Amerakoon v. Widyalankara, 2026 ONSC 4428

CITATION: Amerakoon v. Widyalankara, 2026 ONSC 4428

COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-1742

DATE: 20260730

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Rijanthe Ranil Amerakoon

Applicant Husband

– and –

Thisari Erandika Widyalankara

Respondent Wife

Kat Kumka and Julie David, for the Applicant Husband

On Her Own Behalf

HEARD: May 27, 28, 29, June 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and July 3 and 8, 2026

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

INDEX

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND NATURE OF THIS JUDGMENT

PART II: OVERVIEW

A. The Husband’s Employment and Financial Circumstances

B. The Wife’s Employment and Financial Circumstances

C. The Husband’s Other Partner

D. Overview of the Date of Separation Dispute in this Case

PART III: A DETAILED CHRONOLOGY AND FINDINGS OF FACT FOR THE ANALYSIS THAT FOLLOWS

A. Relationship History

B. The Parties Left Australia and Moved to Namibia in 2016

C. The Parties’ Move to Singapore in August of 2017

D. The Husband’s Assertions About the Breakdown of the Relationship and a March 15, 2019 Date of Separation

E. What Actually Transpired Surrounding the Wife’s Move to Ontario

F. The Husband Began to Pursue His Other Relationship in Secret in Singapore After the Wife Left

G. The Parties’ Purchased Property in Ontario After the Wife Arrived Here

H. The Various Written Communications About the Parties’ Continuing Relationship and the Further Severing of Ties from Australia

I. The Circumstances Surrounding the Husband’s Move to Ontario in October of 2020

J. The Completion of the Joint Application for an Australian Divorce, the Husband’s Departure from the Matrimonial Home, and the Parties’ First Separation

K. The Husband’s Canadian Job Search and His Return to the Matrimonial Home Between January 23, 2021 and March 29, 2021

L. The Husband’s Move to Montreal in April of 2021

M. The Husband’s Trips to Ontario After His Move to Montreal, and Whether He Was “Primarily Resident” in Quebec or Ontario

N. The Christmas Incident and the Violence Between the Husband and His Other Partner in Early January of 2022

O. The Husband’s Return to the Matrimonial Home, and the “Attempted Reconciliation, But For Less than 90 Days”

P. The Parties Separated for the Second Time, Briefly

Q. The Wife’s Eighth Pregnancy, and the Abortion

R. The Parties’ Second Separation Did Not Last Long

S. The Parties’ Estate Planning in 2023

T. The Husband’s Plan to Marry His Other Partner in 2023, Followed by His Return to the Matrimonial Home in November of 2023

U. The Husband’s Lie to the Wife About the Sephora Pamphlet: the Stalker Explanation Revived

V. The Husband’s Re-Marriage on May 15, 2024 and His Continued Relationship with the Wife, Notwithstanding His Re-Marriage

W. The Husband’s Secret Purchase of Another Property in Ajax

X. The Wife’s September 6, 2024 Discovery of the Husband’s Re-Marriage

PART IV: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

A. The Husband’s Allegations About the Wife’s Abuse Towards Him in the Marriage

B. The Husband’s Abuse of the Wife During the Marriage

C. The Abuse Allegations Involving the Children

D. The Wife’s Therapy

E. Findings of Fact and Conclusions Regarding Intimate Partner Violence

PART V: PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

A. Summary of the Prior Proceedings

B. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning Bifurcation Orders

C. Analysis Concerning Bifurcation

D. Other Aspects of the Conduct of this Trial

E. The Mid-Trial Order for A Custody and Access Assessment

PART VI: CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY

PART VII: CONFIDENTIALITY

PART VIII: ANALYSIS RESPECTING THE AUSTRALIAN DIVORCE

A. The Absence of Expert Evidence About Foreign Law

B. The Completion of the Joint Application for Divorce

(1) The Parties’ Accounts Respecting the Preparation and Filing of the Joint Application for Divorce to the Court in Australia

(2) Ontario Lawyer Rishi Singh’s Evidence

(3) Events After the Meeting in Mr. Singh’s Office

C. Findings of Fact and Analysis Respecting the Completion of the Joint Application for Divorce

D. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning the Statutory and Common Law Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce and the Exceptions to Its Recognition

(1) The Statutory Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

(2) The Common Law Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

(3) The Exceptions to the Recognition of a Foreign Divorce

E. Analysis Regarding the Statutory Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

F. Analysis Regarding the Common Law Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

(1) The Domicile of the Spouses

(2) Whether the Foreign Divorce, Although Granted on a Non-Domicilary Jurisdictional Basis, is Recognized by the Law of the Domicile of the Parties;

Whether the Foreign Jurisdictional Rule Corresponds to the Canadian Jurisdictional Rule in Divorce Proceedings; and

Whether the Circumstances in the Foreign Jurisdiction Would Have Conferred Jurisdiction on a Canadian Court had they occurred in Canada

(3) Whether Either Party Had A Real and Substantial Connection to Australia

(4) Whether the Foreign Divorce is Recognized in Another Foreign Jurisdiction with which the Petitioner or Respondent has a Real and Substantial Connection

G. Conclusions Regarding the Statutory and Common Law Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

H. Analysis Regarding the Exceptions to the Recognition of a Foreign Divorce

(1) Where the Foreign Court or Other Authority that Granted the Divorce Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Do So Under the Law of that Foreign Country

(2) Where there is Evidence of Fraud Going to Jurisdiction

(3) The Denial of Natural Justice

(4) The Public Policy Exception

(5) Unfair Forum Shopping

(6) Whether the Court Should Recognize Intimate Partner Violence As An Additional Exception

I. Summary and Conclusions Respecting the Exceptions to Recognition of the Australian Divorce

PART IX: OTHER ISSUES

A. Analysis Regarding the Date of Separation

B. Extension of the Limitation Period to Claim An Equalization Payment in the Alternative

C. Alternative Jurisdiction to Order Child and Spousal Support

PART X: TEMPORARY AND FINAL ORDERS RELATING TO CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT

A. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning the Determination of Income

B. The Principles to Be Used for the Determination of the Husband’s Income on a Final Basis, and Income for Temporary Support

(1) The Husband’s Line 150 Incomes

(2) A Projection of the Husband’s Current 2026 Income

(3) The Husband’s Additional Self-Employment Income

(4) The Husband’s Bonus Income

(5) The Husband’s Stock Options

(6) The Husband’s Section 4 Argument

C. Conclusions Respecting the Husband’s Income

D. The Determination of the Wife’s Incomes on a Final Basis for 2024 and 2025, and the Income to Be Used for Temporary Support

E. Temporary Child Support

F. Temporary Section 7 Expenses

G. Temporary Spousal Support

H. Additional Adjustments to Address the Husband’s Direct Payments and Cash Flow Arguments

I. Health Benefits and Life Insurance

PART XI: THE SALE OF THE MATRIMONIAL HOME

PART XII: CASE MANAGEMENT

PART XIII: ORDER

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND NATURE OF THIS JUDGMENT

[1] This is my Judgment following the first part of a bifurcated family law trial heard over the course of several days in May, June and July of 2026.

[2] The facts of this case are extremely unusual. One might describe them as astonishing.

[3] This was an arranged marriage. After it, the wife moved away from her family of origin in Sri Lanka to join the husband in Australia where he was then living. She sacrificed and delayed her own career as a lawyer to discharge her parenting responsibilities for the four children they would have, and to follow the husband around the world across multiple continents, in the pursuit of his own career. The parties would go on to live together in Namibia, in Singapore, and ultimately in Ontario, because of this.

[4] Except for a three-month period between March and June of 2019 when she left Singapore to settle in Ontario first before the rest of the family would follow later, the wife has been the children’s primary parent. She continued to be the primary parent post-separation. Although she now works as an Ontario personal injury lawyer, she and the children remain financially dependent upon the husband. Her income earning capacity is lower than the husband’s because of her career interruption and her ongoing parenting responsibilities.

[5] The husband physically abused the wife multiple times during this relationship, first when they lived in Australia, and then in Singapore. The relationship was not just marked by physical abuse. There was a pattern of intimate partner violence throughout it. The intimate partner violence included gaslighting behaviour.

[6] Since 2018, the husband has maintained a separate, parallel relationship with another woman (the “husband’s other partner”). He conducted his separate relationship in secret, until he got caught.

[7] For approximately six years, the husband’s duplicity involved moving his other partner from the United States to Singapore to live with him after the wife left, and then to Canada, so that she would also be nearby. He toggled back and forth between two households.

[8] The husband’s conduct amounted to more than just a years’ long affair. Citing the Supreme Court in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 ¶ 121, the husband did not just behave in a way that was the “hurtful and sometimes vengeful behaviour that can be part of high-conflict disputes”, or engage in “dishonestly, infidelity, emotional neglect or disagreements”. His conduct was psychologically abusive to the wife.

[9] Against this backdrop, the husband obtained, through e-filing, a divorce from Australia dated February 24, 2021. He did so via the internet, from Ontario. The parties had not lived in Australia for more than four years at the time of that divorce.

[10] The husband threatened and bullied the wife into signing a joint Australian divorce application in various ways. The wife was distraught. She was afforded no legal protections or advice. The husband then took the divorce documents away with him, and went to a temporary rental that he had secretly pre-arranged. Days later, his other partner came to join him. Two months after that, he was back in the matrimonial home. The divorce was granted after that.

[11] The husband continued to maintain both relationships in parallel. He secretly bought a second property starting in the spring of 2024. It closed in the summer. He married his other partner, on May 15, 2024. The day of his wedding, he made plans with the wife for the next weekend. How the husband got caught by the wife in the early fall of 2024, is a different, but equally astounding story too.

[12] During the prior proceedings in this case, different judges made three different bifurcation Orders. At the start of this trial, this Court was of the view that the trial could not proceed based on the penultimate bifurcation order for various reasons. The Court converted the first day of the trial into a Trial Management Conference. The parties agreed to different bifurcation terms, and the trial then proceeded.

[13] Pursuant to this Court’s May 27, 2026 bifurcation Order, this Judgment addresses on a final basis:

(a) whether the parties’ divorce granted by the Family Court of Western Australia on February 24, 2021 (the “Australian divorce”), which became effective on March 25, 2021, should be recognized under section 22 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp.), as amended;

(b) the date of the parties’ separation; and

(c) whether the limitation period in section 7(3) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3., as amended, should be extended under section 2(8), to permit the wife to proceed with her claim for an equalization of net family property payment, if this Court recognizes the foreign divorce.

[14] This Court declines to recognize the foreign divorce. This Court finds that the husband has not made out a single ground for its recognition. This Court equally finds that the wife has proven several of the exceptions to the recognition of the foreign divorce, even if the husband had met his onus respecting its recognition. One of the exceptions should be a new one, rooted in intimate partner violence. The Court recognizes that its refusal to recognize a foreign divorce disturbs the certainty and finality that accompanies a divorce Order. But this divorce was heavily problematic. The husband did not have a reasonable expectation in certainty and finality, in light of what transpired.

[15] The date of the parties’ separation is in dispute. As I will explain, it is tied up in the dispute about the recognition of the foreign divorce. But it is also relevant to the wife’s family law entitlements here. The husband asserts the parties separated on March 15, 2019; the wife’s date is August 16, 2024. This Court finds that the parties’ date of separation was in fact September 6, 2024. The wife is not statute barred from pursuing an equalization claim in Ontario. Had this Court recognized the foreign divorce though, I would have extended the limitation period, although subject to the wife then pursuing an unequal division, equalization would be calculated using the date of the divorce as the valuation date as opposed to September 6, 2024, a date that is 3 ½ years later.

[16] During the prior proceedings, the Court granted the husband leave to bring a motion for the sale of a the residence in which the wife and the children reside, title to which is in his name alone (the “matrimonial home”). The Court granted the wife leave to bring a motion for child support. Neither party then brought those motions.

[17] The penultimate bifurcation Order listed child and spousal support as issues for trial now. Parenting and other issues that need to be addressed either first, or at the same time got deferred until later. The trial could not proceed ordered like that. At the Trial Management Conference on May 27, 2026, the parties continued with their plan to have the parenting claims, the wife’s claim for an equalization of net family property, and certain other financial matters like occupation rent tried later. The wife still wanted the Court to deal with child and spousal support now though, and the husband wanted his claim to sell the matrimonial home heard. The parties in the end agreed that the Court would address on a final basis the determination of their incomes, to narrow the matters in dispute for the second part of this trial. They agreed to call evidence and make submissions about what temporary child and spousal support should be put in place now if any, pending the second part of the trial. They agreed that the Court would address whether to order the sale of the matrimonial home now or later. I am seized of the second part of the trial. Any evidence called during the first part of the trial does not need to be recalled during part two, and any findings made here, are binding in the second trial.

[18] The years of retroactivity of child support and spousal support start in 2024 only, given this Court’s ruling about the date of separation. Having now heard the evidence and the submissions, the Court finds that it is only able to deal with the wife’s incomes in 2024 and 2025 on a final basis though. The Court cannot determine finally, the husband’s incomes in the relevant years, in view of some of the positions he took, combined with the Court’s finding that the wife is entitled to pursue an equalization payment, and the fact that the husband does not yet have certain valuation evidence, including about his stock options. But not every argument the husband advanced about his income needs to be reheard later. The Court finds it can make at least some determinations about his income that will be final. These relate to the methodology pursuant to which his income will be finally determined. Those methodology issues were fully argued.

[19] To address temporary support in the mean time, the Court has undertaken its best estimate of the husband’s current, projected income for 2026, based on the still incomplete record placed before it. My income determination right now places that income at $352,500.00. As I am using current, projected income for the husband to determine temporary support until the second part of the trial, I will do so for the wife too on a temporary basis, for consistency. Her current, projected income for 2026, is $140,000.00.

[20] Commencing August 1, 2026, the husband shall pay temporary child support in the amount of $7,076.00 per month for the parties’ four children, based on that income of $352,500.00. The husband shall pay temporary section 7 expenses of $979.00 per month. From this I will net out a credit of $3,126.00 also on a temporary basis, to recognize that the husband is making direct payments towards the children’s and the wife’s housing and he will continue to do so until the matrimonial home is sold. The credit is not for the full amount of the monthly payments that he makes. I have reduced it to the best of my ability based on the incomplete record before me at this point, to recognize that while his payments benefit the family, they also contribute to his equity in the home that he solely owns. But I have nevertheless done so, being mindful of his cash flow concerns.

[21] The wife has a strong compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support claim. Her spousal support is lower than it would be, because of the amount of child support and section 7 expenses being paid.

[22] Commencing August 1, 2026, the husband shall pay temporary spousal support to the wife in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. The sum is right in between the low and mid ranges of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the “SSAGs”). To come up with this result, I have looked into the husband’s budget on his most recent Financial Statement. All of which will change by the resumption of the trial or soon after, given that the matrimonial home will be sold, and thereafter he will be maintaining only one set of housing expenses, not two. A different location on the SSAG ranges may or may not then be appropriate. Submissions about that can be made later.

[23] The wife opposed the sale of the matrimonial home based on her and the children’s need for housing. Alternatively she asked for an advance and a preservation Order. While she framed that particular request as interim disbursement in her written submissions, what she was really seeking, was an advance against her equalization payment.

[24] The wife’s alternative proposal was reasonable. Any prejudice that the wife identified is addressed by ordering an advance, preservation, and other sale terms to ensure the matrimonial home is sold with transparency. She is not seeking either permanent exclusive possession, or a vesting Order. There is no need to defer the sale. She can have temporary exclusive possession pending the sale. The sale will alleviate the husband’s cash flow arguments, and should simplify the support issues later, once the house sells.

[25] Finally, the parties are not ready for the second part of the trial. There needs to be single judge case management in this case going forward. The parties are to appear before me for a case management appearance. Some directions about what needs to be done before the second part of this trial resumes, are set out below. There may be others. They will be discussed.

[26] To the extent that this case couldn’t settle before now because of any uncertainty respecting the foreign divorce, that is no longer the case. I am also requiring the parties to attend with another judge for a Settlement Conference in addition, before the resumption of the second part of the trial.

PART II: OVERVIEW

A. The Husband’s Employment and Financial Circumstances

[27] The husband has a Bachelor’s degree in accounting and finance. He obtained a MBA in Australia before the marriage. He continued with his education after he married the wife. He obtained additional certification in mining engineering.

[28] The husband has worked for a global mining company for many years, since the outset of the marriage. He has had different roles in that company. His career has taken him to several different countries. At the beginning, the husband worked a management accountant and an operations analyst, earning about $105,000.00 AUD. Currently in Canada, the husband has a director level job. While I have not finally determined his incomes since 2024 yet, it appears that he now earns about three times as much as he did at the outset of the marriage. He earns significantly more than the wife too. He compensation comes in several forms.

[29] The husband’s compensation consists of a base salary, a bonus calculated as a percentage of his base salary that is “contingent on personal and company performance”, and his stock options, or a “target long term incentive plan opportunity”. The husband’s bonus is paid in March of the next calendar year, for the previous year. The fact that this is paid once per year, and because it is not guaranteed, are amongst the reasons why the husband wants the Court to exclude it from the determination of his income for regular monthly support, and then order him to share it in an annual top up payment, if and when he receives it each year.

[30] The husband’s stock options vest three years after they are granted provided he is still working for his employer. The husband says that when they vest, the original value of the stocks from their grant date three years earlier, are included in his income for tax purposes. But he has access to the fair market value of the shares at the time they vest, net of any amount to cover the tax payable on the income inclusion for their grant date value. He testified that the company typically disposes of the shares needed to pay the tax.

[31] The husband says he has for the most part not realized any actual income from his vested stocks. He says that except for when he bought the new property in Ajax in April of 2024 in which he and his other partner now reside, he has not sold any of his stocks during the past five years. He says he is keeping his stocks as a “retirement vehicle”, and so his income for support purposes should be less than what his Line 150 income says it is. On the other hand, because he has generally not disposed of the shares, there are unrealized capital gains in addition to the income inclusion on his returns based on the shares’ value when granted. Had he sold the shares, his income for support would perhaps be even higher on account of any capital gains and any gross up on the non-taxable portion of the gain.

[32] The husband has, for the past few years, earned additional self-employment income from consulting. He did not disclose this income on his tax returns to the Canada Revenue Agency, on his sworn financial statements in the Trial Record, or in his written closing submissions that otherwise contain his breakdown of his proposed, adjusted income since 2019. While there were apparently disclosure disputes about this prior to trial, the husband’s exhibit books at the trial did contain a chart of the consulting income he has earned, along with the corresponding bank statements showing where the money was deposited. The husband’s consulting income decreased significantly in 2025, and then stopped in 2026. He says that he stopped doing this work after he acquired his new home in Ajax. He says the reduced 2025 payment was just a residual remaining payment that he received for work done in 2024. The wife disputes that the husband isn’t or won’t in the future resume doing this work. She wants the Court to impute an income to him from his past consulting work.

[33] The husband has not filed a return for 2026 yet, as it is mid-year. He did, during his in court testimony, estimate that his current income in 2026 would range between $330,000.00 and $340,000.00, similar he said, to what is reported on his 2025 taxes. To arrive at this projected sum, he testified that his base salary in 2026 is $242,000.00, he already obtained a bonus of $70,000.00 in March of 2026 for 2025, and he estimated the value of his shares that would vest this year to be $30,000.00. But as I explain below, both the husband’s base salary and bonus were higher than in 2025, and his estimate of the value of the shares to vest was lower (this would also be before considering any capital gains). For these reasons I have calculated a higher projected 2026 income of $352,500.00 for now. My methodology and mathematical calculations underpinning that come later.

[34] The husband’s net worth increased over the course of the marriage. The husband’s Form 13.1 Financial Statements sworn August 22, 2025 and May 1, 2026 contain figures for his assets at the date of marriage, and as of the wife’s proposed date of separation of August 16, 2024, on a “without prejudice basis”. While some of the numbers contained therein are estimates, there are certain valuations to be obtained (one of the reasons why the parties were not ready to proceed with equalization now), and I have determined the valuation date to be September 6, 2024, not August 16, 2024, these financial statements contain sufficient information for the purposes of the issues before me at this first part of the trial. They show the husband’s net worth increased by $1,248,719.24 over the course of the marriage up to the wife’s date of separation of August 16, 2024.

B. The Wife’s Employment and Financial Circumstances

[35] Since 2021 the wife works as a personal injury lawyer for a local law firm. She neither worked as a lawyer in Sri Lanka after having obtained her degree in law there, nor during the entire time that the parties were in Australia, nor at all in Namibia or Singapore, nor originally after she came to Ontario.

[36] The wife worked as an “internal auditor” in a research role, before the marriage. The wife re-qualified as an Australian lawyer, by pursuing additional education there for about ten months. She worked as a legal assistant at first while she retrained. The wife was called to the bar in Australia, in 2013. She started practicing after having already given birth to the parties’ first child. The wife worked in an “advice bureau” giving advice in family law and other certain other areas of the law. She stopped working in January of 2016. She was pregnant again, and apparently there was some kind of “disagreement” with her employer. The parties left Australia in 2016 in any event, due to the husband’s employment.

[37] The wife did not work again until she came to Ontario in March of 2019. Her career trajectory is similar once she got here. The wife first got a promotions-type job briefly, that involved soliciting applications for Canadian Tire credit cards. She then secured a legal assistant job in a personal injury law firm. Then the Covid-19 pandemic came.

[38] The wife re-qualified to be a lawyer, now for a second time, in Ontario. She was called to the Ontario bar, in around October of 2021. Currently, the wife earns a salary from the personal injury law firm, plus a discretionary bonus.

[39] The wife’s Financial Statement sworn May 1, 2026 for trial, says that her current income is $125,017.98. The wife updated this during her testimony, saying that her current income will be about $140,000.00 this year.

[40] There was a dispute during this trial, about whether there was financial control during this marriage, some of which had to do with the wife’s direct or indirect contributions to real estate that was in the husband’s name or substantially in his name in Australia. The husband denied financial control, by pointing to the fact that there were joint accounts, by claiming that the wife had access to his funds, and by pointing to the various payments he has made since the wife came to Canada. But the wife says that right from the beginning of this marriage, most if not all of her income was used for family expenses, leaving her with little left to save or spend on herself. The husband, who earned more than her, was able to save.

[41] What is quite notable to the Court, is the manner in which wealth has accumulated during this relationship. It has all accumulated in the hands of the husband. This would eventually include the matrimonial home in Ontario, title to which was also put in his name alone. Unlike the husband, whose net worth accumulated by over $1 million during this marriage, the wife’s net family property appears to be negative, and therefore Nil. Perhaps that will change when certain valuations are done (like her Australian pension if it needs to be valued), but I cannot see how there will be a significant difference to the bottom line.

C. The Husband’s Other Partner

[42] The husband’s other partner is also originally from Sri Lanka, but when the relevant time frame begins, she was living in Europe with her parents. The husband had previously been in some form of online relationship with his other partner, starting in 2004. They never met in person, nor did they even really speak on the telephone.

[43] The husband and his other partner were supposed to be arranged to marry, apparently. It never materialized. The husband’s other partner says that by 2007, they decided to end the relationship, as the two had still not even met in person.

[44] The husband’s other partner married someone else in 2008. That marriage did not last. The husband’s other partner separated from her former partner in 2016, although they remained living under the same roof until April of 2019, when that divorce was finalized. They lived in the United States.

[45] The husband heard through the grapevine that his other partner had separated from her former spouse. He learned that she planned a trip to Cancun with a friend. While on a 2018 business trip to the United States, he went on a detour to Cancun. They met for the first time in person, supposedly on a platonic basis. Thus began a period of renewed contact that never ended. By no later than 2019, the husband began to maintain two separate residences, in which he lived with both women, toggling back and forth over the years that would follow. This culminated in the husband marrying his other partner in Montreal, on May 15, 2024.

D. Overview of the Date of Separation Dispute in this Case

[46] One of the several pieces of false information that the husband supplied to the Australian Court when he applied for the foreign divorce, was that the parties had been separated for a year. That, incidentally, is the only ground for divorce in Australia, and factually, it was not true. But the parties’ dispute about the date of separation is relevant not only to just that; it of course has relevance to the parties’ Ontario family law claims.

[47] There is some common ground that the parties did in fact separate for two brief periods of time on two occasions, after the signing of the foreign divorce documents in November of 2020, and again in the late fall of 2022. But it is disputed whether those separations lasted (I find they did not), and it is disputed whether they were separated before that, as early as 2019 (I find they were not). Complicating the factual matrix about the date of separation dispute in this case, is the fact that the parties did not always live together under the same roof, even when they agree that they were actually not separated and still in a relationship.

[48] I intend to map out in some detail the facts of this astounding case, in part to demonstrate why I have found the date of separation to be September 6, 2024. Any periods of separation that occurred in 2020 and 2022 were brief and not long-lasting. I cannot even really ascertain how long those periods of separation actually lasted because of what happened here.

PART III: A DETAILED CHRONOLOGY AND FINDINGS OF FACT FOR THE ANALYSIS THAT FOLLOWS

A. Relationship History

[49] The parties had a civil ceremony in on August 26, 2010, followed by a ceremonial wedding on January 6, 2011, both in Sri Lanka. The wife did not move to Australia until after their ceremonial wedding; their pattern of sometimes maintaining separate residences during this marriage thus started right from its outset. After the wife arrived, the husband left for a few months, to work on a foreign assignment in Mongolia, too.

[50] The parties and the three children who would eventually be born in Australia, remained living there for about 5 years until 2016. Thus began a pattern of the wife, and the children, following the husband around the world as he pursued his career. The family left Australia for Namibia in 2016, and then the family moved to Singapore in 2017.

[51] The parties have four children in total, all born during the first half of the marriage. The wife actually became pregnant eight times during this marriage; she had three miscarriages and one abortion. The parties’ children are a girl named Am. (age 13), and three boys named Av. (age 11), N. (age 9, turning 10 in September), and As. (age 8). [1] Am., Av. and N. were born in Australia, and As. was born in Singapore.

[52] When the wife eventually moved to Ontario on March 15, 2019, she came here alone, at first. It is disputed, as the husband said, whether the marriage was “unquestionably” over at that point. In reality, the wife’s move to Ontario, was the first step in implementing a family plan to move here. The children would follow her three months later, and the husband, the following year.

B. The Parties Left Australia and Moved to Namibia in 2016

[53] The husband’s overarching narrative was that he moved several times to appease the wife whom he said was unhappy in Australia (and in the case of the moves to Singapore and Canada, he says those moves were to the detriment of his career). The husband says he looked first for opportunities with his employer in North America, or in the United Kingdom where the wife’s sister lives (and where the wife wanted to go), but he could not then find work in those places. So he secured a temporary assignment in Namibia in October of 2015, to move the family out of Australia.

[54] The husband says that his assignment was supposed to run between November 15, 2015 and November 14, 2018, but the wife changed her mind. The wife, who was pregnant with N. at the time, said she did not want to give birth in a “poor country”, according to the husband. The husband says she only came around when her relationship with her employer in Australia “soured”.

[55] This criticism levelled during the trial, failed to take into account that the wife, by that point, already had miscarriages. As she said, she did not want to risk moving while pregnant again, to a new country where she did not have a doctor. Moreover, while the husband’s contract was supposed to start in November of 2015, he did not actually go there until April of 2016. This had nothing to do with the wife. When asked by the Court about the reason behind the delayed start date (which the husband had not yet explained), he added that he had existing projects to complete in Singapore. Incidentally, the anticipated dates during which the parties supposed to remain in Namibia would shorten after the parties got there. The husband testified that his Namibia assignment ended early by mid-2017, due to his stellar work performance.

[56] In the end, the husband left Australia for Namibia alone, in April of 2016. The wife and the three children followed him later in October of 2016, after N.’s birth in Australia.

C. The Parties’ Move to Singapore in August of 2017

[57] The husband claimed that after his Namibia assignment ended, the parties planned to return to Australia, but once again the wife didn’t want to go. He cited as an example of his intention to return, the fact that they had left two containers full of their personal items behind, and they had already registered A. in a “prestigious private school”. But because of the wife’s discontent with Australia, he found a job in Singapore instead, saying it was closer to Sri Lanka, so perhaps its proximity to the wife’s family there, would appease her.[2]

[58] This, in my view, was another example of revisionist history, designed to bolster a continuing connection to Australia that already by that point had started to diminish. The school document about the pre-registration upon which the husband relied to make his point, was dated August 15, 2024, a time when Am. was just one year old, and well before moving to Namibia was even on the horizon. This dated document did not prove an intention to return. The items in the shipping containers would later be brought to Singapore during the time that they lived there. Despite his claim about this move to Singapore being detrimental to his career, the husband obtained a higher ranking in that job, and he says he “worked so hard to prove himself” in his new role, so much so that he managed to secure two promotions over the next 3 ½ years while in the Singapore role.

D. The Husband’s Assertions About the Breakdown of the Relationship and a March 15, 2019 Date of Separation

[59] The husband claims that by about December of 2017, after he had finally secured an expensive apartment for the family to live in, in Singapore, the wife now said that she no longer wanted to live there. The husband says he told her that he could not break their lease, given the expense that would have been associated with that.

[60] The husband claimed that he stopped being physically intimate with the wife almost entirely after their last child was born in Singapore in late April of 2018. He even claimed that the last birth was not planned, and accused the wife of lying to him about being on birth control. Supposedly he was wary of any form of sexual contact with her thereafter because of that, and because caring for four children was already demanding financially enough. Yet there are many, many examples of the parties being intimate over the course of the years that would follow.

[61] The wife’s father passed away in March of 2018. This further contributed to the breakdown of the marriage, according to the husband. The husband says that the wife was “catatonic” with grief, she barely interacted with the children, she did not cook or clean, and she became angry when he asked for help. The house was in a constant state of chaos according to him; it was cluttered and disorganized, all while he was working full-time. The wife admitted that she found the death of her father difficult, and she grieved, but she denied that this was the start of a breakup. As I explain later, the wife’s inability to keep the house clean to the husband’s standards was a source of some conflict from the outset of the relationship, and indeed that became a backdrop to the intimate partner violence that the wife endured almost right from the beginning.

[62] In or around late May of 2018, the husband says that with the wife still unhappy in Singapore, an opportunity for a position opened up in Montreal. Even though that job entailed a pay cut, it too was supposedly career limiting, and the husband would have to pay higher taxes here, the husband “desperately wanted to make [the wife] happy”, so he pursued it. But the husband in the end rejected the Montreal job. He blamed the wife for this, too. After simultaneously and perhaps inconsistently testifying about all of the benefits that this career limiting job would have offered the family, the husband said the wife did not want to move to Montreal, as she could not speak French, and she would not to be able to work as a lawyer there.

[63] Supposedly after this opportunity was lost, the wife then announced that she was going to move to Ontario in early 2019 without him, because she had a cousin who lived here. The husband’s narrative included that the wife even left the parties’ four children behind. Intimating she was a bad mother, he added that the youngest child didn’t even know his mother, when the family was later reunited. Setting the stage for his later claim that he was not involved in the conception of a pregnancy that later occurred in 2022, the husband also added that the wife seemed “very interested” in suddenly dealing with her birth control, before she left.

[64] The husband’s position was that he had no intention to move to Ontario with the wife at this point. He said that he knew the relationship was “unquestioningly” over when the wife was at the airport on March 15, 2019, as she departed without displaying any emotion towards him. To use his words, the wife neither “thank[ed him] for the ride” to the airport, nor even “acknowledge [him] or say goodbye”. So the husband says he extended his lease in Singapore for an additional 12 months, and he even successfully obtained a promotion there in May of 2020.

[65] In support of his narrative that the wife just up and left the family behind, the husband called his mother to testify. During her in court testimony the paternal grandmother claimed to have asked the wife at the time “wouldn’t it be nice to go as a family” to Ontario instead of going alone, but wife got really angry at her. The husband also called his friend Ishara to testify. After saying in his trial affidavit that he never observed any “serious conflict” between the parties when they socialized regularly in Australia between 2014 and 2016, Ishara said that in around July of 2019, the husband confided in him that the relationship was not “healthy and that things were not going well between them”.

E. What Actually Transpired Surrounding the Wife’s Move to Ontario

[66] The above narrative is not supported by the record before the Court. There are thirteen clusters of facts that contradict it.

[67] In reality, the wife’s move to Ontario in March of 2019 was the first part of a broader family plan to move here, that by October of 2020, was substantially implemented. That plan involved the wife coming here first to set up, while the husband stayed behind to work so that the family would have an income while she did that. The evidence does not reveal separated spouses, the wife leaving the family behind, or the husband travelling here afterwards only for the sake of the children, as the husband claimed. The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. What the wife of course did not then know, was that her absence from Singapore also enabled the husband to pursue his secret relationship with his other partner, in parallel.

[68] First, the wife did not just up and leave because her cousin had moved to Canada, or because she wanted to go on birth control to have relationships with other men, as the husband either expressly said or implied. The wife says that in fact, the parties left Singapore because A. was getting to school age, and she would either have to go to a public school in Singapore primarily in the Mandarin language, or the parties would have to pay for private school. She agreed that the parties did discuss returning to Australia, amongst other places. She did have a cousin who was applying for his permanent residency here too, which was taken into account in their deliberations. But it was not a primary or overarching motivation behind the decision to move to Canada.

[69] Regarding the birth control allegation, the wife explained that after As.’ birth, she had an IUD inserted to avoid any more pregnancies, because the husband refused to use condoms, and the parties continued to have sex together. This had nothing to do with her move to Ontario, or the implied if not express suggestion that the wife intended to pursue relationships with other men once here, following a separation that had already occurred. The wife explained that she got pregnant again despite having the IUD, because that method of birth control had failed. She did not lie to the husband. Nor did she have any other relationships either before this marriage or during it, which fact I return to later, when discussing the 2022 pregnancy and the husband’s insinuation that the wife had an affair.

[70] Second, despite alleging a willingness to take a pay cut to move Montreal in 2018 to address the wife’s discontent, the husband didn’t do that; at least not right away. Both parties tendered emails written by the husband in October of 2018. The husband points out that the wife had omitted part of the chain, in which he said that the ultimate decision to reject the job in 2018 was based on “family circumstances” and that they found another solution. But the decision was also based at least in part on the job’s inadequate remuneration package, despite the email’s reference to family circumstances. For instance, in other parts of the email chain, the husband wrote “…the economics are too wide apart to bridge and the transfer mechanism proposes, is what it is. I would not be offended if you did not make an updated offer”. Even in another part of the chain where the husband makes reference to the fact he applied “100% based on family circumstances”, the husband also made reference to the job “financially… [not working] for us at the moment & [they] have found a solution for our family circumstance”. What the solution was (i.e. whether a separation (the husband’s position) or a family plan to move to Canada in stages (the reality)) is not explained in the email.

[71] Third, the husband then continued to apply for jobs in North America after that he turned down the Montreal offer. He would later, in 2021, take a similar job in Montreal after being unable to find something else.

[72] Fourth, the family by that point, had already taken concrete steps to implement their plan to move here. They had applied for Canadian Permanent Residency in early 2018; the husband was the main applicant. Between July and August of 2018, the parties travelled to Namibia with their youngest son, As., and during that trip, they obtained a police report to support their immigration application. In October of 2018, the parties came to Canada for their “permanent residency landing”. The wife’s friend Tilini, who lives in Ontario, with whom the parties stayed during their landing trip, testified and confirmed this. The husband acquired his permanent residency status in Canada, in October of 2018, before the wife’s departure.

[73] Fifth, in February of 2019, the husband listed for sale the parties’ former home in Australia, located at 10 Humboldt Entrance. While this property would sell later, arrangements were made for its sale, starting the month before the wife left. The parties would also later sell a separate investment property that they owned. If a return to Australia was still on the table at that point, the parties no longer had real estate there. Both properties closed prior to the date of the application for the Australian divorce. While the husband tried to explain these sales by talking about deteriorating real estate market conditions in Australia as the motivating factor, why he would sell property in Australia if a return there was on the horizon, did not make sense.

[74] Sixth, on March 3, 2019, twelve days before his asserted date of separation, the husband bought the wife roses and a card, that read “To Our Special Mum Love you loads! From Ranil, A. Av. N. and As.” The husband was evasive about this in cross-examination, by making arguments rather than just addressing the fact that he gave the wife the card. He argued that he could not recall having given the wife this card, that there was no “time stamp” on the card, and that the card could have been falsely created, “with today’s technology”. These were all convenient arguments that avoided an admission that he should have just made.

[75] Seventh, it is common ground that the couple went on a trip to a resort in Indonesia just before the wife left. The husband incredibly claimed that this was a friends’ only trip, to console the wife who was still grieving, even though he separately had claimed the relationship wasn’t unquestionably over, until the wife was mean to him after the airport, which happened subsequently. The wife by contrast, says that the Indonesia trip was a “romantic” one, and they shared a bed. The wife tendered a photograph of the couple, romantically posing with their heads touching, side by side.

[76] Eighth, while it is common ground that the wife left the children behind when she left in March of 2019, the children stayed behind for only three months per the plan. If the husband’s theory that the parties separated on March 15, 2019 is true, then the Court would have to accept the wife inexplicably left the children behind in his care without a plan, only for the husband to then take the children to Ontario three months later, on June 16, 2019. The wife also hired a nanny to care for the children before she left. Also hard to comprehend on the husband’s theory, is that in later taking the children to Ontario, the husband made absolutely no arrangements to secure any kind parenting agreement or Order, before changing the children’s habitual residence and transporting them half way around the world to resume residing with their mother, from whom he was supposedly separated.

[77] Ninth, regarding the wife’s departure at the airport, perhaps she did not express the warmest or most emotive goodbye to the husband, but the wife was upset about leaving her family behind. She testified that she was crying on the plane on the flight to Ontario as she left her family behind, to go to a new country that she knew nothing about.

[78] Tenth, when the husband brought the children to Ontario three months later in June, he stayed for just five days. That is because he had to go back to work, in part. But it is also because while he was here, his other partner was in the process of secretly moving into the Singapore apartment. Even then, during those five short days that he was here, he purchased a car in the wife’s name. To explain this one, the husband said he bought the car “for the benefit of the children” and cited it as one of many instances where he “provided non-support financial contribution”. The wife would later add the husband as a secondary driver on this vehicle’s insurance, after the husband moved here.

[79] Eleventh, the husband travelled to Ontario a couple more times after that before the Covid-19 pandemic set in. One of those trips was for Christmas in 2019, during which time the parties went on a family vacation to Blue Mountain. The wife showed the Court the booking reservation and talked about the activities in which the family engaged during that trip. Minimizing the significance of this family outing in cross-examination, the husband said “we did many activities”. Meanwhile, the husband’s other partner went back to Europe to visit her parents, when the husband came here.

[80] Twelfth, in October of 2020, the husband made “temporary” arrangements with his employer in Singapore to work remotely, and he moved here. Like the Indonesia trip, the husband says that the parties slept in separate rooms, and he added that he only came here to see the children. The wife says that the parties shared a bedroom together when the husband was in the matrimonial home. The wife’s sister says that when she visited Ontario, multiple times over the years, she observed the two to be sharing a bedroom. Both the wife’s sister and Tilini (who also visited the home) observed the husband’s clothes and belongings were in the primary bedroom closet.

[81] Thirteenth, I did not find Ishara’s evidence described above, to be particularly helpful or reliable respecting the main areas of dispute. Despite that the husband’s relationship with Ishara was presented as a close friendship, Ishara did not have good visibility into what was going on in this relationship. While in his trial affidavit, Ishara discusses the husband’s statement to him in July of 2019 that things were not going well in the relationship, notably absent in this passage is any statement that the husband had actually specifically told him, that the parties were separated. When asked about this particularly in cross-examination, Ishara said he could not recall if the husband had told him about a 2019 separation. The first time Ishara even learned that the husband had remarried his other partner, was in 2025, a year after that re-marriage. Notably absent from Ishara’s affidavit and oral evidence as well, was any evidence of a discussion about what was going on in parallel, between the husband and his other partner. Ishara said in cross-examination, that he was unaware of that relationship when it was carrying on.

[82] Despite all the objective evidence, much of which was already in affidavits that had been exchanged prior to the trial, the husband, during his examination-in-chief, was asked whether he had a plan to move to Ontario around the time that the wife left. He responded “No absolutely not”. That answer is not credible.

F. The Husband Began to Pursue His Other Relationship in Secret in Singapore After the Wife Left

[83] While the wife was grieving the death of her father and while the parties were planning their move to Ontario, the husband resumed his contact with his other partner, starting with the detour trip to Cancun in 2018. Soon thereafter, he arranged for her to come to Singapore in a clandestine fashion. The husband’s other partner first moved into a nearby apartment either before, or around the time that the wife left in March of 2019. After the wife eventually found out about the husband’s re-marriage to his other partner in September of 2024, she contacted via Facebook the nanny she had hired back then in Singapore. From the nanny, the wife learned that the husband’s other partner moved into the parties’ former Singapore apartment “within hours” of the children’s subsequent departure, in June of 2019. The nanny further informed the wife that after she left, the husband instructed her to hide the children’s things, particularly As.’, as his other partner did not then know that the husband had recently had a fourth child with the wife.

[84] The husband attempted, unsuccessfully, to challenge the nanny’s credibility during this trial. He claimed that the nanny made sexual advances towards him. He said that is why he had his other partner move into the apartment, originally on a ‘friends only’ basis, because he was supposedly uncomfortable living with the nanny alone. The nanny appeared to be very surprised, when the husband’s counsel confronted her with this allegation during cross-examination. She denied having made any sexual advances towards the husband.

[85] The husband accused the nanny of engaging in illegal behaviour in Singapore. He claimed that he did not authorize the nanny to work elsewhere, as that would have been contrary to Singapore employment laws, but he found out that she was working elsewhere. The nanny agreed that she had another job with a different family, but said the husband knew about it. The nanny also said in her trial affidavit that she wanted to end her employment with the husband, given what was going on in the apartment. She said that the husband and his other partner tried to ship her back to the Philippines, but she had not done anything wrong. The husband even confiscated her work permit, but she was able to retrieve it back from him after they signed some “simple documents”.

[86] The husband called his other partner to testify at this trial. When asked whether the husband had told her at the time, that the wife didn’t know that she was moving in, the husband’s other partner adopted a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ stance, saying she “didn’t ask” him, and he “didn’t tell” her. This was the first of several ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ answers that the husband’s other partner offered up during this trial. The husband’s other partner also admitted in cross-examination, that she was initially unaware, that in 2018, the wife had just given birth to As.

G. The Parties’ Purchased Property in Ontario After the Wife Arrived Here

[87] If the parties were separated after the wife came to Ontario and there was still no plan for the husband to move here as he claimed to have been the case, then they still bought property here nonetheless. As the husband would claim multiple times about a number of matters, this act too, was done only for the benefit of the children, ostensibly.

[88] When the wife first arrived in Ontario alone, she obtained a small apartment. It was a small one-bedroom apartment, with a small additional “nook” that was intended to be for a “mini-office”. There was seemingly no issue with the four children living there with the wife when the husband dropped them off three months later.

[89] But by March of 2020, the parties embarked upon a search to acquire a larger property here. They did this together, although the wife did take the lead. She found the professionals to help them with this endeavour. Despite the husband’s attempt to distance himself from the process, the wife sent him real estate options over the internet.

[90] The husband tried to explain away during this trial, the manner in which he identified himself or his relationship with the wife on various real estate documents (i.e. that he was married and/or the wife was “his spouse”). Although he would later buy the matrimonial home in his own name, he also sought to explain away the fact that he made an initial offer to purchase a different property, jointly with the wife.

[91] The husband accused the wife of having filled out on his behalf, the mortgage application that identified him as married, which he says he just signed without really reading it or paying attention. The husband blamed the wife for the fact that they tried to buy the first property jointly, saying that the wife told him that she would have to be on title and on the mortgage, as he could not purchase property on his own if he did not yet live here. He said that after the first failed attempt to purchase a different property, he discovered that title and the mortgage could in fact be in his name alone, if he paid a greater deposit of just 5% more. In the end, that is why he took title alone.

[92] Finally, the husband said that he signed a “spousal declaration on the advice of the real estate lawyer because at the time [he and the wife] were still legally married”, while still maintaining they were separated.

[93] But these explanations do little to establish that the parties were separated, as the husband claimed. Regardless of how title to the matrimonial home was ultimately taken or the reasons for it, the process of sourcing and purchasing the matrimonial home was a joint one. The matrimonial home was not purchased for the children. The timing of the acquisition of the matrimonial home lined up with the husband’s own preparations to come to Ontario. Whereas the wife and the children would continue to live in cramped quarters for a year after the children arrived here in June of 2019, by August of 2020, the parties completed the purchase of the matrimonial home. Two months later, the husband came to Ontario, ostensibly on a “temporary” basis only. The husband’s evidence about what the real estate lawyer told him about spouses was hearsay; the husband did not call the real estate lawyer to testify about the advice given to him.

[94] Meanwhile, the husband’s other partner admitted in cross-examination, that she was unaware that the husband had bought the matrimonial home at the time. If the parties were in fact separated and the husband was just buying a home for the children, there would have been no need to keep the purchase a secret.

H. The Various Written Communications About the Parties’ Continuing Relationship and the Further Severing of Ties from Australia

[95] The parties tendered a number of written communications between them covering the time period after 2022. The husband made arguments about the absence of similar, voluminous written communications between 2019 and 2022. Perhaps there would have been other communications documenting the separation, had those communications not gone missing, or so went the argument.[3]

[96] The wife meanwhile pointed the Court to a number of pieces of other correspondence and documents after March of 2019 showing an ongoing relationship. There is not a complete absence of a written record during this time frame, notwithstanding the missing written communications. The documents that do exist, reveal the husband’s continuing search for a job in Canada, his preparations to establish himself in Ontario, the parties’ further divesting themselves of some of their remaining connections to Australia, and both parties’ states of mind about the continuing nature of this spousal relationship.

[97] In particular:

(a) There is email correspondence from the husband asking the wife for help with his ongoing job search here, after he turned down the Montreal offer in 2018;

(b) After the wife moved here in March of 2019, she sent an email to her new landlord to advise that her “husband” was an “emergency contact”;

(c) In early December of 2019, the husband corresponded with a real estate agent in Australia, about the sale of their investment property there. In his correspondence to the agent, the husband referred to the property as being owned by himself and “my wife”;

(d) In late May and early June of 2020, the husband signed a letter to TD Canada Trust, giving the wife the authority to open up a joint bank account. In that letter, the husband once again referred to the Respondent as his wife;

(e) In August of 2020, the husband referred to the Respondent as his wife again, in written email correspondence to someone else, about the relocation of the parties’ dogs from Singapore to Canada; and

(f) In September of 2020, the husband sent email correspondence to HydroOne, referring to the Respondent as his wife, to ask that she be added to the hydro account for the matrimonial home.

[98] The husband’s explanations for the documents that he wrote or signed, included that the wife just helped him with his job search, because he did not have anyone else in Canada to help him, or it was the wife who had written letters and told him to sign them, or that the email correspondence that he wrote himself was done on her instruction, or that he referred to the Respondent as his wife because that is how he habitually referred to her at the time, or that he was not about to air ‘dirty laundry’ (meaning the separation) with third parties.

I. The Circumstances Surrounding the Husband’s Move to Ontario in October of 2020

[99] Even though they had just bought the matrimonial home two months earlier, the husband claimed that when he came to Ontario in October 2020 for a more extended stay, it was still only “temporarily”, due to the difficult travel restrictions then in place after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 made the two previous shorter trips he took here to see the children impractical. To exemplify the still “temporary” only nature of his extended October trip here at the time, the husband says in his trial affidavit that he negotiated with his employer to be able to work remotely from Canada, on a “limited and temporary basis”. He says he had to work in the middle of the night to cover his Singapore working hours while here, and that was impractical in the longer term. He added that had he remained working in the Singapore role but from Ontario in the longer term, there would have been issues with “legal compliance with Singaporean, Canadian and international commerce regulations”, as well as “payroll, tax and other regulatory considerations”, whatever that means.

[100] Yet in addition to having just bought the matrimonial home, the husband admitted at his questioning and again during this trial, that he gave up his lease in Singapore in August of 2020, before he came to Ontario in October. To explain this fact away, he claimed to have had no need to continue to pay for a three-bedroom apartment that he would not be occupying. He said it remained his intention either to return to Singapore, despite having given up the lease, in which case he would have stayed with a friend. Perhaps he might have returned to Australia. But again, by the time he came here, he no longer owned property in Australia anymore either.

[101] Meanwhile, the wife testified that she was excited to have her husband back with her, after another period of a ‘long-distance relationship’. She says that when the husband arrived in Ontario, he apologized to her for the past abuse, and claimed to have sought treatment. She says they shared a bed and continued with their marital relations. According to the wife, the husband even bought her two diamonds for her birthday that year. Like his purchase of the car and the matrimonial home, the husband would later try to recast that purchase, this time as a gift for Am., who was then only 7 years old and did not have her ears pierced.

[102] If they were separated, then the husband nevertheless moved into the matrimonial home upon his arrival in Ontario. His explanation for this fact, was that it was too difficult to find a suitable short-term rental, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet not too long after his arrival, he was easily able to pre-arrange a short-term rental from November 27, 2020 until January 23, 2021, which conveniently lined up with what would happen next, being the completion of the divorce documentation, and the husband’s new partner following him from Singapore to Ontario, just as he had earlier arranged to bring her from the United States to Singapore in 2019.

[103] The month before the husband left Singapore for Ontario, his other partner returned to Europe temporarily, to stay with her parents. She would not return to Singapore thereafter, where the husband was supposedly planning to return. She would instead come to Ontario within days of the divorce documents getting signed, and the husband’s move into the temporary rental, where she joined him.

J. The Completion of the Joint Application for an Australian Divorce, the Husband’s Departure from the Matrimonial Home, and the Parties’ First Separation

[104] I address later in some detail what happened on November 26 and 27, 2020, that culminated in the signing of the Australian divorce application. I do so when analyzing why this foreign divorce should not be recognized by an Ontario Court. By way of a brief overview here as part of the chronology though, on November 26, 2020, in a surprised manner, the husband told the wife that he had downloaded and prepared Australian divorce documents for her to sign. An argument ensued as the wife neither wanted a divorce nor thought they were separated. The husband took the wife to a local lawyer’s office the next day under protest and threat, where she signed the documents, while he sat there and glared at her.

[105] The husband then moved into his pre-arranged temporary rental. He told the Court that he had pre-arranged it, because he expected the wife would be unhappy with him when they returned home from the lawyer’s office. Why he needed to do that, if this divorce was part of continuing separation discussions (as he maintained), I do not know.

[106] Days after he left the matrimonial home, the husband’s other partner followed shortly behind him into the temporary rental as indicated. She arrived in Ontario in early December. She testified that she “probably” decided she was coming to Ontario in October, or at the beginning of November (i.e. her travel here was pre-planned before the husband introduced to the wife, the topic of getting a divorce). Also going on during this time frame and inconsistent with a separation, the husband and the wife had just opened up before the divorce, a joint Scotiabank account into which the husband would deposit his additional consulting income that he earned on a self-employed basis.

[107] There is some common ground that the parties had conflict when this signing happened, and there was probably even a short-lived separation afterwards. But by January 23, 2021, less than two months later, the husband was back in the matrimonial home. Quite notably, he moved back in before the Australian divorce was even granted. Also notably, this coincided with the husband’s other partner leaving Ontario, after her one month stay here.

K. The Husband’s Canadian Job Search and His Return to the Matrimonial Home Between January 23, 2021 and March 29, 2021

[108] The husband continued his job search in Canada after the signing. This included looking for jobs in the Toronto area, and elsewhere. For example, in cross-examination, the wife pointed to an email dated December 17, 2020, sent less than one month after completing the divorce documents, that the husband had sent to someone as part of his job search in “the mining industry in Ontario”. In that email, the husband wrote, “My partner and the kids moved to Ontario in early 2019 given her extended family network in Canada,[4] as a result I am seeking professional opportunities to re-unite with the family. We are Australian citizens but Canadian permanent residency holder” [my emphasis added].[5]

[109] The husband did not at that time obtain work in the Toronto area. Inconsistent with his plan to supposedly return to Singapore (or Australia), he instead re-engaged in a discussion about working in Montreal, and in the end, he obtained a similar if not the same Montreal position, that he had rejected in 2018. The husband negotiated this new position in the early part of 2021, and secured an offer on February 26, 2021. His new job in Montreal started in April of 2021. The husband testified that he thought that he would move to Montreal earlier, but he said that it took longer to implement the move internally within the company. That is why, he says, he remained in the matrimonial home for the first few months of 2021. Like his evidence about the earlier moves that he had undertaken ostensibly to satisfy the wife, this move to Montreal too, has also been “detrimental” to his career. Incredibly, even though he criticized the wife for having raised French as a barrier when the Montreal opportunity first came up in 2018, he now cited his own inability to speak French as part of his current career limitations.[6]

[110] In my view, the husband’s return to the matrimonial home between January 23, 2021 and early April, had less to do with needing a place to stay until he got the new job. The husband did not have the new job yet when he moved back in, although he negotiated it soon thereafter. The husband’s return to the matrimonial home lined up with his other partner leaving Canada after her one-month stay in Ontario, at the temporary rental. And, once the husband returned to the matrimonial home, the parties hosted family friends for dinner at the matrimonial home. Tilini confirmed that she visited during this time frame. She testified that she “had no idea that they might have been separated at any point”. It was on this occasion, that Tilini saw the bedroom closet full of the husband’s shirts.

L. The Husband’s Move to Montreal in April of 2021

[111] The husband’s employer gave him temporary accommodations in Montreal when he first started his job there, until he could secure his own apartment. The husband then entered into a lease for an apartment in Montreal on May 2, 2021, for a year, while the wife and the children stayed in the matrimonial home. The wife did not then know, that his other partner would once again return to Canada, now to Montreal where the husband would be.

[112] The husband’s other partner stayed with him in Montreal until the spring of 2022. During this time frame there was a significant incident of violence between the two, after the husband’s other partner suspected the husband was continuing in a relationship with the wife. The husband’s other partner once again testified that she did not know however that the husband had actually been living with the wife before she came. When asked, she said she understood that he had been living “somewhere in Toronto” between January 2021 and April of 2021. Yet again, she said she “didn’t ask” for better details.

M. The Husband’s Trips to Ontario After His Move to Montreal, and Whether He Was “Primarily Resident” in Quebec or Ontario

[113] The husband claimed to have been “primarily resident” in Montreal for 462 days after he obtained the new job. He says he returned to Ontario for 62 days during that period, but again this was just “to see the children”. The husband says that with few exceptions, his visits were for only two days at a time. The husband stayed at the matrimonial home when he returned, ostensibly because this was the most economical way for him to see the children. He calculated that his travel, including hotels or more Airbnb rentals, would have cost him $26,000.00 per year had he not stayed in the home, that he could ill afford.

[114] Meanwhile, the husband filed his tax returns in each of 2021 and 2022 using the matrimonial home (and then his Markham apartment (discussed below)) as his addresses. He completed Ontario tax forms. There were no taxes filed with Revenue Quebec introduced during this trial. He did not tell the tax departments that he was “primarily resident” in Montreal.

[115] The husband continued to look for work in Ontario. Despite the husband’s claim that the parties were not in a “conjugal relationship” during this 462 day period, the parties continued to carry on as a couple when the husband returned to the matrimonial home. For example:

(a) in September of 2021, the parties celebrated N.’s birthday at the matrimonial home;

(b) The parties went on a trip to the Bruce Peninsula National Park, when the wife’s sister visited in September; and

(c) In October of 2021, the husband ordered sex toys and had them delivered to the matrimonial home.

[116] The husband had an alternative explanation for these facts too. He claimed that any day or weekend trips that he took with the wife, or any social interactions undertaken during that time frame, were meant “for the children”. In cross-examination, the husband denied that he purchased the sex toys. His lawyer also attempted to object to the introduction of a document about these, because the wife redacted portions of the document that itemized the products that the husband had ordered, out of embarrassment.[7]

N. The Christmas Incident and the Violence Between the Husband and His Other Partner in Early January of 2022

[117] One of the husband’s returns to Ontario while he lived in Montreal occurred during the Christmas period in 2021/2022. The husband was here from December 26, 2021 to January 2, 2022. The husband participated in a family photograph taken for Christmas. The wife’s sister, who was also here visiting, posted the photograph online. The husband’s other partner found the photograph online, and this led to the altercation that the two had, when the husband returned to Montreal after Christmas. The Montreal police records that documented contemporaneous statements the two had made, were not produced until mid-trial, despite pre-trial requests for production having been made. The mid-trial productions corroborated the wife’s account.

[118] Before their production, the husband and his other partner told a different account of what happened. The incident was relied upon by the husband, to argue that the wife has in fact known about his other relationship since then, and they were separated. What actually happened, was relied upon by the wife, as evidence of her continuing relationship the husband, and the extent of husband’s deceit. As I explain next, the husband told the wife a detailed lie, to cover up both what happened in Montreal in the aftermath of Christmas, and his separate, secret relationship.

[119] According to the husband and his other partner, the husband’s other partner had reached out to the wife, after the husband had sent the wife some photographs, that he had supposedly taken with his other partner, of some local travel that the two had taken. While these photographs were allegedly sent by the husband to the wife, for her to “show the children”, the wife instead posted them online, which upset the husband’s other partner, so went their version of events.

[120] It is true that the husband’s other partner did contact the wife via some kind of online communication tool called “Viber”. The husband’s other partner no longer had the message that she sent, nor did the wife have it, at least not in its original format.[8] The wife did in the past though, cut and paste the husband’s other partner’s Viber message into an email that she then sent to herself. That copied Viber message[9] reads:

Because of Ranil’s dishonest behaviour I’m reaching out to you hoping to get to know the truth. Now before you run to him with this msg, you might want to act smart and get to know the truth. I think he is lying to both of us.

I met him in Mexico in 2018 and as you know I was with him in Singapore[10] and then we moved to Toronto last year, where [Av.] came to spend time with us and now we are in Montreal.

Before I started this relationship with Ranil he told me you and him were separated, that you have some mental issues, he also lied to me about the number of kids you two have. Later I got to know from Fe the helper that he told me lot of lies.

That is when Fe tried to reach out to you[11] to tell everything but you were very foolish to believe Ranil when he told you Fe is trying to get money from him and she is trying to scam him. He knew exactly why Fe contacted you and as always he managed to make you believe something else and got away from it.

You can hate me and not care about any of these but I’m sure for kids sake you want to know who you are dealing with. All I want is to clear things up. I hope this time you will act smart and talk to me first before you go and show him this msg and ruin everything for everyone.

[121] The wife did not talk to the husband’s other partner following receipt of this message. Nor had she posted travel photographs to her “own website” as was alleged. This story was made up, with details extracted from another activity that the husband and the wife engaged in, as part of their activities as a couple.[12]

[122] When the husband returned to Montreal after Christmas, there were physical altercations between him and his other partner, that involved the police. A pre-trial request for the Montreal police records had been made during this case. The request was not fulfilled. The husband said during this trial that he delegated the responsibility to his other partner to obtain and produce the records. What was obtained and produced, was a letter from the Montreal police saying that its file had been closed. The letter did not say that no records existed. When I inquired into this during the trial, I learned from the husband’s other partner that she did in fact have redacted police records. The husband claimed to be unaware of this. The records that the husband’s other partner produced contained redactions. I made a mid-trial order for the production of unredacted records from the Montreal police. The Montreal police records that were eventually produced indicate that the Montreal police had been told, that the posted photograph was of the nature described by the wife (i.e. the Christmas photograph).

[123] The Montreal police records further reveal that on January 5, 2022, after his return to Montreal, the husband called 911. The records state that there had been escalating conflicts between the two for some time, after the husband’s other partner learned that the husband had “children” with another woman when the two were not together during times when the husband went to “Toronto” to visit his family. On the evening of January 4, 2022, the husband and his other partner had an argument regarding Instagram photographs that the husband’s “ex-wife” had posted online, of the husband and their children (i.e. not of travel photographs that the husband and his other partner had apparently taken and that the husband had sent to the wife to “show the children”). The police had been told, that the husband’s other partner became aggressive and hysterical, and broke objects in the home, including the husband’s personal items. The husband reported to the police that he didn’t want his other partner to remain with him any longer.

[124] The next morning, the husband and his other partner had another argument, when the husband said he was going to go back to “Toronto” again, this time to care for a sick child. The records say that the husband’s other partner attacked him with a hot hair iron, in addition to trying to hit him with the object, causing a burn. The records state that the husband’s other partner hit him on his head with her hand. They state that the husband did not want to press charges, he intended to separate from his other partner, and he hoped she would leave the country. I was told during this trial that the husband’s other partner was not arrested as a result of this altercation, but the records state that the husband’s other partner was taken the police station, and there appears to have been an arrest. Whether there was or there wasn’t, doesn’t really matter to the disposition of this case.

[125] When the husband testified in Reply, the Court asked him what happened after this incident, since the records indicate that the husband’s other partner would be leaving Quebec. The husband said that he patched things up with her, and so she did not leave right away. The husband thought that she remained in Quebec until May of 2022.[13] But the husband did nevertheless return to Ontario again in January. When he was here for the second time, he concocted a lie, and referred to his other partner as his “stalker”.

[126] The wife’s sister was still present in January of 2022, when the husband returned from Montreal again, after the Christmas incident. In her trial affidavit, she says that the husband had a “severe burn” on his arm. She says that he had an elaborate story to tell, that he had a stalker for many years, who was an ex-girlfriend of his. He claimed that this “stalker” followed him to Montreal and forcibly entered his apartment and burned him, because she was jealous about the photograph that the wife’s sister had posted. The wife’s sister says the husband told her that the “stalker” was in Canada under a visa and would be deported, so there was nothing to worry about.

[127] The wife’s sister asked the husband how the “stalker” had found his whereabouts. The husband relied on hacking as the explanation, yet again, this time claiming that she was the one who had hacked into his accounts. The wife’s sister was understandably suspicious about this tale, and raised her suspicions to her sister.

[128] While there was certainly some indication at the time that the husband was engaging in another relationship, revealed to the wife via the Viber message, I accept that the wife was not made fully aware of those goings on, because of the husband’s “stalker” lie. To quell her sister’s suspicions, but also reflective of the wife’s state of mind at the time, the wife told her sister, that this “stalking” behaviour had been going on for years, and the husband had never met the “stalker” in person before. That is what she then believed.

[129] The husband meanwhile lied to his other partner too at the same time, this time by omission in the aftermath of the Christmas incident. In cross-examination, the husband’s other partner said she was unaware that the husband had returned to Ontario after the incident. Nor did she know that while here, he called her a “stalker”. She didn’t even seem to comprehend what she was being asked or how the husband could have said that about her, saying “how can I come to the apartment that I was already living in”.

O. The Husband’s Return to the Matrimonial Home, and the “Attempted Reconciliation, But For Less than 90 Days”

[130] In his trial affidavit, the husband says that his other partner next returned to Europe in April of 2022, to help her parents. The husband says while she was gone, he decided (in around June of 2022), that that relationship was not working out. So although the husband maintained that he and the wife had not been together after 2019, now he would try to reconcile, but the attempted reconciliation was for no more than 90 days.[14]

[131] The husband’s other partner testified, once again, that she thought the husband was living “somewhere in Toronto” after their 2022 separation, when she went back to Europe. She did not know that he went back to the matrimonial home, which is in reality, where he went.

[132] Around this time that the husband switched roles at work, to be able to work remotely from Ontario on an indefinite basis. The husband either did not tell the wife that he had been planning to return to Toronto for good, or he lied to his other partner about what he did or didn’t tell the wife. In written communications between the husband and his other partner exchanged in mid-June of 2022, the husband’s other partner said the following to the husband, evidencing her awareness or suspicion as to the husband’s ongoing relationship with the wife :

I thought the reason we wanted to move to Toronto is to take care of your kids without involving Thisari but doesn’t matter what we do she is always there and I’m always not.

I’m tired of this situation where she is always in the picture.

Your previous relationship worked longer because she didn’t confront you, she stayed silent so it was easier for you but with me I tell you what you do to your face and you get annoyed.

[133] Buried in these messages, the husband told his other partner that he “didn’t even tell her [meaning the wife] about moving to Toronto” [meaning the change in roles].

[134] All the while, the parties were once again, continuing to act as a couple leading up to his move back to Ontario, and beyond. For example, in her trial affidavit, Tilini says that the family visited her home again in January of 2022, this time with the wife’s sister, who was also visiting. The wife’s sister says in her trial affidavit, that the wife asked her whether they could celebrate the husband’s birthday, during her next trip to Ontario in March of 2022. They also celebrated A.’s birthday in the matrimonial home in June of 2022. Even the paternal grandmother who visited Ontario at that time, participated in the birthday celebration. On June 22, 2022, the husband sent the wife a “Weekly Plan” which included “date nights”.[15]

[135] The parties went on a trip together to Belgium, Sweeden, Denmark and the Netherlands between July 29, 2022 and August 14, 2022. The parties would visit Tilini’s home again before their Europe trip. The husband basically said that it was during the trip, that he realized yet again, that the reconciliation was not going to work out. He said that the wife remained “disengaged, did not attempt to spend time together, refused to participate in most of the activities that [he] planned and instead worked almost the entire time [they] were there”. The husband had the paternal grandmother, who was unaware of his years’ long affair, repeat, in her trial affidavit, that there was an attempted reconciliation but “there had been no progress toward reconciliation and [the wife] spent most of the trip working”. The grandmother was not on the trip, and wouldn’t have observed how much work the wife did, or did not do. Incidentally, the wife testified that she did not work the entire time. She said she only worked for 30 minutes, perhaps on a single day. She said the parties travelled a lot, and took numerous photographs.

[136] After the couple returned from Europe, the parties took the children on a trip to a water park in Ottawa. The husband accused the wife of having become physically aggressive towards him in the hotel room. The husband added into the mix a series of incidents about the wife’s mistreatment of him that allegedly started a decade earlier. The husband claimed that it was after this latest incident of alleged violence from the wife in the Ottawa hotel room, that he thought this might not be a “one off”, and so he was no longer willing to risk “the children being exposed to have two unhappy parents living in one home together”. Hence the reconciliation came to an end, according to him. The husband had the paternal grandmother repeat in her trial affidavit, that the wife was physically aggressive in Ottawa, but yet again, the husband was the source of that information; the paternal grandmother did not witness it.

[137] The wife, by contrast, denied any abuse.

P. The Parties Separated for the Second Time, Briefly

[138] The husband says he moved out of the matrimonial home in late September/early October 2022 and began residing, yet again in a temporary accommodation, now in North York. He then moved into a rental property in Markham, in December. All of which coincided with the husband’s other partner’s return to Canada, as the two had by that point, patched things up. Unlike after the signing of the foreign divorce papers (moving apart because of an argument and the signing of divorce documents), or the husband’s move to Montreal (living apart for work reasons), there was no good excuse this time for the husband to maintain a separate residence, nearby in a rental. As such, there is common ground here amongst the parties, that the husband’s move this time was on account of an actual separation.

[139] But the husband was hardly unequivocal about his intention to permanently separate. By no later than early 2023, the husband was seeking a rapprochement. He would return to the matrimonial home, yet again, later in 2023.

[140] In fact, in the month that the husband left, the wife discovered she was pregnant. Earlier that day before the pregnancy discussion, the husband sent the wife sexualized text messages. During this trial, the husband audaciously accused the wife of having had an affair.

Q. The Wife’s Eighth Pregnancy, and the Abortion

[141] On November 11, 2022, shortly after the husband moved out, the wife found out that she was pregnant again. The parties decided to terminate the pregnancy and the wife had an abortion.

[142] But in keeping with his narrative that there had been a failed reconciliation and the parties had not been intimate with one another, the husband denied that the wife’s latest pregnancy was conceived by him, and he did so by cherry picking from the records to argue this. He accused the wife of concealing abortion records that were not beneficial to her narrative. He said that he only accompanied the wife to the abortion clinic because the wife was “the mother of the children”, but not because he was the father of the unborn child. Yet in WhatsApp messages that the parties exchanged on November 11 and 12, 2022, during which they discussed planning the abortion, the husband said to the wife “I feels like seeing me is painful for you. That’s why I proposed it” (referring to a different plan to meet the wife at the clinic, as opposed to picking her up and driving her to the clinic). The wife responded that what was painful for her, was the husband moving out.

[143] The husband during this trial accused the wife of having had an affair, the very behaviour in which he had been engaging. When the wife cross-examined the husband, the husband would not just admit that he was the father. At times he seemed to be questioning whether the pregnancy even occurred all together, which made no sense to me. For example, he said “you advised me that you became pregnant”.

[144] To argue he was not involved in the conception, the husband used a combination of other WhatsApp messages, along with Ishara’s trial affidavit and some abortion records that state the wife was eight weeks pregnant at the time of the procedure, to compile a concocted tale, that it was not possible that he was the father. During a WhatsApp conversation on November 11, 2022, the husband said to the wife “We haven’t had sex in a while” to which the wife responded “We did after you came back from the trip with Ishara”. Part of Ishara’s trial affidavit described some of his travels with the husband over the years. Ishara says that he and the husband travelled to Australia and Thailand in July and August 2019. There is then a gap in their travels until March of 2023. Because Ishara said their last trip before the 2022 pregnancy and abortion was in 2019, the husband argued that the aforementioned WhatsApp messages, saying the parties “hadn’t had sex in a while” meaning after the “trip with Ishara”, meant no sex between 2019 and the 2022 pregnancy, and so the husband could not possibly have been the father in a 2022 pregnancy, or so went his argument.

[145] However, the wife would later say in cross-examination, that she believed there had been another trip with Ishara in around September of 2022, after parties’ Europe and Ottawa trips, when the husband was back in the matrimonial home. In any event, the wife maintained at trial, and in her trial affidavit, that she had never been intimate with anyone else before the marriage and during it. And I believe her. And read in its context, the WhatsApp message doesn’t make any sense if it is interpreted to accord with the husband’s argument of no sex since 2019. It doesn’t make sense that the wife would respond to a November 2022 message from the husband saying that said they hadn’t had sex in a while, and refute it by referring back to a sexual encounter from three years earlier, to argue otherwise.

[146] Finally, the husband argues in his written closing submissions that there is no contemporaneous written confirmation that the parties agreed the pregnancy was conceived together. I am not sure why there would be such a written confirmation unless someone at the time was doubting that fact. What is more notable, is the fact that the husband never questioned, not once, the conception; he chose to do so in this proceeding, years later, as part of an overall narrative to support a 2019 date of separation and the validity of the foreign divorce. His answer when confronted with his failure to deny paternity in writing at the time, was to flip the situation back at the wife. He said that he knew the baby was not his, and that the wife failed to provide “DNA evidence”.

[147] But she was not required to produce “DNA evidence”. Query how one is supposed to provide DNA evidence respecting a fetus that was aborted 3 ½ years ago, or why the wife would have had the good foresight to obtain some kind of DNA sample before the procedure, when there was not then any suggestion as to a dispute about paternity.

[148] There was also enough other evidence before the Court, that established the parties were in fact intimate with each other in various ways over the years, such as through sexualized text messages, and the purchase of sex toys. It is not a stretch for this Court to conclude that they were also physically intimate throughout as the wife said. A good example occurred on the morning of November 11, 2022, the very day before the pregnancy and abortion discussion occurred. That day, the parties exchanged a number intimate text messages, as they would continue to do in the two years that followed.

[149] And yet again, the husband lied to his other partner, if not expressly then by omission, about what went on in the fall of 2022. His other partner was unaware of the sexualized text messages. The husband also withheld the pregnancy from her. In cross-examination, the husband’s partner said that she did not know the wife was pregnant at the time, although after this proceeding got underway, the husband told her that the wife was “making such accusations”. If the husband was not the father as he maintained, there was no need for such secrecy.

[150] The pregnancy and the abortion, coupled with the husband’s move out a month or so earlier, were traumatic for the wife. The wife’s sister visited again in December of 2022. She observed her sister to be extremely depressed.

R. The Parties’ Second Separation Did Not Last Long

[151] Very soon after he left in the fall of 2022, the husband started to make overtures to the wife, with promises to return to be a better husband and father.

[152] On December 8 and 9, 2022, the husband sent the wife regretful messages, referring to himself as “dishonest” and a “pathological liar” who was “disgraced”. He said that he would come back home “at the end of this deep dark period”. The family then spent Christmas together. On December 26, 2022, the husband sent the wife another overture in writing, saying “[t]he best Christmas gift I could ever get is to see everyone so happy! Thanks for making the day for the kids. I promise next year we will be all celebrating Christmas together. That’s my only goal for 2023 is to be back home.” On December 31, 2022, the parties exchanged written wishes for New Years.

[153] On February 4, 2023, the husband wrote another message to the wife saying, once more that he wanted to come back to the home more regularly and build a more positive relationship. He repeated that he would move back home for good by the end of the year and “be the best husband and the best father [he] can be for the family”. The husband’s explanation for this message, was that he had been misleading the wife into thinking that they could reconcile.

[154] It was not just in 2022 that the parties exchanged intimate text messages. On February 9, 2023, the parties exchanged even more such messages. In fact, in cross-examination, the wife asked the husband to confirm that he sent intimate messages to her in each of 2022, 2023 and 2024. He was only prepared initially, to admit to having sent messages in 2022 and 2023, until he was confronted with another message he sent on July 11, 2024, which he then admitted to as well.

[155] The husband’s explanations for these various sexualized messages, were that the parties were exploring a reconciliation in 2022, and in general, he referred to all of the messages as mere “fantasy talk” or “sexting”, as opposed to evidence of actual physical intimacy. Notably he sent his February 9, 2023 messages of a sexual nature a mere twelve days before the limitation period for the wife to claim an equalization payment would expire. He sent his July 11, 2024 “sexting” and “fantasy” messages to the wife two months after his re-marriage to his other partner.

[156] The husband said that when he sent the 2023 messages specifically, he was “trying to determine a path forward” with his other partner. Meanwhile in or around that time frame, the husband obtained a foreign divorce opinion, and obtained an Ontario marriage license to marry her. It seems he had already determined his pathway forward with her.

[157] It was not just sexualized talk between the two that evidences an ongoing relationship throughout 2023, while the parties lived under separate roofs. On February 13, 2023, the wife added the husband to her gym membership, that she paid for. The husband’s explanation for this, was that the wife said she could obtain a low corporate rate. The husband bought the wife flowers for Valentines’ Day, the next day. Tilini invited the family to visit her home in July of 2023, to celebrate her daughter’s first birthday party. The entire family, the husband included, attended. The parties engaged in estate planning during the first eight months of 2023. I explain that next.

S. The Parties’ Estate Planning in 2023

[158] Starting in January of 2023, and then again in April of 2023, the husband told the wife that he wanted to prepare a Will. In response to his message to the wife dated January 20, 2023 in which he raised the subject, the wife said that she could draft one, but they should have it done professionally. But she also proposed she could look into how her firm does it. She asked the husband to let her know what he wanted, because if it was just a simple Will, perhaps she could try to draft it herself. The husband, who opted for the latter, would later rely on this particular message to accuse the wife of having exploited him.

[159] On April 12, 2023, the husband wrote to the wife again about estate planning, this time saying that he was worrying about death, and reviving the earlier discussion about the Will. His instructions at that point, were that he needed her help to obtain a Will with the wife as “power of attorney”, “think of some as power of attorney in case both of us die”, “pathway to have you in control of all of my assets”, “between us have life insurance for the family” and “sort out our SL properties and how to ensure the money gets to our kids”.

[160] On June 14, 2023, the husband sent to the wife the details of his retirement funds, in which he listed the wife as either the sole beneficiary, or as a partial beneficiary with the children. Notably, the wife is identified as the husband’s “spouse” on these documents. During this trial, he claimed that the reference to the wife as his “spouse” was a mistake, once again repeating his general narrative that these documents were about ensuring the children had access to their inheritance, and did not reflect the truth regarding his spousal status.

[161] The wife did end up drafting the husband’s Will for him. The wife says she sent the draft Will to the husband to review in advance, before he signed it, and testified that she made a similar Will for herself. The parties executed these Wills on August 4, 2023. They were witnessed by the husband’s cousin and his wife in August of 2023.

[162] The husband’s Will that the wife drafted, was entered into evidence as an exhibit. It appoints the wife as the husband’s Estate Trustee. The wife is referred to as the husband’s “spouse” yet again. The husband bequeathed the matrimonial home to the wife in it. He divided half of the residue of his estate to the wife, and the other half to the children.

[163] The husband came up with an explanation for the contents of his Will. He claimed to be under the influence of alcohol when he signed it. He argued that he did not receive independent legal advice. And like he claimed about their discussions surrounding the purchase of the matrimonial home, and then the foreign divorce, he claimed that he relied on the wife’s advice, respecting his Will.

[164] Borrowing from her complaint about the pressure and influence that was exerted upon her at the time of the signing of Australian divorce documents, the husband even said that he signed the Will without properly reviewing it. The husband did not call either his cousin or his cousin’s wife, both of whom were witnesses, to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of his Will.

[165] Also borrowing from her complaint about not having been given a copy of the Australian divorce documents after the fact, the husband claimed that he had not been given a copy of the Will he signed, either. But in her supplementary trial affidavit, the wife pointed out that the Will was stored in the walk-in-closet of the primary bedroom in the matrimonial home, where the husband kept all his other important documents. The husband had access to the Will, right up until he left the matrimonial home for the final time, in August of 2024. And as the wife points out in her written closing submissions, the husband called no evidence that he subsequently revoked this Will either, even though he claimed during this trial not to have understood what he had signed.

T. The Husband’s Plan to Marry His Other Partner in 2023, Followed by His Return to the Matrimonial Home in November of 2023

[166] Meanwhile, the husband was parallel planning to marry his other partner in 2023. When it did not materialize, the husband returned to the matrimonial home, yet again.

[167] On March 3, 2023 the husband obtained a legal opinion from an Ontario lawyer about the validity of the foreign divorce. He relied on that opinion to obtain an Ontario marriage license. No Ontario wedding then occurred in 2023, and the Ontario marriage license expired.

[168] The husband’s other partner’s explanation for the delay, was that while she and the husband had planned a small ceremony, “during the planning process” the husband became aware that his daughter Am., and their son Av., “were not doing well in school and required additional support”. This apparently caused the husband “significant stress” and so his focus shifted to ensuring a better educational support for the children, rather than marrying her.

[169] The husband’s explanation alluded to the fact that perhaps there was more trouble that relationship. The husband says that by November of 2023, his other partner went back to Europe once more, before going on a trip to Sri Lanka. Once gone, the husband decided to move back into the matrimonial home with the wife and the children, not because they were in a relationship, rather because he wanted to “save to purchase a separate property for [himself] to allow for the children to spend time with [him] consistently”.

[170] His other explanation for not pursuing a 2023 marriage was that he was facing another “crossroads” with his other partner, whom he said wanted to marry and focus on travel and leisure activities, whereas he apparently wanted to save to buy a home. This explanation about deciding to come back to the matrimonial home only to save money, of course stands in contrast with the husband’s earlier promises to the wife, to return home by the end of the year and to be a better husband and father. And once again, the husband’s other partner testified that she was not aware that the husband moved back into the matrimonial home after her departure. The husband would remain living in the matrimonial home, until mid-August of 2024.

[171] In keeping with their past practice, the parties continued to have intertwined lives financially, and otherwise continued to act as a couple after the husband’s latest return. For example, on December 22, 2023, the husband’s new 2023 Mercedes got added as part of a car insurance policy in the wife’s name. The husband admitted that the wife even paid for his car insurance until August of 2024. His explanation for this, was that he did not have a Canadian driving history, and the wife had told him he could obtain a lower insurance premium, if he was part of her insurance.

[172] The parties and the children went on a trip to New York in December 2023. In January of 2024, the parties celebrated Av.’s birthday together. There is a video recording from the celebration.

U. The Husband’s Lie to the Wife About A Sephora Pamphlet: the Stalker Explanation Revived

[173] On March 24, 2024, a promotional catalogue or pamphlet from the cosmetics’ store Sephora arrived by mail to the matrimonial home. It was addressed to the husband’s other partner. Both the husband and his other partner testified during this trial, that this must have happened in error, when the husband’s other partner used the husband’s credit card to buy something there. Because the credit card’s mailing address was at the matrimonial home, they surmised that someone at Sephora must have updated their records to link the mailing address with the husband’s other partner’s name, or so the explanation went.

[174] This time, the husband’s lie to the wife about how this could have happened was in writing, and he repeated the stalker allegation. He told the wife to keep the document as “physical proof” of the stalking behaviour. He claimed, yet again, that this person must have hacked his emails, and he even went so far as to say that they should obtain a Retraining Order against her. Towards the end of his written message to the wife dated March 25, 2024, the husband’s lies continued. He told the wife “I told her F off many time – I blocked the phone number – I don’t respond to emails. I’ll do it again”.

[175] Three days later, on March 28, 2024, the husband wrote the following message to the wife:

Thisa – you will never hear from [the husband’s other partner] again, ever again. We will never discuss about her. If I ever say a word remind me that this is a topic we will never discuss/talk. I am sorry for the pain I caused. It will never happen again in the future. I only love and care for one person only – that’s you. I want you to be happy, look good, I just want you to be the girl I fell in love with in 2010. That’s all I ask for.

[176] The husband’s explanation during this trial for this first message, particularly his reference to getting a Restraining Order, was that he said that to pacify the wife. His explanation for his message of March 28, 2024 was the same. He added that he had to say such a thing, as he didn’t want to come to a house where the other person was “frowning” at him.[16]

[177] Meanwhile, after writing that elaborate message of March 28, 2024 saying that there would be no further discussions about his other partner, the husband had already started to look for a new property to purchase, into which he and his other partner would later move.

[178] In cross-examination, the wife asked the husband’s other partner whether she was aware that the husband had referred to her as a stalker yet again in response to the Sephora mailing. Not dissimilar to her response to questions about the earlier stalking explanation that he levelled around the time of the Christmas Incident, the husband’s other partner said that she was in Europe at the time of the Sephora mailing, and so she was not sure why the husband would say such a thing (given that she was not in the country). But he said it in writing.

V. The Husband’s Re-Marriage on May 15, 2024 and His Continued Relationship with the Wife, Notwithstanding His Re-Marriage

[179] The husband would later re-marry his other partner on May 15, 2024, in Montreal. I was told they married in Montreal, to avoid having to go through the process of getting another foreign divorce opinion to obtain another Ontario marriage license, after the earlier license had expired. Apparently that is not a requirement in Quebec when someone has been divorced in another jurisdiction. In his trial affidavit, the husband also said they chose Montreal to get married, for its “sentimental value” given that they had lived there and had “many happy memories”.

[180] The husband, who was then living in the matrimonial home, lied to the wife about his travel plans around this time period. On April 30, 2024, the husband told the wife that he had to go on a trip to Europe from May 10, 2024 to May 16, 2024 for “work”. While perhaps he did travel to Europe, he was not gone to Europe until May 16. According to the husband, his other partner returned to Montreal between May 12-15, 2024, and he too was there. On May 15, 2024, they got married. His other partner went back to Europe on May 16, 2024. Less than two months before that, the husband had told the wife for at least the second time, that this person was his stalker.

[181] The same day as his wedding, the husband sent the wife written messages in which he talked about planning for an upcoming weekend (to have a BBQ and to do some gardening). On May 16, 2024, the day after the wedding (the same day that his other partner left for Europe), the husband came to the matrimonial home, and celebrated his 40^th birthday. During this trial, the husband accused the wife of having organized the birthday on her own initiative, and said he never asked for that.

[182] The husband lied to his mother, if not directly then by omission, about his re-marriage. In cross-examination, the paternal grandmother said that the husband had told her that he intended to marry someone else because his first marriage was over. But she was not at the wedding, and she admitted that she only learned about the re-marriage, after the fact.

[183] After first returning to Europe, the husband’s other partner then went to Sri Lanka. The husband joined her from June 20, 2024 to July 12, 2024. On July 11, 2024, the day before his return, the husband sent the wife a message over WhatsApp, saying that he was “so excited to be coming back I had it enough in Sri Lanka”. This was the same day that the husband and the wife also had another intimate written conversation (or “sexting” or “fantasy talk” as the husband would describe it).

W. The Husband’s Secret Purchase of Another Property in Ajax

[184] The husband had already secretly purchased his second property in Ajax on June 7, 2024, unbeknownst to the wife. The husband started looking for this property in March of 2024, found it in May, and made the offer in June. The closing was planned for August 9, 2024, but it got delayed until August 12, 2024, at a time he was back in the matrimonial home, post his re-marriage. The husband says that he left the matrimonial home on August 9, 2024. He says he went to a nearby Best Western hotel until the closing occurred. I heard some evidence that the husband was in Niagara Falls on August 13, 2024, referable to disputing the wife’s date of separation a few days after that, which the wife tied to another intimate encounter (their last one). The husband denied that the encounter occurred, saying that he was away. In any case, the husband’s other partner also arrived back in Ontario on August 10, 2024 apparently (i.e. the day after the husband left the matrimonial home for the Best Western or Niagara Falls, as the case may be).

[185] Of more significance in my view, the wife found out about the Ajax property a few days later. Not unlike the Sephora mailing, the wife found out because a mortgage document respecting the new property came to the matrimonial home in error. The wife confronted the husband about this in writing on August 19, 2024, and yet again the husband’s instinct was to lie, this time by trying deflection.

[186] The husband said to the wife in writing “Wow I am super rich. No I didn’t – it must be something to do with the glitches I said with the accounts or their system. Either way I should get it sorted asap otherwise I’ll have to carry a non-existing loan”. When the wife told the husband that she didn’t believe him and urged him to tell the truth, he said “OK. I live in Ajax. There is no glitch. Be happy now.”

[187] On August 20, 2024, the husband sent yet another message to the wife, suggesting that they should carry on status quo, by once again maintaining two separate homes. He said:

Thisa, I am sorry, I didn’t mean to hurt your feelings. I don’t want to fight anymore. I find it difficult to live the way we live. I don’t think its your issue, it’s the way I was brought up which makes it’s very difficult for myself. Either way two houses means nothing, we both do everything for our kids. That’s the most important thing for me is to set up the kids to succeed. Time will resolve all things, you don’t need to trust me, but you are the only person in this world I trust with everything. Take good care of yourself.

[188] And three days after that on August 23, 2024, the husband sent the wife a message in which he said that he “love[d] and care[d] for [her] as an adult – a wife/partner”.

[189] The wife still did not then know, that the husband had re-married, although the husband tried to claim otherwise. The wife did not find out about the re-marriage, until September 6, 2024.

X. The Wife’s September 6, 2024 Discovery of the Husband’s Re-Marriage

[190] The wife discovered that the husband had re-married when she looked on Facebook, on September 6, 2024. The wife discovered pictures of what appeared to her (and incidentally to the Court), to be wedding photographs from Sri Lanka.[17] The wife confronted the husband about this in written communications that carried on for the next two days. There were also phone calls. On September 7, 2024, the wife accused the husband of lying, and asked him, now thinking back on the past years, if this is why he had asked for the divorce.

[191] The husband now accuses the wife of since then engaging in a “ruthless campaign” of parental alienation, and “to seek as much financial gain as possible”, which has included making “escalating false allegations of family violence” against him. In support of this argument, the husband excerpted only part of his written communications with the wife, in which the wife said that his new partner “will have absolutely no access to any of the kids”, and in which she said that until the parties sorted things out, she would take the children to their sports. This partial communication is marked as Exhibit 33.

[192] But the complete chain that also got separately introduced during this trial, reveals that the wife repeatedly said that she wanted to work with a lawyer and ensure that there was a legal document in place. At one point she said she was fearful that the husband would not return the children to her. She was not denying contact with the children; she wanted to deal with the matter formally now. Notably when the husband later tried to bring this case before the Court on an urgent basis to address parenting, Daurio J. on November 25, 2024 noted that there were gaps in the husband’s evidence, about the efforts the wife was trying to make to negotiate early on.

[193] In her trial affidavit, the wife’s sister says that her sister was “completely shattered” after she discovered the photographs from the Sri Lanka wedding (or the photoshoot, whatever it was). It was then that the wife disclosed to her sister for the first time, that the husband had forced her to sign divorce documents back in 2020. The wife’s sister says that she and her family were “shocked” to learn that the husband not only lived with his “mistress” in Montreal, but also rented an apartment less than 30 minutes from the matrimonial home, and then bought a property with her, while he continued to maintain a relationship with the wife.

[194] Before turning to the analysis, I wish to note one other thing. Above, I indicated that the husband claimed that the wife knew about his relationship with his other partner as early as early 2021, after the Christmas incident. Yet he also accused her of engaging in “parental alienation” after she discovered the re-marriage. His theory that the wife was aware in 2021 does not make sense in this context. If it was the wife’s discovery of the husband’s re-marriage that triggered her to react and withhold the children, then it remains unexplained why she didn’t behave similarly in 2021, if she supposedly knew back then. That would require the Court to believe that she got so bothered by the wedding, but was less disturbed by their unwed infidelity.

PART IV: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

A. The Husband’s Allegations About the Wife’s Abuse Towards Him in the Marriage

[195] The husband as the Applicant, called his case first. His attempt to control the narrative during this trial included attempts by him, to neutralize in advance, the wife’s evidence about intimate partner violence that would follow, by saying he was in fact the victim. A large part of that tactic included trying, with the assistance of his mother, to paint the wife as the main problem, and indeed even as the abusive one in the marriage, essentially from the outset. This included the husband even tendering photographs of current scars that he has, which he claimed the wife had caused years earlier.

[196] I do not need, or intend to go through each of his or his mother’s historic complaints. Some of the complaints, like the fact that the wife put dirty clothes on top of the husband’s clean clothes, were petty.

[197] The husband is not credible. The wife denied that she ever abused the husband. She says that if she scratched or cause marks on the husband, then they were caused by her attempts to defend herself, or to flee from his violence.

B. The Husband’s Abuse of the Wife During the Marriage

[198] The manner in which the wife was treated violently by the husband is another matter. The wife says that the husband’s abuse was verbal, emotional and physical. She says he criticized her constantly regarding her domestic duties not meeting his standards, her physical appearance, and her relationships with friends and family.

[199] The wife says that the husband kicked her, beat her with objects and slapped her. The abuse occurred when she was pregnant. The wife says that she often hid bruises with her hair, glasses and clothes. She says she had black eyes. She says that the husband would apologize and there would then be a period where he was nice to her, but the abuse continued.

[200] During her in court testimony, the wife described the first incident of violence that occurred, soon after she came to Australia following the ceremonial wedding. She says that she was ironing some clothes and she pulled the iron’s plug out of the wall, which caused a spark, and that upset the husband.

[201] The wife says the husband got angry and punched her in the face. The wife says she ran into the bedroom to get away from him. The husband followed her into the bedroom and kicked her. The wife testified that the parties were having work done on the outside of the home. She worried the contractors could hear. The wife says that the husband walked out of the house after the incident occurred, and acted as if nothing happened in the presence of the contractors.

[202] Notably, the husband admitted during his testimony, that he had discussed the issue of the sparks coming from the electric sockets with the wife. He denied that he was violent towards her relating to the electric sockets. In any event, the wife says the husband apologized to her after the incident, and she accepted the apology thinking the parties would move on. She says she didn’t realize then, that this would be the first of a number of incidents or a pattern of violence in the relationship.

[203] The husband went to Mongolia for work shortly after she came to Australia. The wife testified that shortly after the husband’s return from Mongolia, the next incident of violence happened. The wife recalled the husband beating her up, because the house was not clean the way the husband wanted it. This is when the wife went to work the next day with a black eye and a swollen face. She told her work colleague, that she had fallen down the stairs, but explained to the Court when she testified that their house didn’t even have stairs. She testified that her colleague disbelieved her, and took her out for lunch. During the lunch meeting, she disclosed the abuse to her colleague.

[204] Caroline is the former colleague of the wife’s from Australia. She filed a trial affidavit and was called to testify by the wife. Caroline had not seen the wife since she left Australia in 2016, and while aspects of her memory failed as a result of the passage of time, Caroline recalled key specific details of what had transpired.

[205] In her trial affidavit, Caroline recalls that in 2011or 2012, the wife came to work with a pronounced black eye. At first, the wife denied that the husband had caused it. Later that day, the wife confided in Caroline, that the husband had punched her. While Caroline could not recall the details of what the wife said had led to this violence, she did recall that the wife told her this had not been the first time he was violent towards her.

[206] The wife testified about another incident that occurred when she was pregnant with Am. She said this would have been during her first trimester (so likely in late 2012) and she had morning sickness. The paternal grandmother was in the home. The wife recalled being unable to eat, and said there was an argument about that. The wife described being on the floor, and she remembered the husband was careful not to hit her on the stomach, but he punched her in the head. The wife says she fled into the bathroom, and the husband was screaming at her. The wife says that later on, the paternal grandmother came to her, and told her that as a woman, she had to take the abuse and not to complain. The paternal grandmother denied having said this during this trial, but she did admit in cross-examination that some matters should be “settled” within the family. I accept the wife’s say-so, that the paternal grandmother, who is also incredible, told her that her role as a woman was to endure the husband’s abuse.

[207] The wife says that after Am. was born, she had no choice but to tell her parents about the abuse that was happening, especially when the next incident occurred. Am. was about two months old at the time. The wife had planned to go to the gym, but there was an argument beforehand about something, and out of the blue, the husband slapped her across the face. The husband then ordered the wife into the car and dropped her off at the gym.

[208] The wife was distraught. She says she did not have any money with her, and she was fearful about whether the husband would come and pick her up. The wife panicked, afraid about how she would get back to newborn Am., so she called her mother. During her call, the wife saw the husband arrive to pick her up. She didn’t want the husband to see her talking on the phone, but her parents and sister continued to call, to try to elicit more information, and the husband learned about her call.

[209] In both her trial affidavit, and during her in court testimony, the wife said that her parents and sister wanted to call the police, and they told the husband to stop. The wife says that in retaliation, the husband’s mother took Am. away from her, and locked herself in a room in the house. The wife says the husband told her to pack her bags and leave, unless her parents and sister backed off. The wife begged her parents not to call the police.

[210] In her trial affidavit, the wife’s sister says that “not long after the marriage”, her parents called her, and were extremely distressed that the husband had been beating her sister. The wife’s sister said that when she called her sister to discuss, she could tell that the wife was on speaker phone, with the husband listening on in the background, and he was making comments in the background. The wife’s sister said she tried to get her sister to leave the relationship, but she did not.

[211] The wife’s sister deposed that on one occasion in 2012 or 2013, she managed to speak to her sister alone, when the husband wasn’t home. During that call, her sister reported to her, some of the abuse she was then enduring, which included being hit with shoes and his fists, and being dragged by the hair.

[212] The wife’s sister says in her trial affidavit, that after the gym incident, she reached out to Caroline. In her trial affidavit, Caroline confirms that she spoke to the wife’s sister in around November of 2013. Caroline says that the wife’s sister was concerned about the wife’s safety and wanted to explore what could be done to keep the wife safe from violence. Caroline recalled a further conversation with the wife’s sister in early 2014, during which the wife’s sister reported that another incident occurred, and she asked Caroline to check on the wife, to ensure that she was safe.

[213] The wife’s sister recounted in her trial affidavit, that over the years of this marriage, she saw her sister lose her voice to speak for herself, and lose her will to fight for what she wanted and believed. She found this upsetting, because she pictured her sister becoming a successful lawyer.

[214] There were written communications between the parties during the marriage, that allude to abuse going on. In the first of such messages that I was shown, the wife’s upset and fear is palpable. On September 23, 2013, the wife sent the husband an email in which she seemingly took responsibility for the problems in the marriage, and in which she seemingly took responsibility for the abuse that she had been enduring. One of the paragraphs of her email, reveals the amount of fear that the wife was then experiencing. It reads:

I know I’ve done some terrible things and that I’m not the most cleanest and the tidiest person in the world but I do try my best. Every time I do something around the house the first thing that comes to my mind is I will be scolded for this. cos it seems like no matter what I did there was always something wrong with it. I live my life being scared every single day, scared of what I did wrong, what I will do wrong what people will say about met etc. I’m really sorry for everything I’ve broken, everything that happened, I know how hard you’ve worked to get to this point. I know how hard you work to get us somewhere.

[215] Incidentally, in another paragraph of that email, the wife identifies that the paternal grandmother never liked her, and never will, an observation that was readily apparent to the Court during this trial. But she went on to say though, that she would not stand in between his relationship with his mother.

[216] The next incident of abuse that occurred, happened on January 31, 2015, the day after Av. was born. This was not an incident of physical violence, but it is an example of the husband’s coercive control. The wife was still in the hospital after having just given birth, but the husband refused to bring Am. to the hospital for a visit with her mother and her new brother. The wife says that family friends tried to reason with the husband, but he was seething with anger.

[217] What caused this behaviour, was that the wife had not removed grapes from the fridge, that were going to go bad. It is not just the wife’s say-so about the mess in the fridge that I heard at this trial. The wife tendered an email from the husband dated January 31, 2015, which shows his anger. It reads:

It is not that hard to keep the fridge like this, I spend less than 20 mins, you have no concern for other people’s feelings. I don’t want to talk about it, but next time I feel like this, I won’t be talking I will take action. The whole house is a mess, outside is shining with inside loads of rubbish and untidiness.

[218] The husband nevertheless denied his behaviour. He claimed to have taken the wife to the hospital the night before she gave birth to Av., and said he arranged for family friends to come and care for Am., but he had to return home in the morning to relieve the family friends. He says he returned the next day, and he did take Am. with him to the hospital. He says that he was accused later on, of refusing to take Am. to the hospital. Yet the aforementioned message about the fridge, was written the day after Av.’s birth.

[219] The wife obtained a trial affidavit from her friend from Australia named Upeksha, who also testified. Upeksha went to the hospital when Av. was born, as a result of learning from another friend that the wife was very upset. In her trial affidavit, Upeksha says that when she arrived she found the wife distraught and emotional. She says that the wife told her, that the husband had yelled at her for the house being dirty, and he said he was not going to bring Am. to the hospital to see her. Upeksha went out to buy the wife some personal items. She later went to see the husband.

[220] Upeksha says in her trial affidavit that she made some dinner that evening, and that she and her partner at the time took it over to the parties’ home. She says that the husband was extremely agitated and angry. He complained that the wife had not cleaned the home before going to the hospital, and said he did not want to go visit her. Upeksha gave Am. some dinner, and then told the husband that his wife was really vulnerable, and that his anger was disproportionate. In cross-examination, Upeksha described the husband as appearing visibly angry. She said he had his eyes open wide, and he was grinding his teeth.

[221] If the husband did in fact go to the hospital the next day, it was because of Upeksha’s intervention. But what was proven at trial, was the extent of the husband’s anger over a trivial matter, and that he threatened to use Am. to punish the wife.

[222] The wife’s sister visited the parties in late 2015, or early 2016, at a time that the wife was moving to a new job. In her trial affidavit, the wife’s sister says that she observed the husband “blast” the wife about finances, for leaving her current job. She says he called her an idiot and other derogatory terms, until she broke down and cried.

[223] During this same trip, some friends were supposed to visit, and they had offered to bring lunch. The wife’s sister says they were late, the husband got hungry, and he started to get agitated. When the wife offered to make the husband some food and feed him in advance of the friends’ arrival, he yelled at her. The wife’s sister intervened. She was angry at the husband for mistreating her sister. The husband then went to the garage with the wife. While the wife’s sister did not see what happened in there, she heard a loud noise as if someone had smashed something or pushed someone against the garage door. The wife’s sister observed the wife to run out of the garage in tears, clutching her shoulder, and then go into the bedroom and close the door. The wife’s sister then saw the wife huddling in the corner of the shower crying. The wife’s sister says that when the husband’s friends arrived, the husband greeted them cheerfully, pretending that nothing had happened. The wife’s sister pointed out that Am. had observed the entire incident.

[224] After the friends left, the wife’s sister confronted the husband. The next day, the wife came and pleaded with her sister not to intervene, and told her that the husband had threatened to not let the wife’s sister see the children if she ever “behave[d] like that”.

[225] There was some common ground amongst the parties, that their relationship was better when they lived in Namibia (i.e. not physically violent). The husband testified that it was “probably the best it had ever been”. The wife testified that the abuse stopped when they lived in Namibia. Quite notably, the wife said “I don’t know why that was”. This was remarkable to the Court. The wife when testifying, questioned out loud, why she was given a period of reprieve.

[226] The husband’s physical abuse resumed when the parties were in Singapore. The wife testified about a time when the parties travelled to Sri Lanka in December of 2017 and January of 2018. There was an incident or an argument between the maternal grandmother and the husband while there, but she was not present or involved in it. The wife says that the husband struck her in the face with a suitcase after they returned from the trip in January of 2018, while she was unpacking. The metal part of the suitcase hit her face, and caused her bruising. The wife recounted another occasion where the husband dragged her by the hair in Singapore, and punched her in front of Am.

[227] The wife says the physical abuse stopped yet again, after the parties moved to Canada. She says that when the husband came here in October of 2020, he apologized to her and claimed he had sought counselling. I referred to this earlier. He was of course carrying on with his other relationship in parallel for a least a year if not two by that point, lying to her repeatedly, and gaslighting her. A month or so later, the husband presented her with the divorce documents. The wife felt financially vulnerable, as the husband was then the main breadwinner for the family. Whatever minimal income she earned (recall she was not yet a lawyer), was spent on the household.

[228] The wife told the Court that she rarely talked to the husband about his conduct after the fact, and in any case she forgave him every time. But in another written message to him that she sent on November 15, 2022, the wife did mention the past abuse. She said to the husband “I forgave you for everything you had done because I believed you to be a good person. I never held all the hitting against you. Not once.”

C. The Abuse Allegations Involving the Children

[229] The wife said that while the physical abuse towards her stopped in Canada, it shifted to the children. The evidence that the Court heard about the husband’s alleged abuse of the children emanated from the wife’s observations, her sister’s evidence, and statements the children have made about the abuse towards them, or violence they say they observed their father engage in towards their mother.

[230] In terms of the professional evidence, the Court heard from Gabrielle Zazzarino, a clinician from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer who prepared a Voice of the Child Report dated July 15, 2025 pursuant to the Order of Shaw J dated April 25, 2025, and from Lourdes Geraldo, who is now involved in reunification therapy principally between the father and the children. Both witnesses have noted some consistency in the children’s statements, although Ms. Geraldo would not draw any conclusions from that during the first part of this trial, when she testified.

[231] Children and Family Services for York Region (the “Society”) investigated the allegations. On December 23, 2024, the Society verified “Physical Force and/or Maltreatment pertaining to the father”. The verification was based on the consistency in the children’s statements, too. Society worker Muyhi Salih testified and was cross-examined.

D. The Wife’s Therapy

[232] On September 18, 2024, twelve days after the wife discovered the husband’s re-marriage, the wife accessed therapy from Suweetha Astorga. Ms. Astorga is a registered psychotherapist with the College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario. The wife called Ms. Astorga to testify.

[233] Ms. Astorga prepared a psychological treatment report that detailed various sessions that she had with the wife, between September of 2024, up to the first part of 2026. The extent of the impact of this relationship on the wife is evident. The wife reported emotional distress and anxiety throughout her sessions. She reported feeling shocked, hopeless, betrayed, and confused. She reported feeling exploited. She reported feeling re-victimized. She reported finding the legal process emotionally challenging. She reported feelings of anxiety about this case, particularly since she had to self-represent due to financial constraints. She reported feeling overwhelmed. On October 9, 2024, she sobbed in session and said “I don’t understand”.

E. Findings of Fact and Conclusions Regarding Intimate Partner Violence

[234] A not insignificant amount of the parties’ written closing submissions were devoted to addressing the admissibility of the children’s hearsay statements about the violence. The husband denies that he was violent towards either the wife or the children, and says that before September of 2024, he had a wonderful relationship with the children. He accuses the wife of engaging in alienation.

[235] I have chosen not to address the violence as it concerns the children now. The husband’s counsel urged the Court to approach this evidence some caution at this time, as there is now a custody and access assessment that is going to happen (see below). I agree it is prudent to wait until the assessor inquires as part of his assessment, into the children’s statements, and what might be drawn from any of the professionals’ observations as to any consistency in their statements. Additional findings as it concerns the children can be made in the second part of the trial, that will deal with the parenting issues. It is not necessary for me to address the children’s evidence right now to address either the validity of the foreign divorce, the income and support issues that are before the Court at this time, or the sale of the matrimonial home. My choice to not address this evidence is also relevant to the Court’s analysis about the husband’s request for a confidentiality Order, also below.

[236] I am not prepared to defer dealing with the allegations of violence between the parties however. It was clear to the parties and to the Court at the Trial Management Conference on May 27, 2026, that the wife intended to call that evidence, and her reliance on intimate partner violence is central to the claims respecting the foreign divorce. The parties would have been aware of this each time that they proposed to proceed with a bifurcated hearing. While the husband obtained the order for a custody and access assessment and achieved having the parenting issues dealt with later, that does not prevent the Court from dealing with the violence claims now, where relevant to the issues that are properly before me.

[237] I find the wife to be credible in her accounts of what happened to her. I find this on a stand alone basis. She does not need to be corroborated. But it is also important to mention that aspects of her evidence about multiple forms of the intimate partner violence that she endured, were corroborated by Caroline, Upeksha, and her sister. This included not only Caroline’s evidence of a contemporaneous statement that the wife made to her, introduced to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, but also Caroline’s specific observation of a physical injury on the wife (i.e. the black eye).

[238] I did not find persuasive, the husband’s end of trial arguments, that the wife’s failure to call her mother or another co-worker in Australia, should result in adverse inferences being drawn against her about the intimate partner violence. The wife chose not to call her mother, because she said she wanted to “leave her out of this”. It was not clear to me that the maternal grandmother or the other co-worker even observed anything. They may have been persons to whom the wife made a recent complaint at the time.

[239] Even if they had observed something more, the wife was not required to call every single person who might have witnessed or heard something, or have been told something. She was entitled to rest on the credibility of her own evidence of the abuse. And she called three other witnesses to address her credibility and their observations. She introduced written communications. This is sufficient evidence.

[240] I likewise found unpersuasive another complaint made during this trial that the wife has only been seeing her current therapist (at times inconsistently) since she discovered the husband’s re-marriage to his other partner, yet she had seen prior therapists before. I find this similar argument that the Court should draw an adverse inference from the failure to call those other therapists suffers the same fate. Perhaps there would have been other evidence from those therapy sessions had it been called, either about the wife’s own supposed anger (i.e. in support of the husband’s allegations that the wife was the violent one), or relevant to other allegations in this case, such as whether there was a 2019 separation. But that is not where the overwhelming weight of the evidence that I do have leads me. If the husband thought this was a matter of significance and wanted productions from those other therapists, he ought to have brought a pre-trial motion for disclosure. Incidentally, recall that the wife testified that the husband told her, upon his arrival in Ontario in October 2020, that he had sought treatment in Singapore. If that was even true, then he didn’t produce his therapy records from that time period either.

[241] I find the wife was subjected to name calling, bullying, and criticism from the husband about her housekeeping, bullying and criticism from the paternal grandmother, threats respecting taking the children away from her, and physical violence on several occasions. The physical violence happened over a period of time in Australia. It was repeated in Singapore. The husband’s behaviour regarding the signing of the foreign divorce documents was an act of coercive control. What happened cannot be viewed in isolation or detached from the context of this history in their relationship.

[242] There was a financial imbalance in this relationship. Whether or not the parties had joint accounts at different points in time as the husband argued, misses the point. The parties have four children. Even though the wife is now a lawyer again, she is financially dependent on the husband. Her career was secondary to the husband’s. At the time that the divorce documents were signed, she had not yet re-qualified as a lawyer in Ontario. Her income that year, while caring for four children, was $38,283.00. This is important context when considering the wife’s statement, that she was fearful of the financial repercussions of not complying.

[243] The husband engaged in gaslighting behaviour towards the wife throughout the relationship. This is relevant to the assessment of intimate partner violence. At ¶ 158-159 of Barreto v. Salema, 2024 ONSC 4972, Vella J. described “gaslighting” as:

158… a type of pervasive behaviour in which the perpetrator artificially creates scenarios, the objective of which is to convince the victim that he/she/they are crazy. The aim is to have the victim question their perception of reality. According to the Cambridge Dictionary (online version) gaslighting is a noun that means “the action of tricking or controlling someone by making them believe things that are not true, especially by suggesting that they may be mentally ill”. The dictionary describes gaslighting as a form of psychological abuse.

159According to the Meriam-Webster dictionary, gaslighting is defined as the “psychological manipulation of a person usually over an extended period of time that causes the victim to question the validity of their own thoughts, perception of reality, or memories and typically leads to confusion, loss of confidence and self esteem, uncertainty of one’s emotional or mental stability, and a dependency on the perpetrator”.

[244] There are many examples of this, and many revolve around the husband’s lies to the wife about his other relationship. The husband moved his other partner into the apartment in Singapore the day the children left. He returned to the wife regularly, when his other partner was away, or when they broke up, or when it was otherwise convenient for him. He led the wife to believe that his other partner was a stalker. He kept his other relationship secret in 2022 and 2023, by making promises to move home and be a better partner. He sent sexual text messages to the wife, while he was with his other partner. On the day of his wedding, he made plans with the wife to keep the rouse going. He tried to lie to the wife about his Ajax property.

[245] While I address the foreign divorce below, I have little hesitation in concluding here that the wife lacked free will when she signed those documents. The husband’s repeated lies to the wife and the manner in which he engaged in his deceit amounts to psychological abuse, that has caused her harm, for which she is now seeking therapy. The wife is suffering from trauma, and she has been suffering from trauma throughout. It bears repeating that the wife’s therapist’s report said that on October 9, 2024, while sobbing in session, the wife said “I don’t understand”. The wife’s sister’s saw her sister severely depressed at the end of 2022. Her powerful observation of her sister’s broken spirit during this marriage, is also worth repeating.

[246] Although the husband cannot gaslight the Court since gaslighting occurs in an intimate relationship, the husband did engage in narrative spinning with the Court. Examples discussed already elsewhere include:

(a) The husband had multiple stories and excuses to support his narrative that there was a 2019 separation and that the wife was the driving force behind the foreign divorce. He relied on arguments, and even claimed his computer, emails and social media had been hacked on several occasions;

(b) The husband borrowed from the wife’s evidence about not having read or received the foreign divorce application. He then used her narrative to try to explain away his Will;

(c) The husband accused the wife of infidelity in relation to the 2022 pregnancy and abortion. He was the one who was unfaithful;

(d) The husband twisted and tried to misinterpret for the Court, some of the documentary evidence;

(e) The husband tried to portray himself as the victim of violence. He was the aggressor; the wife was the victim; and

(f) The husband even tried to assert that he was a victim of the wife’s gaslighting, by proactively telling the Court that that the wife was blaming him for things, that in fact she had done to him.

[247] I do not find the husband’s allegations that the wife abused him to be credible.

PART V: PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

A. Summary of the Prior Proceedings

[248] During the prior proceedings, the parties and/or their counsel proposed to three different judges, three different ways to bifurcate the question of the validity of the Australian divorce, among other issues, from the rest of the trial. Before turning to the analysis of the issues currently before the Court, I will explain what happened during the prior proceedings, and why this Court embarked upon another Trial Management Conference on May 27, 2026, before starting the trial. There is also one interim consent Order of Shaw J. dated April 25, 2024, that is relevant to the temporary support issues and the sale of the matrimonial home that I was called upon to decide during this trial, that requires some mention.

[249] The first event in this case was a case conference before Shaw J. on April 25, 2025.[18] The parties signed temporary Minutes of Settlement, which were incorporated into a temporary Consent Order that day. The temporary Minutes/Consent Order provided that the parties would exchange Requests for Information and answer them, and they provided for the release of notes and records from the Society, for the release of information from Am.’s therapist, for the release of hospital records concerning an incident involving N., and for the release of records from the Ontario lawyer who signed the Australian divorce documents with the parties. The temporary Minutes/Consent Order also provided that the parties and the children would start reunification therapy with Lourdes Geraldo, to work on the father’s relationship with the children.

[250] The parties agreed in the temporary Minutes/Consent Order that the matrimonial home would not be sold pending a resolution of the property issues, or pending further agreement of the parties or Court order. They also agreed that the husband would start paying 77% of various section 7 expenses based on his annual income in his 2024 Notice of Assessment. There are terms that govern the exchange of receipts and reimbursement. The temporary settlement lists specifically the categories of section 7 expenses to be shared.

[251] The wife next tried to bring a 14B Motion to seek an urgent motion date for support. That 14B Motion went before Himel J. on July 28, 2025. The husband opposed it. Himel J. dismissed the wife’s request, noting that she had not provided “full and accurate evidence” including disclosing the “non-support financial contributions made by the other party”. She also noted the proximity of this request for an urgent motion to an upcoming settlement conference, and said the step might instead be a November trial. While that was Himel J.’s purview, this Court now has more comprehensive evidence about the “non-support financial contributions made by the other party” and it finds that a support order is indeed appropriate. With the benefit of hindsight, this case ended up not being ready for trial in November 2025; it was still not even ready for a trial on all issues by the time it came before me in May of 2026.

[252] At the Settlement Conference on August 7, 2025, Shaw J. granted leave for there to be a long motion about the validity of the Australian divorce, as well as a motion for the sale of the home and child support. This was the first form of bifurcation that got put in place. Neither motion was then brought, nor with the benefit of hindsight that I now have, could the questions about the validity of the foreign divorce have been dealt with by way of a motion anyway, given the volume of evidence that the parties tendered and the numerous credibility issues that have been raised.

[253] Jarvis J. heard the first Trial Scheduling Conference on January 15, 2026. His Endorsement was somewhat critical of the parties’ approach to this case, and included some commentary about the length of the parties’ witness lists.

[254] On the parties’ Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form, the parties listed all issues for trial. Yet on page 22 of the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form, the parties also flagged for the trial judge that there “will need to be a bifurcated trial on the equalization issues” as the parties had been unable to have the validity of the Australian divorce determined beforehand. This confusing statement, which conflicted with the earlier listing of all issues for trial, seemed to defer to the trial judge whether equalization would proceed, or not.

[255] Next, the husband filed a 14B Motion dated February 27, 2026 seeking a custody and access assessment pursuant to section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. In her responding 14B Motion, the wife objected for various reasons, including the proximity of the request to the May 2026 trial sittings, the availability of other evidence rendering it unnecessary, and the fact that this could now result in the parenting issues being further bifurcated too, leading to the possibility of three trials. In the alternative, the wife asked to bifurcate and move the parenting issues to November, and she sought certain other terms respecting the assessment, and decision-making responsibility in the interim. This 14B Motion was never dealt with.

[256] The parties then appeared before the Court on April 28, 2026, for Trial Readiness Court. Trial Readiness Court in Newmarket is a brief appearance. The purpose of Trial Readiness Court includes to ensure that the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form has been complied with, and to seek direction if it hasn’t been, so that the trial proceeds smoothly. Its purpose is generally not to seek a late in the day adjournment, or to seek a late in the day Order that fundamentally alters the manner in which the case will be presented. But that is what happened.

[257] For some reason, counsel appeared and advised that there would now be a different form of a bifurcated trial (the third bifurcation proposal). It is not clear to me whether the parties brought to the Court’s attention the husband’s pending 14B Motion for the assessment. In any event, based on what was reported to the Court, the Endorsement says that the issues for the first trial, would be child support, spousal support, the parties’ incomes for support purposes, the validity of the Australian divorce, the possession and sale of the home, occupation rent, post-separation adjustments and equitable claims. The Endorsement states that the balance of the issues, being equalization, parenting time, and decision-making, shall be adjourned to the November 2026 sittings. The stated reason for this different bifurcation Order, was that the parties were in reunification therapy, and the issue of equalization depended on the validity of the foreign divorce. What the Court was told about equalization (i.e. that it depended on a ruling about the validity of the foreign divorce), was not legally accurate.

[258] The trial was called in to start on May 27, 2026. When reviewing the trial record and the husband’s and the wife’s trial affidavits beforehand, I developed significant concerns about the manner in which the parties had structured their latest bifurcation proposal. On May 27, 2026, the husband’s counsel advised that she was not even present at Trial Readiness Court when this third bifurcation Order was proposed, having sent a colleague in her place. She was confused as to how the trial could proceed this way. For instance, she assumed the reference to support proceeding now, necessarily meant support on a temporary basis, because the parenting issues were being tried later. But interim issues are not usually litigated by way of a trial.

[259] I converted the first day of the trial into a Trial Management Conference, largely to discuss the wisdom of this new bifurcation plan, that the parties had recently come up with.

B. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning Bifurcation Orders

[260] Rule 12(5) of the Family Law Rules allows for bifurcation. It provides that if it would be convenient to hear two or more cases, claims or issues together to split a case into two or more separate cases, claims or issues, the court may, on motion, order accordingly.

[261] Bifurcation creates a multiplicity of proceedings. Section 138 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, as amended, provides that as far as possible, multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided.

[262] At ¶ 16 of Simioni v. Simioni, 2009 CanLii 934 (Ont. S.C.J.), Quigley J. wrote:

…. it is equally important to remember that the splitting of a trial effectively denies the fundamental principle that as far as possible, multiplicities of proceedings are to be avoided, and thus the power to split a case should be regarded as one that is narrowly circumscribed and to be exercised in only the clearest of cases – in cases that exhibit the exceptional merit that calls upon the Court to exercise its inherent power: Courts of Justice Act, section 138; Elcano, above; Carriero (Litigation Guardian of ) v. Flynn, [2004] O.J. No. 3117 (S.C.J.O.). In light of this caution, the onus necessarily lies upon the party seeking to bifurcate to satisfy the Court on a balance of probabilities that if granted, severance will result in the “just, expeditious and least expensive determination of the proceeding on its merits”.: Merck & Co. v. Brantford Chemicals Inc., 2004 FC 1400, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1704 (F.C.C.) at para 4.

[263] Simioni v. Simioni concerned, as do a number of other reported decisions in family law, whether to bifurcate the issue of the validity of a domestic contract, for example to obviate the need for disclosure, or to narrow its scope later on in a second trial, if the contract is upheld: see also, for example Dove v. Dove, 2016 ONSC 4091, and see in particular the various cases cited at ¶ 13 of Dove v. Dove.

[264] At ¶ 17 of Simioni v. Simioni, Quigley J. set out a number of questions or factors that the Court should consider in deciding whether bifurcation is “just and expedious”, some of which have application here. The factors are:

(a) whether the issues for the first trial are relatively straightforward and the extent to which the issues proposed for the first trial are interwoven with those in the second;

(b) whether a decision from the first trial will likely put an end to the action, significantly narrow remaining issues, or significantly increase the likelihood of settlement;

(c) the extent to which resources have already been devoted to all issues;

(d) the possibility of delay;

(e) the advantages or prejudice the parties are likely to experience;

(f) whether the order sought is on consent or over the objections of one or more of the parties; and

(g) the focus on expediency does not displace fairness and justice as the dominant considerations.

C. Analysis Concerning Bifurcation

[265] While it seems the eventual impetus for the third bifurcation proposal rested in part on the current state of affairs respecting the father’s parenting time (i.e. it is advantageous to him to defer the parenting portion of the trial because he is still having limited visits, he is reunification therapy, and he was seeking a section 30 assessment), the application of the factors from Simioni v. Simioni militated against bifurcation, certainly in the manner proposed on April 28, 2026. What got proposed to the Court did not make sense. A number of the issues that the parties purported to include in the first trial, were intertwined with those in the second trial. The manner in which the parties purported to divide and structure the two trials, would have resulted in the Court making legal errors right from the get go, had it proceeded in the order they proposed.

[266] I have identified six problems with what the late in the day plan that parties came up with:

(a) First, how does the Court decide child support on a final basis, when the parenting issues are not being tried until later. Given that the husband is claiming primary residence or a shared schedule in the alternative, does the Court just make a final child support Order based on the de facto arrangement with the children with the mother now? What if that changes, after the second part of the trial? That is perhaps why the husband’s counsel added during the discussion on the first day of trial, that she thought that the reference to support being included in the first part of the trial was to address temporary support only;

(b) Second, spousal support is decided after child support. So similarly, how does the Court decide spousal support on a final basis now, if child support might change later on (if the trial of the parenting issues results a change in the children’s primary residence)?;

(c) Third, the second reference to bifurcation on page 16 of the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form averred to the possibility that equalization might be addressed later on. That then got repeated in the third bifurcation proposal. But isn’t it preferable to address equalization first, before ruling on spousal support?[19]: . Yet spousal support was supposed to be dealt with in the first trial, and equalization got put over to the second trial;

(d) Fourth, a ruling on whether to recognize (or not) the Australian divorce does not necessarily dispose of equalization. Even if the Court were to recognize the foreign divorce, the Court can still award an equalization payment where the parties’ last common habitual residence was Ontario: see Okmyansky v. Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427. While a ruling recognizing the Australian divorce in this case would result in there being an expired limitation period, the wife had before the Court a claim to extend the limitation period, which was not addressed by the parties at Trial Readiness Court. The Endorsement was silent about when that limitation period issue would be addressed, now or later;

(e) Fifth, there is the dispute about the date of separation in this case, that doesn’t seem to have been raised when the parties presented their bifurcation plan at Trial Readiness Court either. The date of separation dispute is relevant to multiple issues, not just to the validity of the foreign divorce. Yet these various issues were split between two different trials, without adequate regard for when the date of separation would be dealt with. Perhaps as a factual matter, the parties envisioned dealing with it first, but that was not clear; and

(f) Sixth, how does the Court decide the wife’s equitable claims now and equalization later? I suppose if the foreign divorce is recognized and the limitation period is not extended, there would be no equalization payment and so the equitable claims could have proceeded during the first trial. But what if that did not happen? (And that is not the result being Ordered). At ¶ 66-67 of Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, Hoy J.A. wrote:

66In my view, if unjust enrichment as the result of a marriage has been found, and it has been determined that monetary damages can suffice, the aggrieved party’s entitlement under the equalization provisions of the FLA should first be calculated. Where appropriate, s. 5(6) of the FLA, which provides for an unequal division of net family properties where equalization would be unconscionable, should be invoked.

67Below, I calculate the respondent’s entitlement under the equalization provisions of the FLA. I conclude that, in this case, the unjust enrichment arising out of the parties’ marriage is addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions under the FLA. I leave for another day the question of what should be done in those rare cases [my emphasis added] where monetary damages for unjust enrichment arising out of marriage cannot be adequately addressed by the equalization provisions of the FLA.

[267] Because of these numerous problems, I inquired of the parties whether they were ready to proceed with a more fulsome trial (they were not; they do not have valuations complete; the husband is not ready to proceed with parenting). I inquired whether they wanted the whole trial adjourned to November; the wife did not want that. Both wanted the foreign divorce dealt with now. The wife wanted some support, and the husband wanted the Court to address the sale of the property (i.e. the very issues that Shaw J. granted leave for motions, that were never brought (although again, the foreign divorce issue could not have been dealt with by way of motion)).

[268] Moreover, the parties came into the trial with numerous binders prepared, containing thousands of pages of documents. Adjourning the trial in its entirety would have caused delay, and costs thrown away. So the Court opted to ‘re-bifurcate’ the trial.

[269] I recognize that three different judges made three different Orders about the structure of this trial based on the parties’ submissions at the time. But the conduct of the trial is ultimately the domain of the trial judge. Even where there are trial conduct orders made in case management, the trial judge retains discretion to alter them as the trial unfolds. He or she retains that discretion for good reason. While a trial judge should always try to give respect to previous directions made in case management, the trial court is not bound to proceed in a manner previously set before, particularly when legal errors would ensue: see Zafar v. Azeem, 2024 ONCA 15 ¶ 57-60. While I ‘re-bifurcated’ this trial in consultation with the parties, I still strove to apply the previous directions of other judges to the extent possible, and apply the spirit of rule 2 of the Family Law Rules: see Kassabian v. Marcarian, 2025 ONCA 239 ¶ 46. To avoid some of the problems with bifurcation that can ensue, such as the duplication of evidence or the risk of inconsistent findings, I agreed to remain seized of the second part of the trial. It is important that there be single judge case management in this case going forward until the second part of the trial occurs.

[270] Even then, my new bifurcation Order ended up being imperfect. After having heard some of the evidence, I am of the view that aspects of the determination of the husband’s income on a final basis now need to go over to the second trial.

[271] In conclusion, it appears to this Court that the parties or counsel did not pay sufficient attention to how to achieve bifurcation. In the future, there should be a different approach taken in other cases.

[272] Rule 12(5) makes reference to achieving bifurcation on motion. It seems to me that in the future, the preferable procedure to obtain a bifurcation Order would be to argue a formal motion, that contains as part of the motion record a detailed plan, parties or counsel should be prepared to make fulsome legal submissions about the aforementioned factors such as those from Simioni v. Simioni, and about the pros and cons of bifurcating, and they should set those arguments out in a factum.

[273] Or, where bifurcation is sought and ordered pursuant to the case management powers in rule 1(7) or 17(8) of the Family Law Rules, such as such as at a Trial Management Conference where one of the purposes is to decide how the trial will proceed (see rule 17(6)(c)), it would be helpful for the case management judge to be provided with a similar plan and proper submissions. It certainly would have been helpful to me as the trial judge, when preparing to start the trial, to have been given some kind of advance understanding as to the logic that went into why the parties felt this third bifurcation proposal was a good idea.

[274] It will most often be problematic, and too late, to be thinking about bifurcation at the 11^th hour, such as a at a Trial Readiness Court appearance, as was done here.

D. Other Aspects of the Conduct of this Trial

[275] The trial then commenced on May 28, 2026. It was heard over ten days (in addition to the first day which I converted into an appearance in the nature of trial management). Even though the trial was bifurcated, it was quite involved, both in terms of the number of witnesses called, and the documentary tendered evidence. The parties cumulatively called 15 witnesses, themselves included. In an attempt to economize on trial time, affidavits for most of the witnesses were tendered in substitution for some of their evidence-in-chief, the witnesses all testified in chief in addition, and they were cross-examined, but numerous days were still required.

[276] The parties cumulatively tendered 24 binders of exhibits, plus the trial record and a binder containing the trial affidavits.[20] The documents in the binders appear to be thousands of pages in length (I did not count them), not all of which were entered into evidence. By the end of the trial, between them, the parties had introduced 145 exhibits.

[277] The Court released daily trial endorsements about the conduct of the trial or scheduling as the trial unfolded, most of which I need not discuss further. That said, the parties came into his trial without any expert evidence about the law of Australia. I raised whether the absence of that necessitated an adjournment, but no one sought one. In my mid-trial Endorsement of June 1, 2026, I endorsed what I had been told, that there would be submissions at the end of the trial about whether the Court could “take judicial notice of Australian statutes/law”. The end of trial submissions were not entirely limited to judicial notice.

[278] The Court also made certain mid-trial production Orders as the evidence unfolded, such as about the production of Montreal police records.

E. The Mid-Trial Order for A Custody and Access Assessment

[279] Neither the husband’s 14B Motion dated February 27, 2026, nor the wife’s response to it, had been dealt with prior to trial for some reason. The husband’s request for the section 30 assessment was brought to my attention on May 27, 2026 during the overall discussion about how this trial was going to proceed. As it turned out, by the time the parties appeared before me that day, they were consenting to the assessment, although terms had to be worked out. I was told that Ms. Geraldo, had also recommended that the parties obtain a section 30 assessment, and she would later testify to that effect when she was called.

[280] By June 2, 2026, the parties sorted out the terms of the custody and access assessment. I made an Order appointing Ricardo Theodoluz to undertake the assessment on consent, and imposed some terms respecting the parties’ cooperation, disclosure to be provided to him, and payment, all on consent.

[281] By the time of the closing submissions, it was brought to my attention that this assessment has not started. While I refrained from delving too far into the reasons for that, it is important that the parties get it underway. During the closing submissions, the husband’s counsel undertook to advise Mr. Theodoluz that this Judgment was outstanding. In view of the Court’s findings herein, it is important that he be supplied with it, upon its release.

PART VI: CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY

[282] At ¶ 36 of Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283, the Court wrote that there are many tools for assessing credibility, namely:

(a) the ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’s evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and the testimony of other witnesses;

(b) the ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness’ testimony;

(c) the ability to assess whether the witness’ testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”, but in doing so the Court is not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behavior;

(d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanor of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution (R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 ¶ 70-75); and

(e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence (R. v. J.H., 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA) ¶ 51-56).

[283] At ¶ 41 of R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, Watt J.A. wrote:

Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness’ veracity, reliability with the accuracy of the witness’ testimony. Accuracy engages consideration of the witness’ ability to accurately observe, recall and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue is not credible cannot give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility on the other hand, is not a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence.

[284] Credibility and reliability were very clearly significant issues at this trial. The husband was not a credible witness, nor was his mother. I have already addressed to some degree the husband’s credibility when reciting the factual history and when addressing family violence. But in general, I will repeat again here that the husband lied directly, or through omission to the wife, to his other partner, and even to his own mother over the years. He provided false information to the Australian Court, and ultimately he tried to tailor his evidence to this Court, to fit a false narrative.

[285] As the Court also wrote at ¶ 37 of Re Novak Estate, “[t]here is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’ testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’ evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’ evidence. (see R. v. D.R., 1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996 2 SCR 291 at ¶ 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).” But the husband’s deceit has been so extensive and so varied, that this is not a situation where I can find him credible on some issues and not on others, in relation to the issues currently before me during this part of the trial.

[286] This decision is lengthy, in part because of the husband’s approach to the voluminous evidence that should have otherwise been either admitted to. Even where there is a document that supported the wife’s narrative, the husband often cherry-picked, or interpreted the document for the Court out of context, to advance his false narrative. In part because of the extent of that deceit and his approach to the evidence, I found it necessary to plot in some detail, the evidence of what went on in each relationship chronologically.

[287] The husband’s other partner testified during this trial as indicated. There were aspects of her testimony that were inaccurate. She also withheld documents, either on her own or in concert with the husband, that ought to have been produced earlier than during the trial (i.e. the Montreal police records).

[288] There were, however, aspects of the husband’s other partner’s evidence that were credible and reliable. What the Court found quite remarkable, was the extent to which the husband’s other partner’s evidence confirmed that she too, had been lied to by the husband, repeatedly. Aspects of her evidence confirmed that the husband had in fact continued in a relationship with the wife, while he pursued a relationship with her at the same time.

[289] The paternal grandmother was not a credible witness. She very clearly has never liked the wife; this was evident right from the outset of her testimony. One of the first things she said during her testimony, was that when she visited the parties early on after the marriage, “it was nothing very special”. She criticized the wife during her in court testimony over trial matters, going back as early in 2011.

[290] In cross-examination, the paternal grandmother claimed that the wife was entirely responsible for every difficulty in the marriage. While that may be her perspective, it was hardly the truth, and her views about that are far from reliable. Her account of the history of the relationship conveniently aligned too closely with the husband’s timeline, particularly her evidence about when it started to break down. The husband was clearly the source of some of the evidence that was elicited from the paternal grandmother, whether in her trial affidavit or during her evidence-in-chief.

[291] In an unbalanced fashion, the paternal grandmother saw fit to describe the wife as difficult and abusive, but did not once mention any of the husband’s abuse, some of which she observed. She instead claimed that she never observed any abusive behaviour from her son. Some of what she said, was contradicted by other witnesses, whom I find credible, like the parties’ nanny, the wife’s former colleague Caroline, her former friend Upeksha, and the wife’s sister. The paternal grandmother was even involved in some of the husband’s acts of violence, such as when she took the parties’ eldest child Am. into the bedroom. I believe the wife, when she said that the paternal grandmother told her that her role as a woman, was to endure the abuse.

[292] The paternal grandmother’s misplaced loyalty to her own son was formed based on not knowing all of the important information, that the Court now knows. The paternal grandmother did not even seem to realize that she had been lied to repeatedly by her son too, either directly or by omission. The paternal grandmother did not know that the husband had carried on an affair for years on end. While she does now know that the husband had remarried, she found out about it after the fact.

[293] The husband’s friend, Ishara, was generally credible, but he gave some evidence about his observations of this relationship that was both dated, and which I did not find reliable. He did not have good insight into the home when the parties lived in Australia. He knew very little about what went on after the parties left Australia. In keeping with the fact that family violence often occurs behind closed doors, I found Ishara’s evidence that he did not observe much conflict between the parties between 2014 and 2016 to be of little value. I find on a balance of probabilities that there is an inaccuracy in his trial affidavit, about his and the husband’s travel together in more recent years, that is relevant to the 2022 pregnancy and the abortion, addressed already.

[294] Rishi Singh is the Ontario lawyer, called by the father, who commissioned the divorce documents on November 27, 2020. He had no memory of his participation in the events in question. While he testified about his usual practice, beyond establishing that he met with the parties briefly and supplied no independent legal advice to the wife, whether about her rights in Australia (which he could not supply), or about the potential loss of rights in Ontario (which he could have theoretically supplied, but did not), his evidence was not helpful. It was also unreliable.

[295] The husband, as the applicant, called his case first. He sought to challenge the wife’s and her witnesses’ credibility before they testified. Trial affidavits had been exchanged before the start of the trial, so he knew for the most part what they would say. His challenges to their credibility focused on minor inconsistencies. Major points of substance were not undermined. In general, neither the wife, nor any of her fact witnesses, were seriously impugned in cross-examination.

[296] I found the wife and her fact witnesses to be credible generally, and their evidence reliable. I have already addressed why I found the wife credible in her accounting of the family violence. The wife’s witnesses Caroline and Upeksha were credible in their accounts too.

[297] The wife’s sister, although obviously supportive of her sister, was a compelling witness. She not only testified about the husband’s abuse of her sister that she observed, but she told the Court about how this marriage caused her sister to have a broken spirit.

[298] The Court did however have two concerns about the wife’s credibility. First, the wife was identified as single on certain Canadian tax returns after the husband’s date of separation and before hers. She is identified otherwise on certain Australian tax returns. Frankly, I am left searching for an explanation for this at the end of this trial. But that is but one piece of an overwhelming amount of other evidence, the weight of which very much supports a later date of separation. Notably, there are also inconsistencies in the husband’s tax filings too. While he would have the Court focus on how he filed his taxes in Canada, when the husband filed his Singapore tax return for 2020 (due in 2021), after the date of the divorce, he claimed a deduction for having a spouse. He filed his 2021 and 2022 tax returns in Canada as an Ontario resident, even though he claimed to have been primarily resident in Quebec for the majority of 2021 (and for part of 2022).

[299] Second, the husband made submissions at the end of the trial, about the fact that the wife signed sworn documents submitted to the Australian Court, at a time that she was a former Australian lawyer, and an aspiring Ontario lawyer. He made submissions about the fact that the wife didn’t take timely and adequate steps thereafter, to inquire into what had been filed with the Court in Australia, if in fact she hadn’t been given a copy of the documents as she maintained. I have considered these arguments seriously and closely, particularly that a former Australian lawyer, and an aspiring Ontario lawyer, should not have knowingly signed false documents under oath.

[300] All of which has to be considered in the full context of this shocking record as a whole. While the wife’s conduct in signing the documents was an exercise in poor judgment, the Court is mindful that she did this in circumstances of significant intimate partner violence. The Court is mindful of the myths and stereotypes that are not to affect legal reasoning, and those myths and stereotypes play no role in the Court’s analysis.

[301] In conclusion, where there is a conflict in the parties’ accounts, and particularly in the absence of some objective documentary evidence, I prefer the wife’s accounts. That includes the Court’s assessment of intimate partner violence. I do not accept the husband’s counter-assertion that he was abused by the wife. If she touched him inappropriately, she did so while defending herself as she said.

[302] Even where there is a corroborating document on a relevant matter, I have found it necessary to approach the husband’s read of it with caution to neutralize any of the ‘spin’ that went on during this trial.

PART VII: CONFIDENTIALITY

[303] The husband in his written closing submissions asks the Court to initialize the parties’ and the children’s names, and the names of others that if published, might identify the children. The husband’s submissions focus on the evidence that was called about the children. Less prominent in his submissions although still referenced, is a focus on the sensitive evidence that the parties called about themselves too, the publication of which might have an effect on the children.

[304] The husband even references the fact that the wife had an abortion. Even though she is not seeking a confidentiality order on the same terms, the husband talks about the desirability of being sensitive to any stigma that might flow from publication about the abortion in this Judgment.

[305] Unlike in Ontario child protection cases where there is a statutory prohibition against making public certain identifying information, no such mandatory prohibition exists in non-child protection family law cases. Ontario could have but has not chosen to legislate that. Ontario has instead opted for legislated or regulated discretionary limits on court openness, such as through sections 135 to 137 of the Courts of Justice Act, section 70 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, and rule 1.3 of the Family Law Rules. This includes limiting access to the Court file. There are no parallel provisions in the Divorce Act, but section 70 of the Children’s Law Reform Act informs the exercise of discretion under section 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act in proceedings under the Divorce Act: see Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 437 ¶ 10-11.

[306] The Supreme Court in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 confirmed that the open court principle is constitutionally guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: see ¶ 1 and 30. There is a strong presumption in favour of the open court principle: see ¶ 2.

[307] A valid legislative enactment can operate as a limit to the open court principle: see Sherman Estate v. Donovan ¶ 38. The legislative enactments that apply in this case are not mandatory; they provide for the exercise of discretion. The test in Sherman Estate v. Donovan informs the appropriate exercise of discretion under those legislative enactments in the Courts of Justice Act or the Children’s Law Reform Act: see Kirby v. Woods ¶ 14. In the result, the Court is required to protect children’s sensitive information in a way that minimally intrudes on court openness: see Kirby v. Woods ¶ 15

[308] Despite the strong presumption in favour of the open court principle, courts can and do still make discretionary orders that impose limits on the principle, such as a ban on publication: see Sherman Estate v. Donovan ¶ 3. Exceptional circumstances may arise where competing interests justify a restriction to the open court principle.

[309] At ¶ 37-38 of Sherman Estate v. Donovan, the Supreme Court set out the test to order a discretionary limit on openness. A request for the initialization of the parties’ names, the children’s names, and the names of others that if published, might identify the children, is a request for a discretionary limit on openness. Such an order may be made where openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest, where necessary to prevent the serious risk because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and as a matter of proportionality, where the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

[310] Regarding the first branch of the test, it is well established that the protection of children is an important public interest worthy of protection. In A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, 1982 CanLii 14 (S.C.C.), at pages 186 and 187, the Supreme Court wrote that the protection of the innocent is a “social value of superordinate importance”.

[311] It is well established that the publication of private or sensitive information about a child is harmful. Although Abella J. was writing about the non-publication provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, it is well known that publication can make children more vulnerable to greater psychological and social stress: see R. v. S.B., 2008 SCC 25 ¶ 87; see also Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 437, which addresses the importance of protecting children’s privacy rights. There are different kinds of harm to a child that could flow from the publication of private or sensitive information. The focus of the submissions in this case before me, was on a threat to the children’s dignity, and on the psychological harm that could flow from publication.

[312] But there is another important public interest here, that in this case is in competition with the public interest concerning children’s privacy. There is a public interest in protecting the “proper administration of justice”: see Sherman Estate v. Donovan ¶ 41. Sometimes the need to prevent a risk to an important public interest like the “proper administration of justice” operates in favour of imposing a discretionary limit, as was the case in HSCAS v. M.S., C.D.S. and C.A.D., 2026 ONSC 3038 ¶ 265. But sometimes ensuring openness actually prevents the risk, rather than causing it. As I find below, there was a fraud on a court here. The Court finds that anonymizing the identity of the culprit of that fraud, would harm, rather than protect the proper administration of justice. Persons who engage in a fraud on a court are not generally entitled to protection by way of an anonymity order. Open condemnation of that kind of behaviour enhances the proper administration of justice rather than detracting from it.

[313] Another important public interest here, is the need to ensure that dignity is afforded to victims of intimate partner violence. Participation in a court proceeding can be worrying and stressful. Where a victim seeks a limit on openness, ordering one can encourage other victims to come forward, rather than contributing to a chilling effect. But the wife in this case is not asking for the same kind of initialization Order as the husband. Respecting a victims’ view in the court process that concerns her, is a desirable goal.

[314] The Court specifically asked the wife during closing submissions whether she understood that the Judgment may contain sensitive details about her life, including about the abortion, which the husband raised as a basis for a confidentiality Order. The wife told the Court that she would have preferred to have dealt with this matter entirely out of court, and she tried, but she also understands the importance of the openness principle in the court system. She does not want either her name, or the husband’s name anonymized, given what happened to her.

[315] The Court questions whether the husband’s request for a confidentiality order advanced under the guise of the children’s interests, is little more than a mere attempt to avoid personal embarrassment, or to help him keep private, the harm that he has caused. If so, except to the extent that his concern about embarrassment coincides with an important public interest, it cannot support a claim for confidentiality: see Sherman Estate v. Donovan ¶ 48.

[316] In my view, the benefits of a broader initialization order do not outweigh its risks here. Implementing a more tailored approach in the unique circumstances of this case better addresses the balancing of the competing public interests that I am required to balance. There are reasonably alternative measures here.

[317] Paragraphs ¶ 106-108 of the husband’s written closing submissions refer to the fact that there is sensitive evidence contained in a Voice of the Child Report, the Society’s notes and records, health records, and reunification therapy records. None of the details of that evidence have been referred to in this Judgment, except very briefly in passing. A further confidentiality Order can be sought at the second part of the trial when the parenting issues are addressed, if either side finds such a request to be necessary or appropriate. In the mean time, rule 1.3 of the Family Law Rules already offers a process to protect against access to those additional details in the Court file, that are not mentioned in this Judgment.

[318] I find that initializing the children’s names only strikes the right balance here. It balances the need to be sensitive to the children’s privacy, against the other public interests I have identified, associated with protecting the integrity of the administration of justice, and paying due respect to a victim’s views.

[319] I accept that there is some risk by association, that the children or others might learn of their identities in this Judgment, or in the case of the children they may even come to know of some of the details in it, if their parents’ names are not anonymized. The children are already aware of some of the details as it is (this was revealed when I heard some of the children’s evidence that I opted not to discuss in this Judgment). Nevertheless there are ways to mitigate these concerns, too.

[320] For instance, the Court can order the parties not to discuss the litigation or the contents of this Judgment with the children, with certain exceptions. The children will need to be informed at some point that the matrimonial home is being sold, since they will be moving. They will have to be told of the parenting arrangements, once decided. A focus of the custody and access assessment will undoubtedly include the circumstances under which the husband’s new partner may have involvement in their lives and what the children should be told about that. It is important that these matters be handled sensitively, and some of these issues with professional guidance. There would be no need, for example, for the parents to specifically show the children this Judgment, or review its details with them. Terms in this regard, are set out below.

[321] There is also the issue of notice to the media. At ¶ 25 of Kirby v. Woods, Madsen J.A. said courts should always consider whether notice should be given to the media before implementing any measure that would limit court openness. I have considered whether to require such notice, which the husband did not provide to the media before seeking a confidentiality Order.

[322] Had I imposed a broader Order as sought by the husband, I would have required notice, given the competing interests at stake. The irony is that may have drawn even more attention to this case, that does not currently exist, causing as an unintended consequence, the very thing that the husband seeks to avoid here: the broader publication of identifying information. Given the more tailored Order being granted (initializing the children’s names), I am prepared to dispense with notice as asked. It is hard to fathom why a member of the media would want or need to identify the children’s names, should there be any future media interest in this case.

[323] Finally, on a related matter, it was brought to my attention on June 24, 2026, that the husband’s other partner requested access to the audio recordings of the entire trial, for which judicial authorization is required. I did not grant that authorization. Through the judicial assistant, I instructed that the issue could be raised during the closing submissions. The husband’s other partner was not present during the closing submissions. No request was raised by the husband about this, and the Court forgot to raise the issue with the parties on account of its focus on the live disputes between the parties to this case. I am uncertain if the parties are even aware that the request had been made.

[324] The Court did not intend to summarily dispose of the husband’s other partner’s request, without providing reasons. These are the reasons. The reasons should be brought to the husband’s other partner’s attention.

[325] The husband’s other partner is not a party. No one has asked ever that she be added as a party to this proceeding. She is aware of the existence of the audio recording I presume by reason of having testified at this trial.

[326] Nonetheless it is worthy of mention that in Powell v. Cockburn, 1976 CanLii 29 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada cited in obiter, an earlier, but related lower court decision standing for the proposition that a person does not have standing in a case about the validity of a divorce between two other persons. Similarly, the husband in Abraham v. Gallo, 2022 ONCA 874, who had remarried after a foreign divorce (like the situation here), argued that the Court should recognize foreign divorce in part because his remarriage was pursuant to a government issued marriage license, and there would be chaos and other unintended consequences if the divorce was not recognized. Roberts J.A. rejected that argument, writing that the husband’s situation was “unique and of his own making” and “his personal circumstances cannot overtake the operation of s. 22(3) of the Divorce Act.” The recognition of the foreign divorce in that case was found contrary to public policy. The husband’s new wife was not a party in that case either.

[327] In this case, the husband’s other partner’s request for access to the audio recordings is in essence, an indirect request for access to the Court file, as the audio recordings will contain not only all of the oral evidence, but many details of the documents that have been filed as part of the trial record. As a non-party the husband’s new partner needs to follow the process for access to the file, which includes the recordings. There is no evidence yet before me, that the husband’s other partner followed the process in Rule 1.3 of the Family Law Rules for access, which would have then triggered the process for the parties to seek a restricted access order. If she does, the parties are entitled to oppose that by seeking a restricted access order. [21]

PART VIII: ANALYSIS RESPECTING THE AUSTRALIAN DIVORCE

A. The Absence of Expert Evidence About Foreign Law

[328] Both parties in their written Opening Trial Statements, made reference to the law of Australia. The husband excerpted various sections from Australia’s Family Law Act 1975; the wife made reference to the “Australian Family Law Act” on one occasion.

[329] Both parties in their closing submissions then made reference to various Australian statutory provisions, some overlapping, and some different. The fact that they intended to do this, had not been identified as an issue under “possible problems to flag for trial judge” on page 22 of the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form.

[330] The Court raised the absence of expert evidence on May 27, 2026; neither side sought an adjournment based on the absence that kind of evidence, as indicated.

[331] To the extent that this Court needs to have resort to foreign law (which I find for the most part, I do not need), the husband in his written closing submissions relies on International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2024 SCC 30 by analogy. At ¶ 73-74 of that decision, the Supreme Court held that expert evidence may be permissible regarding certain questions of international law [my emphasis added], where needed for a court to carry out its function. But if the test for admission of expert evidence is not met, judges should proceed with questions about international law as they would for any other question of law, that is on the basis of submissions and the authorities. In other words, the husband argued relying on this case, that he was free to make submissions about the Australian family law statute, without an expert.

[332] The wife argued in her closing submissions that the Court could take judicial notice of various provisions of Australia’s legislation. She seeks to rely on the legislation in support of her forum shopping and public policy arguments. She wants the Court to compare certain provisions in Australia’s legislation, to those in Canada’s or Ontario’s, to aid in coming to the conclusion that those exceptions to the recognition of the foreign divorce have been made out.

[333] I do not find the international law context to be analogous. At ¶ 65 of International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency), before concluding that expert evidence is sometimes required respecting international law (and sometimes it is not), the Supreme Court noted an “important distinction between foreign law and international law”. It said that “foreign law is the domestic law of other states”, which is “treated as a question of fact that has to be pleaded and proved, generally by way of expert evidence”, as opposed to international law, which is different. International law is treated as a question of law, except to the extent required by the legal criteria about the admissibility of expert evidence in any other area of Canadian law. It is treated differently from foreign law.

[334] Nor do I need to have resort to judicial notice, the approach that the wife argued for. Rather, there are specific evidentiary rules about the admissibility of foreign law.

[335] First, regarding the parties’ references to portions of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975, no one referred the Court to section 25 of the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 23, as amended, which reads:

Copies of statutes, official gazettes, ordinances, regulations, proclamations, journals, orders, appointments to office, notices thereof and other public documents purporting to be published by or under the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or of the Imperial Government or by or under the authority of the government or of any legislative body of any dominion, commonwealth, state, province, colony, territory or possession within His Majesty’s dominions, shall be admitted in evidence to prove the contents thereof.

[336] Australia is a member of the commonwealth. Although the recognition of a foreign divorce (or not) is dealt with under the Divorce Act, which is a federal, and not a provincial statute, section 23(1) of the Divorce Act provides for the application of provincial laws of evidence. The statutory provisions that the parties seek to rely can be properly put before me as a result of section 25 of the Evidence Act.

[337] Although both sides referred to various sections, no one actually asked to introduce any of the sections of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 into evidence as an exhibit specifically. No one seems to have considered the possibility that the Court may need to have resort to the specific provisions that were in force at different times either.[22] In the absence of that having occurred, I will simply excerpt the provisions to which each referred the Court, but for accuracy, I do so from the applicable version of the legislation that was in force at the time of the divorce or currently, as the case may be. I also excerpt a few other sections, that neither side referred to, but which are necessary to a proper reading of the sections that they did refer to (such as interpretive provisions). This excerpting can be found in Schedule “A” to this Judgment.

[338] Introducing or seeking to rely on a piece of foreign legislation from another commonwealth jurisdiction under section 25 of the Evidence Act doesn’t answer how this Court is supposed to interpret and apply that foreign legislation (to the extent it needs to). The additional principles that I rely on in that regard are:

(a) Foreign law is “treated as a question of fact that has to be pleaded and proved, generally by way of expert evidence”;

(b) The burden of proving foreign law rests with the party relying on it. However where the application of foreign law and its contents are not actually in dispute and the parties differ only on relevant facts, then those facts are determined in the usual way;

(c) A Canadian court may also dispense with the formal requirement for proof of foreign law where the parties consent. It may be less willing to dispense with formal proof where it would be required to speculate on the effect of the application of foreign statutes to the particular facts in question (see below the discussion about universality);

(d) The Court will usually apply domestic law if foreign law is not pleaded or adequately proved, or if the parties agree to forgo the application of foreign law, even if that results in different relief from that which might be available in the foreign legal system;

(e) Applying domestic law includes applying domestic statutes and case law. However where the foreign statute has been proven by admission, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the court may instead apply domestic rules of construction to the foreign statute; and

(f) The application of domestic law as an alternative may only be appropriate if there is “potentially some degree of universality”: see the Mercury Bell v. Amosin, 1986 CanLii 6832 (F.C.A.). If however there are specific foreign statutory provisions that alter the common law, this may not be possible: see Hellens v. Densmore, 1957 CanLii 50 (S.C.C.) per the majority decision of Cartwright J.

See the specific cases cited above, but see also J. Walker, “Canadian Conflict of Laws”, Volume 2, Lexis Nexis Canada, 7^th Ed. 2005, but with 2023 updates, pages 16-1 to 16-14.

[339] Finally, I address the husband’s counsel’s end of trial argument, that the husband is only relying on certain sections of the statute, that the wife bore the onus to prove foreign law respecting the exceptions to the recognition of a foreign divorce, and that she cannot meet her onus to the extent that she is relying on different sections of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 than the husband is relying upon, because she did not plead that foreign law.

[340] The problem with advancing this argument, is twofold. First, the husband did not specifically plead Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 either. It bears repeating that this is a family law case, where there is a different approach to pleadings: see Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 ¶ 16; see Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799 ¶ 11-17; see also Sethi v. Sethi, 2025 ONSC 5079 ¶ 39-57. Despite the failure of both sides to plead foreign law, both referred to the foreign divorce Order and to facts surrounding how it came into existence repeatedly. The wife specifically plead facts indicating that the Australian Court was given false information. They both made reference to Australia’s legislation in both their Opening Statements and in their written closing submissions, as indicated. The Court raised the issue about the absence of expert evidence before the trial started, and both sides said they wanted to proceed, based on submissions. There is no question that they had notice of the issue.

[341] Second, most of the statutory and common law bases for the recognition of a foreign divorce, and most of the exceptions to its recognition don’t actually require the Court to consider foreign law at all. Almost all of them are decided based on the statutory provisions in the Divorce Act, or domestic common law.

[342] Nevertheless, I am prepared to consider the sections in Australia’s legislation that both sides referred me to, to the extent that I can, and to the extent that I need to. The specifics of how I have done that, follow below where applicable in the analysis.

B. The Evidence Respecting the Completion of the Joint Application for Divorce

(1) The Parties’ Accounts Respecting the Preparation and Filing of the Joint Application for Divorce to the Court in Australia

[343] At the risk of repeating myself, the husband’s position is that he and the wife were already separated when the joint application for divorce got filed, and it was the wife who advised him to apply for a divorce in Australia. He claimed that the entire process was done jointly.

[344] The wife says that on the evening of November 26, 2020, she came home from work. Without any advance warning or prior discussion, the husband demanded that she agree to a divorce. She says he threatened her when she would not agree, saying that she would not be able to financially support the children without his assistance.

[345] The wife says that she was taken to an Ontario lawyer the next day, who witnessed the divorce documents. The appointment lasted no more than a few minutes, and the wife did not know beforehand, that the husband had planned to take her there. The husband’s explanation for this, was that the divorce documents needed to be commissioned, so he and the wife just went to a law office that was near the matrimonial home, to get this done.

[346] This lawyer meeting happened during the Covid-19 pandemic. The wife says that on the way to the appointment, the husband said to her in Sinhalese, “Don’t make this difficult for me”. The wife was distraught. She was crying. She was wearing a mask and glasses.

[347] The wife says that the signing of the documents took place in a conference room during the appointment. She testified that the husband sat next to her at the appointment, and stared at her. I understood her evidence to mean that after the husband threatened her during the drive to the lawyer’s office, he sat there silently intimidating her during the meeting. The wife says that the lawyer who commissioned the documents, did not give her any advice before administering an oath. The husband meanwhile, claimed that the wife’s demeanour was “normal”, and he said that she even drove the car to the appointment. The husband denied, in cross-examination, that he sat next to the wife and stared at her, when they signed the document.

(2) Ontario Lawyer Rishi Singh’s Evidence

[348] Ontario lawyer Mr. Singh testified that his law office provides notarial services. Because he could not recall the specific circumstances of meeting the parties, his evidence focused on his general practice as to what he does, when he provides notarial services.

[349] Mr. Singh testified that notarial services are done on a walk-in basis. But I heard evidence that there had been an appointment arranged and booked.

[350] Mr. Singh said that he probably would have checked the parties’ identification and confirmed if the parties understood what they were signing. He said that the signing would have then occurred quickly in the reception area. He said that if a party was “visibly distressed” he would not have signed the document with them.

[351] But Mr. Singh’s evidence about his general practice, the reception area, and what he would have done had he saw someone “visibly distressed”, all elicited by the husband to contradict the wife’s detailed account of what happened, was not helpful. It was not reliable.

[352] Mr. Singh had no recollection of the specifics of meeting. He didn’t even know if his firm still had a file. In cross-examination, Mr. Singh testified that he would not have made notes of this encounter anyway. He said that such notarial signings would last no more than 5 minutes.

[353] Quite frankly, I was left wondering exactly how Mr. Singh could have adequately assessed whether anything was “off”, (such as to gage the wife’s distress), during what was according to his general practice evidence a five minute walk in meeting, during the Covid-19 pandemic, during which the wife says she was wearing a mask and glasses.

(3) Events After the Meeting in Mr. Singh’s Office

[354] The wife says that she was neither given a copy of the documents that she signed, to review either before or after the meeting at Mr. Singh’s office. She testified that she did not read the documents at the lawyer’s office either, before she signed them. The wife testified that she thought the documents were perhaps for a divorce in Canada. She recalled Mr. Singh commenting that he did not know what the document was for, which she said she found odd, since she thought the divorce documents pertained to getting a divorce in Canada. She said that she didn’t ultimately draw the connection or link the two things together, at the time.

[355] The husband says that the parties filed the divorce documents online together after the meeting, before he left for the “short term-rental” that he had pre-arranged to stay at. He pointed the Court to an electronic time stamp showing that the documents were filed on November 28, 2020 at 4:15 AM Australia (or 4:15 PM here, on November 27, 2020). He claims that the wife was sitting next to him when he filed the documents. He also claimed to have given the wife a copy of the joint application.

[356] The wife denied any participation in the filing of the documents. She did not know that the husband had pre-arranged his temporary rental five days earlier on November 22, 2020, into which his other partner would soon join him. The wife’s evidence was that within 30 minutes of returning home from the signing, the husband packed up and left the home. She says he took the divorce documents with him. The wife says she did not even know whether the husband had filed them or not.

[357] In tandem with giving this evidence, the husband testified about his various intentions at the time. At one point, he said that he was going to return to Singapore and live with a friend. Later on during his testimony, he said “at that point I either stay in Ontario… or go back to Singapore”. Later on during his testimony, the husband explained that he had pre-arranged the temporary rental because he expected the wife would be “unhappy with him” when they returned from the lawyer’s office, even though this was supposedly a plan to jointly apply for the divorce, and even though on the facts, his other partner would return to Canada a few days after that.

[358] The husband claimed to have later told the wife when the divorce was granted. But the wife testified that the husband did not tell her about that at all, until the fall of 2022, around the time of the pregnancy and the abortion discussion. Despite the husband’s contested suggestion that he gave the wife a copy of the application contemporaneously with the signing and he told her when the divorce was granted, what is common ground that the husband did not in fact provide the wife with a copy of the Divorce Order until two years after it was granted. It was only on February 23, 2023, when the wife asked about it because she was renewing her principal residency status, and she wanted to ensure that she made accurate filings with the immigration authorities, that the Divorce Order granted two years earlier, was emailed to her.

[359] The wife learned when she finally got the divorce order, the limitation period for her to claim an equalization payment in section 7(3)(a) of Ontario’s Family Law Act was about to expire. The parties were not even separated at that point; during this time frame the husband was making overtures to return. They were engaging in estate planning and otherwise acting as a couple.

[360] The first time the wife actually obtained a copy of the joint application was post-separation, after she found out about the husband’s re-marriage. She obtained it not from the husband, but by tracking it down from the Court in Australia.

C. Findings of Fact and Analysis Respecting the Completion of the Joint Application for Divorce

[361] I accept the wife’s account of what transpired. It is not just my overall credibility assessment above, that leads me to this conclusion. I will give five specific examples of why I accept the wife’s account, and reject the husband’s.

[362] First, I have not found that the parties were separated when the husband did this. Notwithstanding the husband’s claim that the parties had been intermittently discussing a divorce, and notwithstanding the hundreds of written communications that the parties briefed for this trial, in which they discussed all kinds of things, there was not a single written communication entered into evidence, that revealed any advance discussion of a divorce before the divorce paperwork got submitted. The husband’s explanation for this, I suppose, would be the missing WhatsApp messages, or that the alleged discussions, were oral.

[363] Second, part of the husband’s claim that the wife was the driving force behind this joint application depended on the wife’s expertise and knowledge as a lawyer, which the husband said included a statement by her that they were ineligible to apply for a divorce in Canada. The problem with this evidence was that neither was factually true. While she had been a lawyer in Australia before, the wife was not yet an Ontario lawyer, when the husband did this. She would not become an Ontario lawyer for another year, and even then, she became a personal injury lawyer in Ontario, not a family law lawyer. This in my view, adds to the credibility of her explanation given in cross-examination, that she didn’t recognize the forms and assumed they had to do with Ontario. She would not have known what Ontario divorce forms looked like. She didn’t read the forms in any event. The wife had not practiced family law for several years by that point. Her in court testimony revealed that when she did practice in Australia, she didn’t really handle divorces.

[364] Regarding the wife’s alleged advice to the husband about the lack of grounds to apply here, I find that was made up. There were in fact grounds to apply here, although the wife wouldn’t have had any specialized knowledge to know this. The wife had been here already for more than a year. Section 3(1) of the Divorce Act confers upon an Ontario Court jurisdiction over a divorce if either spouse had been habitually resident here for at least a year beforehand [my emphasis added]. The fact that the husband had just moved to Ontario two months earlier, did not matter.

[365] Nevertheless, because the wife had practiced some form of family law in Australia before, because she was a former member of the bar there, because she was aspiring to be a lawyer here at the time, and because it has been suggested that she was the impetus behind this, the Court asked her specifically, why she signed the documents. But I am equally mindful that at ¶ 166 of Barreto v. Salema, Vella J. identified some of the myths surrounding intimate partner violence, two of which are:

(a) The partner did not complain to anyone in authority, his/her/their family, or otherwise of the offensive treatment and therefore it did not happen; and

(b) The partner did not behave in a certain manner in response to the alleged abuse or mistreatment and therefore cannot be believed.

[366] More recently in Fiorenza v. Mitic, 2026 ONCJ 403, Sherr J. was called upon to consider, among other things, whether to award costs personally against a lawyer whom he found had engaged in some behaviour that caused some costs to be incurred or wasted unnecessarily. Despite making that finding, he found that the lawyer’s conduct had to be looked at in context.

[367] At ¶ 115, he wrote that the lawyer had been a “victim of an active campaign of harassment…” that “… caused her considerable stress and anxiety”, which included a fear for her safety and caused her trauma. Although the lawyer had failed to prove it, she did nevertheless have a reasonable basis to fear that it was the husband (i.e. the opposing party in the case) who was harassing and intimidating her.

[368] At ¶ 118, Sherr J. found that the situation before him, had parallels to family law cases where there is family violence between spouses. He wrote that one of the consequences of the significant trauma from abuse, may be an inability to provide a detailed, consistent and accurate recollection and timeline of the events in question. At ¶ 120, Sherr J. declined to draw any adverse inferences from the lawyer’s trial conduct, based on the lawyer’s trauma.

[369] The facts of this case before me are stronger, in that unlike in Fiorenza v. Mitic, the wife in this case before me did prove intimate partner violence from the husband. Adapting the approach that Sherr J. took to the situation that confronts this Court, I can see the myths above taken from Barreto v. Salema as being engaged here. The Court will similarly not draw an adverse inference against the wife in the assessment of her credibility respecting the divorce. The wife was not, when she signed those documents, signing the documents que lawyer (she was not even a practicing lawyer at the time); she was signing the documents que a spouse, who had suffered significant abuse for a number of years. The abuse and trauma she endured goes some distance to explain her actions and her subsequent inaction, which but for the abuse and trauma, might be seen as irresponsible. The abuse and trauma, coupled by the husband’s almost immediate return to the relationship after the signing, explains adequately her lack of follow up too, in my view. To fault the wife for any lapse in judgment in 2020 or for her lack of subsequent follow up, would be to ignore the important context of intimate partner violence, and I am not prepared to ignore that.

[370] Moreover, to the extent that it is important to the analysis, the wife also said that she refused to sign the documents at first. She says that the husband threatened to leave her and the children, and that he would “take everything from [her]”. Additional context that is important to keep in mind here, is that the wife was then living in a new country, with the parties’ four children, she was trying to retrain as a lawyer, and she depended on the husband’s financial assistance, to support the household. All of which are factors I have already accentuated elsewhere, throughout this ruling.

[371] The wife’s answers to the Court’s questions above, succinctly summarized her state of mind at the time, and they revealed trauma. She said to me: “I just signed it”, “I wanted him to stop doing what he was doing”, “the screaming and shouting”, and “I just signed the document”. In response to the questions about her lack of follow up, the wife testified that she was “holding on to hope that he wouldn’t file it”.

[372] Third, the wife did not receive adequate notice of the Australian divorce proceeding. This is dealt with below, in the analysis about the natural justice exception to the foreign divorce.

[373] Fourth, the husband has said a number of other nonsensical things, about this divorce. For example, in her trial affidavit and during her in court testimony, the wife said that the husband told her, that he had to obtain the divorce, because otherwise his employer would categorize him as a Canadian based employee and his marital status would pose complications at work. This made no sense to the wife, either then or now, nor did it make any sense to the Court. Once again, in a gaslighting fashion, the husband tried to control the narrative, and said that it was the wife who told him that they needed a divorce “to circumvent challenges [their] married status would present for his employer transferring [him] to a Canadian role”, which he then went on also to refute as not having a basis in reality. I find this was the husband’s own nonsensical statement to the wife, which he then tried to recast as a statement that the wife had made to him, followed by an attempt to argue to this Court, that he never said such a thing, because it didn’t make sense.

[374] Fifth, there is what the husband wrote on the joint application for divorce itself. Not only did it provide numerous pieces of false information to the Australian Court, but much of what the Australian Court was told stands in contrast, either to what this Court was told during this trial, including by the husband himself, or to findings of fact this Court is making. This further undermines the husband’s credibility and is addressed in more detail below, when I address the fraud exception.

[375] Having first made these findings of fact, I turn next to the applicable legal principles concerning the bases to recognize a foreign divorce, and the exceptions to its recognition, after which I will apply the principles to these findings of fact.

D. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning the Statutory and Common Law Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce and the Exceptions to Its Recognition

[376] There are two statutory bases in the Divorce Act for the recognition of foreign divorces in Canada. There are at least six common law bases. Attornment may add or contribute to a seventh. The husband only needs to establish one of the statutory or common law bases to meet his onus for the recognition of the foreign divorce.

[377] There are limited grounds upon which a court may decline to recognize a foreign divorce that is otherwise presumptively valid. There are five recognized exceptions. Here I recognize a new, sixth one. Similarly, the wife only needs to make out one exception.

[378] As I have just alluded to, the initial burden to establish the divorce should be recognized falls upon the party seeking to have the Court recognize the Order. Once satisfied, the burden then switches to the party disputing its validity, to demonstrate it would be contrary to “order and fairness”. It is “only in very rare circumstances will a foreign divorce properly obtained pursuant to the laws of another jurisdiction, not be recognized by Canadian courts”: see Sonia v. Rattan, 2024 ONCA 152 ¶ 25; see also Nourjamaly v. Badkoobeh, 2025 ONSC 5736 ¶ 83, per Vella J.

[379] But this divorce was by no means properly obtained. I find the husband has failed to make out any of the grounds to recognize a foreign divorce. I find the wife has made out four exceptions.

(1) The Statutory Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

[380] Section 22(1) of the Divorce Act provides that a divorce granted on or after the coming into force of the Divorce Act, by a competent authority shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person, if either former spouse was habitually resident in the country or subdivision of the competent authority for at least one year immediately proceeding the commencement of proceedings for the divorce.

[381] Section 22(2) of the Divorce Act provides that a divorce granted after July 1, 1968, by a competent authority, on the basis of the domicile of the wife in the country or subdivision of the competent authority, determined as if she were unmarried and, if she was a minor, as if she had attained the age of majority, shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person.

[382] Section 22(3) expressly upholds the common law principles applicable to the recognition of foreign divorces. Section 22(3) of the Divorce Act states that nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any other rule of law respecting the recognition of divorces granted otherwise than under this Act.

(2) The Common Law Bases to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

[383] At ¶ 21-22 of Sonia v. Rattan, 2024 ONCA 152, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that under the Canadian common law, Canadian courts will recognize a foreign divorce where:

(a) jurisdiction was assumed on the basis of the domicile of the spouses;

(b) the foreign divorce, though granted on a non-domicilary jurisdictional basis, is recognized by the law of the domicile of the parties;

(c) the foreign jurisdictional rule corresponds to the Canadian jurisdictional rule in divorce proceedings;

(d) the circumstances in the foreign jurisdiction would have conferred jurisdiction on a Canadian court had they occurred in Canada;

(e) the petitioner or respondent had a real and substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction wherein the divorce was granted; or

(f) the foreign divorce is recognized in another foreign jurisdiction with which the petitioner or respondent has a real and substantial connection.

[384] In Canadian Conflict of Laws, Volumes 1 and 2, Professor Walker adds that attornment, by commencing or participating in a proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction, may be a basis for recognition, or it will preclude the person from later disputing the jurisdiction of the foreign court: see pages 2-5, 11-2, and 20-31. Although attornment was not specifically argued, the parties called evidence and made other related arguments, that put attornment in issue in my view.

[385] These common law rules are rooted in principles of comity, to avoid the uncertainty and a lack of finality that might flow if parties were permitted to re-litigate issues already decided in foreign jurisdiction again in Canada, perhaps even requiring domestic courts to interpret and apply foreign law over which they have no jurisdiction: see Sonia v. Rattan ¶ 24.

[386] However comity must be balanced against “order and fairness”. Where a foreign divorce satisfies a common law ground for recognition, the divorce is presumptively valid, but that is not the end of the inquiry: see Sonia v. Rattan ¶ 25.

(3) The Exceptions to the Recognition of a Foreign Divorce

[387] The five already existing recognized exceptions are:

(a) where the foreign court or other authority that granted the divorce did not have the jurisdiction to do so under the law of the foreign country;

(b) where there is evidence of fraud going to the jurisdiction of the granting court;

(c) where there has been a denial of natural justice such as the absence of notice;

(d) where the foreign divorce is contrary to public policy. The public policy exception is “directed at the concept of repugnant laws not repugnant facts”, where “it is appropriate for the court to condemn the foreign law on which the judgment is based.” It is to have a “narrow application” and should not “be used lightly”; and

(e) the Ontario Court of Appeal added a fifth, additional exception, namely “unfair forum shopping tactics”, in Vyazemskaya v. Safin, 2024 ONCA 156.

See Sonia v. Rattan ¶ 26-27; see also Vyazemskaya v. Safin ¶ 25.

[388] I find the common law should be further developed to recognize a sixth, analytically distinct exception, where a person is coerced either to remain passive and not object, or to participate in a foreign divorce proceeding, in circumstances of intimate partner violence. It should also capture a situation where a person then delays in taking steps to address the situation, as a result of the intimate partner violence.

E. Analysis Regarding the Statutory Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

[389] There is no dispute that the statutory grounds to recognize the foreign divorce are not met in this case. In regard to section 22(1), neither party was habitually resident in Australia for one year preceding the commencement of the proceeding there in 2020. Indeed, neither had resided there for at least four years when the husband submitted the paperwork.

[390] Section 22(2) makes reference to the wife’s domicile. The wife’s domicile was not Australia. There was no argument at this trial, that this statutory ground applied anyway. In fact, as I explain next when analyzing the common law grounds for recognition, the husband wasn’t domiciled in Australia either, although the Australian Court was misled to believe that he was.

F. Analysis Regarding the Common Law Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

(1) The Domicile of the Spouses

[391] The first common law ground above, considers whether jurisdiction was assumed on the basis of the domicile of the spouses. The question as to whether the parties were domiciled in Australia, is decided by a court here, based on our common law, although it may very well be that the result would be no different under the common law of Australia.

[392] In volume 2, chapter 17 of Canadian Conflict of Laws, Professor Walker provides a comprehensive explanation of the meaning of domicile. In summary:

(a) Individuals are domiciled in the legal unit in which they have, or are deemed by law to have their permanent home;

(b) Domicile is different from residence, which reflects more closely the person’s current situation. An individual might have more than one residence but will only have one domicile for any other purpose;

(c) Although the Divorce Order states that the husband “was at all material times domiciled in Australia”, domicile is determined with reference solely to domestic law. A foreign determination as to domicile, such as occurred here, is immaterial;[23]

(d) There are two kinds of domicile: domicile of origin and domicile of choice;

(e) A domicile of origin arises at birth, and is tied to the person upon whom the individual is dependent. One’s domicile of origin is retained until the acquisition of a domicile of choice. A domicile of choice is acquired later by the individual actually moving to another country, state, province, territory or legal unit and intending to remain there indefinitely;

(f) One cannot divest themselves of their domicile of origin. It remains in abeyance during the continuance of a domicile of choice;

(g) A domicile of choice is lost by abandonment, during which time the domicile of origin revives unless some other domicile is acquired;

(h) The domicile of choice is destroyed when it is lost, but it may be acquired anew by fulfilling the same conditions as are required to obtain it, in the first instance;

(i) The domicile of origin is more durable, in the sense that it is harder to change than a domicile of choice;

(j) To change one’s domicile from origin to choice, there must be a fixed intention of establishing a permanent residence somewhere else, carried out by actual residence there and an intention to remain. The new residence can be brief, provided that it is accompanied by the required state of mind;

(k) There is a presumption against a change of domicile. The burden of proving a change of domicile rests upon the person alleging it. It is more onerous though, when the change is to a domicile of origin rather than a domicile of choice;

(l) Evidence of intention may be inferred. Direct evidence of intention (i.e. a witness’ statements) must be weighed along with the circumstances in which the expressions occurred. Conduct subsequent to the time at which the state of mind has to be determined may be relevant, but that evidence is to be considered carefully to the extent that it demonstrates a subsequent change in intention, rather than one’s original intention at the material time: see also Bradshaw v. Hougassian, 2024 ONCA 425 ¶11-12; Nishi v. Rascal Trucking, 2013 SCC 33 ¶ 36; Nafie v. Badawy, 2015 ABCA 36 ¶ 57-63; and Pecore v. Pecore,2007 SCC 17 ¶ 56-70;

(m) In family cases, where persons have more than one place of residence but establish the home of their spouse and family in one of them, this may be compelling evidence that their domicile is in that place, although it could be outweighed by other considerations; and

(n) To abandon a domicile of choice entails the reverse process of acquiring it. One must reside away from the domicile of choice and cease to have an intention to return there. It is unnecessary to sever every “thread of attachment” to cease to be domiciled there.

See volume 2, Chapter 17 of Canadian Conflict of Laws, pages 17-1 to 17-10, and 17-13.

[393] The evidence leads to the clear conclusion that that neither was domiciled in Australia at the time of the divorce, because:

(a) Both parties’ domiciles of origin are Sri Lanka;

(b) They both chose Australia as a domicile of choice, in the wife’s case, after marriage, and in the husband’s case, earlier. But that was in 2011 for the wife, and in the husband’s case, earlier. They then left Australia in 2016, between four and five years before the divorce. They lived in two other countries before coming to Canada. While there was some evidence about a possibility of a return to Australia at some point at least two years before the divorce, it was not acted upon;

(c) The parties instead implemented a plan to move to Ontario;

(d) Since he was the one who asserted in the divorce documents, a domicile in Australia, I note that inconsistent with that assertion, the husband participated in the process of purchasing property in Ontario in 2020, before he came here and before he filed the divorce application. On his own evidence, he established a property for his family. He would then move in to it, before the divorce;

(e) The husband sold both Australian properties before he came to Ontario in October of 2020. He also gave up his lease in Singapore, severing some of his ties to that jurisdiction as well;

(f) The husband has not returned to Australia since he left in 2016, other than in 2019 for a vacation with Ishara. That was a temporary trip, not a return to the domicile with an intention to remain;

(g) The husband’s credibility is in issue. His claim that he was in Ontario only temporarily, or that he was perhaps contemplating returning to Australia around the time of the divorce, was convenient. He was applying for jobs in Canada. He wasn’t even clear about his intention to return to Australia, saying that he might have instead returned to Singapore to live with a friend; and

(h) The subsequent evidence also informs what his intention was at the time of the divorce, not a change in intention later on. He remained in Canada, immediately made arrangements for a temporary residence for his other spouse to visit him there in secret, he returned to the matrimonial home after that, he obtained a job in Montreal, he changed his position to be able to work remotely from Ontario a year later, he entered into multiple leases in Quebec and Ontario, and he purchased a second property in Ontario, in the months and years that followed. He hasn’t set foot in Australia ever again, since the divorce.

[394] I conclude that at some point after leaving Australia, well before the divorce application, both parties abandoned Australia as their domicile of choice. Any residual connections, such as citizenship, the filing of taxes, voting in elections, or assets that still exist in Australia are just that; residual connections from a past life that is long gone. Even if the husband’s stay in Ontario wasn’t sufficiently adequate yet at the time of the divorce, Australia was not by that point his domicile of choice. And if Singapore wasn’t either, then his domicile of origin in Sri Lanka reverted after abandonment of Australia, until Ontario became his new domicile of choice.

[395] Having concluded that neither spouse was domiciled in Australia at the time of this divorce, this Court declines to recognize the Australian divorce based on the first common law ground, being the domicile of the spouses in Australia.

(2) Whether the Foreign Divorce, Although Granted on a Non-Domicilary Jurisdictional Basis, is Recognized by the Law of the Domicile of the Parties;

Whether the Foreign Jurisdictional Rule Corresponds to the Canadian Jurisdictional Rule in Divorce Proceedings; and

Whether the Circumstances in the Foreign Jurisdiction Would Have Conferred Jurisdiction on a Canadian Court had they occurred in Canada

[396] I address each of these grounds together, as the analysis is the same, or substantially similar. The Australian divorce order specifically says it was granted on the basis of the husband’s domicile. It was not granted on a non-domicilary jurisdictional basis.

[397] Nevertheless, there are two other bases for jurisdiction in Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975, being citizenship and ordinary residence. Section 39(3) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 in force at the time of the divorce (i.e. from Compilation 90), reads:

Proceedings for a divorce order may be instituted under this Act if, at the date on which the application for the order is filed in court, either party to the marriage:

(a) is an Australian citizen;

(b) is domiciled in Australia; or

(c) is ordinarily resident in Australia and has been so resident for 1 year immediately preceding that date.

[398] The husband seemed to argue that even if the parties were not domiciled in Australia, this is not fatal because both were citizens at the time of the divorce. I return to this argument below again, when discussing the exceptions. But at the recognition stage, even if it were appropriate to re-cast the jurisdictional basis upon which the Australian Court granted the foreign divorce to one of citizenship, “the foreign divorce, although granted on a non-domicilary jurisdictional basis” would still not be recognized by the law of the parties’ domicile. In other words, Canada does not recognize divorces granted based on citizenship. Alternatively, if I am mistaken and either party’s domicile was Singapore or Sri Lanka at the time of the divorce instead of Canada, then I have no evidence at all about whether those jurisdictions would have recognized a non-domicilary divorce based on citizenship. In which case I am to apply domestic law based on the aforementioned principles about foreign law in the absence of expert evidence, and the result is the same.

[399] Now it may be, that if there was some attornment in Australia, alongside citizenship, that might be an adequate basis for a Canadian court to recognize a non-domicilary divorce based on citizenship in keeping with Professor Walker’s commentary about attornment in Canadian Conflict of Laws. But to the extent that it isn’t already, it will become even more obvious below, when dealing with the wife’s defenses based on lack of notice, fraud, unfair forum shopping, and intimate partner violence, that there was no attornment on her part.

[400] Likewise, to the extent that Australia’s other jurisdictional ground for divorce being ordinary residence for a year corresponds sufficiently with the habitual residence provision in section 3(1) of the Divorce Act, again that is not the basis on which the Australian Court acted. And the parties were not ordinarily (or habitually resident) in Australia for a year preceding the commencement of the proceeding in any event.

[401] Regarding the third common law ground listed above, whether the circumstances in the foreign jurisdiction would have conferred jurisdiction on a Canadian court, had they occurred here, this too is not satisfied. The parties were not residing in Australia for the requisite time. Canada takes jurisdiction over divorces based on habitual residence for a year.

(3) Whether Either Party Had A Real and Substantial Connection to Australia

[402] The only common law ground for recognition that the husband might successfully advance, is the one that considers whether either party had a real and substantial connection to Australia. On the evidence before me, the Court concludes that connection to be too tenuous.

[403] Citing other jurisprudence, Kurz J. explained at ¶ 46-48 of Antonova v. Stefanov, 2026 ONSC 1087, what the real and substantial connection test entails:

46In Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, at para. 82, LeBel J. wrote for the Supreme Court that the common law real and substantial connection test which applies in conflict of law situations, must "be established primarily on the basis of objective factors that connect the legal situation or the subject matter of the litigation with the forum." At para. 90, the court set out a list of four presumptive connecting factors that, prima facie, entitle a court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute. They are:

1. the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;

2. the defendant carries on business in the province;

3. the tort was committed in the province; and

4. a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.

47LeBel J. was clear that that list is not a closed one. Other presumptive connective factors could apply, which entitle a court to assume jurisdiction: para. 91.

48In Wang v. Lin, 2013 ONCA 33, the Court of Appeal for Ontario pointed out that the Van Breda factors apply to tort cases. The presumptive connecting factors that would apply in family law cases are necessarily different from the ones that apply in tort cases: para. 46. In family law cases, the court should look to the “real home” or ordinary residence of a party or the children prior to the separation as a presumptive factor in the real and substantial connection test: para. 47.

[404] But as Professor Walker also notes in volume 2, chapter 11, page 11-5 of Canadian Conflict of Laws, “the real and substantial connection test provides a very low threshold for most for that could reasonably be expected to be chosen. However there [still] have been some cases in which Canadian courts have held that the test has not been met.”

[405] Even on the “very low threshold”, I am left doubting that there was a real and substantial connection to Australia at the time of the divorce based on a review of the facts of various other family law cases.

[406] For example, as explained at ¶ 12 of Abraham v. Gallo, 2022 ONCA 874, the trial judge found a real and substantial connection to Egypt because the parties were born and raised in Egypt, the respondent spent his entire childhood there, the parties married there, the respondent served in the army there, the parties still had family there, the appellant still had a bank account there and remained very concerned about her family’s reputation in Egypt, and because there had been a bare talaq divorce there.

[407] In overturning that finding, the Court of Appeal held that while past connections to a jurisdiction may be considered, the focus of the real and substantial connection analysis should be on the parties’ real circumstances at the time of the divorce, not on historical or transitory factors. This approach is in keeping with the Court’s guidance that the location of the parties’ “real home” or “ordinary residence” is a significant presumptive connecting factor informing the real and substantial connection analysis in the context of family law proceedings and marriage breakdown. By the time of the divorce in Abraham v. Gallo, neither party lived in Egypt and both parties had set down deep roots in Ontario: see ¶ 31-32.

[408] At ¶ 56 of Sonia v. Rattan, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that there was a real and substantial connection between the wife and Bangladesh, where the foreign divorce had been granted. In that case though, the wife was married, had her children and was living in Bangladesh until after she received the husband’s divorce notice.

[409] In Nourjamaly v. Badkoobeh, a real and substantial connection to Iran was conceded. But the facts that Vella J. listed out at ¶ 84 as establishing the real and substantial connection, included that the parties were born in Iran, married in Iran, the children were born in Iran, they were citizens, the majority of their property was there, they had extended family there, they spent considerable abouts of time in Iran, they were physically present in Iran when the Respondent commenced the proceedings, they filed taxes in Iran, they had doctors in Iran, and the Applicant continued to go there for her medical needs.

[410] Perhaps in contrast to some of the earlier appellate and other authorities above, at ¶ 22 of Vyazemskaya v. Safin, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the Court below, which found the real and substantial connection test was met on account of the parties being Russian citizens. But there is very little mention in either the decision below, or at the appeal level, about what other connections to Russia, if any, existed. The Vyazemskaya v. Safin trial and appeal decisions had more to do with recognizing unfair forum shopping tactics as a new, analytically distinct exception to the recognition of foreign divorces, than they did about whether there was a real and substantial connection. That is where the analysis focused.

[411] Many of the same factors applicable to changes in the parties’ domicile are relevant to the assessment of whether there was a real and substantial connection to Australia at the time of the divorce. The parties and the children’s “real home” was not Australia.

[412] It is true, like in Nourjamaly v. Badkoobeh, that three of the parties’ four children were born in Australia. But their third child was born there just before the wife left to join the husband in Namibia. Their fourth child was born in Singapore. None of the children have returned to Australia since the parties left (which was when the first three children were very young). The parties’ youngest child has never been there.

[413] The only remaining connection between either of the parties, and Australia, is citizenship. While the husband tried to argue that his 2017 job offer for the job he took in Singapore listed his home base office as the Australian office, that he and the wife continued to file taxes there, that he has continued to vote there, that he continues to have a bank account or accounts there, and that there remain pension assets there, I see these factors more as a function or as the residual effect of having lived and worked there in the past. Some of them like voting and filing taxes, may very well be an ongoing requirement of keeping citizenship.

[414] Even the fact that there remains some bank accounts in Australia is tenuous. The husband testified that after he sold the two Australian properties previously owned (before the divorce), he consolidated the money from the sales, and transferred it to Ontario for the purchase of the matrimonial home here, and to otherwise support the children, such as through his purchase of the car. In other words, he transferred money out.

[415] In the result, I find the application of this factor to be a closer call because of Vyazemskaya v. Safin’s reference to citizenship, but it is one which I find should still be resolved in favour of the wife in the totality of the circumstances.

(4) Whether the Foreign Divorce is Recognized in another Foreign Jurisdiction with which the Petitioner or Respondent has a Real and Substantial Connection

[416] There is no evidence of this. This ground was not argued by either side.

G. Conclusions Regarding the Statutory and Common Law Grounds to Recognize a Foreign Divorce

[417] In conclusion, the husband has not satisfied this Court that there are any statutory or common law grounds for the recognition of the foreign divorce. For these reasons alone, the Court declines to recognize the foreign divorce under section 22 of the Divorce Act. If I am wrong respecting my analysis about real and substantial connection, it doesn’t affect the outcome, because the wife has also made out four exceptions.

H. Analysis Regarding the Exceptions to the Recognition of a Foreign Divorce

(1) Where the Foreign Court or Other Authority that Granted the Divorce Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Do So Under the Law of that Foreign Country

[418] I return here, to the argument that even though the Australian Court granted the divorce based on domicile, it could have alternatively granted the divorce based on citizenship. That is of course not what the foreign court did. But assuming citizenship, perhaps coupled with the appearance of attornment was theoretically an option, there remains a question about whether the Australian Court would have taken jurisdiction under its own laws, had it known the truth about what was transpiring.

[419] Kurz J. recently dealt with a sufficiently analogous situation in Antonova v. Stefanov. There, he considered the difference between jurisdiction simplicitor and forum non conveniens.

[420] Now by the time the Antonova v. Stefanov case came before him, unlike here, there were parallel family law proceedings going on in Ontario and Bulgaria at the same time, rather than one proceeding followed by another in two different jurisdictions. There, unlike here, the foreign court had not yet granted a divorce, but a divorce had been claimed in both jurisdictions. There, unlike here, the wife asked the Ontario Court to take jurisdiction over the divorce and corollary relief and to restrain the husband from continuing with divorce proceedings in Bulgaria. And there, also unlike here, the litigation was contested in both locations.

[421] However of some similarity to the situation before this Court, both parties in Antonova v. Stefanov were Bulgarian citizens, just as both parties in this case before me are Australian citizens. Despite that the parties in Antonova v. Stefanov both resided here for several years, the husband physically returned to Bulgaria and immediately commenced a proceeding there. The husband in this case before me applied for a divorce in Australia, online from Canada without needing to leave the country. And there, the Bulgarian Court took jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship, just like this hypothetical re-framing argument suggests that Australia could have granted the divorce based on citizenship.

[422] But at ¶ 70, Kurz J. found that the Bulgarian Court’s decision to take jurisdiction based on citizenship was a decision in the nature of jurisdiction simplicitor, and that was not dispositive as far as Kurz J. was concerned. The Bulgarian Court did not decide the forum conveniens. And Kurz J. found the forum conveniens rested with Ontario.

[423] At ¶ 37, citing Muscutt v. Courcelles, 2002 CanLii 44957 (Ont. C.A.), and other jurisprudence, Kurz J. explained the distinction between jurisdiction simplicitor and the forum conveniens:

The question of whether Ontario has jurisdiction to hear these actions is a different question from whether this court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because another forum is the more convenient forum. Using other terminology, the concept of jurisdiction simpliciter is different from that of forum non conveniens. The second question of whether Ontario should decline to exercise jurisdiction because another forum is the more convenient forum only needs to be considered once an Ontario court has determined that it has jurisdiction to hear the action.

[424] At ¶ 53, Kurz J. extracted from Muscutt v. Courcelles a list of several factors that may be considered in determining the most appropriate forum for the action. Those pertinent to this case before me, are the location of the majority of the witnesses, the location of key witnesses and evidence, the avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings, geographical factors suggesting the natural form, and whether declining jurisdiction would deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate juridical advantage available in the domestic court. All of those particular factors if applied in this case before me, clearly result in the conclusion that Ontario, and not Australia, is the forum conveniens.

[425] Just like the Bulgarian Court had not done in the case before Kurz J., the Australian court did not engage in a forum conveniens analysis. The Australian court did not do so here, because of the manner in which this divorce application went before it (i.e. a joint application, no opposition), and because it was misled or deceived.

[426] The husband argued that the wife cannot meet this particular exception to prove that Australia lacked jurisdiction according to its own laws because she didn’t call expert evidence as to the foreign law, to prove this. I agree that it is her onus to prove an exception. I disagree that the wife can’t make out the exception given the absence of expert evidence.

[427] The Court does not require expert evidence to dispose of this argument. Section 39(3) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 was put before me by the husband. In the absence of expert evidence as to its interpretation, domestic law rules of construction, and Canadian case law apply, unless a specific foreign statutory provision is not a provision of some “universality” that renders the application of domestic common law inapplicable.

[428] I was pointed to nothing in Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 that would stand for the proposition that the jurisdiction provisions in section 39(3) alter an Ontario Court’s ability to apply the concepts of jurisdiction simplicitor and forum non conveniens to its interpretation. And for that matter, while section 42(1) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975, provides that its jurisdiction in a divorce case is based on the provisions of the statute and the applicable Rules of Court, there is an exception in (2). Section 42(2) reads:

Where it would be in accordance with the common law rules of private international law to apply the laws of any country or place (including a State or Territory), the court shall, subject to the provisions of the Marriage Act 1961, apply the laws of that country or place.

[429] In other words, not only does Australia’s legislation not create a barrier to a Canadian court applying Canadian common law to decide this question, it actually incorporates the law of Canada into its own legislative scheme, which as Kurz J. recently addressed, includes a forum non conveniens analysis.

[430] I find that it is likely that had Australia known the truth, the result of the divorce application would have been different including based on a forum non conveniens analysis. However I am still left wondering whether there isn’t, for the purposes of this particular exception, a distinction to be drawn between a foreign court not having jurisdiction at all according to its own laws, and a foreign court that otherwise has jurisdiction deciding to decline it, in a forum non conveniens analysis.

[431] Assuming that it would be appropriate for me to re-cast the jurisdiction under which the foreign court granted the divorce to one based on citizenship (the appropriateness of which I doubt), my conclusion is the foreign court would have jurisdiction simplicitor, based on citizenship, perhaps combined with the appearance of the wife’s attornment. It seems to me that the forum non conveniens analysis is more about declining jurisdiction, once it is found to have existed.

[432] Therefore I agree that the wife has not made out this exception, but for different reasons than those argued by the husband’s counsel. Incidentally, many of the facts underpinning this argument involve the fact that the Australian Court was deliberately given false information and deprived of relevant information. All of which is better dealt with in the fraud exception, that follows next.

(2) Where there is Evidence of Fraud Going to the Jurisdiction

[433] In Re Edlund, 1944 CanLii 179 (Sask. K.B.), both parties swore before a “police magistrate” that they were married, which was essential to give jurisdiction to the magistrate under the Deserted Wives’ and Children’s Maintenance Act, R.S.CS. 1940, c. 234, to make an order to pay a monthly sum to the “deserted wife”. The man later moved to quash the Order, and said that the parties had been living together, but they were not married. He deposed that he did not realize the importance of a real marriage to the application in question. The woman confirmed this evidence in an affidavit of her own.

[434] At ¶ 5 Bigelow J. wrote, “…[i]t is quite apparent now that the parties were never married and that the magistrate was induced to make the order in question on false evidence. That I consider to be a fraud on the Court”. Bigelow J. set aside the underlying Order. There was no foreign judgment aspect to that case, but it explains what constitutes a fraud on the Court.

[435] In Powell v. Cockburn 1976 CanLii 29 (S.C.C.), Dickson J. described a fraud on the court as “an extrinsic collateral attack which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice”. This quote, which was taken from an earlier authority, is also cited in Re Edlund.

[436] But Dickson J. in Powell v. Cockburn, drew a distinction between fraud going to jurisdiction as opposed to fraud “going to the merits of the petition”. He wrote, “[i]f the foreign court is fraudulently misled into believing the jurisdictional facts are such as to give it jurisdiction, when in fact they are not, this will be a ground for refusal of the domestic court to recognize the decree”. Fraud that “goes to the merits of the petition”, such as the grounds for divorce, “have never been of concern to the recognizing court”, although that distinction has not been free of criticism.

[437] At ¶ 51 of Beals v. Saldhana, 2003 SCC 72, the Supreme Court revisited this distinction somewhat, allowing that the merits of a foreign judgment could be challenged for fraud where the allegations are new and not the subject of the prior adjudication.

[438] The husband gave the Australian Court multiple pieces of false information, when he filed the documents. Some of the fraud goes to the jurisdictional basis of the divorce Order that was granted, being his domicile; some of it goes to the merits of the application.

[439] I intend to set out all of the false statements the husband made on the application, because as indicated, it is also relevant to my credibility finding in favour of the wife. But this fraud argument can be disposed of by focusing only on fraud as to jurisdiction. It is unnecessary for me to delve into whether this is a case where the fraud as to the merits of the application should also ground the exception, based on ¶ 51 of Beals v. Saldanha.

[440] First, the joint application correctly identifies the parties’ countries of birth, as well as the dates that they began living in Australia. But the application erroneously indicates that the husband’s residential address was in Singapore, which by that point, was not true. He gave up his apartment there before he came to Canada. The wife’s residential address is correctly identified as the Ontario property.

[441] The parties’ addresses for service, were identified on the joint application to be the 10 Humboldt Entrance address in Australia, which was also not true. That property had been sold. That false information went to the question of a continuing domicile in Australia.

[442] The joint application says that the husband regards Australia “as his home and intends to live indefinitely in Australia”. That statement went to establishing a domicile in Australia. That too, was not true. There was no evidence at this trial about any intention to live indefinitely in Australia at the time of this divorce.

[443] While the application did indicate that neither “ordinarily” lived in Australia for the previous 12 months (thus negativing one of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction in Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975), the application indicates that both are Australian citizens, another statutory ground. This particular fact was true, but the other facts in the application deliberately created the false impression of a greater connection to Australia than existed. And again, jurisdiction was not taken based on citizenship.

[444] The application states that both parties regarded their marriage as over as of the date of separation, on March 15, 2019. The Australian divorce order in turn, specifically says that the ground for the divorce, was that the marriage had “broken down irretrievably”.

[445] Section 48(1) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 then in force (Consolidation 90) states that an application for a divorce order in relation to a marriage shall be “based on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably”. Section 48(2) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 defines that as meaning “if, and only if, the court is satisfied that the parties separated and thereafter lived separately and apart for a continuous period of not less than 12 months immediately preceding the date of filing of the application for the divorce order.”

[446] The underlying facts in the application leading the Australian Court to conclude that the parties’ marriage had “broken down irretrievably” were not true. In this regard the wife correctly argues that the parties lacked the grounds to obtain an Australian divorce. But this goes to the merits of the application, not to jurisdiction.

[447] Part F of the joint application identifies the parties’ four children, and it states that the children were currently living with the mother in Ontario. That was not true. The husband was also living in the matrimonial home in Ontario with the mother and the children at the time this application was created. In his Form 35.1 sworn October 24, 2024, the husband told this Court the opposite of what he said to the Australian Court about the parent with whom the children were then residing. The husband said that all four children lived with both parents, between October 1, 2020 and April 1, 2021. Incidentally, this too was not entirely true, as the husband moved into the temporary rental for a time after the divorce was filed. Nevertheless, the children were in fact living with both parents in the matrimonial home during the month before (October 2020), and for almost the entire month (November 2020) in which the Australian divorce application got e-filed.

[448] The joint application tells the Australian Court that the husband was currently working in Singapore, but that he had daily video calls with the children and quarterly visits “from Singapore or overseas for approximately a week”. This was not true. While the husband was “currently working in Singapore”, he living in the matrimonial home in Ontario, working remotely, and not having daily video calls or quarterly visits.

[449] Notably, the application also says that the husband was “currently seeking options to relocate to Toronto or Montreal, if successful expects to visit on a fortnightly basis”, as if to suggest that he might change his residence or domicile in the future, but it hadn’t happened yet. This statement was not accurate, since the husband was in Ontario already when this document was signed. It also stands in stark contrast again, to one of the husband’s claims during this trial, that his plan was to return to Singapore, and live with his friend after working remotely from Ontario for a while.

[450] Finally, the husband set out various expenses that he was paying for, as a form of financial support in the application. The expenses included childcare expenses, food, clothing, toys, and activities, and housing expenses for the matrimonial home. While at times during this trial the husband tried to characterize this as some kind of support Order, it was not. This was information that the husband supplied to the Court in Australia, so that it could be satisfied that “proper arrangements in all the circumstances have been made for the care, welfare and development” of the children. That is a legal requirement under section 55A(1) and (2) of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975, similar to that in section 11(b) of the Divorce Act. As a result of the foreign court being supplied with the husband’s statements, the Australian divorce Order in turn specifically says that the Australian Court was satisfied that “proper arrangements in all the circumstances have been made for the care, welfare and development” of the parties’ four children. I heard some evidence from the wife that the husband did not fully comply with this either, although this too goes to the merits of the application rather than to jurisdiction.

[451] In summary, it is my view that there was fraud going to both the jurisdiction of the Court, and to the merits of the application. I need rely only on the fraud going to jurisdiction to find that the wife has made out this exception as well, without needing to wade into the meris.

[452] However those other untruths about the merits are not irrelevant. In addition to being relevant to the husband’s lack of credibility, they reveal in general the overwhelming extent to which the Australian Court was mislead. Adapting what Mills J. said at ¶ 9 of Ahmed v. Ahmed, 2024 ONSC 7261 to the circumstances of this case before me, “[almost] none of the information provided by the [husband] in the [Australian] divorce application was true.”

(3) The Denial of Natural Justice

[453] There was a denial of natural justice in this case. The wife did not have proper notice.

[454] In Novikova v. Lyzo, 2019 ONCA 821 the husband brought a summary judgment motion in ongoing proceedings under the Divorce Act to recognize a foreign divorce that he had obtained from Russia and to terminate the wife’s right to spousal support pursuant to a consent order for interim child and spousal support previously made in the Ontario proceedings.

[455] At ¶ 6, the Court of Appeal noted that the husband returned to Russia for several months in February of 2016, where he commenced divorce proceedings. He persisted in serving the wife at her parents’ address in Russia. Her parents refused to accept the documents on her behalf. Communications from the local court were also sent there. The Russian divorce was finalized on June 8, 2016.

[456] At ¶ 7-8, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the wife, who was aware of divorce proceedings in Russia, did not receive any of the documents, or a copy of the divorce decree within the 30 day appeal period. The wife also said she thought the balance of the issues would be dealt with in Canada, where they were represented by counsel and had already started discussions about support. At ¶ 17 and 19, the Court found there to have been a lack of notice, despite the wife’s awareness of the proceeding, and upheld the motion judge’s conclusion that there had been a denial of natural justice.

[457] There are some parallels here.

[458] The first page of the joint divorce application in this case before me contains instructions respecting service and e-filing in Australia. But as this was a joint application, service of the application was not required prior to filing. Notably, there are instructions for a recipient who is served with a (not joint) application, that explain how to contest the divorce. There is a warning at the bottom of the page, that one must file a separate application for property or maintenance within 12 months after the divorce becomes final, otherwise leave is required. This warning was repeated as a note in the Divorce Order itself, that the Court granted.

[459] The fact that as a joint application, service was not required before the Australian Court granted the divorce, is another piece of evidence that is consistent with the wife’s account that she was not given the documents. It is not as if there is some affidavit of service or equivalent Australian document that exists somewhere, that had to be supplied to the Court there, for the joint application to proceed, that suggests otherwise, to challenge her credibility. Because she didn’t have to be served and wasn’t served, none of the instructions about how to respond, and none of the warnings or the consequences of her subsequent inaction, were drawn to her attention in a timely way.

[460] Lack of notice is especially problematic when fraud is present. The jurisdiction of the foreign court must not be established “through any flimsy residential means” and the “petitioner must not have resorted to the foreign court for any fraudulent and improper reasons such as “for the purpose of obtaining a divorce”: see Orabi v. Qaoud, 2005 NSCA 28 ¶ 17.

(4) The Public Policy Exception

[461] As Professor Walker writes at page 16-62 of volume 2, chapter 16 of Canadian Conflict of Laws, if a foreign law is to be denied effect on public policy grounds, it must violate “some fundamental principle of justice, offend international norms or some prevalent conception of good morals or some deep-rooted tradition of the forum”. Prior to Vyazemskaya v. Safin, there were some cases that considered forum shopping under the public policy exception, as opposed to on a stand-alone basis. Those cases engaged in some degree of comparison of one’s entitlements in the foreign jurisdiction as compared to the entitlements in Canada and Ontario. Some refused to recognize foreign divorces specifically on the basis that the foreign jurisdiction provides either no, or wholly inadequate spousal support. As the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote at ¶ 36, “[a] law that leaves a vulnerable party entirely without compensation for the financial consequences of marriage breakdown might be contrary to Canadian public policy”. But the Ontario Court of Appeal in Vyazemskaya v. Safin did not decide the case on that basis.

[462] The wife nevertheless cited in her written submissions sections 44(3), 72, 74(1), 75(2), and 79 of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 to establish that leave is now required for her to pursue both spousal support and property entitlements in Australia, and that the legal considerations that would apply to her in Australia on the merits of any such application are quite different and more restrictive than those which apply in Canada. She argues that the focus in Australia is primarily on needs-based support, rather than on compensatory support, and the property regime in Australia is discretionary, inherently less predictable and potentially less favourable to the non-asset owning spouse, than the statutory equalization regime in Ontario.

[463] The husband’s counsel’s written closing submissions say that the wife cannot argue this. The husband wants this Court to find that entitlements exist in Australia, but I should go no further than that given the absence of expert evidence about what exactly the foreign legislative scheme provides for.

[464] I don’t accept either argument, fully. A plain reading of the provisions in Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 concerning its support and property regime appear to lend credence to the wife’s argument, that there are noticeable differences in entitlement (if a Court in Australia would even take jurisdiction at this point given the passage of time, the leave requirement and potential arguments that could be raised about forum non conveniens).

[465] But by the same token, I also tend to agree somewhat with counsel for the husband, about the import of the absence of expert evidence in this instance. I doubt it would be appropriate, having regard to the aforementioned rules about the absence of expert evidence as to foreign law, to apply the domestic case law to interpret Australia’s notably different statutory provisions. There is less universality to the property and support laws.

[466] So because the wife has cited the above provisions and I have referred to them, I reproduced them (and a few others that were missing that are necessary to understand those she cited) in Schedule “A” of this Judgment also (taken from Compilation 101, not Compilation 90).

[467] But I would not decide this case on a public policy ground.

[468] The wife’s failure to make out this exception does not matter. There is no longer any need to resort to a comparison between the generosity of one jurisdiction’s family law regime to the other’s. The different “unfair forum shopping” exception that the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in Vyazemskaya v. Safin is discussed next, and it extends to the consideration of factors that do not depend on the application of foreign law.

(5) Unfair Forum Shopping

[469] The husband in Vyazemskaya v. Safin, made a similar argument, framed under the public policy exception, that even if he had obtained a divorce in Russia with the specific intention of avoiding spousal support (which he denied doing), that was a “repugnant fact” not a “repugnant law”, and so the foreign divorce should be recognized. He also argued that the trial judge required expert evidence and should have done a comparison between the family law of Russia to the family laws of Canada and Ontario. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected both arguments.

[470] That is because the “unfair forum shopping” exception’s inquiry is not limited to foreign laws that “violate our principles of morality” but also extends to decisions taken to avoid the application of domestic laws. Forum shopping does not always violate our principles of morality, but unfair forum-shopping tactics most certainly will: see Vyazemskaya v. Safin ¶ 27-31.

[471] The Court of Appeal found that while a newly recognized exception of “unfair forum shopping”, like fraud or the denial of natural justice, could be subsumed within the public policy exception, they should be kept analytically distinct. In the family law context in particular, the “unfair forum-shopping tactics” exemption is “particularly persuasive”. Canadian family law places a strong emphasis on the values of partnership and equality. Those principles, for example, are reflected in the preamble of the Family Law Act: see Vyazemskaya v. Safin ¶ 27-32. In other words, the wife in this case before me, can make out this exception without needing to look at the law of Australia at all.

[472] For the wife to establish this exception, she must demonstrate that the husband engaged in unfair tactics to avoid the application of his domestic obligations here. The divorce that was obtained in this case makes little sense to the Court. At one point, the wife surmised that perhaps it had something to do with his other relationship, but during her testimony, she said she still hadn’t pieced together what exactly the divorce accomplished respecting that other relationship.

[473] In my view, there are only three logical conclusions that could be drawn as to why the husband did this. One is his account, that the parties were separated, and the wife told him to apply there. I have rejected this explanation for numerous reasons. As such, his real motivation for his actions, has gone unexplained by him.

[474] A second inference that could be drawn, is he did this so he could pursue his other relationship and marry his other partner. That may have been part of it, but that other relationship had already been going on for at least two years when he obtained the divorce, and he would not go on to re-marry his other partner, for almost another three years. I wondered during this trial whether the foreign divorce had something to do with facilitating the husband’s other partner’s immigration to Canada. Except for a travel authorization that the husband’s other partner supplied to show how she entered Canada during the Covid-19 pandemic, no immigrations applications formed part of the evidentiary record for this trial. I ordered that some underlying immigration documents be produced mid trial, but the husband’s other partner said she could not access them online.

[475] The only other explanation that makes any sense, was that he did this, to give himself the upper hand, when it comes to avoiding his financial obligations towards the wife and children. It gave him some control.

[476] Now the husband did argue that is not what he did. But the husband is once again lacking in credibility. His inconsistent and incredible testimony considered alongside some of his positions in the litigation underscores that. One example is what he said about the matrimonial home. He testified that he bought the house for the children. Yet when this case got underway, and particularly once he bought a new home for himself in 2024, his position changed. Now it must be sold. Yet there are four children and they are all still minors. If it was so important to him that there be housing for his dependent children as he maintained was his position in 2020 when the house was bought, then what changed?

[477] Other examples are that he contests the entitlement to pay spousal support on various grounds, including by relying on the foreign divorce. His pleading even raised a question about the obligation to pay child support. He contests that there should be any form of property order, whether through equalization or based on the wife’s equitable arguments.

[478] The manner in which the husband launched the foreign divorce application, in circumstances of deceit against a backdrop of intimate partner violence, followed by the failure to even give the wife a copy of the documents, or the Order once it was issued, are also telling. Those are all very unfair tactics.

[479] The foreign divorce, if recognized, would have enabled the husband to avoid some of his obligations. Below, when I analyze the remaining issues, I will explain the extent to which the wife would suffer prejudice in each area that there would be prejudice, and in the areas that there would not be prejudice.

[480] And regarding this underlying suggestion that the wife could just go to Australia to pursue her entitlements there (i.e. the husband’s request that I find Australian entitlements do exist, above), perhaps there is some authority for this, although I doubt it should be given much weight under the “unfair forum shopping” exception.

[481] At ¶ 29-47 R.N.S. v. K.S., 2013 BCCA 406, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected an argument about forum shopping as between British Columbia and Australia, saying that even though the wife required leave to pursue spousal support there, there was no evidence that she would be denied leave.[24] The Court in R.N.S. v. K.S. went on to say that if the wife was precluded from seeking spousal support in Australia, it is because she did not seek it on time, because it would be expensive and impractical to do so.

[482] This decision considered these questions about unfair forum shopping under the public policy exception. It did not make these comments under the new analytically distinct exception that the Ontario Court of Appeal has recognized, with its focus on decisions taken to avoid the application of domestic laws.

[483] And with respect, under the Ontario approach I tend to disagree that the expense and impracticality associated with pursuing a remedy in a foreign jurisdiction on the other side of the world is irrelevant to the unfair forum shopping defense. As the Ontario recognized exception “extends to decisions taken to avoid the application of domestic laws”, part of that must include by implication, the loss of convenience from not being able to address all issues domestically, in a local court here, where everyone is situated. The equally problematic inverse of that, is that the husband will gain a juridical advantage should the wife choose not to pursue her rights in Australia because of inconvenience. By default he will get to avoid the application of domestic laws here.

[484] Returning to the forum convienens analysis earlier, in addition to the fact that the parties are here, as is all the evidence (except perhaps for the parties’ pensions), and this trial is underway already, geographical factors are not irrelevant. Even if the wife theoretically has rights in Australia that she can pursue, she is a working mother, with limited resources and four children in her primary care.

[485] There is something inherently imbalanced here. The husband was able to obtain a quick divorce essentially over the internet. The wife, according to him, should now have to litigate various issues on the other side of the world in a proceeding that would undoubtedly be contested, if the Australian Court even takes jurisdiction over her claims. Incidentally, giving effect to that kind of argument would create yet another multiplicity of proceedings in this case. Parenting and child support would remain in this Court’s jurisdiction.

(6) Whether the Court Should Recognize Intimate Partner Violence As An Additional Exception

[486] At ¶ 42 of Beals v. Saldanha, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that “unusual situations may arise that might require the creation of a new defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment”. While the Court declined to speculate on what those unusual situations might be, it held that should the evolution of private international law require the creation of a new defence, the courts will need to ensure that any new defences continue to be narrow in scope, address specific facts and raise issues not covered by the existing defences. This is exactly what the Ontario Court of Appeal did in Vyazemskaya v. Safin when it recognized the new unfair forum shopping exception.

[487] In addition to pointing to the intimate partner violence that she endured as a factor, the wife relied on a number of duress cases, that she argues have some application by analogy. But those cases consider the impact of duress or undue influence in the formation of domestic contracts, and whether those contracts should be disregarded or set aside. This case before me is not one of duress in that sense; a joint application to obtain a foreign divorce is not a domestic contract that can be set aside. And even if her consent to the application is a “contract”, the questions before this Court are not whether the foreign divorce should be “set aside”; they are whether it should be recognized and/or equally, whether there is an exception to its recognition.

[488] I have found already the intimate partner violence in this case relevant to the fraud and natural justice defences, to the extent that it forms part of the factual backdrop behind explaining what transpired, how something like this could have been allowed to transpire, and why there was inaction on the part of the wife. But none of those other exceptions recognize that perhaps intimate partner violence should form its own, analytically distinct exception. Because the wife raised the issue but framed as a separate duress argument, I asked the parties to address instead during their closing submissions, whether there should be a new exception, based on the intimate partner violence on its own.

[489] The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 was of course about the creation of a new tort of intimate partner violence, not about a new exception to the recognition of a foreign divorce. For the purposes of whether there should be a new exception though, the analysis in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia is nevertheless important for three reasons.

[490] First, Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia defines intimate partner violence broadly as “all abusive conduct by which one intimate partner coerces and controls the other, thus depriving them of their autonomy”, and elsewhere as “conduct that non-exhaustively includes tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, physical, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse, and intimidation that can control, isolate and entrap intimate partners.” It recognizes the “broader legal and societal consensus that condemns [intimate partner violence] in unambiguous terms”, by canvassing various legislative responses and by examining the nature of the relationships in which it occurs. It recognizes the long-lasting impact that intimate violence may have, which can include post-separation effects: see ¶ 96-126, 190.

[491] Indeed, at ¶ 127, Kasirer J. wrote “there is little doubt that intimate partner violence engages the victim’s dignity, autonomy, and equality and interferes with their ability to make independent decisions about their lives and about themselves”.

[492] This is exactly what happened here; the intimate partner violence in this relationship interfered with, and in fact deprived the wife of her dignity, autonomy and equality through which she lost the ability to decide whether to participate freely in the foreign divorce application, which in turn affected her status, and but for this decision, her legal entitlements in Ontario.

[493] Second, like Beals v. Saldanha left open the possibility for the creation of a new defence, Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia provides a framework for the incremental and necessary development of the common law, albeit in the tort context, to “respond to evolving social conditions” where there is an absence of adequate remedies: see ¶ 65-95.

[494] Third, I recognize that the wife has not specifically pleaded a new exception. But Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia also recognized a flexible approach to pleadings in family law cases, particularly where there is a self-represented litigant. Questions or arguments about pleadings should focus on substance over form: see ¶ 62.

[495] Here, there was adequate notice that the wife was relying on intimate partner violence right from the outset. She argued duress and undue influence. In her written submissions intimate partner violence forms a large feature. The parties were given an opportunity to address whether there should be a new exception based on intimate partner violence.

[496] I find it appropriate to recognize a new exception for a few reasons.

[497] First, it is important to condemn again, intimate partner violence. This is being done in many different ways, at law and otherwise. But it seems apt to also do so here, in this unusual context.

[498] In this regard, counsel for the husband argued that creating a new exception is tantamount to awarding the wife damages, when she did not plead any of the torts. I disagree. An exception to the recognition of a foreign divorce has nothing to do with tort damages. The wife has chosen to pursue her statutory family law entitlements in Ontario. While the new exception does of course afford the wife a remedy that allows her to pursue those, it bears repeating that statutory family law entitlements serve a different purpose than tort damages: see Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia ¶ 210.

[499] This argument also begs the obvious two questions: why should the wife be deprived of some of her statutory remedies here (or if they are not completely denied, why should they be more limited), just because of her participation in the foreign divorce application, that was on the facts, coerced, in a spousal relationship that involved intimate partner violence? How would that be just and equitable, particularly in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recognition in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, of the broad consensus condemning intimate partner violence in unambiguous terms?

[500] Second, part of the Supreme Court’s consideration in creating the tort of intimate partner violence was restorative justice. Torts are not the only way for restorative justice to be achieved. That there might be a denial or limiting of one’s family law entitlements as a consequence of intimate partner violence is repugnant. That would be contrary to notions of restorative justice. Like the Ontario Court of Appeal said in Vyazemskaya v. Safin, Canadian family law places a strong emphasis on the values of partnership and equality.

[501] Third, while it is true that the facts in this case giving rise to the new exception (i.e. intimate partner violence and its aftermath) do overlap and provide a factual backdrop to the other exceptions like natural justice, fraud, or unfair forum shopping, that will not necessarily always be so.

[502] For instance, in this case before me, had the husband provided a copy of the joint application for divorce at the time it was signed and then filed, and had he provided her with the divorce Order in a timely way after it was granted, the wife may not have been able to make out her defense based on lack of notice, despite the intimate partner violence. And she may very well have still delayed in doing anything about the documents had she been served, because of the intimate partner violence.

[503] What about a different situation where a person is coerced into participating in a foreign divorce application, or abstaining from objecting to it, but where there isn’t fraud going to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. That could occur where there are two places that might take jurisdiction, for example in the case before Kurz J. But what if the hypothetical wife in a case like that which was before Kurz J. didn’t take steps. Should that foreign divorce proceeding have gone forward in this hypothetical scenario, when Ontario is the forum conveniens, in circumstances where there is coercion, followed by a victim’s inaction due to trauma?

[504] The unfair forum shopping exception, focuses on choices the husband made to avoid his domestic legal obligations; it does not necessarily focus, in an analytically distinct way, on the consequences of coercive control. Even in this case, while the intimate partner violence (coercion around the time of the signing, and even some of the history) is unquestionably relevant to explaining how the husband was able to unfairly forum shop here, not all of the intimate partner violence necessarily forms part of the immediate circumstances, or the actual choice he made, to avoid his obligations. His intimate partner violence went on for years, well before he made the choice to apply for an Australian divorce. What the intimate partner violence did, was put the wife into the state of mind to willingly submit, and to not object. That in my view raises a separate, stand-alone and analytically distinct problem to be addressed.

[505] In other words, I find that intimate partner violence does raise “specific facts and raise[s] [other] issues not covered by the existing defences”: see Beals v. Saldanha ¶ 42.

[506] The new exception that I propose below, is sufficiently narrow in scope in my view. I did not find compelling the floodgates argument that was raised during submissions (which was not strenuously pursued anyway). The exception should hopefully be a fairly “unusual situation”: see again Beals v. Saldanha ¶ 42, just as this case before me had extremely unusual, and indeed astounding facts.

[507] Borrowing therefore from the elements of the tort of intimate partner violence at ¶ 206-208 of Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia as a guide to help frame the new exception, I find that there should be a new exception to recognizing a foreign divorce, where:

(a) a person, during the course of an intimate partnership or in its aftermath;

(b) has on an objective measure, been coerced as a result of intimate partner violence, into:

1. participating in; or

2. abstaining from defending a foreign divorce application;

the exception would be made out.

If the person then remains silent or delays in taking steps, explained by the impact of intimate partner violence, the exception would still also be made out.

[508] I find that the foreign divorce in this case, should not be recognized based on the intimate partner violence that occurred here, and its consequences.

I. Summary and Conclusions Respecting the Exceptions to Recognition of the Australian Divorce

[509] In summary, the wife has met her onus that the Australian Divorce should not be recognized, based on lack of notice, based on fraud, based on unfair forum shopping, and based on the intimate partner violence that occurred, and its consequences. The intimate partner violence explains why the wife signed the joint divorce application in the first place, and then remained silent.

PART IX: OTHER ISSUES

A. Analysis Regarding the Date of Separation

[510] At ¶ 12 of Kassabian v. Marcarian, 2025 ONCA 239, Madsen J.A. wrote:

There are at least three contexts in which the timing of spousal separation is material in a family law case: to grant a divorce under the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.); to determine spousal support under the Divorce Act, or the Family Law Act, and to determine the “valuation date” for the purpose of equalization under the Family Law Act. The date of separation under the Divorce Act and the valuation date under the Family Law Act, are frequently, but not always, the same date.

[511] Madsen J.A. then elaborated in the paragraphs that followed, about these contexts, and the various consequences that flow from a date of separation. There is an additional import to the date of separation in the unusual circumstances of this case. The parties’ date of separation formed part of the factual matrix underlying the assessment of the validity of the foreign divorce.

[512] Insofar as the wife’s family law entitlements are concerned now that the foreign divorce is dealt with, all three usual contexts for why a date of separation matters that Madsen J.A. mentioned, align. The date of separation under the Divorce Act, for the purposes of a divorce and the commencement of child and spousal support, and under the Family Law Act for the purposes of equalization, are the same date. To explain why I find September 6, 2024 to be the date of separation I will focus my analysis on the date of separation for the purposes of an equalization payment, also given the wife’s alternative claim to extend the limitation period to claim one.

[513] At ¶ 24-25 of Chan v. Chan, 2013 ONSC 7465, McGee J., citing Corbett J. in Strobele v. Strobele, [2005] O.J. No. 6312 (S.C.J.), wrote that the goal of section 4(1) of the Family Law Act is “to fix the date on which the economic partnership should be fairly terminated.” There are two aspects to the definition, being the date on which the spouses separate, and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation. No one factor determines when the test has been met. There may be cases where one spouse knows that there will be no reconciliation, but the other does not, because the other does not yet understand that the former has come to this determination. But a “fair determination of the issue requires that an objective eye be cast upon the unique circumstances of the couple.”

[514] As McGee J. cautioned at ¶ 29 of Chan v. Chan, )“[e]very marriage is different and the courts must look to the various objective factors to determine if the parties are living separate and apart… Some marriages are by nature stormy and erratic. The Court must exercise caution and differentiate between a couple living together albeit with some unhappiness and dissention, on the one hand, and a situation where they are instead both living there but as two separate individuals…. A marriage may be at times stormy, but ongoing…”

[515] At ¶ 20-21 of Kassabian v. Marcarian, Madsen J.A. went on to write that the leading case for determining a spousal separation remains Oswell v. Oswell, 1990 CanLii 6747 (Ont. H.C.J.), aff’d by 1991 CanLii 7741 (Ont. C.A.). She said that additional considerations and guiding principles in subsequent cases have expanded the analysis. For example, the list of factors in M. v. H., 1999 CanLii 686 (S.C.C.) (and Molodowich v. Penttinen, 1980 CanLii 1537 (Ont. H.C.J.)), that are relevant to the existence of a conjugal relationship are also relevant to spousal separation. They include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. These elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be conjugal.

[516] Madsen J.A. emphasized the element of change when it comes to determining the timing of spousal separation. Changes in the characteristics of a conjugal relationship at the alleged separation date best serve to guide the court in fixing the date. Likewise, whether formal steps were taken to end the relationship, as well as any steps taken to resume cohabitation are also relevant: see Kassabian v. Marcarian ¶ 22-23.

[517] Relevant to this case, is this additional factor. Just as two persons can live separate and apart under the same roof, the fact that two persons live apart at times under separate roofs, does not necessarily mean they are separated. Sometimes two persons maintain separate residences for a reason, and that happened here: see for example Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554 ¶ 58.

[518] The aforementioned factors are not a checklist. As Madsen J.A. wrote at ¶ 31(f) of Kassabian v. Marcarian, the Court does not tabulate factors for or against any alleged separation date. Some factors may seem to contradict others. In this case before me, the fact that the wife filed certain tax returns identifying herself as single after 2020 is contradictory. But no one factor is determinative, and there must be a weighing of the factors in the “overall assessment of the uniqueness of each relationship, and of each separation.”

[519] I see very little need to analyze the evidence in any further detail than I already have earlier. With the exception of a couple of brief periods of separation, followed by a resumption of this very “unique” relationship, essentially all of the factors evidencing an ongoing relationship are applicable right up until September of 2024. After the wife left Singapore in March of 2019, when the parties occupied separate residences, they did so either because of the husband’s work, first in Singapore and later in Montreal, or because of the deceit in which he was engaging to pursue his parallel relationship with his other spouse.

[520] Earlier, I highlighted that the wife claimed a date of separation of August 16, 2024. Her evidence was not entirely accurate as to when she said the husband returned to the matrimonial home after that. Although pointed to by the husband as an example of the wife’s lack of credibility, this is yet another minor inconsistency as opposed to something of substance, and it is not dispositive. What I found to be most significant, was what the wife said about both sides’ intentions at the time she found out about the re-marriage. The wife, still to this day, does not know if the husband would have initiated a separation from her, had she not found out about his re-marriage on September 6, 2024. I agree with that. While the husband may have at one time or the other during the past several years have had moments where he felt the relationship was over, that intention to separate never solidified into a permanent one. Nor did the wife ever form an intention to end this relationship on a final basis, until she found out about the other relationship, when she learned on Facebook, about the re-marriage. She didn’t even intend to separate when she found out about the Ajax property.

[521] If one looks at what changed, a key focus that Madsen J.A. emphasized, it is what happened after the wife finally found out about the relationship and the re-marriage. She then took the position she took about the husband’s parenting time, she told him to retain counsel, she re-engaged with a therapist days later, and then by November of 2024, the husband started this proceeding. His position about how the finances should be handled changed after that, including his change in position about maintaining the matrimonial home, among other things.

[522] For these reasons, I fix the date of the parties’ separation to be September 6, 2024. That is the date of real change here.

B. Extension of the Limitation Period to Claim An Equalization Payment in the Alternative

[523] The wife as I indicated was never precluded from claiming in Ontario an equalization payment, solely by virtue of the fact that there was a foreign divorce: see again Okmyansky v. Okmyansky. The parties’ last common habitual residence was Ontario. The property rights of the spouses arising out of the marital relationship are governed by the law of Ontario: see section 15 of the Family Law Act.

[524] Now that is of course subject to any applicable limitation period. Sections 7(3)(a) and (b) of the Family Law Act provide for a limitation period that is the earlier of two years from the date of a divorce, or six years after the day the spouses separate and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation the separation. Had the Court recognized the Australian divorce, then the applicable limitation period would have been that in section 7(3)(a) (i.e. a two year limitation period) and it would have expired. For completeness, I will address in the alternative why, had I recognized the foreign divorce, I would have extended the limitation period under section 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

[525] Section 2(8) of the Family Law Act provides that the court may, on motion, extend a time prescribed by this Act if it is satisfied that:

(a) there are apparent grounds for relief;

(b) relief is unavailable because of delay that has been incurred in good faith; and

(c) no person will suffer substantial prejudice by reason of the delay.

[526] There are apparent grounds for relief. As indicated elsewhere in this Judgment, the wife is entitled to an equalization payment that is prima facie in excess of $600,000.00 based on the record currently before me (although it wouldn’t necessarily have been that high prima facie, had the valuation date been the date of the divorce instead of September 6, 2024). The husband did not, in his written closing submissions, argue that there aren’t apparent grounds for relief.

[527] Regarding the good faith requirement, at ¶ 13 of Taylor v. Taylor, 2019 ONSC 2968, Hebner J. cited El Feky v. Tohamy, 2010 ONCA 647, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal said to establish “good faith”, the moving party must have acted honestly and with no ulterior motive. The mere failure to make enquiries should not necessarily negate “good faith” provided that the absence of enquiry does not constitute willful blindness or, in all the circumstances “fall below community expectations”. The Court in El Feky v. Tohamy excused what it referred to as the wife’s “blameless ignorance”.

[528] In this case before me, the result on a good faith argument flows from the intimate partner violence. I have already addressed the reason for the wife’s delay in taking steps after both the signing of the divorce documents, and after she was given a copy of the divorce Order. She delayed because of the husband’s manipulation and deceit, and because of the effects of the intimate partner violence on her. The wife has satisfied the Court as to the good faith part of the test.

[529] Regarding substantial prejudice, the husband does not suffer prejudice from having to make the equalization payment. Substantial prejudice means an “irreversible financial decision”, or the inability to secure evidence to calculate the equalization payment: see Taylor v. Taylor ¶ 24-29. There is no such thing here. The husband did not, in his written closing submissions, even argue substantial prejudice.

[530] Finally, Hebner J. noted at ¶ 30-31 that the decision to extend is discretionary. She noted that in the case before her, the parties had two daughters and the wife was the parent responsible for caring for the children since the separation as factors warranting the exercise of discretion in the wife’s favour. This is the situation in this case before me too. In addition, the husband either returned to the matrimonial home regularly, or lived there in the years after the foreign divorce. He continued to receive the benefit of the wife’s contributions towards some of the carrying costs of the home, and her domestic and parenting contributions. He was able to save. The wife was not. The equities favour the wife here.

[531] Frankly, it is the wife who would have suffered prejudice in this alternative scenario, even with an extended limitation period. Had the Court recognized the foreign divorce and extended the limitation period, the valuation date for the equalization calculation would still be the date of the Australian divorce (February 24, 2021) as opposed to the September 6, 2024 date of separation. In order to pursue her share of any growth in the husband’s wealth after the date of the divorce on February 24, 2021, until September 6, 2024, the wife would have to proceed with a claim for an unequal division of net family property under section 5(6) of the Family Law Act, which requires an unconscionability analysis, among other things. The husband received several grants of stock options after 2021, that would be exempt from sharing, but for an unconscionability analysis. The value of the matrimonial home likely increased as well.

C. Alternative Jurisdiction to Order Child and Spousal Support

[532] Irrespective of the determination about the foreign divorce, and despite what the husband seemed to plead, the wife would have been entitled to child support one way or the other. She is now entitled to it under the Divorce Act in view of this Court’s decision. Had this Court recognized the foreign divorce, the wife could have pursued child support under the Family Law Act: see Chang v. Liu, 2017 ONCA 104.

[533] Had I recognized the divorce, I would found entitlement to order spousal support under the Family Law Act, based on the statutory interpretation analysis in Rasaei v. Bahman, 2025 ONSC 2074. But I appreciate there has yet to be appellate clarification or legislative reform about this. This could have prejudiced the wife.

[534] There would have also been jurisdiction to award spousal support under the Family Law Act separately based on a different read of the meaning of “spouse” in section 29(a) of the Family Law Act. Except the for two brief periods of separation, the length of which I have already said I am not even able to calculate with precision, the parties cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years, after the date of the divorce.

[535] There may, however have been some prejudice to the wife there too, if the proper way to compute the length of the relationship in a SSAGs calculation in that circumstance, would limit the duration of the relationship to just the period between the Australian divorce on February 24, 2021 and September 6, 2024, when in fact the real length of this relationship was over 14 years.

PART X: TEMPORARY AND FINAL ORDERS RELATING TO CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT

A. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning the Determination of Income

[536] Section 2(3) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, Reg. 97-175, as amended, provides that the most current information must be used to determine incomes. Sections 15 to 20 provide the methodology for the determination of incomes.

[537] For the most part, I can dispose of the income issues presently before me based on section 16 alone. It provides that subject to sections 17 to 20, a spouse’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency and is adjusted in accordance with Schedule III.

[538] The husband’s argument about his stock options, also engages the imputing sections 19(1)(d) and (e).

B. The Principles To Be Used for the Determination of the Husband’s Income on a Final Basis, and His Income for Temporary Support

(1) The Husband’s Line 150 Incomes

[539] The husband in his trial affidavit, calculated his employment income for the past three years. His written closing submissions go back to 2019. The years 2019 and 2020 are in Singapore Dollars, which he converted to Canadian dollars. The retrospective review provides a helpful background against which I consider the issues he raises about the treatment of his bonus and stock options, but in the end result of this case, because of the date of separation, the Court only needs to actually determine incomes starting in 2024, and for the purposes of interim support right now, I am working with the most current incomes only.

[540] Nevertheless, the husband says he earned the Singapore Dollar equivalent of $293,760.31 CAD in 2019 and $357,273.78 CAD in 2020. Thereafter, he earned $442,496 in 2021 (although this included a relocation allowance), $300,585.09 in 2022, and $327,970.00 in 2023. In most of the years, the husband has broken out the different forms of compensation he received to arrive at the totals. For 2021, he says the break down was not available, but he did still make reference to the relocation allowance forming part of his total compensation.

[541] While the husband did provide his totals of his incomes for all of these years, he has also made a number of proposed adjustments to his income. Starting in 2024, the husband, in his written closing submissions, says that he earned:

2024: $344, 642.00 [25] (but he says his actual disposable income is $290,977.29)

Base Salary: $221,388.00

Bonus (2023 Paid in 2024): $62,379.00

Vested Stock Options Before Tax: $53,664.71

Other: Investment Income: $7,210.28

2025: $334,483.81 (but he says his actual disposable income is $292,665.79)

Base Salary: $234,819.17

Bonus (2024 Paid in 2025): $57,553.00

Vested Stock Options Before Tax: $41,818.62

Other: Investment Income: $313.62

(2) A Projection of the Husband’s Current 2026 Income

[542] The husband estimated that his current income in 2026 would range between $330,000.00 and $340,000.00, before any adjustment to get to his “actual disposable income”. 2026 is of course, not over yet, so I don’t have this data fully and accurately. I also am left wondering why the husband claims he is going to earn less this year, than what he earned last year.

[543] The husband’s base salary was $234,819.17 in 2025, and the bonus he received in the first part of 2025, was $57,533.00. He testified that his base salary increased to $242,000.00 in 2026, and he obtained a bonus earlier this year of $70,000.00. This is a cumulative increase of $19,647.83.

[544] The husband estimated the value of his shares that would vest this year to be $30,000.00 however. This is lower than the vested amount (shown on his tax return, not the actual shares’ value) in the last three years by at least $11,000.00, and in the case of a comparison with 2025, by about $23,000.00.

[545] Even if the husband is only receiving a tax value of $30,000.00 for any not yet exercised shares that vest this year, his projected, current income for this year, ought to have been $7,829.81 higher than last year’s income, or $352,471.81. I will round that to $352,500.00 for simplicity.[26]

(3) The Husband’s Additional Self-Employment Income

[546] The husband earned consulting income on a self-employed basis in certain years in the recent past. The husband says that in 2021-2022, he was approached by several companies to undertake limited contract work, which he referred to as the “expert network”. He did not, in either of his trial affidavit, nor in any of his Financial Statements in the trial record sworn October 24, 2024, April 17, 2025, August 22, 2024 or May 1, 2026, nor in his written closing submissions, include the amounts he earned from doing this, nor did he ever report that income to the Canada Revenue Agency either.

[547] But according to a spreadsheet he filed at the trial, which cross-references corresponding bank statements showing various deposits, the husband earned $8,309.35 in 2023, $39,771.45 in 2024, and residual amounts of $1,901.60 in 2025 from this self-employment or consulting income.

[548] The 2024 and 2025 amounts will form part of his 2024 and 2025 incomes when it comes to retroactivity, and they will need be grossed up. The go-forward issue before me right now though, is whether the Court should impute an income to the husband from like activity in the past, under section 19 of the Guidelines.

[549] The husband claimed that he stopped earning this additional income in 2024, after he acquired enough money to buy his other property in Ajax. The amount received in 2025 he says, is a residual payment for a contract previously obtained and performed.

[550] The wife did not prove that the husband is still doing this work, or concealing self-employment income. Rather, she questions the husband’s say-so that he will continue not to do this work in the future, particularly once this case is over and he is no longer under the lens of the Court. She argued that he is not doing it now because this case is ongoing. She asks the Court to impute to $9,915.00 to him, which is higher than what he earned from this in 2025, but about 25% of the higher 2024 earnings.

[551] I do not find that the husband has to do additional self-employment work, even though he did it in the past. He is not underemployed. If he resumes doing this in the future, it will fall into his income for support purposes. I will not impute to him.

[552] But there is additional relevance here to these past self-employment earnings. One is a disclosure issue. He needs to provide an accurate ongoing accounting and disclosure on a timely basis if he starts doing this work again, or alternatively some level of disclosure even if he does not, so the wife can be satisfied that he is continuing not to do self-employment work. The Court is not prepared to rely on the husband making a voluntary future disclosure if he starts this work again. He already failed to report the past on his taxes and on his sworn financial statements as it is. The Court will order annual production of his bank statements so the wife can satisfy herself.

[553] The other area of relevance, pertains to his arguments below, that there should be a different approach with his bonus and stocks, rooted in an argument that he has a cash flow problem at the moment. While I will deal with that cash flow argument on a stand alone basis and I do intend to give him some relief, I note this. The husband chose to take on extra consulting work when it suited him, including to buy a new house. Then he stopped even though he has several dependents. Having chosen to stop doing this extra work, he nevertheless wants the Court to adopt a different (and lower) approach to the determination of income, which includes excluding any income from his stock options, and treating his bonus differently, so he can save for his retirement, and for cash flow reasons. The Court is not prepared to do so. While I will not impute to him from past consulting work, his decision to stop doing that work waters down the force of some of his other cash flow complaints, and his request for additional remedies.

(4) The Husband’s Bonus Income

[554] The husband does not seek to exclude his bonus from the determination of his income entirely. What he wants to do, relying on his cash flow arguments, is to defer the sharing of his bonus in a support calculation until the time that it is received each year. In other words, he is proposing that regular support be based on his base pay, and he will pay an annual top up if and when he gets a bonus. That is what was done in D.(A.) v. P.(A.), 2016 BCSC 2023, because of a cash flow problem based on significant debt and little ability to obtain additional credit: see ¶ 112-113. Similarly, after reviewing some authorities at ¶ 124 of Easton v. Coxhead, 2018 ONSC 4784, Madsen J., as she then was, ordered a sharing of a bonus when received, also, in part, based on cash flow considerations.

[555] But this case before me is not one of a fluctuating bonus, in the sense that some years it is received and some years it is not. Even though the husband’s bonus is discretionary, the husband’s chart in his closing submissions shows that he received a bonus in every year since 2019, except possibly for 2021, but I do not even know that, because the breakdown was not provided.

[556] The smallest amount of a bonus in the last 8 years (including 2026) as far as I can tell, was about $55,000.00 in 2023. Between last year and this year, the husband’s bonus increased to $70,000.00, according to his own say-so.

[557] From a cash flow perspective, I do accept that the husband is maintaining the household in which the wife and the children live, as well as the Ajax property in which he and his other partner live. But the reality is that he will have expenses associated with support going forward, given the number of dependents he has. His real cashflow crisis, if I can call it that, is driven by the fact that he has been funding two relationships, in secret for years, including since 2024 the second residence in Ajax. There are also increased expenses associated with this litigation, like the reunification therapy and now the custody and access assessment, which are anomalies and will in the future come to an end. In other words, the husband’s cash flow crisis is temporary in nature. The Court is already giving effect to his request to sell the matrimonial home now to help alleviate that, as well as an additional credit towards his temporary support, explained below. The latter credit will alleviate the cash flow crisis in the short term until the sale of the matrimonial home should bring it to an end.

[558] Finally ordering a deferred sharing of the husband’s bonus requires the Court to trust that the husband will disclose it to the wife in a timely way upon receipt, and cooperate respecting calculating and paying the amount of any top up support. Given his failure to include the consulting income in his sworn financial statements or on his taxes, and given the other credibility issues that I have identified, the Court does not have this trust.

(5) The Husband’s Stock Options

[559] The husband seeks to exclude any income, or potential income from his stock options.

[560] Section 13(1) of Schedule III of the Guidelines provides for how employee stock options are to be calculated in income where they are exercised during the year. It does not address the situation where they haven’t been exercised. But schedule III is also subject to sections 17 to 20 of the Guidelines, which includes imputing.

[561] The husband in this case wants to retain complete unfettered discretion as to the timing under which he will exercise any vested stocks. In Walker v. Walker, 2024 ONSC 198, Audet J. considered whether the payor should be left with such complete discretion. She referred to Patterson v. Patterson, 2006 CanLii 53701 (Ont. S.C.J.) in which the payor chose to leave his vested shares in trust, thereby shielding sizeable income from being included as part of his income for support purposes. The Court in Patterson v. Patterson held that the timing of the exercise of underlying shares could be considered under section 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Guidelines (i.e. there could be imputing based on the diversion of income, and based on a payor not reasonably utilizing his property to generate income). Audet J. noted that the same conclusion was reached in De Zen v. De Zen, 2021 CanLii 28139 (Ont. S.C.J.): see ¶ 45-58.

[562] At ¶ 60 Audet J. went on to write that there were very few cases that considered the issue since Patterson v. Patterson was released, but a key finding in Patterson v. Patterson, and in De Zen v. De Zen, was that the payor was intentionally deferring significant income, and he would have gained a substantial financial benefit had he sold the shares at the time. At ¶ 61, Audet J. set out a variety of factors to consider.

[563] In his written submissions, the husband says that the primary consideration for him, would seem to be whether there are any valid reasons for the deferral of available compensation, or whether the husband is simply deferring for the main purpose of minimizing existing or future support obligations. The husband says he is not minimizing or avoiding his support obligations. He says he has been treating the stocks as a retirement savings vehicle for the most part since he started to receive the grants in 2020.

[564] While that may have been the plan when the family was intact, this is not an intact family any longer. The husband now has a former spouse, a current partner, and four children. At least five, and possibly six of these people, are his dependents.[27] Nor has the husband completely saved his stocks for his future retirement. Again, when it suited his purposes (to buy a new house), he exercised some options.

[565] The Court is not prepared to give the husband discretion as to when he will exercise his shares. I find that they should fall into income, in the year that the shares vest. But the Court cannot at this time undertake a better calculation. I wasn’t given the data to do so. This needs to be procured before the second part of this trial.

[566] While equalization was deferred until the second part of the trial, income was supposed to be before the Court and dealt with on a final basis. It cannot be as a consequence of the Court subsequently learning about the stock options during the trial, and the position the husband took.

[567] Once the husband obtains a stock option valuation and an income analysis respecting those stocks, I will entertain further submissions at the second part of the trial, about whether the husband should have a different income or incomes to the extent of the equalized portion of the income that flows from the options until 2027. Because the husband said his shares vest three years after the grant date, the last grant date before the separation should be in 2024. That is why I envision the different income calculations likely running until 2027. But the final income determination will include the vested shares, in the sense that I am not excluding them from income entirely, contrary to what the husband argued. Any non-taxable portion of any capital gain will also need to be calculated and grossed up.

[568] For now, the Court’s income determination of $352,500.00 for temporary support includes the husband’s estimate of the value of the shares that vest in 2026. This will be revisited later.

(6) The Husband’s Section 4 Argument

[569] Section 4 of the Guidelines allows the Court to depart from the approach under section 3, where a payor has an income over $150,000.00, if the Court finds the amount of child support to be inappropriate. During closing submissions, there seemed to be a suggestion from the husband’s counsel, that it could also consider the husband’s arguments about the stocks, or perhaps even the different approach to the bonus, under this section. In his written submissions, the husband argues that the children’s lifestyles are maintained as it is before the stocks are taken into account.

[570] I was not given any authority for the proposition that the analysis under section 4 could include a different methodology for the determination of income. A plain reading of the section provides for a different approach to child support once income is determined. To push its interpretation in the direction the husband argued for, would run afoul of the other statutory sections in the Guidelines referred to above, specific to the determination of income. Nothing in the approach to the determination of income in section 16 makes the determination of income subject to section 4. Section 16, is subject to sections 17 to 20.

[571] Nor on the merits of a section 4 argument did the husband provide any authority or more fulsome submissions to support an argument that the approach in section 3 of the Guidelines is inappropriate at his level of income either, although over $150,000.00. The Court intends to apply the approach in section 3 of the Guidelines. It is not adjusting his income by using section 4.

C. Conclusions Respecting the Husband’s Income

[572] In conclusion, I fix the husband’s income at $352,500.00, for the purposes of determining temporary support between now and the second part of the trial. Certain principles that will apply when his income is finally determined from 2024 going forward, are set out below in the Order.

D. The Determination of the Wife’s Incomes on a Final Basis for 2024 and 2025, and the Income to Be Used for Temporary Support

[573] There are no issues with the wife’s income. Her Line 150 Incomes since she came to Canada in 2019, were:

2019: $23,259.00

2020: $38,283.00

2021: $53,394.00 (this is the year the wife started working as a lawyer, mid-year);

2022: $75,576.00

2023: $91,556.00

2024: $104,538.00

2025: $113,500.00

[574] The Court is able to find on a final basis, that the wife’s incomes in 2024 and 2025 were $104,538.00 and $113,500.00. These are the incomes that will be used, when it comes to retroactivity later on.

[575] Regarding temporary support between now and the second part of the trial, the wife’s Financial Statement sworn May 1, 2026, says that her current income is $125,017.98. The wife updated this during her testimony, saying that her projected current income, will be about $140,000.00 this year (in 2026). I will use that $140,000.00 figure for consistency, since I used a projected 2026 income for the husband.

E. Temporary Child Support

[576] Based on an income of $352,500.00, the husband’s table child support obligation for four children, is $7,076.50 per month.

F. Temporary Section 7 Expenses

[577] The parties agreed on a without prejudice basis at the appearance before Shaw J. on April 25, 2025, that the father would start paying 77% of various section 7 expenses based on 2024 Notices of Assessment. The listed shareable section 7 expenses in the parties’ temporary agreement are before and after school care, summer camp, tutoring for two children, soccer for two children, martial arts and basketball, uninsured health expenses, and therapy for one child. There are terms in the temporary Minutes/Consent Order for the exchange of receipts and reimbursement. Contribution to any other section 7 expenses had to be agreed upon in writing in advance, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld.

[578] The parties agreed to a direct payment and reimbursement regime back then. The incomes are now different, which affects the percentages. The Court is ordering spousal support. That affects the percentages. And as the wife seeks spousal support and the Court is ordering it, the approach to how section 7 expenses are dealt with needs to be different. If I don’t take the section 7 expenses into account in the Court’s support calculation somehow, the spousal support will be too high.

[579] I heard some evidence and was given charts, about who paid for what in the past. Not all of the items on the parties’ charts are necessarily section 7 expenses. In any event this will be dealt with later, as it is part of the retroactive analysis. Any prior spending that is properly credited, will be credited then.

[580] The husband’s DivorceMate calculations that accompanied his written closing submissions do not have any section 7 expenses at all. Nor does he say there should be any spousal support either though. Paragraph 231 of the wife’s written closing submissions contain various expenses for basketball and soccer (but not martial arts),[28] summer camp, tutoring and before and after school care. The wife’s list generally accords with the parties’ prior temporary consent for section 7 expenses.

[581] I have included the amounts the wife lists in her written closing submissions in the Court’s calculations, less any applicable tax credits, to calculate a temporary support Order until the second part of the trial. The percentage sharing for these section 7 expenses, when the spousal support that I intend to order is taken into account, becomes 69% (husband) and 31% (wife). The husband’s monthly share of the section 7 expenses is $979.00 per month.

[582] Shaw J.’s April 25, 2025 temporary consent Order says that the cost of reunification therapy could be apportioned later. So too, did my mid-trial Order of June 2, 2026 for the custody and access assessment, say that its cost could be re-apportioned later. The husband is paying for both up front. I have not accounted for these expenses in my calculations. This can be done later at the second trial. It was not argued for at this trial anyway, and I would need properly organized evidence as to these total costs, and submissions as to how they should be apportioned.

[583] When the second part of the trial occurs, the parties need to provide proper retroactive and go forward calculations, as well as a chart of only the section 7 expenses that are properly shareable and that were incurred by each of them, from 2024 to the date of that second trial, and projections of what will be incurred going forward. They will also need to address the cost of the reunification therapy and the assessment, with evidence, charts, calculations and submissions.

G. Temporary Spousal Support

[584] The wife has entitlement on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds. The factors to consider are in section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, and the objectives of the Order, in section 15.2(6).

[585] This was a 14 year marriage. The parties have four children. The wife was pregnant for seven years of the marriage. She moved internationally. Her pregnancies, her parenting responsibilities, and the sacrifices she made to support the husband’s career, delayed her own career as a lawyer. The husband’s circumstances improved as a result of this marriage, despite the husband’s arguments about pay cuts and limits to his career.

[586] The wife has ongoing disadvantage. She was, and remains the children’s primary parent. She was the primary parent throughout, except for the three months between March 15, 2019 and June 16, 2019, when the children stayed behind in Singapore. Even then, there was a nanny to help the husband, until the children were brought to Ontario.

[587] The wife’s net family property appears to be negative at the end of this marriage. The husband’s net worth increased.

[588] The common markers of both a compensatory and a non-compensatory claim are present: see Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the Revised User’s Guide, April 2026, Chapter 3, Entitlement. She has few savings at the end of this marriage.

[589] That said, there is an ability to pay issue here, given the number of children and the fact that the husband is right now, maintaining two households.

[590] The Court’s DivorceMate calculations are attached as Schedules “B” and “C”. The calculations use the projected incomes for 2026. They include the above section 7 expenses and any tax credits. I have also input the husband’s tax deductions and credits that he took on his 2025 tax return, since I don’t have current information about what they will be in 2026.

[591] Spousal support is less because of the amount of child support being paid. I fix temporary spousal support at $1,000.00 per month. I have selected an amount based on a review of the parties’ budgets and after considering further, the husband’s cash flow concerns. The amount selected falls right in between the low and middle ranges of the SSAGs. Before giving the husband any further credit for the ongoing direct housing expenses that he will continue to pay pending the sale of the matrimonial home, I note this sum leaves the wife with 66.6% of the net disposable incomes (see the calculation at Schedule “B”). It is appropriate that she have more of the net disposable incomes as she has four children in her care. The location on the range may or may not change at the second trial, when support is dealt with on a final basis, and after I have evidence about what the budgets will be when the matrimonial home is sold.

H. Additional Adjustments to Address the Husband’s Direct Payments and Cash Flow Arguments

[592] I arrived at the $1,000.00 per month figure by looking at the parties’ budgets, and considering further, the husband’s cash flow concerns.

[593] The husband’s Financial Statement sworn May 10, 2026 shows that his expenses (other than taxes which are already taken into account in the Court’s DivorceMate Calculations, and other than expenses for the children, which for now are being dealt with in a support Order), are about $15,000.00 per month. This includes housing expenses for both households.

[594] Even though she has four children in her primary care, the wife’s monthly expenses are much lower, but she is living modestly and the husband is paying for the mortgage and property taxes on the matrimonial home. The wife’s budget is therefore incomplete.

[595] Working with the husband’s budget, if I don’t make a further adjustment to the support amounts above, the husband will not be able to afford his monthly expenses with his remaining net disposable income that is depicted in Schedule “B” (subject to my earlier comments about the stock options, that my 2026 income projection for him may be understated if there are unrealized capital gains yet to be taken).

[596] The husband tendered a chart of his past contributions towards the housing expenses for the matrimonial home. These will have to be accounted for at the second trial in the retroactivity analysis. The husband also has an occupation rent claim that he has not yet proven. The wife claims post-separation adjustments. Both of these are issues for the second trial too.

[597] But there is a current issue that needs to be addressed. The husband is continuing to pay for the carrying costs of the matrimonial home. On the one hand, he is the sole titled owner. On the other hand, I accept that some of the housing expenses that the husband has been paying for, and that he will continue to pay, also benefit the wife and the children in lieu of support.

[598] Going forward until the second trial and the sale of the matrimonial home, I find it to be appropriate to give him some credit for his continuing mortgage and property tax payments. Unhelpfully, no one gave me any admissible evidence to help me come up with an appropriate credit. Both sides said they made their own inquiries about slightly different matters. In cross-examination, the husband’s counsel suggested to the wife, that the matrimonial home could rent out for $3,800.00 per month. Counsel’s approach was based on an occupation rent analysis. The husband did not introduce any expert evidence of market rent. The wife gave different evidence in response to a question from the Court, and said that she thought she would need between $2,500 and $3,000 per month to rent a place that could house her and the children. It would have been helpful to have had better, ideally admissible evidence about this, for the purposes of the temporary Order.

[599] For now, the best I will do is take the mid-point of the low figure that the wife proposed as an alternative amount for rent ($2,500.00), and the position that the husband argued for that the matrimonial home could earn ($3,800.00). My mid-point figure is $3,150.00.

[600] So to recognize his cash flow issues, I will give the husband a credit of this sum of $3,150.00 off his temporary support, as a rough credit for direct support that is being paid by his continuing to make payments towards the ongoing housing expenses. The analysis at trial, once the occupation rent and post-separation adjustments are dealt with, and once the matrimonial home is sold, will be refined and may warrant a different approach.

[601] With his credit, while he continues to pay housing expenses (see the second calculation attached at Schedule “C”), the husband’s net disposable income increases to $11,642.00, closer although not entirely aligned, with his monthly budget. Between now and the sale of the matrimonial home, he may need to draw on capital to meet his shortfall, such as by accessing his shares, given that he took on the responsibility for a second household. The Court cannot completely cure his cash flow issues and recognize the wife’s entitlement to spousal support at the same time. I would not find this to be an appropriate case, for no spousal support at all, based on inability to pay anyway.

I. Health Benefits and Life Insurance

[602] The wife seeks an order that the husband maintain health insurance for the children. I am not certain that I heard any oral evidence about this, but both parties’ Form 13.1 Financial Statements sworn May 1, 2026 say that they have health coverage. Both parties should maintain this for the children, and coordinate their coverage.

[603] The wife also seeks an order for life insurance to secure support. According to his Form 13.1 Financial Statement sworn May 1, 2026, the husband has four different policies, one through his employer in the sum of $236,000.00, “Optional AD&D” insurance in the amount of $500,000.00, and two other policies through Sunlife in the amount of $50,000.00 and $750,000.00. It seems that he has now named his other partner as the beneficiary of the first two, and he has named his other partner as the “primary” beneficiary of the latter two policies, with the four children being “equal”, whatever that means.

[604] The wife has asked that the husband be required to use the first policy having a face value of $236,000.00 to secure support. No one gave me a life insurance calculation, but on its face, what she has asked for is insufficient to secure support.

[605] The parties’ eldest child is 13. Assuming the final Order for child support will approximate the temporary table amount of child support of $7,076.00 being ordered now, the husband would need about $425,000.00 to secure child support only for the next five years. His child support won’t end in 5 years. Am. may continue to be a dependant. Even if she doesn’t, there are three other children who will be, and table support, while it will be lower for only three children instead of four (all other things being equal), will still continue. This very basic calculation of $425,000.00 doesn’t factor spousal support into the mix, any existing section 7 expenses, or future post-secondary expenses either.

[606] I intend on a temporary basis to order the husband to maintain the policy of $750,000.00 to secure support. I will not order him to do so irrevocably at this time, as the amount may change. He can use his other policies for his other partner for now if he wants, or buy her additional insurance, but he has the wife and four children all of whom are dependents, and there needs to be enough security for them.

[607] When this trial returns, it will be important for the parties to supply proper life insurance calculations, and to call some evidence and make submissions about the matters identified by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606.

PART XI: THE SALE OF THE MATRIMONIAL HOME

[608] The wife has a claim for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home before the Court in defence of the husband’s request that it be sold now as opposed to later. Had the Court recognized the foreign divorce, the wife would have lost the ability to argue for this, as the property would not be a matrimonial home.

[609] Furthermore, as a matrimonial home, the husband cannot unilaterally sell the property. He requires the wife’s consent, or a court order under section 23 of the Family Law Act. That provides her with some degree of security. That too would not have been the case, had the Court recognized the foreign divorce.

[610] The wife is not actually opposed to the sale, on its merits. She just wants some funds to ensure that she can move the children. While I indicated earlier that the wife framed this as a request for an interim disbursement, it is not; it is an advance towards equalization: see Zagdanski v. Zagdanski, 2001 CanLii 27981 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[611] Having regard to the factors in ¶ 39 of Zagdanski v. Zagdanski, the wife’s request for funds to move with the children is reasonable. There is no question that the wife will be entitled to an equalization payment. At this time, it appears it will be in excess of $600,000.00 (the wife’s precise more calculation at ¶ 279 of her written closing submissions, is $624,359.62).

[612] I agree that the husband should be ordered to pay the wife an advance of $15,000.00 now, as she asked. She will need funds before the closing of the sale of the matrimonial home to find alternative accommodations and to move. I agree that the wife should then receive a further advance of $200,000.00 towards her equalization payment from the sale proceeds as she asked for.

[613] I am not prepared to order the release of any funds to the husband. I don’t yet know what the remaining amount he will owe the wife will be on account of equalization, retroactivity, and whatever else remains in issue. I agree with the wife, that the balance of the sale proceeds should be preserved.

[614] The wife can have temporary exclusive possession pending the sale. She needs a place to live with the children. Although support is now being put in place, until the property issues are resolved, there remains a financial imbalance. The husband has alternative accommodations, because he accessed his resources in the past. The wife did not have the resources to access. The wife has not yet been able to secure alternative accommodations for herself and the children due to her dependency. There has been intimate partner violence in this case. The criteria for an exclusive possession Order are satisfied: see section 24(3) of the Family Law Act.

PART XII: CASE MANAGEMENT

[615] It is important that there be single judge case management in this case going forward until the second part of the trial is heard. The Court at the Trial Readiness Court appearance ordered the parties to book a date for a further Trial Management Conference to organize the second part of the trial. A date was booked then for September 18, 2026 before Law J. That Order was made before this trial was assigned to me.

[616] During the closing submissions on July 8, 2026, I advised the parties that the Trial Management Conference should proceed before me, since I am hearing the second part of the trial, but they should appear before Law J. for a Settlement Conference instead. After all, one of the purposes of a bifurcation Order is that the second part of the trial might settle.

[617] Except for that Settlement Conference, all further steps in this case are to be before me. This includes any 14B Motions, which are to be brought to my attention. There are to be no interim motions pending the second part of the trial, without my leave.

[618] I am booking a date for a case management attendance to address some trial organization issues that I have already identified, after which there may need to be a further attendance to address witness lists, and the organization of the affidavit and documentary evidence for the second part of the trial.

[619] The second part of the trial is scheduled to proceed in November. The parties should still work towards that, but on July 8, 2026, I learned that the custody and access assessment had not started yet. I am also already aware of gaps in the evidence needed for the second part of the trial (i.e. missing valuations or disclosure). It may be that a November trial will not be feasible. I am not saying here that it is to be adjourned, but I am prepared to have that discussion based on the reality of the situation. And if it makes more sense to have the Settlement Conference later (such as after the assessment), that too can be discussed. I intend at the case management attendance to work with the parties to come up with a timetable that makes sense, once I have updates about the status of assessment and the state of affairs respecting disclosure and valuations.

[620] Finally, the wife’s draft Order for trial seeks an Order severing the divorce from the corollary relief. This was not argued, nor was it listed as an issue for the first part of the trial when the ultimate bifurcation Order was made on May 27, 2026 (although perhaps the request flows from the Court’s decision not to recognize the foreign divorce). If the parties consent to this at the case management hearing, I am prepared to entertain that request so that the divorce can proceed uncontested. Otherwise the parties should be prepared to have all of the necessary documents (marriage license, clearance certificate etc.) available for the second part of the trial, and they can call the evidence needed for the Court to grant a divorce.

PART XIII: ORDER

[621] I make the following Orders:

Confidentiality

(a) This Judgment identifies the parties’ children with the use of initials;

(b) The parties shall not discuss this litigation with the children, or the contents of this Judgment. The wife may advise the children that the matrimonial home is being sold, and that she and the children are moving. Further orders may be sought in the second part of the trial about what additional information should be shared with the children, and how it is to be shared, once the assessment is complete;

On a Final Basis Pursuant to the Divorce Act;

(a) The Court declares that it does not recognize the foreign divorce granted by the Family Court of Western Australia on February 24, 2021;

On a Final Basis Pursuant to the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines;

(b) The husband’s bonus income shall form part of his Line 150 Income and shall be included in his total income for the purposes of calculating his regularly monthly child and spousal support obligations. The husband’s argument that his bonus shall not be included for that purpose, and that it shall instead be shared in the future if and when a bonus is received, is dismissed;

(c) Except to the extent that there may be double dipping arguments at the second trial, any income attributable to the husband’s stock options when they vest, which includes any capital gains, or any income or capital gain that would form part of the husband’s income but for the fact that he chose not to sell his shares when they vest, shall form part of his income for support in the year that his stock options vest. Any portion of that income that consists of a non-taxable capital gain shall be grossed up;

(d) The husband’s self-employment income earned in 2024 and 2025 shall form part of the determination of his incomes for those years. As it was not reported to the Canada Revenue Agency, it shall be grossed up for tax;

(e) If the husband resumes earning additional self-employment income, the husband shall immediately disclose that to the wife, with documentary proof of the amounts he has contracted to earn, followed with documentary proof of the amounts he actually earns, such as through deposits into a bank account. Any such self-employment income shall form part of the husband’s income for the purposes of determining his child and spousal support obligations, and in the absence of agreement, the husband resuming earning self-employment income in addition to his employment income shall constitute a material change in circumstances. If the husband fails to report any such self-employment income that he may earn in the future to the Canada Revenue Agency, it shall be grossed up in the determination of his income for child and spousal support;

(f) The husband’s annual disclosure obligations commencing in 2027, shall include the requirement to provide a copy of statements for any bank accounts in which he has an interest worldwide for the past 12 months, so that the wife can verify for herself whether the husband has earned any additional income from self-employment that is not reflected on his income tax returns;

(g) The wife’s income for 2024 is $104,538.00;

(h) The wife’s income for 2025 is $113,500.00;

On a Final Basis Pursuant to the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act

(i) The Court declares that the date of the parties’ date of separation is September 6, 2024. September 6, 2024 is also the valuation date for the purposes of calculating equalization;

On a Part Final and a Part Temporary Basis;

(j) The matrimonial home shall be sold. This is a final term.

(k) The balance of the sale terms are temporary and are subject to adjustment by the Court if needed;

(l) The wife and the children are at liberty to remain in the matrimonial home pending the closing of the sale. The wife shall have temporary exclusive possession pending the closing of the sale. They wife may also choose to move with the children prior to the closing;

(m) Within 14 days, the parties shall agree upon a real estate agent, with whom the parties shall list the matrimonial home for sale, also within 14 days;

(n) The parties shall agree upon the listing price in consultation with the real estate agent;

(o) The closing date shall be at least 60 days from the date that any accepted offer is firm;

(p) There shall be complete transparency as to the sale. All documentation in connection with the listing and the sale, to include the listing agreement, and offers, and the eventual purchase and sale agreement, shall be provided to both parties contemporaneously;

(q) The real estate agent shall copy both parties on all written communications;

(r) Both parties shall cooperate respecting the sale, and shall sign all documents necessary to effect the sale. The wife, who remains in the property, shall make the property reasonably available for showings as required by the real estate agent;

(s) The parties shall jointly select the real estate lawyer who is handling the sale;

(t) If any further sale terms are required, or if there is a problem with the implementation of these sale terms, I may be contacted;

Advance and Preservation on A Temporary Basis;

(u) On or before 14 days, and in any event no later than concurrently with the execution of the listing agreement, which is also to occur within 14 days, the husband shall pay to the wife, an advance of $15,000.00. This is a credit to the husband against any amounts that are found to be owing to the wife, at the second trial;

(v) The wife shall receive from the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home, an advance of $200,000.00 on the closing. This is a credit to the husband against any amounts that are found to be owing to the wife, at the second trial;

(w) The balance of the net sale proceeds shall be held in trust by the real estate lawyer subject to further agreement of the parties or Court order. A copy of this Order shall be provided to the real estate lawyer;

(x) Between now and the sale neither party shall encumber or otherwise deplete the equity in the matrimonial home;

Temporary Child and Spousal Support Pursuant to the Divorce Act;

(y) Commencing August 1, 2026, the husband shall pay to the wife temporary child support in the amount of $7,076.00. The Order to be issued and entered shall state that this is based on the husband’s current projected income for 2026 of $352,500.00, and it is the table amount for the parties’ four children, whose names and dates of birth shall be included in the Order;

(z) Commencing August 1, 2026, the husband shall pay to the wife temporary special or extraordinary expenses pursuant to section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $979.00 per month;

(aa) Commencing August 1, 2026, the husband shall pay to the wife temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month;

(bb) The husband shall be entitled to deduct from his monthly support payments, the sum of $3,150.00 per month on a temporary basis. To avoid any difference in tax treatment between taxable and non-taxable support and this credit, the husband’s credit of $3,150.00, which is in net dollars, shall be deducted from his child support, which is also in net dollars;

(cc) The husband shall continue to pay for the mortgage and property taxes associated with the matrimonial home, until the closing of its sale. The wife shall continue to pay for the monthly home insurance and any utilities associated with her and the children’s consumption while living there;

Temporary Health Benefits Coverage and Life Insurance

(dd) On a temporary basis, both parties shall maintain the children as beneficiaries under the health coverage that they have available through their employment. They shall coordinate their coverage to ensure that they can access maximum coverage for any health and dental expenses for the children. They shall sign any documentation to give effect to this. If one party obtains reimbursement from his or her insurer for an expense paid by the other, then he or she shall immediately refund that amount to the other party. If there are any uninsured health expenses for the children, they shall be shared as a section 7 expense, 69% (husband) and 31% (wife);

(ee) On a temporary basis, the husband shall designate the wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or policies having a face value of $750,000.00 to secure support;

(ff) Within 14 days of this Judgment, the husband shall provide a copy of the policy or policies to the wife, that identifies her as the beneficiary. He shall also provide her with a signed direction to the insurance company, that enables her to make inquiries directly with the insurer from time to time, that the policy remains in force and in good standing;

(gg) The husband shall ensure that he pays all premiums and that the policy remains in force and in good standing;

Directions and Next Steps

(hh) There shall be a case management appearance before me on September 16, 2026 @ 2:15 PM – by zoom.

(ii) The purpose of the appearance shall be to discuss:

(1) whether there is a consent to sever the divorce from the corollary relief;

(2) the status of the custody and access assessment and its expected completion date;

(3) what expert valuation evidence is needed (i.e. pensions, stock options, double dipping calculation, disposition costs, market rent analysis?);

(4) whether any real estate appraisals are required for the date of marriage or the date of separation, and if not, how those values will be proven;

(5) whether any other financial disclosure is missing to calculate equalization or any other pending claims in this matter;

(6) a timetable for the exchange of updated Financial Statements which use the correct valuation date (September 6, 2024), Net Family Property Statements, Comparison Net Family Property Statements, the delivery of expert reports and a timetable for the other person to respond and produce his or her own responding reports if necessary;

(7) to set a date for a Trial Scheduling Conference thereafter, to organize the timelines for witness lists, trial affidavits and any additional focused exhibit books for the second part of the trial;

(8) In this regard, when this trial returns, the parties need to provide the Court with charts of the section 7 expenses that each says he and she has paid, broken down by category on a year by year basis, with credits for any amounts that the other parent has paid identified. The parties need to provide similar information respecting the ongoing section 7 expenses that they estimate will be incurred into the future. The parties need to provide proper life insurance calculations and proposals, and call any other evidence relevant to life insurance;

(9) When this trial returns before me, the parties also need to provide with their Form 13.1 Financial Statements, two budgets. One budget shall include the monthly expenses that each is incurring until the matrimonial home is sold. The other budget shall be based on the projected state of affairs after the matrimonial home sells (or the actual state of affairs if the matrimonial home has already sold and closed by the time of the second trial);

(jj) The Trial Scheduling Conference currently set for September 18, 2026 before Law J. shall instead proceed as a Settlement Conference, subject to it being rescheduled by me at the case management hearing, depending on the timetable discussion at the case management hearing;

(kk) A copy of this Judgment shall be provided to Mr. Theodoluz (the custody and access assessor) immediately;

Costs

(ll) The Court intends to deal with costs of the first part of the trial in writing;

(mm) The wife may submit costs submission in writing, limited to five pages double spaced, plus a Bill of Costs and copies of any Offers to Settle. She need not supply case law, but she may hyperlink it. The wife’s costs submissions shall be served and filed on or before August 18, 2026; and

(nn) The husband may submit costs submissions in writing, subject to the same restrictions on length and attachments. The husband’s submissions shall be served and filed on or before September 4, 2026.

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: July 30, 2026

CITATION: Amerakoon v. Widyalankara, 2026 ONSC 4428

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Rijanthe Ranil Amerakoon

Applicant Husband

– and –

Thisari Erandika Widyalankara

Respondent Wife

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: July 30, 2026

1I refer to the children with the use of initials, for the reasons that follow later. As three of the children’s names begin with the latter A., I use those three children’s first two initials, when anonymizing their names, to differentiate between them.

2Notably, the husband used the same kind of rationale to explain why his other partner moved to Singapore from the United States in 2018/2019, as opposed to the reality, which is that the wife was leaving for Ontario, and so he was free to have her there in secret.

3Both parties explained that they had lost their WhatsApp messages between 2019 and 2022 due to issues with their respective phones. The husband also alleged at times that the wife had access to his computer and passwords, intimating that perhaps he had been hacked by her (or others), and perhaps documents that existed were altered, or manufactured, or some that should have existed, were deleted.

4There was no such extended family network.

5The husband’s explanation for his use of the word “partner” was once again rooted in not wanting to ‘air dirty laundry’. He added that the children had in fact moved here, and children “don’t move by themselves”.

6He even went so far as to say that his career is now “dead”, particularly after he switched into a new role in May of 2022, while still based out of Montreal, that allows him to work remotely from Ontario. Yet he has continued to receive bonus and stock options ever since.

7The wife had the unredacted document, and I instructed that she could show the unredacted document to the husband’s lawyer. The redacted document went into evidence in the end.

8The wife no longer had a “Viber” account at the time of the trial.

9This was the best evidence of the message that was sent. While the husband questioned its authenticity, I accept that the wife accurately copied the message that had been sent to her.

10The wife did not know this.

11The evidence I heard at this trial, was that the wife and the nanny spoke in September of 2024, after the wife found out about the husband’s re-marriage, and not earlier.

12As a hobby, the husband has for years taken travel photographs that he gave to the wife to “photoshop”. The couple, together, posted the travel photographs on a travel blog that they both maintained. Incidentally, in cross-examination, the husband’s other partner testified that she was unaware, that the husband had been sending the wife photographs to photoshop and to post on the travel blog.

13He said April in his trial affidavit.

14This reference to 90 days appears to be referrable to section 8(3)(b)(ii) of the Divorce Act, which provides that the Canadian ground for divorce in section 8(2)(a), being that the parties lived separate and apart for at least one year before the commencement of the divorce proceeding and were living separate and apart at the commencement of the proceeding, is not interrupted or terminated by reason of the resumption of cohabitation during a period of, or periods totaling, not more than 90 days with reconciliation as its primary purpose. This 90 day rule has no application here. I am not deciding whether to grant a divorce in Canada based on a separation in 2019, that may or may not have been interrupted by reason of a resumption of cohabitation. I am deciding whether to recognize the foreign divorce granted on February 24, 2021, or not.

15The husband tried to minimize this communication about “date nights” during this trial too. He claimed there was only one such outing, and its purpose was to discuss an upcoming trip that he was going on, as opposed to an actual date.

16The husband had earlier claimed during this trial, that at the outset of the marriage the wife told him that she would deliberately frown at him, because he knew that it made him unhappy. He repeated the ‘frowning’ allegation when testifying about the Sephora pamphlet.

17Both the husband and his other partner denied that they had a wedding in Sri Lanka. Although after the husband had a civil marriage with the wife in Sri Lanka, he then had a ceremonial wedding thereafter, both the husband and his other partner claimed there was no ceremonial wedding for them in Sri Lanka. Rather they just had some kind of photo shoot done together, while attending the wedding of someone else when they travelled there earlier that summer. While I have my doubts as to the veracity of that claim, wherever the truth lies about whether there was a ceremonial wedding or not, does not matter.

18This event followed an earlier attempt by the husband by way of 14B Motion, to get an urgent date. Daurio J. dismissed that on November 25, 2024, for the reasons expressed earlier.

19For example, one of the objectives of a support order in section 15.2(6)(c) of the Divorce Act is to relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage. In spousal support cases decided under the Family Law Act, section 33(8)(d) makes one of the purposes of a spousal support order to “relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home)” [my emphasis added]. These provisions often entail a review of the parties’ financial positions after a property award, including the impact of that, if any, on incomes: see also Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349 ¶ 140.

20Some of the binders are part of a set of several volumes of certain kinds of documents, like financial disclosure.

21Incidentally, although the husband’s new partner is not entitled to standing in this case, in the event of her future separation from the husband, her family law entitlements are preserved provided there was good faith on her part. The meaning of “spouse” in sections 1(1) and 29 of the Family Law Act, includes two persons “who have together entered into a marriage that is voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any right”. Persons who meet this definition may pursue an equalization payment and spousal support under the Family Law Act.

22The current version of Australia’s Family Law Act, 1975 is Compilation No. 101. But it was Compilation No. 90 that was in force from November 27, 2020 until August 31, 2021, when the joint application for divorce was filed, and the Australian Court granted the divorce.

It is Compilation No. 90 to which the Court would need to have resort, to the extent that it is necessary to consider the statutory grounds upon which the Australian Court took jurisdiction over this divorce, or the statutory basis upon which it granted the divorce. It is Compilation No. 101 to which the Court would need to have resort, if it is necessary to consider foreign law to address the wife’s forum shopping arguments, since her arguments focused on what entitlements she does or does not have now, as a result of the earlier foreign divorce.

23To this I would add that the Australian Court made its determination about domicile based on false information supplied to it. I will have more to say about that, when addressing the fraud exception, below.

24The husband in R.N.S. v. K.S. represented to the British Columbia Court of Appeal that he would not oppose the wife seeking leave. Such an undertaking has not been offered here.

25There was a small discrepancy between the total for 2024 above before adjustment, when compared to the husband’s tax return for 2024. The husband’s Line 150 income on his tax return was $347,910.91 for 2024, not $344,642.00 as set out above.

26I.e. 2025 income of $344,642.00 plus increase in base salary and bonus of $19,647.83, less the decrease in the value of his vested stock options of $11,818.02 (i.e. 2025 Vested Value of $41,818.02 - $30,000.00 = $11,818.02). This totals $352,471.81.

27For example, in 2025 the husband claimed the spouse amount tax credit for his other spouse, on his tax return.

28The wife in her trial affidavit says that since August of 2024, she has had to discontinue certain activities for the children due to her inability to afford the cost.