freightliner is pushed to the right as the Kenworth cab slides by and then comes into collision with V.S.’s truck.
[94] The relatively forward facing of the headlights of the Kenworth, following the left to right downward curve of the road changes at 1.01 of the video. From this evidence, I find that the Manac had begun to swing about six seconds or so before the collision.
[95] The ferocity of the collision is evident from the dash cam video and the photos of the aftermath wreckage in the area of the collision.
[96] The dash cam video also allows for the assessment of how quickly the Kenworth came to a full stop once it collided with the Freightliner. The video shows it to be 3 seconds from the point of impact to the 1.08 mark in the video where the cab of the Freightliner hits V.S.’s truck.
[97] This is credible evidence demonstrating what occurred. It also records and shows things in real time. I find the time on the video is accurate in so far as recording the seconds it takes things to occur on the video. This is important objective evidence against which to measure other evidence tendered by the Crown in this matter particularly the ECM data.
[98] The ECM data shows that from the “point zero” event where the truck decelerates more that 11.27 km/h in one second (going from 95 km/h to 82 km/h), the brakes were first deployed at -7 seconds. They were consistently applied except for a one second interval at -4 seconds. I find this is consistent with the video showing the Kenworth going into the guardrail and then the Manac sliding into collision with the Freightliner. Mr. Singh testified he pumped the brakes when the Manac began to swing out. The ECM data would indicate they were let off only once before the “zero point” was reached.
[99] At -7 seconds, the ECM data shows the truck travelling at 107 kilometers per hour. I accept this data as accurate. I do so because I accept the expert testimony of Constable Morris on the reliability of the ECM and I reject the evidence of Mr. Raffery that the Cummins caveat should be relied upon to minimize the value of this data. Mr. Raffery admitted he had no specialized training or knowledge with regard to testing these units against actual observed conditions.
[100] I accept that the ECM data is accurate and reliable because I accept Constable Morris’s testimony concerning the independent testing that he witnessed in his training and the scientific journal that was tendered concerning independent testing of the ECM units as shown in Exhibit J. That 2009 study looked at Cummins engines and compared the ECM data in a tractor equipped with a Cummins engine against the ECM data generated. The article found that despite a calibration error in the software (which Cummins was going to fix), the recorded speed in the sudden deceleration reports (like the one relied upon by the Crown in this case) was accurate to 1 km/h from the actual observed data in the test truck. The results of this academic article were consistent with what Constable Morris has experienced in using ECM data from other collision investigations and in testing that was done in his training.
[101] Further, the academic article reported that recorded speeds were underrepresented by a moderate amount of heavy braking.
[102] I agree with the Crown submission that the ECM is a standard measuring device whose accuracy can be generally relied on: see R. v. Murray, 2013 ONCA 173, at para. 7, citing R. v. Redmond, 1990 CanLII 10971 (Ont. C.A). Despite the Cummins caveat, the engines continue to be equipped with the software that can create data reports like the SVSDR. It seems illogical to suggest this measuring capability is designed for nothing. I agree with the assessment of Constable Morris that the caveat by an American manufacturer, or indeed any manufacturer, is primarily designed to limit liability. I am satisfied the ECM was accurate because it also accords with the video evidence and the carnage left behind by the collision. The high speed of the Kenworth is evident from the video and validates the ECM data that the vehicle was travelling above the speed limit of 90 km/h, rather than under the speed limit in the seconds before the collision.
[103] I was not persuaded to treat Constable Morris’ evidence as untrustworthy based on what I consider to be small and inconsequential errors in his report. The fact he treats what are obviously three separate bridge structures in the area as one bridge does not undermine his abilities to opine on collision reconstruction. He has travelled that road many times in both his professional and personal life. It was not obvious to him there were three different bridges. I accept that his observations in that regard do not in any way detract from his significant opinions about what he observed that evening and what conclusions can be drawn from the ECM data retrieved from the Kenworth.
[104] I also accept Mr. Singh’s evidence that the Kenworth slowed down as it was ascending the upward side portion of the hill immediately before the 6% grade sign. This accords with common sense and experience that vehicles slow down going up hills. I also accept Mr. Singh’s evidence that the Kenworth sped up as it crested the hill. This would be consistent with the experience of Mr. Singh applying the accelerator in an attempt to get up and over the hill. He admitted he had not regularly travelled this route in the past. If he had done so, it might be expected that he would have anticipated the relatively significant downward slope that he was facing.
[105] The ECM data showed the Kenworth speeding up from 91 km/h at 16 seconds to 107km/h at -7 seconds where the brakes are first applied. The ECM indicates the vehicle only slowed down about 10 km/h in a 7 second span until a rapid deceleration event is experienced at point zero. There is a common sense inference that two heavy vehicles travelling opposite directions at a significant rate of speed on a road and then colliding with each other, would cause both vehicles to rapidly decelerate and very quickly come to a stop.
[106] From my review, the dash cam video shows the Kenworth travelling at a significant rate of speed collide with the Freightliner, where both experience rapid deceleration in a short space and a short time.
[107] The ECM data shows the Kenworth going from 95 km/h to 1 km/h in 6 seconds after experiencing the rapid deceleration point zero. Looking at the video, it can be seen that about 4 seconds elapse between the time that the Kenworth is seen hitting the Freightliner, to when it comes to a complete stop after colliding with V.S. truck. In my view, this is a very close correlation from what I can see on the video and what the ECM indicates. This shows that the ECM was accurately recording what speed the Kenworth was doing in the seconds before the collision.
[108] In my view, the course of the Kenworth shown in the dash cam video demonstrates the braking action that Mr. Singh testified took place in the last nine seconds or so before the collision. This is significant because it is a reliable way to assess the accuracy of the ECM data, particularly the braking data and the speed data. The application of the brakes as shown by the ECM is consistent with the video showing the Manac going into a swing out. Again, there is a common sense inference that a vehicle travelling at an excessive rate of speed on partially snow covered road, may become uncontrollable by the rear end or steering not responding. I believe Mr. Singh’s evidence that he was applying the brakes as the Kenworth was moving toward the Freightliner. I find he was going too fast at the time and did not have the braking distance necessary to avoid the collision of his trailer swinging across to cover the oncoming lane.
[109] However, I do not believe Mr. Singh’s testimony that he was driving according to the conditions immediately before the collision. His testimony and also his response to key questions concerning the time immediately before the collision lead me to conclude that he was either being untruthful or that he simply cannot accurately remember the events of the seconds before the collision occurred. I do not doubt his testimony that he regrets what occurred. He testified he was trying to control the truck with an intention that somebody may not be hurt, but it happened. I am sure the events of December 2, 2022 left a big impact on him. However, I am of the view that he was driving the Kenworth at an excessive speed which was dangerous to the public and when he did apply the brakes, at that dangerous excessive speed, a “swing out” was assured given the effects of gravity and the slippery conditions.
[110] While I believe Mr. Singh’s testimony that he accelerated to climb the hill, I do not believe that he immediately moderated the speed of the Kenworth such that it was travelling at an appropriate speed for the conditions as it descended the hill towards the point of the eventual collision. I come to this conclusion for the following reasons.
[111] On a number of key points during his testimony both in chief and in cross examination, Mr. Singh was evasive and unresponsive. In chief, he admitted that he did not have a specific recollection of how the driving log app worked. Yet this was the log that he was using to refresh his memory about various times he was driving that evening. The driving log data was important to the defence in that ultimately it formed the basis of a submission that Mr. Singh’s average driving speed, in the last four minutes before the collision, was significantly less than what was shown in the ECM data. His lack of recall, in my view, is surprising given the significance of that evidence to his defence. This indicates a lack of credibility on this essential issue.
[112] In cross examination, the Crown asked a very simple question about the speed limit on Highway 102. It was not a trick question. However, Mr. Singh was evasive in answering:
Q. What was your knowledge of the speed limit on that stretch of the road back on December 2nd, 2022; specifically, that stretch of the road from Petro Pass until the scene of the accident?
A. So, as you are asking about my knowledge or information about the road while traveling, I had a fair idea throughout my drive, road condition and other limitations, but if you are specifically asking me for that track of – that portion of the road, I don't have any specific about - idea or information about that road. However, I was driving, keeping in mind the road condition, weather, and other circumstances.
Q. What is your understanding what the speed limit - the posted speed limit is on Highway 102?
A. So, what I have noticed is that the truck has a speed limit of 90 kilometers an hour and as I mentioned and I know the [indiscernible] also has some uphill and downhill and because at least three such curves or change of surface – change of gradient, sorry, that's what my knowledge is and driving varies according to that.
[113] The simple answer was “90 km/h”. I find Mr. Singh’s answer was evasive on an important question concerning the speed of his driving that evening.
[114] The Crown was clear that the essence of its case against Mr. Singh was that he was driving the Kenworth too fast which was therefore dangerous and was in a manner that was a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances. The posted speed limit is a well understood guide to assess speed. It is a limit which drivers are prohibited from exceeding. It may be that many people occasionally do so but that does not mean that doing so is not a marked substantial departure or is not dangerous. In my view, the worse the road conditions are, the more important the posted speed limit becomes because it is an objective standard against which to measure reasonable road speed of a vehicle.
[115] I am sure that on dry pavement in May, a tractor trailer coming eastbound down the hill on Hwy 102 towards the Kaministiquia River bridges would have a different, more successful braking profile even at speeds in excess of 90 km/h than what was experienced by the Kenworth in the evening in question. That said, it was incumbent on Mr. Singh to have moderated the speed of the Kenworth once he saw the 6% grade sign as he had just engaged in an acceleration mode to get the Kenworth up and over the hill. I find as a fact he did not pay proper attention to the conditions of the road as the Kenworth began the downhill slope. Mr. Singh’s testimony about the final seconds before the crash were equivocal, imprecise, and not exculpatory such that it would raise a reasonable doubt that he was driving the Kenworth at an excessive speed as the Kenworth began travelling down the hill toward the point of collision. For example, in chief he testified:
Q. What speed were you driving at when you left Petro Pass, roughly? Do you want to maybe slow down for Mr. Interpreter?
A. So, as this passage was not even, rather it was slopes and ups and downs, the speed was variable and I was driving according to the condition, sometimes 50, 60, 70, 75, 80 kilometers....
[116] Mr. Singh’s evidence concerning when he applied the brakes in chief was also equivocal. He testified in chief:
Q. Like how did the vehicle feel to you as you started going downhill?
A. How the vehicle felt.... I - I cannot start the vehicle was going down - downhill. The vehicle was going downhill, like, you know, you feel that something is feeling light; first, the power is being applied and then suddenly that force is not applied anymore, it feels very light.
Q. Do you have any - do you have a recollection
of before there was an impact - before your vehicle impacted the snowplough or even the guardrail, do you recall when you applied the brakes prior to that?
A. Are you asking me about the brakes or about the vehicle that how far behind before that I just hit the brakes or how it hit....
Q. No, what I'm asking is before the trailer swung out prior to that, how many - do you remember how many seconds before that you applied the brake?
A. I cannot remember anything like that, but I can just call and tell you that it might be seven to eight seconds.
Q. When you started feeling that you were going downhill on this stretch of the road, after you realized you're going downhill, when do you think you applied the brakes?
A. I told you that when the uphill part ended, I started releasing the brake at that time.
[117] In my view, it is clear from the testimony that Mr. Singh does not have a credible or reliable recollection of the events immediately before the collision. His last answer noted above, in particular, does not make sense in regard to the context of the question.
[118] In my view, on snowy roads, driving a vehicle the size, weight and length of a fully loaded tractor trailer, there is a big difference from going 50 km/h as opposed to traveling 80 km/h. This very wide swing in the numbers indicates that Mr. Singh either did not accurately remember how fast he was going, or was not telling the truth as to the speed of his vehicle in the seconds before the crash. His lack of experience in driving a tractor trailer in snowy conditions could account for his inability to accurately recall how fast he was going because he did not have the proper experience to judge the conditions. I would note that Mr. Singh’s level of experience is not exculpatory. It is but one factor that I use to assess his credibility. Snowy roads are something that should concern drivers. It should be obvious that there is a need to slow down.
[119] I find Mr. Singh’s evidence on the issue of the speed of the Kenworth at the critical time to be unreliable and lacking credibility: his answers regarding his driving demonstrated a lack of understanding of effect such conditions would have on the performance of the Kenworth. Snowy roads call for uniform lower speeds if possible. Changes in speed can cause vehicles to act not as they should; for example, trailers swinging out to completely sweep away anything that is approaching from the other direction.
[120] I find on all the evidence Mr. Singh was driving the Kenworth in excess of the posted 90 km/h speed limit for 15 seconds before the collision occurred. I reject his testimony that he did not drive the vehicle in excess of the speed limit in the last 20 seconds or so before the collision. I accept the ECM data as to the speed of the Kenworth at this critical time.
[121] I find Mr. Singh, upon cresting the hill, should have known that he immediately had to take steps to slow the Kenworth down in the face of the downhill grade of 6% and the snowy conditions. I accept the data from the ECM that the brakes were not applied until 7 seconds before the zero point deceleration event, and then when the collision occured about 5 seconds later. This, in my view, is evidence of his state of mind in driving the vehicle in a significant period of time when considering the context of a large, heavy vehicle coming down a hill on a provincial highway. It is objectively dangerous because it evidences a failure to take steps to slow the vehicle in a circumstance of slippery conditions and a significant downhill grade.
[122] Mr. Raffery’s diagram of the area shows that the crest of the hill was about a half a kilometre from the collision site. It is a math question to determine how long a vehicle traveling at 100 km/h takes to cover .5 kilometres. It is about 18 seconds. This is a consistent time frame from the data shown in the ECM where the Kenworth was travelling in excess of the speed limit of 90k/h in the last 16 seconds before the point zero deceleration event.
[123] In my view, it is incumbent on the driver of a vehicle the size and weight of a tractor trailer unit to ensure that the entirety of the conveyance does not become a hazard to others travelling on the road at all times. The manner of driving includes keeping the trailer under control. In my view, when a trailer swings out from behind a tractor, this is not a consequence of dangerous driving – it is dangerous driving. It is an important point. The conveyance is one. The collision of the Manac with the Freightliner is the consequence. But the fact it was swinging out is evidence of dangerous driving. I am not assessing the collision consequence as part of my assessment that Mr. Singh’s driving was dangerous to the public.
[124] I do not accept the submission that Mr. Singh’s driving represented a momentary lapse in judgment. His state of mind of significance for this case, lasted twenty seconds. A momentary lapse is just that – a moment. Two, maybe three seconds. From the time the Kenworth crested the hill, and it was apparent the vehicle was headed down a significant grade with partially snow-covered roads, Mr. Singh should have immediately taken steps to slow down the truck. Twenty seconds is a long time in a vehicle traveling at highway speeds. It was long enough for a reasonable driver to take steps to slow the vehicle. I find those steps were not taken. As a result, the swing out of the Manac occurred which was conduct dangerous to the public caused by the dangerous driving of Mr. Singh.
Conclusion
[125] To summarize, I reject Mr. Singh’s evidence that he was driving in a manner appropriate to the circumstances in the seconds before the crash. Nor does it raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt. The totality of his evidence did not represent testimony that indicated he appreciated the situation that the Kenworth was facing in the circumstances, and that he took appropriate defensive driving actions to ensure his vehicle stayed in control in the portion of the highway over which it was travelling. Also, his testimony does not leave me in a reasonable doubt about the assertion by the Crown that the Kenworth was in fact, travelling in excess of the posted limit of 90 km/h as it travelled down the hill towards the point of collision. His evidence about the speed of the vehicle at various times was too disjointed and varied widely such that I do not believe it to be credible or reliable evidence as to his driving conduct at the material seconds before the collision.
[126] On the whole of the evidence, I find that the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singh was driving the Kenworth at a speed that was dangerous to the public. It represented a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances. It is an agreed fact the collision caused the death of Terrance Quirt.
[127] I therefore find Mr. Singh was driving in a manner that was dangerous to the public.
[128] I find Mr. Singh’s conduct of driving the Kenworth at a speed in excess of the posted limit represents a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable tractor trailer driver in the circumstances.
[129] Stand up please, Mr. Singh.
[130] For these reasons given orally and which will be provided to counsel by the close of business today in writing and made the next exhibit in this trial, I find that on or about the on or about the 2nd day of December, 2022 at Thunder Bay District in the said Region, you, Pritam Singh, did operate a conveyance in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, was dangerous to the public, and as a result, caused the death of Terrance Quirt, contrary to s. 320.13(3) of the Code. Therefore, Mr. Singh, I find you guilty of the offence with which you have been charged.
[131] I thank both counsel for their excellent advocacy on behalf of their respective clients.
[132] Date for sentencing?
_______________________________
The Hon. Mr. Justice F.B. Fitzpatrick
Released: July 30, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 4448
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-0286-000
DATE: 2026-07-30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Crown
- and -
PRITAM SINGH
Accused
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Fitzpatrick J.
Released: July 30, 2026