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HSCAS v. M.S., C.D.S., and C.A.D., 2026 ONSC 3038 — SCJ | minicounsel | minicounsel

May 25, 2026

HSCAS v. M.S., C.D.S., and C.A.D., 2026 ONSC 3038

Case Summary

Following a lengthy child protection trial involving two children, three parents, extensive lay and professional evidence, and multiple preliminary motions, the court dismissed the mother’s constitutional challenge and found both children in need of protection under the CYFSA. The court found serious risks arising from chronic family violence and conflict, physical discipline, coached false sexual-abuse allegations, educational neglect, health-care mismanagement, abusive social media conduct, vexatious complaints and litigation behaviour, and significant untreated mental health concerns. The court accepted the court-ordered psychological evidence diagnosing ADHD and borderline personality disorder, rejected the mother’s effort to prove sexual abuse by one father, and admitted certain recordings including Ring camera evidence while limiting other recordings to non-hearsay use. Final s. 102 orders placed each child with his respective father, imposed strict supervised access and extensive conduct restrictions on the mother, granted a restraining order in favour of one father, and imposed a two-year moratorium plus leave requirement for any future motion to change. The court also dismissed the mother’s post-trial motion and deferred any costs process.

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

CITATION: HSCAS v. M.S., C.D.S., and C.A.D., 2026 ONSC 3038

BELLEVILLE COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-420

DATE: 20260525

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E E N:

Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society

Lauren Hawn, for the Applicant

Applicant (the “Society”)

and -

M.N.S.

On her own behalf

Respondent (the “Mother”)

and -

C.D.P.

Laura Shaw and Jessica Oudyk, for the Respondent, T.’s Father

Respondent (the “T’s Father”)

and -

C.A.D.

Heather Smith-McGurk, for the Respondent, H.’s Father

Respondent (the “H.’s Father”)

Sharon Leitch, counsel for Office of the Children’s Lawyer, for the children T.P. and H.A.D.

HEARD: April 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, May 1, 4 and 5, 2026

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

INDEX

PART I: OVERVIEW

PART II: BACKGROUND

A. Circumstances of the Mother’s Relationship with T.’s Father, and Post-Separation Events

(1) Relationship and Residential History

(2) The Chaos and Family Violence During the Mother’s Relationship with T.’s Father

(3) Events Following the Separation and the Prior CLRA Proceedings

B. Circumstances of the Mother’s Relationship with H.’s Father, and Post-Separation Events

(1) Relationship and Residential History

(2) The Chaos, Conflict and Family Violence in the Parties’ Various Households

(3) The Mother’s Marijuana Use and Erratic Driving

(4) Family Therapy Did Not Assist the Mother and H.’s Father

(5) The Criminal Proceedings Following the Separation

(6) The Mother’s Sexual Assault of H.’s Father in the Shower

(7) The Mother’s Housing Instability Following Her Separation from H.’s Father

(8) Prior Police and Society Involvement

(9) The Prior CLRA Proceedings Concerning H.

C. The Mother’s Brother R.’s and His Partner F.’s Confirmatory Evidence About this Troubling Background

(1) R.’s and F’s Affidavit and Oral Evidence

(2) The Ring Camera Videos that F. Recorded

PART III: THE PRIOR CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS

A. The Mother’s August 20, 2024 Allegation that H.’s Father Sexually Abused Him

B. The Children’s Removal from the Mother’s Care on November 1, 2024

C. The Society’s Investigation Following the Receipt of the Ring Camera Videos

D. The Removal Hearing Before Tellier J. on November 6, 2024

E. The Temporary Care and Custody Hearing Before McCarty J. on February 14, 2025, and the Ruling dated May 13, 2025

F. McCarty J.’s Order Regarding the Mother’s Social Media Postings Dated June 5, 2025

G. The Maternal Grandmother’s and M.W.’s Motions for Party Status

H. The Mother’s Motion for Access and a Plethora of Other Relief, and H.’s Father’s Contempt Motion

I. The Mother’s Access Motion Heard December 8, 2025

J. The Mother’s Request to Bring a Motion About H.’s Swollen Eye

K. The Mother’s 14B Motion Regarding Disclosure and Evidence dated January 20, 2026

L. The Trial Scheduling Conferences Held February 23, 2026 and March 12, 2026 and this Court’s Supplementary Endorsement of April 15, 2026

M. Tellier J.’s March 26, 2026 Ruling About the Mother’s Access

PART IV: CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY

PART V: PRELIMINARY ISSUES

A. Overview of The Mother’s Constitutional Challenge

B. The Mother’s Complaint that Her Freedom of Expression Has Been Infringed

(1) The Mother’s Position

(2) Applicable Legal Principles

(3) Findings of Fact About The Mother’s Social Media Activity

(4) Analysis Regarding the Mother’s Freedom of Expression and Her Social Media Activity

C. Summary and Conclusions Regarding the Mother’s Freedom of Expression and Her Social Media Behaviour

D. The Mother’s Complaints that Her Section 7 Rights Have Been Violated

(1) The Mother’s Position

(2) Applicable Legal Principles

(3) The Mother’s Complaints About the Disclosure That She (and Others) Have Been Given

(4) The Mother’s Complaints About the Children’s Removal From Her Care

E. The Mother’s Complaints that Her Section 15 Charter Rights Have Been Violated

F. The Mother’s Other Arguments

(1) The Mother’s Argument that the Children Are Not In Need of Protection

(2) The Mother’s Complaint that the Society Workers Did Not Follow the Child Protection Standards

(3) The Mother’s Other Complaints of Procedural Unfairness

(4) The Conduct of this Trial

G. Summary and Conclusions Regarding the Mother’s Constitutional Challenge and Her Other Complaints

H. The Admissibility of Various Video and Audio Recordings that the Mother Either Made, or in Which She Participated

(1) Applicable Legal Principles

(2) The Mother’s Position About the Ring Camera Videos

(3) Analysis About the Ring Camera Videos that F. Supplied

(4) The Mother’s Evidence About Substance of the Events Depicted in the Ring Camera Videos

(5) Exhibit “B”: The Mother’s Video Interview of H. Making A Statement of Sexual Abuse

(6) The Approximately 40 Hours of Audio Recordings that the Mother Made at Her Supervised Access Visits

I. The Children’s Hearsay Statements

J. The Children’s State of Mind Statements

K. Analysis Regarding H.’s Statements that His Father Hit His Penis

(1) Analysis Regarding Dr. Lezhanska’s Evidence

(2) The Society’s Interactions With the Mother on August 28, 2024, Prior to H.’s Interviews the Next Day Are Concerning

(3) Ms. Johnson’s and Ms. Brooks Interview of H. on August 29, 2024

(4) The Events After the Interviews

(5) H.’s Father’s Testimony

(6) Dr. Spreadbury’s Evidence

(7) Exhibit “B”/Exhibit 123: The Mother’s Video of the Child in the Car

L. Summary and Conclusions About H.’s Statements that His Father Hit His Penis

M. The Children’s Statements that the Mother Uses Physical Discipline and Yelling

PART VI: STATUTORY FINDINGS

PART VII: ANALYSIS REGARDING WHETHER THE CHILDREN ARE IN NEED OF PROTECTION

A. The Protection Findings Sought by the Society, and by the Mother

B. Risk of Physical Harm

C. Risk of Emotional Harm

D. Analysis Regarding the Numerous Risks of Both Physical and Emotional Harm

(1) Parental Conflict and Family Violence

(2) The Use of Physical Discipline

(3) The Impact of the Mother’s Physical Discipline on T.

(4) The Mother’s False Sexual Abuse Allegations

(5) Concerns About the Children’s Education

(6) The Mother’s Internet Behaviour

(7) The Mother Has Mismanaged the Children’s Health Care

T.’s Health Care
H.’s Health Care

(8) Summary and Conclusions About the Mother’s Mismanagement of the Children’s Health Care

(9) The Mother’s Lawsuits, Complaints and Threats to Others

(10) Summary and Conclusions Regarding the Mother’s Lawsuits, Complaints and Threats to Others

E. The Mother’s Improperly Managed Mental Health Condition Poses A Risk of Physical and Emotional Harm

F. Summary of the Evidence and Findings of Fact About the Mother’s Medical Condition

(1) Psychiatrist Dr. Stakheiko

(2) Psychiatrist Dr. Mammoliti

(3) Psychiatrist Dr. Epelbaum

(4) Psychiatrist Dr. Jain

(5) The Mother’s Claim that She Suffers from OCD

(6) The Court Ordered Psychological Assessment of Dr. Rowe

(7) The Mother’s Suicidal Ideation and Gestures

G. Summary of the Evidence and Additional Findings of Fact About the Mother’s Treatability

(1) Dr. Rowe’s Evidence About the Mother’s Treatability

(2) Events After the Release of Dr. Rowe’s Assessment

(3) Psychiatrist Dr. McArthur’s Evidence

(4) The Mother’s Therapy

H. Summary and Conclusions About Whether the Children are In Need of Protection

PART VIII: ANALYSIS REGARDING DISPOSITION

A. The Disposition Options In this Case

B. The Assistance Provided Prior to Intervention

C. Less Disruptive Alternatives

D. A Supervision Order With Either of Both Fathers versus A Section 102 Order

E. The Children’s Best Interests Respecting the Section 102 Orders

(1) T.’s Father’s Plan

(2) H.’s Father’s Plan

(3) The Children’s Views and Preferences

(4) The Mother’s Plan

F. The Mother’s Access

G. Virtual Visits

H. Sibling Access

I. Restraining Order, Conduct Orders, Contact with Service Providers for the Children and the Release of Information and Records

J. Moratorium on Motions to Change, and the Future Process and Terms to be Met, Before Doing So

K. H.’s Father’s Claims for a Restraining Order and the Termination of Child Support in a Separate Proceeding

PART IX: ORDER AND DIRECTIONS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PART I: OVERVIEW

1This is my Judgment following a trial of the Society’s Amended Protection Application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (the “CYFSA”) and An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24 (the “Federal Act”), heard over several days in April and May, 2026. This case concerns two brothers, T., age 9, and H., age 5. T. is a First Nations, Inuit and Métis (“FNIM”), through his father’s (and his paternal grandmother’s) West Coast Salish heritage.

2The parenting and child support arrangements in place before the removal were memorialized in separate Orders made in two different proceedings under the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, as amended (the “CLRA”) and the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, as amended (the “FLA”). Those Orders provided that the children resided primarily with their mother. These arrangements were volatile and unstable, and harmful to the children.

3The children were removed from the mother’s care and placed with their respective fathers on November 1, 2024. H. remained in this jurisdiction where his father lives; T. was moved to Guelph, where his father lives.

4The Society called evidence during this trial about eight clusters of protection concerns, namely extreme parental conflict and the children’s exposure to family violence, the mother’s use of physical discipline, concerns arising out of the fact that the mother coached H. to make false allegations of sexual abuse, concerns about the children’s education, concerns about the mother’s inability to manage the children’s health care, concerns about the mother’s inappropriate internet use, concerns about numerous lawsuits, complaints or threats towards others involved in the children’s lives that the mother had initiated, and underpinning all this, significant concerns about the mother’s mental health, her refusal to accept one of her diagnoses, and her refusal to obtain proper treatment for it.

5Although the Society had sought additional protection findings in the Amended Protection Application, by the end of the trial, the Society pursued findings only under sections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CYFSA (risk of physical harm) and under section 74(2)(h) (risk of emotional harm). The Society, both of the fathers, and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (the “OCL”) ask that each child be placed in the care and custody of his respective father on a final basis, pursuant to section 102 of the CYFSA. They point to the children’s improved circumstances since the removal. They each ask that the mother have supervised parenting time on various terms. H.’s father seeks a restraining Order against the mother. There are proposals for sibling access too, since the proposed placements result in the separation of siblings.

6The mother’s position is that the children are not in need of protection. She asserts that the Society has relied on unverified allegations, hearsay, “retrospective narrative framing” and inconsistent third-party accounts. She says that the temporary decisions made in this case breached procedural fairness; that the record was incomplete at the time of those decisions, due to the Society’s failure to provide full and timely disclosure. She has launched a constitutional challenge that raises complaints about disclosure, alleged violations of sections 2(b), 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”), and complaints that the Child Protection Standards were not followed.

7Included with the mother’s trial affidavit are three draft Orders. Her principal draft Order is that the Amended Protection Application should be dismissed, and the children be returned to her care pursuant to the underlying CLRA Orders. Her alternative Orders seek a finding that H. is in need of protection as a result of sexual abuse from his father; and that T. is in need of protection as a result of “emotional harm and the failure of [T.’s father] to protect him from exposure to known safety concerns”. In these alternative scenarios, she proposes various restrictions be put in place regarding both fathers. In her least preferred alternative scenario, if the children are in need of protection “in relation to a risk of emotional harm arising from exposure to ongoing parental conflict” and the children remain with their fathers, then she seeks increased supervised parenting time from what is in place now, that shall be reviewed within 90 days with a view to transitioning to unsupervised parenting time. Regardless, she still proposes joint decision-making in this scenario, access to information, and an Order that her participation in any recommended supports or services shall not be used to restrict her parenting time “absent demonstrable risk”.

8For the reasons that follow, I find:

(a) The mother’s constitutional challenge is dismissed;

(b) Statutory findings shall be made, and there shall be findings that both children are in need of protection pursuant to sections 74(2)(b)(i), (ii) and (h) of the CYFSA;

(c) There shall be final Orders pursuant to section 102 of the CYFSA placing the children with their respective fathers. I intend to Order certain specific terms and conditions about T.’s placement with his father though, based on certain evidence I heard about T.’s father’s childhood trauma. This shall include a requirement for the Society to assist to set up two services, which I order pursuant to section 34(2) of the CLRA, with its consent;

(d) There are an alarming number of serious concerns about the mother’s ability to parent, and concerns about some in her entourage. The Court seriously considered terminating the mother’s access. But in view of some of the other evidence about the children’s connections to her, some positive aspects of her supervised visits, and the submissions by all, none of whom sought such a remedy, I will not do so. To balance properly the children’s interests in maintaining some form of a relationship with the mother against the serious risks, I am left with the inescapable conclusion that the only remedial option here, is for the mother to have limited supervised parenting time, on strict terms;

(e) The mother needs to take serious steps to address better her mental health, starting now. I do not accept her claim that she has already done so, or that it is in progress. Unless and until she accepts her Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”) diagnosis, and unless and until she is able to commit and follow through in treating it, and demonstrate meaningful change in her behaviour in the process, I do not foresee a lifting of the restrictions. The mother may very well disregard this ruling, and self-sabotage the Court’s supervised access Order. If she does that, that is a contemplated event by this Court, and it would not in my view be grounds for a Motion to Change;

(f) The children need to be insulated from any complaints relating to this case, and from any of the mother’s threats, emailing, and social media or other internet activity. Terms regarding the mother’s internet use will be imposed to protect these children;

(g) In this context, H.’s father’s request for a Restraining Order is appropriate. Many of the terms and conditions that are conduct orders under section 28 of the CLRA, shall also form part of a Restraining Order under section 35 for him. T.’s father has not sought a Restraining Order. As such, conditions being imposed on the mother in relation to T., shall be made under section 28 of the CLRA only;

(h) As much as possible, there needs to be a moratorium on further litigation involving these children. I intend to prohibit the mother from launching a Motion to Change for at least a two-year period. Although some suggested 18 months was sufficient in their draft Orders tendered for closing submissions (based on the fact that the mother has already done some therapy), I disagree. While at the upper end of what the court appointed expert proposed, the Court has selected a two-year period. This is based on all the evidence about the harmful conduct in which she has engaged, her refusal to seek proper treatment, and the expert opinion evidence about the barriers to treatment. At the expiry of the two-year period, there still needs to be a screening mechanism before the mother can just bring a Motion to Change. The Court will need to ensure that she has actually followed through and made improvements; in other words, ensure that there is at least some prima facie merit to her Motion to Change, before the children are thrust back into this; and

(i) Finally, it is critical that these children be insulated from any spin-off litigation that the mother may decide to launch. I considered declaring the mother to be a vexatious litigant to protect others in the children’s sphere, but I cannot do so for reason of lack of notice to the mother. Another judge may however see fit to make that declaration, if the mother’s litigious behaviour continues.

9This Judgment is lengthy. The Court’s description of the conduct of this trial in Part V(f)(4.) of this Judgment below, explains why. This trial was scheduled for 10 days; it took 12 (several of which were extended sitting days). This case concerns two children and three parents, with multiple competing plans. In a certain respect, this was a trial of two cases in one, albeit with overlapping evidence.

10Over the course of the 12 day trial, the Court heard from a staggering 33 witnesses, one of whom had to be recalled, and two of whom were added into the mix mid-trial. The Court was called upon to deal with multiple voir dires about expert opinion evidence and the admissibility of documents and statements. There are now 123 Exhibits at the end of the day, which include surprise documents sought to be tendered mid-trial, sometimes as events outside the court room unfolded. The Court was bombarded with the mother’s seven binders of documents, several thousands of pages in length.

11Below, I deal with multiple preliminary issues, before being able to get to the crux of the analysis. One of these preliminary issues is the mother’s multi-faceted constitutional challenge, much of which did not require the Charter to dispose of. Incidentally, all of this contributes to, but is not even the complete explanation, for why I have found there needs to be a moratorium on more litigation concerning these children.

PART II: BACKGROUND

12The mother has lived in a troubling home environment for her entire life. She disclosed significant abuse when she was raised by her grandmother in Brazil before coming to Canada, as well as abuse from her own mother thereafter. She advised the Court that her biological father was absent, with which she struggled. She claims that she made the deliberate decision based on this history, to support the children’s relationships with their fathers. But there was a caveat to this; “unless there was a clear safety concern”.

13According to the mother, T.’s father was unhelpful and absent; H.’s father was abusive. The fathers of course, have very different perspectives about who was the abusive one, and about the extent to which she in was supportive in reality, of their relationships with their sons.

14There was much conflict in the mother’s relationships with both of the fathers, although more so in her relationship with H.’s father. Family Services Worker Lindsay Johnson deposed in her trial affidavit that during the three-year period between November 21, 2021 and the start of this proceeding, there had been an incredible 12 previous file openings, including intakes, investigations and ongoing files concerning T., and 27 previous file openings concerning H. These file openings emanated from phone calls from the police, from H.’s father, some from the mother, from concerned family members, and from concerned community resources.

A. Circumstances of the Mother’s Relationship with T.’s Father, and Post-Separation Events

(1) Relationship and Residential History

15The mother had a very short relationship with T.’s father, during which she quickly became pregnant with T. According to the mother, this relationship began just about one month after she had been discharged from a “psychiatric ward” for a suicide attempt, during which she had used a vehicle’s exhaust to try to end her life. T.’s father was apparently aware of this, but chose to enter into a relationship with her anyway, according to the mother.

16T.’s father testified that his relationship with the mother was “tumultuous”. He said that there would be times that the relationship was positive, but there were also entire weekends filled with arguments. He testified that the only way to bring these arguments to an end, was to concede, admit he was wrong, and tell the mother she was right about whatever the argument concerned.

(2) The Chaos and Family Violence During the Mother’s Relationship with T.’s Father

17The mother’s view was that T.’s father was not prepared to be a parent. She described that he was not working, they had a lack of financial resources, and generally that he was unsupportive. In his trial affidavit, T.’s father says that the mother threatened to cut him out of T.’s life during her pregnancy, but he tried to remain involved.

18The couple, and later T. after his birth, lived with the maternal grandmother and the mother’s step-father D (the “maternal grandfather”).[1] As most other witness who also had insight into that home would say, T.’s father described conflict in the household between the mother and other family members, as well as instances of conflict he had with the mother himself, when he lived there briefly. The conflict between the mother and T.’s father, included the mother acting violently towards him.

19The mother engaged in acts of family violence towards T.’s father. T.’s father testified that the mother slapped him in the face twice. He said that she tried to do so on a third occasion, but he blocked her. He denied that he was ever physical with her, but he defended himself against her attacks.

20T.’s father said that on one occasion he became frustrated after an argument with the mother, and banged his head into a door, causing a dent in it. The mother said that T.’s father had headbutted the door two times, not once.

21In her trial affidavit, T.’s paternal grandmother says that she observed this dysfunctional relationship, beginning back when the mother was pregnant. She says she was the recipient of “vitriolic late-night texts” from the mother, to the point that she was worried about the mother’s and her son’s health. She reached out to the maternal grandfather, to ask him to intervene, unsuccessfully.

(3) Events Following the Separation and the Prior CLRA Proceedings

22The relationship ended when T. was still an infant, sometime between 6 and 9 months of age. The mother said that she was overwhelmed, and could not handle the relationship. T.’s father testified that he left because the relationship was “broken and toxic” and there was “no possible way” that he was going to raise a child in that environment. He thought that if he left, the mother would stop getting mad at him and there would be more of a safe space for T., once left behind.

23In his Opening Trial Statement, T.’s father says that he was unaware of the subsequent involvement of the Society, and its frequency, with the mother, H.’s father, and H., in the years that followed him leaving. T.’s father repeated in his testimony, that he was “mostly unaware” of the severity of what has transpired since the relationship ended. Now that the has reviewed the affidavits and heard the in-court testimony, he feels “incredibly sad” that T. had been exposed to this. While on the one hand I understand that T.’s father felt he needed to extricate himself from the situation in the past and perhaps he thought this was beneficial for T., what he ended up doing, was leave the child behind in a dysfunctional environment.

24The mother testified that T.’s father was not interested in pursuing a relationship with the child after he left, but said she tried to make arrangements otherwise, because of her childhood trauma. The mother says that she wrote an agreement with T.’s father outside of the court process, but after he signed it, he disappeared.

25The parties’ accounts differed about this. T.’s father gave some examples of attempting to see the child after he first left, but he said he was blocked by the mother. The paternal grandmother says in her trial affidavit that she too tried to make arrangements to see T. She did so through the maternal grandmother, but contact did not materialize when she followed up. She says her son then asked her not to pursue the matter due to the mother’s erratic behaviour. She testified that the mother also threatened her with police action if she persisted, so she respected the mother’s wishes. She did try to send gifts for T.’s third birthday though, that were delivered, but other gifts that she said had been sent on behalf of the family at other times, did not reach him. When she testified, the maternal grandmother mocked the gifts T.’s paternal grandmother had sent, calling them culturally inappropriate.

26The mother commenced a CLRA proceeding in April of 2018. The mother testified that T.’s father delayed the initial court proceedings and he was eventually noted in default. She says that she was awarded “sole custody” and “access at her discretion”. Later in around 2022, T.’s father would commence a Motion to Change, seeking to expand his parenting time, to include overnights. Once he started to have expanded visits on alternating weekends, the paternal grandmother was also able to re-engage with T. as well.

27T.’s father agreed that he had parenting time at the mother’s discretion at first (before his Motion to Change). He complained about the manner in which the mother exercised her discretion. He gave examples of him trying to propose parenting time, but the mother would not allow it. So he said he tried other approaches, such as showing up with less notice hoping he would be allowed to see T. There were times when he drove several hours to have a short visit with T., which didn’t materialize. The mother’s response to this evidence was that T.’s father was an absentee father, or that there needed to be safeguards in place. She told the Court about a time that he had moved back to this area for school, but he had not told her about that in advance, and she found out otherwise.

28The governing CLRA Order concerning T., in force at the time of the protection application, was the consent Order of Minnema J. dated March 1, 2023, made on the T.’s father’s Motion to Change. This Order varied the prior Order of Wright J. dated April 10, 2019, which I was not shown (I don’t need to see it to decide this case). Minnema J.’s variation Order granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility. It provided T.’s father with parenting time on alternate weekends, FaceTime contact, and a holiday schedule. It also provided that T.’s father would pay child support and his share of special or extraordinary expenses pursuant to section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines. The child support terms in this Order continue to be enforced even though T. has been out of his mother’s care since November 1, 2024.

A. Circumstances of the Mother’s Relationship with H.’s Father, and Post-Separation Events

(1) Relationship and Residential History

29The mother entered into a relationship with H.’s father when she was still dealing with the court proceedings with T.’s father. The mother and H.’s father lived together, also in a short relationship, of one year and ten months, between some time in January or early February of 2020, and October 24, 2021. H.’s father testified that the mother became pregnant very quickly with H. in this new relationship, too. He testified that he took on a parental role for both boys while in this relationship.

30The couple lived together in three different residences during their short relationship, at first on their own until May 31, 2021, and then in the maternal grandparents’ home for about 2 ½ months until August 15, 2021. They ended their relationship living on their own again. They separated on October 24, 2021.

(2) The Chaos, Conflict and Family Violence in the Parties’ Various Households

31According to several accounts, the living situation to which these young children were exposed during this relationship, was also chaotic and volatile. The parties’ homes were often in a state of disarray. H.’s father documented that with some photographs he introduced at trial.

32There was regular screaming and yelling, and even physical confrontations. H.’s father testified that there was daily, and if not daily, then weekly fighting and arguing. Similar to what T.’s father had said, H.’s father said that once fights started, they would only come to an end when the mother’s mood changed, and that could take days. The underlying cause of the conflict was never addressed though, according to him. He felt he was “always on edge”.

33H.’s father described parenting as a shared responsibility in the relationship, even though he did shift work, involving overnights. He testified that he undertook chores on a regular basis despite his shift work. Except for some occasional and sporadic work that she did in the maternal grandfather’s office, the mother did not work outside the home, yet there were many chores to do when H.’s father was not at work, regardless. He explained that the mother regularly relied on the maternal grandmother and the mother’s brother R., to care for the boys. The mother needed a lot of assistance, in other words.

34The mother attributed the conflict in this relationship, at least in part, to H.’s father’s “lack of support”. She felt that she was doing all the heavy lifting, whereas H.’s father was focused on his outside interest, bodybuilding. The mother described financial strain in the relationship, maintaining that she was covering the expenses. She said that H.’s father was then training as a bodybuilder, and he directed his resources towards that. But inconsistently, she also said she had “impulsive buying” habits, and this was the principal cause of the financial strain.

35H.’s father testified that on August 19, 2021, there had been an argument between the two about finances. Apparently after this argument occurred, the mother left for hours on end, with the children, and drove around in the car. The mother did not return home until 11 PM that night. When she did, the car windshield was smashed. H.’s father tendered a photograph of the broken windshield, showing extensive damage. The mother originally claimed that T. had thrown a toy at the windshield, causing the significant damage. However, H.’s father also observed that the mother had an injured hand. The mother later admitted to him, that she had broken the window herself, by hitting it. The mother would also later throw a phone in the house that night, causing a hole in the wall. The mother admitted to having done this too. During the trial, she claimed that she had not hit the windshield all that hard to break it, that the boys were sleeping in the car when she broke the windshield, and that she did not hit H.’s father with the phone when she threw it, or cause that much damage to the wall.

36H.’s father described other family violence. He testified that the mother yelled and screamed, and threw items. He testified that she once slapped him in the bathroom. He said the maternal grandmother once slapped him on the back of the head. There was another argument on September 14, 2021. During it, the mother threw an envelope box at him, causing a cut on his leg, which he photographed. The mother admitted to a version of this event, although she claimed that H.’s father just happened to be walking by, when she threw the box and hit him with it by “accident”. A similar accidental throwing explanation would get repeated by the mother, when she was confronted with a different allegation, that she once threw a step-ladder down the basement stairs.

(3) The Mother’s Marijuana Use and Erratic Driving

37H.’s father said that the mother would smoke marijuana from morning to night, at 2-hour intervals. I heard evidence from several people about the mother’s heavy marijuana use, a topic that had been raised to this Court right from the get go of this protection proceeding.[2]

38H.’s father observed the mother drive after smoking. He said he tried to make a point of driving himself, to prevent her doing so while high, or with the children in the car. He testified that the mother had tried several times to stop smoking marijuana, but she would always return to it.

39When cross-examined by counsel for the Society, the mother claimed that she only started smoking or vaping in 2022, when her friend M.W. introduced her to it, as if to suggest this had not been an issue before. She said that by 2023, her doctor told her to vape instead, or to use topical cream or edibles. She said that she was only smoking at night in 2024, to help her sleep. I understood this evidence to be some kind of attempt to contradict the evidence, that her marijuana use has been a problem going back some time, and to contradict the specific evidence of Ms. Johnson, that she smelled marijuana around the mother, at the time of the removal.

40Regarding her driving, H.’s father is worried that the mother may not even have a driver’s license anymore, right now. In an email from the mother to the Society dated December 22, 2025, she complained about the long drives to Guelph to have access with T. after the removal. She blamed the Society for having to use the 407 to get there, and she sent the Society her 407 Bill. In her email, she said “I am no longer in a position to maintain my driver’s license”.

(4) Family Therapy Did Not Assist the Mother and H.’s Father

41The mother and H.’s father attempted four sessions of family therapy before they separated. It did not work. The therapist ended the service, due to a lack of their participation. When cross-examined by the OCL, H.’s father said that the mother weaponized their discussions in therapy, in later arguments with him.

(5) The Criminal Proceedings Following the Separation

42On November 3, 2021, ten days after the parties’ separation, the mother sent H.’s father two emails with the words “By the way, good luck today bud. Get Bail”, followed by another email that said “Get bail”. The mother tried to recast these messages as containing a typographical error, testifying that what she had meant to say was “get my mail”.

43Yet eight days after the mother claimed to have said “get my mail” as opposed to “get bail”, the father was criminally charged. What precipitated the charges apparently, was that the father went to the police first to complain about the broken windshield. The mother made a statement to the police following that, and H.’s father got charged instead.

44On November 11, 2021, H.’s father was charged with mischief, assault with a weapon (a paint roller), and sexual assault. The father would have his criminal trial a little over a year later. On March 29, 2023, Bonn J. acquitted the father of the charges that the Crown pursued. Bonn J. made adverse credibility findings about the mother in his Reasons.[3]

(6) The Mother’s Sexual Assault of H.’s Father in the Shower

45H.’s father testified that it was the mother who had in fact sexually assaulted him, at a different time. He explained that she did this in the shower, using the handle of a razor. H.’s father says he reported this to the police later on, but the police did not believe him, thinking that he was making a retaliatory complaint. Not only was the father apparently disbelieved by the police when he brought this to their attention, but he was then degraded and humiliated on the internet about it, by the mother.

46Incredibly, when the mother testified at this trial, she provided additional intimate details about the encounter, and essentially admitted to having done what the father had described. She maintained that she did it jokingly (she made a noise from the witness box to illustrate this), after which she said the father “let out a feminine scream”. She claimed that she and others later laughed about it in the kitchen.

47Not only did she and others laugh about this in the (relative) privacy of her kitchen, the mother later went on social media (on Tic Tok live) and mocked the father in front of a group of others. At this trial, the Society tendered a video of the mother’s social media post about the shower incident. On it, the mother, while laughing hysterically, said that she would probably continue to tell this story until her wedding day. She referred to H.’s father as a “stupid ass body builder”, said that he “fucking screamed like a little girl”. She said that he “screamed like a little bitch”.

48The mother disclosed other details of their intimate relationship on this live video. The discussion that then ensued amongst the others on the video, included her and some other guy speculating as to the father’s sexual orientation. This video lasts about 2 minutes, before the mother went on to talk about a different intimate sexual encounter with someone else.

49When she was asked about this video in cross-examination, the mother showed no insight into the significance of acting like this online, claiming that there had only been five or six people on Tic Tok live at the time. She argued that she hadn’t identified H.’s father’s by name. She denied that she was trying to minimize what she had done, including by saying that she was just providing “context”. She said she didn’t think her actions were abusive. She doesn’t even seem to recognize, still to this day, that had the police not disbelieved H.’s father, had charges been laid, and had a criminal court then found an absence of consent (a conclusion that may have very well been drawn based on H.’s father’s testimony and the public admissions she made online), she may very well have been found guilty of a sexual assault. During closing submissions, the mother made a statement of apology about what she had done on Tic Tok live, but frankly it came too little, too late.

(7) The Mother’s Housing Instability Following Her Separation from H.’s Father

50In cross-examination by T.’s father’s lawyer, the mother provided a timeline of her various residential arrangements with the children, after her separation from H.’s father on October 24, 2021.

51At first, the mother continued to live with her parents. There was a time in August of 2022 though, that the mother said she tried to rent an apartment with another person. That person, she said, had addiction issues, and there was Society involvement respecting that person’s infant, apparently. The mother claimed that the plan then was for the two to live together and support each other in their parenting, while the other person was monitored for her drug use with urine screens.

52These living arrangements never really materialized. The mother claimed that the landlord cancelled their lease when they were trying to move in, after receiving an anonymous email or letter. She said this other person would later have her children removed by the Society, attributing that to the lease that did not go through. In the end, the mother and the children did not get to live with this so-called “addict” to “support her”, and the other person’s children were taken from her care.

53The mother continued to reside with her parents, until around April of 2023. She moved out due to a significant argument with her mother. She did not speak to her mother until December of 2023. She and the children returned to the maternal grandparents’ house in October of 2024, where the children would remain for about one month, until the removal. However there was a period of time that the mother and the children also went to Oshawa. When questioning H.’s father about the various police and Society contacts that had occurred over the years, it came out that H.’s father had called the Durham Society as the mother was living with the children in Oshawa in some kind of a hotel or motel. The mother later claimed that she had actually tried to move to Oshawa, she mostly stayed with a friend until it was no longer feasible, and then she stayed in a hotel only briefly.

54During this post-separation period, the mother changed T.’s school three times in the process. His school would be changed a fourth time, following the removal. H. did not start school until just before the removal, so he has not experienced these kinds of school changes, during this unstable period. There were other concerns about T.’s education, relating to his attendance record.

(8) Prior Police and Society Involvement

55There has been a lot of police and Society involvement since the mother’s and H.’s father’s separation. This has continued post-trial, despite this Court’s concluding comments to the parties, on the last day of the trial.

56H.’s father says that the mother contacted the police on him. He says she made up false allegations about him and others in his family, to the police. One example that he cited, was that she falsely accused him of harassing the maternal grandfather at an access exchange. But a record of the Belleville Police Service dated April 5, 2024, documents that the grandfather told the police that that the two had not communicated at all at the exchange, in the face of his own daughter’s allegation of harassment to the contrary.

57Another incident occurred at an exchange at the police station on July 19, 2024. H.’s father said he felt he needed to record exchanges, because things were “escalating instead of de-escalating”. He said that he had his phone out to do this, while walking with H. back to his car. He testified that the mother drove by him fast and aggressively (with T. in the car), and yelled “I hope you capture that on video as well”. In their later written exchange about this over AppClose, the mother wrote, “[a]nd before you start your little gaslighting, manipulation tactics and victimization comma this is pertaining to [H.] as your actions continue to not be in his best interests”.

58During her cross-examination of H.’s father, the mother highlighted a sample of 17 records from the Belleville Police Service, and one from the OPP, ranging between November 2021 and October 2025, to show that the father complained to the police about her several times. What the mother ended up eliciting by doing this though, were the father’s oral explanations as to why he was contacting the police so much. In short, he said it was in response to a series of alarming behaviours, that she was directing at him or his partner. He went to the police for help. He also said that he had been told by the police, to document his concerns.

59There had been a tremendous amount of Society involvement too, before the initiation of the protection application. During her cross-examination of H.’s father, the mother likewise pointed to a selection of case notes of various calls that he made to this Society, and to the Durham Society. The points that she sought to make included that the Society had closed files, but the father continued to call, which resulted in more openings, sometimes shortly after a file had been closed.

60But likewise, H.’s father testified as to the reason for calling the Society so much. His reasons were similar to his explanation about why he had contacted the police.

61The mother contacted the Society for that matter too. She did this quite a bit after the children were removed from her care. According to the trial affidavit of Family Services Worker Candice Wylde, the mother, and her friend M.W. advanced a series of concerns about the care of the children with their fathers, on January 22, 2025, March 19, 2025, March 23, 2025, April 5, 2025, April 8, 2025, April 9, 2025, April 17, 2026, April 24, 2025, June 3, 2025, June 25, 2025, June 30, 2025, July 3, 2025, August 14, 2025, January 8, 2026, January 13, 2025, and January 24, 2026.

62Quite frankly these records and reports do not reflect well on either party, the mother included. They reveal an inability to engage with each other in a functional way, leading each to resort to the police for help to manage their chaos. Meanwhile, the Society had been opening and closing files for a three-year period, yet protection concerns continued to persist.

63The sample of the police and Society records that the mother highlighted, and those which H.’s father and the Society introduced, are concerning. The police and the Society had become ineffective at helping the parties to de-escalate the conflict. Sometimes the police used excuses like there was no police enforcement clause in place, or that the father should direct his concerns to the Family Court, when declining to assist.

(9) The Prior CLRA Proceedings Concerning H.

64H.’s father testified that after his arrest, he communicated with the mother through counsel at first. When he was later allowed to communicate through a family communication app, he used that. H.’s father said he kept his communications with the mother “child focused” as required, but the mother did not.

65Family law proceedings concerning H. got underway in 2022. This would have been while the criminal proceedings were pending.

66H.’s father testified that he originally had supervised parenting time for about 1 year, but the mother would sometimes not show up, after having given him no advance warning. He said she would claim that H. was sick, when he was not. This latter complaint was corroborated specifically by the mother’s brother R. and his partner F. They said that the mother once used a positive, discarded Covid-19 test of someone else, to pretend that H. had Covid-19.

67The mother’s CLRA proceedings ended with the Final Consent Order of Tellier J. dated March 24, 2024. That Final Consent Order is a 16-page long, very detailed Order.

68In broad strokes, the Order provided that the mother and H.’s father would have joint decision-making responsibility on various terms, including that there would not to be changes to health care providers without consent, and that health care decisions would be made in consultation with the health care providers. The mother, who was then (and still is) saying that H. has autism, was obliged to pursue obtaining autism related services. But both parties were permitted to attend appointments. Two months earlier, there had been significant conflict at H.’s then most recent autism assessment, the result of which was the father ended up being excluded from participating in the assessment. The assessor was given false information and H. obtained an inaccurate “likely” diagnosis, not an “actual” or accurate one.

69There were terms in the Order about H.’s education, including which school he would attend in the fall of 2024. There were a number of terms in the Order about parental conduct, in an obvious attempt to regulate what had been going on.

70There was a term in the Order about the removal of social media postings. There were terms agreed to on consent, about the future use of social media. The mother’s social media use was then, and still is a problem. Once this protection proceeding got underway, McCarty J. would be called upon to make yet another order about social media and internet behaviour, that the mother then breached.

71The Order contained terms about not advising professionals involved with the child about past or current conduct complaints, and about keeping any such communications with professionals “child focused”. Likewise, this too remained a significant problem once this child protection proceeding got underway.

72The Order contained a graduated schedule for H.’s father’s parenting time, that culminated with the child being in his care from Tuesdays to Thursdays in Week One of a two week rotation, and on Fridays to Sunday nights or Monday mornings in Week Two, depending on the father’s shift work schedule. There is also a holiday schedule in the Order. The parties agreed to a review in February of 2026, with a view to expanding the father’s parenting time into a shared parenting schedule. Unusually, but reflective of the high degree of conflict between them, the parties agreed to do H.’s parenting exchanges inside the Belleville Police station, to shift to H.’s school, when he would start in the fall. There were also child support and section 7 expenses terms in the Order, that provided for payment by the father to the mother. H.’s father has continued to pay child support to the mother to this day, despite the removal.

73Ms. Johnson says in her trial affidavit, that Tellier J.’s March 22, 2024 Final Consent Order would have mitigated many of the Society’s concerns, had it been followed. But H.’s father testified that the mother denied his parenting time after the Final Consent Order. Many, many other problems persisted, not just the frustration of H.’s father’s parenting time.

74H’s father felt compelled to bring a contempt motion, respecting the mother’s non-compliance with his parenting time. There was an appearance on the father’s contempt motion on August 19, 2024. The next day the mother took H. to a hospital emergency room, where H. would make a statement suggesting that his father had sexually abused him. On November 1, 2024, a little more than seven months after the Final Consent Order, the Society removed the children from the mother’s care. The reasons for the removal included this false allegation; but that was far from the only reason.

B. The Mother’s Brother R.’s and His Partner F.’s Confirmatory Evidence About this Troubling Background

(1) R.’s and F’s Affidavit and Oral Evidence

75R. is a 23 year-old young man. He is the mother’s half-brother, younger by about 7 years. He was a powerful witness for the Society. He provided a clear, yet disturbing account of what went on in the maternal grandparents’ home, during the times that he lived there with the mother, each of her former partners, and the children.

76R. and his sister have not maintained a relationship in the last three years, in part as a result of R. and his partner, F. speaking out about what went on. He says that the mother has continuously harassed and defamed himself and his partner, over social media.

77F. is R.’s partner. She was also a powerful witness for the Society. She started dating R. in April of 2021. She began spending a lot of time at the maternal grandparents’ home. F. later lived in that home between February of 2022 and August of 2022, and again from December of 2022 to January 1, 2024. Like R., F. no longer maintains a relationship with either the mother, or the maternal grandparents, but she was a great help to the mother in the past, when the mother needed her parenting support.

78R. and F. corroborated that the home environment was volatile, unstable, chaotic and violent. R. confirmed that the mother was the recipient of emotional and verbal abuse, from the grandmother. He confirmed that the mother was also the perpetrator of abuse, in return towards others in the home, and towards the children, too. He described that there was “abuse in all aspects of the house”. He described “very frequent” conflict, occurring daily, but if not, “for sure weekly”, consistent with H.’s father’s account of the situation, when he lived there.

79In her trial affidavit, F. says there was tension in the home between the mother and her parents particularly. F. says that arguments with the mother could escalate very quickly into explosive arguments. She also said arguments occurred daily, and yelling probably occurred weekly.

80R. described consistent fights when T.’s father lived in the home. He described “emotional conflict” (i.e. a lot of yelling) when H.’s father later lived in the home. The mother was the perpetrator. He said the mother would frequently threaten to take herself and the children and leave, something that H.’s father also testified about.

81R. testified that the children were frightened and anxious when exposed to all the fighting. R. testified that he tried to insulate the children from the situation, such as by removing them to another area of the house or outside. But he testified that very little could be done to de-escalate the mother. He testified that the maternal grandfather was avoidant, and that if either grandparent tried to intervene, the situation would end up escalating further. This evidence was similar to H.’s father’s evidence of ongoing fights, that never got resolved.

82R. corroborated the physical violence in his household of origin too, to which T. and later H. after his birth, were exposed. He described that the mother and the maternal grandmother were violent towards one another. Although she minimized the conflict and violence in the household, even the maternal grandmother admitted in cross-examination, that “there was [one] incident” when the mother pushed her. But she excused this, saying the mother had not been diagnosed yet, and the incident in question was actually the grandmother’s fault.

83Both R. and F., confirmed that T. was the recipient of the mother’s physical discipline. Below, I discuss two videos that F. captured from Ring security cameras that had been placed inside the home, showing this.

84R. and F. were the recipients of the mother’s outbursts and violence. R. says that the mother threatened to “bash” his, and F.’s “heads in”, during an argument in April of 2022. The Society tendered a text message that the mother had sent to her brother on August 17, 2022[4] that reads:

The next time that cunt oversteps with my fucking kids I will bash her fucking face in regardless of who is there. It’s also not a threat, it’s a fair fucking warning. She is permanently banned from being anywhere near MY children. Stay in your lane. They are not your children.

85The mother’s explanation for this particular message was that F. had interfered with a paramedic, who had come to take T. to the hospital. She claimed that when she arrived at the hospital, separately in her own car, hospital staff would not let her back into the examination room with T., without first questioning her identity. She would not concede when cross-examined by counsel for the Society about this, that hospital staff verifying the identity of a parent arriving at the hospital separately, might be part of their normal security procedure. She instead assumed that F. had said something to the paramedic, since she was the last person who had contact with the paramedic. She went on to try to excuse the aforementioned text message, like she would say many times during this trial when making excuses for her other behaviour, that she had not yet been diagnosed [with ADHD] at the time.

86R. confirmed other evidence I heard about the mother’s inability to manage her parenting responsibilities without significant help. In his trial affidavit, R. says that he became one of T.’s primary caregivers starting when T. was just 8 months old, even though he himself was just 14 or 15 years old at the time. He said in his affidavit, and in court, that he was also financially responsible for the mother and T., providing funds to the mother from his earnings from a job that he maintained while he was in high school. R. says that the mother often left T. in his or others’ care in the household, either in the mornings, or when she went out.

87F.’s observation of the mother’s inability to parent was similar, adding that the mother was out of the home a few times per week. There was rarely any advance planning before the mother would leave. The mother would become upset if others didn’t help out when she demanded that they do so, with little to no notice.

88Both in her trial affidavit and during her in court testimony, F. says she looked after H. for a week in September of 2022, when the mother went on a trip to Los Angeles. She even says she left her school and job, because of the responsibility she took on to look after the children. She felt the mother needed help. Although the mother and the maternal grandmother attacked F. at this trial, quite notably the mother did agree at another time during her testimony, that F. was a “great help”, because she “understood my mental health and illness”.

89R. is both children’s uncle; he was also named as T.’s godfather. R. says that several times when the mother got upset, she would tell the children that he was no longer their uncle or T.’s godfather, and she instructed them not to speak to him. She repeated this behaviour towards other members of the household, after disagreements. F. confirmed this behaviour occurred.

90In cross-examination by the Society, the mother agreed she did this. She tried to explain this away, claiming that R. and F. were a danger. She said she did not want her children exposed to them, because they were “profusely drinking alcohol” and smoking marijuana “to the point of passing out” (topics she did not question them about). She also made inconsistent statements about when she told the children not to speak to R. and F. At first she said she only did this after the removal. When further cross-examined, she said she probably did this some time in September of 2023. At other times, the mother claimed to have removed the children to different parts of the house when fighting was going on, and so she would have instructed the children not to speak to other family members on those occasions, but again this was due to “safety concerns”.

91R. and F. moved out of the home in August of 2022, until January of 2023. After they moved back in for a time, there was a heated argument in February of 2023, to the point that the mother threw a clear plastic bottle at the back of R.’s head. This occurred in H.’s presence. R. testified that the mother had used items to throw at him as “projectiles” on at least two occasions. In cross-examination, the mother denied having thrown a bottle at her brother’s head. At another time during her testimony, the mother accused R. of having charged at her, and she said that T.’s father intervened. I accept that the mother threw the item as a projectile at R., in H.’s presence.

92R. testified about a time when the mother stole $11,000.00 from him to make various purchases, including a couch, a computer, a weight machine, and various items from Wayfair. R. was only about 19 years old at the time. She did not repay him, and their father had to cover the bill. This caused conflict within the home, and resulted in the grandfather telling the mother to move out, for a time.[5] In her trial affidavit, the mother said that R.’s statement about the $11,000.00 is internally inconsistent. While making such arguments, she did not directly address this allegation. And she has admitted to impulse buying, apparently as a by-product of her mental health.

93Neither R. nor F. called the Society to report their child protection concerns before the removal. Not only were they both young, but they were afraid of reprisal. In her trial affidavit, and during her in court testimony, the mother tried to discredit R. and F., saying that F. retaliated against her after the removal by disclosing information to the Society. She accused F. of not being motivated by a concern for the children, but because of a debt owing by F.’s parents to the maternal grandparents, relating to a trip the families took together in the past. The mother also suggested that F.’s actions were motivated by the fact that she had put a post online about this debt.

94There was a heavy burden on R. when he was in that household. R. himself has dealt with depression and anxiety. While the underlying cause of this wasn’t explored and didn’t need to be, it seems likely that living in that environment contributed to the adverse impact on R.’s mental health. R. testified that it has only been through extricating himself from the situation and moving into a supportive and healthy environment, that he feels he is more mentally healthy.[6] This causes one to wonder further what would have been in store for T.’ and H.’s long term mental health, had the Society not intervened on November 1, 2024.

(2) The Ring Camera Videos that F. Recorded

95It is common ground that there were Ring security cameras not only outside the home, but also inside in the living room and in the boys’ room. F. says the cameras were in the living room because the mother had said she was afraid that H.’s father would come into the home. F. says that she had been given access to the cameras in the boys’ room, and in the living room, while she lived there, a fact that the mother contested during this trial.

96The mother regularly experienced difficulty in the mornings with her parenting, trying to get T. ready for school. January 31, 2023 was one such morning. F. heard yelling. From her room in the basement, she went onto her phone and looked at the Ring camera app, to see what was going on in the living room. She started to screen record what was being streamed onto her cell phone. F. saw the mother strike T. and then proceed to “toss him out the front door” while screaming to him “get ready for school”.

97The screen recording that she captured is broken up into two parts, due to the manner in which the phone recorded. In the first part of the video, the mother marches towards T., who is lying on his stomach on the floor by the door. She forcefully slaps the child and yells “Get your boots on now”. H. can be seen behind a couch in the living room, peering over to watch the mother’s physical discipline of T. Incidentally there is also a large box and a lot of clutter in the house on the left side of the screen, further corroborating H.’s father’s evidence, that their houses were in a state of disarray.

98In the second part of the video, the mother can be seen and screaming “Get your boots on. Get your fucking boots on and get ready for school” and “Get up”. She then drags the child up to his feet by his collar and shakes him as the door is being opened. At the end of the second part of the video, the grandmother is seen slowly walking towards the door, carrying what appears to be the child’s backpack or lunch pack (i.e. not intervening to protect T.). Throughout this second video, H. continues to watch the incident from behind the couch.

PART III: THE PRIOR CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS

A. The Mother’s August 20, 2024 Allegation that H.’s Father Sexually Abused Him

99A number of things occurred, leading up to the events of August 20, 2024. First, in June of 2024, just about three months after Tellier J.’s CLRA Order of March 22, 2024, the mother called the Society and alleged physical abuse by H.’s father.

100One month later, the mother took the child to the emergency room (on July 22, 2024), this time saying that the child came home from a visit with his father, complaining of a “sore butt”. The mother alleged that this was not the first instance of “assault” reported, and claimed that the father had hit him with his hand. There would be yet another hospital visit the following month, this time at which sexual abuse would be alleged.

101H. had last been in his father’s care on Sunday, August 18, 2024, before the sexual abuse statement was made. H. was due to transition into his father’s care again on Wednesday, August 21, 2024, but as things happened, he would be brought to him late.

102As indicated already, the father had brought a contempt motion against the mother for alleged non-compliance with Tellier J.’s Order. There was an appearance on the contempt motion on August 19, 2024. It got adjourned, to permit the mother to get counsel.

103On August 20, 2024, the very next day, the mother sent a video to the father showing the child whining, with the mother rubbing his back and consoling him. There was back and forth between the two over AppClose, that the mother was going to take the child to the hospital. The mother claimed at this trial, that she took the child to the hospital because the child said he had pain in his legs and back, and it hurt to pee, and he was hot.

104The hospital triage nurse’s report says that when at the hospital, the complaint was fever, lower abdomen and penile pain, nausea, and that the child was not eating or drinking. H. had a urinalysis done. The urinalysis report did not reveal a urinary tract infection, and it seems that the child was administered some Tylenol. The mother then waited for H. to be seen by emergency room doctor, Dr. Anastaysia Lezhanska.

105The mother testified that both boys were asleep when Dr. Lezhanska arrived to examine the child, as it was late at night. She said that she just told Dr. Lezhanska that H. had previously made a disclosure that his father had hit and pinched him, and there had been a SCAN referral previously made.[7]

106The mother said that H. then woke up, but T. was still sleeping. Supposedly while T. was still sleeping, Dr. Lezhanska asked to see the child’s penis, but H. was not really giving Dr. Lezhanska any answers. The mother said that she made a comment in Dr. Lezhanska’s presence, that H. needed to stop hitting himself there, because boys often do that, but H. said that he didn’t hit himself.

107Crying dramatically during this part of her testimony, the mother testified that she needed to take a moment to wake up T. “to preserve his mental health”, “because his father is not like that”. She said that she then took T. outside, while Dr. Lezhanska examined H., but she looked on from outside through the examination window. The mother said that Dr. Lezhanska came out after she was done, and didn’t tell her “anything”, but said that she had to make a report to the Society. The mother asked Dr. Lezhanska if H. was OK; Dr. Lezhanska told her that she did not see any trauma.

108The mother went on to say that “this really caught her off guard”. Despite her “past” with H.’s father, she didn’t think “that” was a possibility. The next morning, the mother messaged the father, but did not tell him what the child had disclosed.

109In the early morning hours of August 21, 2024, Dr. Lezhanska called the Society pursuant to her duty to report. Ms. Johnson says that Dr. Lezhanska reported that the mother had brought H. to the hospital due to a fever and because he kept touching his “penile area”. She said that H. had said that his father had “hit [his] penis”. She said that both the mother and T. were present at the hospital when H. made this disclosure. Ms. Johnson was assigned to investigate this.

110According to Ms. Johnson, Dr. Lezhanska spoke with her again, now on September 9, 2024. According to Ms. Johnson, Dr. Lezhanska said that this was a bit of an “odd situation”, because the mother was freely talking about the father and the abuse she endured, while in the room in front of both children, before Dr. Lezhanska examined H. While H. did share that his father hit him, it was at the end of the visit, he did not disclose anything further, and he did not appear with any physical trauma, although he was in pain upon examination.

111Ms. Johnson later interviewed the child on August 29, 2024. Society worker Sandra Brooks, who has significant experience conducting forensic interviews of children, participated in the interview, too. Both Ms. Johnson’s and Ms. Brooks’ trial affidavits describe in some detail, the interviews of H. that they conducted, at the end of which they concluded that the child had been coached. The mother testified that she hadn’t said anything to the child prior to this interview, except that he should “tell his truth”. I come back to this evidence in more detail later, when considering the admissibility of the child’s hearsay statement of abuse, and another video of the child that the mother had made in the car, of the child making another similar statement.

112The mother saw her and the children’s family doctor, Dr. Ian Spreadbury, after this, on September 10, 2024. Dr. Spreadbury testified that the mother questioned the child during this appointment too, trying to get H. to remember the incident he reported at the emergency room. He said that the mother wasn’t trying to put words in his mouth, but after asking a series of open-ended questions, she asked more direct questions. Dr. Spreadbury testified that H. was looking confused, and eventually reluctantly and equivocally agreed that his father had touched him, as if to get the questioning to stop. Dr. Spreadbury said that the child was still reporting pain on September 10, 2024, but could not recall the events of August, and made his statements reluctantly.

113Dr. Spreadbury queried whether the child had a urinary tract infection. He prepared a requisition for certain testing, but did not have in his file any record of the tests ever coming back to him. At the request of the Court, he inquired of his office and learned that he did have the hospital test from August 20, 2024, though.

114The same day the mother made another report, now to the child’s teacher, that there had been sexual abuse. In her trial affidavit, H.’s teacher says that while she didn’t have much contact with the mother before, in early September of 2024, she followed up with the mother to ensure that the school had H.’s “custody agreement”, so that the school could follow the requirements for pick-up scheduling. In the mother’s response email to her of September 10, 2024, she told H.’s new teacher that H. had disclosed “SA” [meaning sexual abuse] during a hospital visit and the father had involved the Society. She also talked about a dispute with the father, about a diagnosis of ASD for H.

115The sexual abuse allegation was brought up again, in a video that the mother made, as indicated. This video was initially marked as lettered Exhibit B. There were obvious questions about its authenticity and admissibility when it was first presented during this trial, readily apparent. The admissibility and the use to which this video will be put, is dealt with below.

B. The Children’s Removal from the Mother’s Care on November 1, 2024

116On October 22, 2024, the Society verified child protection concerns for both children, relating to “caregiver capacity, post separation conflict over custody, and caregiver’s response to child’s mental, emotional and developmental condition”. The Society did not verify sexual abuse.

117Ms. Johnson contacted H.’s father on October 25, 2024, and T.’s father on October 31, 2024 to inform them of the outcome of the Society’s investigation. Ms. Johnson tried to schedule a similar meeting with the mother on October 28, 2024, in between her contacts with both fathers, but the mother refused to meet with her. The mother did however send the video (Exhibit B) to the Society that day.

118Supervisor Kathleen Sonnenburg’s trial affidavit states that a decision was made to bring a child protection application, after it was determined that ongoing voluntarily involvement with the mother was not feasible. On November 1, 2024, the Society obtained warrants to bring T. and H. to places of safety. Each child was taken to their respective fathers’ homes that day, directly from their school.

119Already well before this point, the mother had taken a combative stance with the Society. Ms. Johnson tried to have interactions with the mother on August 29 and 30, 2024. Ms. Johnson then tried to interact with the mother again by phone on September 6, 2024. In response, the mother told her that she had reported her to “governing authorities” and hung up.

120Ms. Johnson says she called the mother back, advised that grounds existed for a protection application, and asked the mother to work willingly with her to mitigate the need for this. This time, the mother accused Ms. Johnson of discriminating against her “cognitive disorder”, and asked for a different worker. When Ms. Johnson tried to discuss how the Society could assist her with her mental health, the mother ended the call saying that she needed to get the children.

121About thirty minutes later, there was another phone call with the mother. This time, Ms. Johnson asked the mother to sign consents for the release of information; at first the mother refused. Ms. Johnson later asked for consents again, for a second time; the mother said she would sign them. But when Ms. Johnson sent her the consents for signature, the mother responded with a list of friends and family members, along with their phone numbers, but without consents to speak to them. Ms. Johnson says that she later received emails from the mother and her peers saying that the mother’s mental health should not be a concern, and one person even wanted to send a character reference. Ms. Johnson says that the mother then forwarded to her an email dated September 7, 2024, that she had sent to the Children’s Treatment Centre,[8] in which she threatened a lawsuit against the Centre for speaking and engaging with H.’s father about H.’s speech and language therapies.

122Now I do note that on November 7, 2024, after the removal, the mother signed several consents for the release of information from various therapists and doctors, and from her academic advisor at her university. Several of these consents exempt the release of information about the mother’s physical health, even though the mother has relied on her physical health complaints in various ways during this trial. On November 8, 2024, the mother emailed Ms. Johnson to provide some information about the Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (“DBT”) that she said she had done in the past, and about her work with the Canadian Mental Health Association (the “CMHA”).

123I found this somewhat confusing because I had heard evidence that the mother didn’t sign consents, yet there were a number of these signed consents from November 7, 2024 in the Society’s Exhibit Book. While it seems that the mother did sign limited consents after the removal later on, when talking about the therapy that the mother engaged in, Ms. Wylde explained that the mother revoked different consents at some point in 2025, “a month after giving them”. Ms. Johnson also said that she had to obtain warrants to obtain productions, mostly pertaining to H.’s health and medical records, and she also obtained police records from the Belleville Police Service and the Quinte West OPP. This Court would later at the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 23, 2026 make disclosure Orders for various collateral records.

124Returning to the day of the removal on November 1, 2024, after the children were with their fathers, Ms. Johnson went to the mother’s home, accompanied by an OPP officer from the Quinte West OPP detachment, to inform her of the warrants, and of the children’s removals. Ms. Johnson says the mother became irate, screamed at her, and accused her of having conducted an illegal investigation. This interaction ended with the mother saying “get the fuck off my property, now”.

125The mother sent T.’s father a text message in the afternoon of November 1, 2024, asking him whether he knew about the removal, and whether he had done this behind her back. About four hours later, she sent him another text message, saying “I’ll see you in civil and family court. Not a wise decision. I suggest you get a highly educated lawyer.”

126The next morning, the mother wrote the following to T.’s father:

Enjoy [T.] while you have him because once I’m done with you and CAS in court, you will never see him again without supervision. CFSRB has been notified and you will be charged and reprimanded. Enjoy your extra time with him as it will be the last.

Epi pen incident[9] and so much more will be showcased to the courts. Rookie mistake so enjoy the last moments with him.

C. The Society’s Investigation Following the Receipt of the Ring Camera Videos

127On November 5, 2024, R., and his partner F. supplied the Ring camera videos to the Society. This caused the Society to undertake a new investigation.

128On November 14, 2024, Ms. Johnson and Ms. Wylde met with the mother to inform her of the new investigation, following receipt of the videos. According to Ms. Johnson, the mother said that the videos were illegally obtained and could not be used in court. She also said that her use of physical discipline had only happened once, and this was before she had obtained an ADHD diagnosis. The mother would later testify that she had spanked T. “twice”.

129On November 20, 2024, Ms. Johnson spoke with the maternal grandmother about the videos. To Ms. Johnson, the maternal grandmother pointed out that the video was cut off, before she began to reprimand the mother for her actions.[10] At this trial, both the maternal grandmother, and her friend B.S., would deny or minimize any prior use of physical discipline by the mother.

130On January 29, 2025, the Society verified “Physical Force and/or Maltreatment – Risk that the Child is Likely to be Harmed – Primary Caregiver”. This was also based on T. later disclosing incidents of spanking and hitting when he misbehaved, not just based on the videos.

D. The Removal Hearing Before Tellier J. on November 6, 2024

131This matter first came before Tellier J. on November 6, 2024 following the removal. In her nine-page Endorsement, Tellier J. began by noting the existence of the underlying Order, that there had been protracted proceedings under the CLRA, and that H.’s father had a pending contempt motion respecting the mother’s non-compliance of the March 22, 2024 Order, before the removal occurred.

132Tellier J. summarized the medical evidence then before the Court about H., and noted the dispute about whether the child had autism, indicating that there was already evidence that was not the diagnosis. She noted the evidence then before her, that the mother was declining referrals from the Children’s Treatment Centre for other services for H., problematic since it was noted that H. had delayed gross motor milestones and delayed speech that needed to be serviced.

133Tellier J. made reference to the sexual abuse complaint, the investigation that followed, its results, and to children’s statements that the mother gets angry and uses spanking as a form of discipline. The Court was informed of the Ring camera videos, although they were not introduced into evidence at that time, without a voir dire.

134Tellier J. made reference to the voluminous prior child protection openings, which included a call from the maternal grandmother, who expressed concern about her own daughter’s mental health and ability to parent.[11]

135Tellier J. found that the children had been exposed to numerous unnecessary medical examinations and numerous interviews by child protection and law enforcement personnel. She found that the mother continued to refer to H.’s father as an abuser in front of the children, contrary to a term in the CLRA Order. She found that the mother took H. to unnecessary health appointments, while failing to obtain necessary health appointments and referrals for him. She found that the mother refused to be serviced by the Children’s Treatment Centre.

136Tellier J. identified, based on the credible and trustworthy evidence then before her, that the protection risks then were:

(a) a “grave risk” that the mother’s continued involvement in healthcare, would expose the children to false messaging and conflict, rather than a focus on their real health needs;

(b) a risk that health care providers would be given false information about the fathers, by the mother;

(c) a risk that health care providers may be the subject of threats, and even actual complaints to governing bodies, resulting in the refusal to treat or the withdrawal of care;

(d) a risk that the mother would withhold access, as had already been occurring regarding both children;

(e) risks about the mother’s mental health and its impact on her parenting; and

(f) risks about the number of complaints the mother was making arising from services or interactions, which suggested that the mother had a perception problem rooted in a mental health disorder, or that she was being hostile and vexatious, casting a wide net of targets, and exposing the children to her “perpetual combative mode”.

137Tellier J. found that the children could not be protected in the mother’s care under a temporary supervision Order. She found the risks were such that the mother could only have supervised access.

138In the result, Tellier J. made statutory findings under section 90(2) of the CYFSA, including that T. is a FNIM child, she made a without prejudice Order placing the children in the care of their fathers on various terms and conditions, she ordered supervised access for the mother and separate sibling access, she appointed the OCL, and she put various terms and conditions in place. She also ordered the mother to undergo a mental health assessment pursuant to section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

E. The Temporary Care and Custody Hearing Before McCarty J. on February 14, 2025, and the Ruling dated May 13, 2025

139The parties later argued a contested temporary care and custody motion before McCarty J. on February 14, 2025. In her ruling of May 13, 2025, McCarty J. found that the applicable test was met at the temporary stage of child protection proceedings, and she continued the children’s placements with their fathers. McCarty J. ordered that the mother could have supervised access with the children, and that there would be in-person and virtual sibling access.

140At ¶ 10 of the ruling, McCarty J. noted that her determination was not based on any one single incident, but rather on a “constellation of concerns”. The basis of McCarty J.’s decision, summarized at ¶ 10, was:

(a) The mother has struggled with mental health concerns, including contemplations of suicide. While she was then being treated for ADHD, there continued to be concerns about her reactions in front of the children;

(b) The mother continued to focus on abuse allegations in relation to H., despite information from medical professionals to the contrary; and

(c) The mother’s focus on complaints and legal actions highlighted her inability to accept feedback and move forward, leaving the children in the middle of high conflict. That interfered with her ability to address valid concerns, and impacted her ability to work with the Society under a supervision Order.

141While McCarty J.’s temporary care and custody decision was under reserve, the Society brought another motion, now dated May 5, 2025, to compel the mother to remove all social media posts, and for orders prohibiting the mother from sharing documents with third parties, including with her friend M.W., for directions as to whether the mother coaching H.’s soccer team was a breach of Tellier J.’s November 6, 2024 Order, and to seek direction about an allegation that Society counsel was in a conflict of interest.

142That motion did not get addressed prior to the release of the aforementioned ruling, but McCarty J. dealt with this next motion, on June 5, 2025. In her Endorsement of that date, McCarty J. noted that there was agreement that Society counsel was not in a conflict, and the mother was no longer seeking to coach soccer. McCarty J. nevertheless clarified that the existing access Order, now being her Order of May 13, 2025, applied to all contact (i.e. this prohibited the mother from acting as a soccer coach).

143The parties consented to the relief sought regarding the social media postings and the dissemination of documents. I note here two things about McCarty J.’s social media Order, which I will come back to. It was broader in scope than the statutory publication ban in section 87(8) of the CYFSA, in that it prohibited all posting about this case, not just the publication of identifying information. It was also made on consent.

144I note the latter because the mother would later breach this Order, mid-trial. She claimed that McCarty J. had never made findings about her internet use, and that she had misunderstood what McCarty J. had ordered. Yet that motion had been brought based on an evidentiary record at the time, the mother consented to the June 5, 2025 Order, and the mother then had counsel. Whether findings were made or not doesn’t matter. And I do not accept the mother’s mid-trial attempt to feign ignorance about what she understood the Order to mean.

G. The Maternal Grandmother’s and M.W.’s Motions for Party Status

145The next event in this case originated by way of two Form 14 Notices of Motion and an additional 14B Motion, brought by each of the maternal grandmother, and M.W., for leave to be added as parties to this proceeding, for access to the children,[12] asking the Court to revisit Tellier J.’s earlier determination that T. is a FNIM child, and for orders prohibiting the mother’s brother R., and his partner F. from having contact with the children “as it is believed with supporting evidence that they are coaching the children and interfering with the integrity of the proceedings”.[13]

146McCarty J. released a principal Endorsement, and two separate Endorsements for the non-parties, on August 21, 2025. In the main Endorsement, she noted that because the main parties to this case had agreed not to challenge T.’s FNIM designation, the Court would not be considering this issue further until the party status issue was decided. She also granted leave to the mother to bring a separate motion to expand her own access.

147Also in the main Endorsement, McCarty J. indicated that that the mother had raised a complaint about the completeness of the disclosure that she had been provided with. This is notable, because it was one of several disclosure complaints the mother would make throughout the prior proceedings, right up to, and continuing throughout this trial. McCarty J. ordered the mother’s former counsel to provide the Society with a list of the discrepancies, within 3 weeks.

148In yet another ruling that has been released in this case, this one now dated January 6, 2026, McCarty J. would later deny the requests to add the maternal grandmother and M.W. as parties. She did however allow that the children could have access with each of their maternal grandmother and M.W., a minimum of once per month, but during the mother’s access visits. The mother was the one to decide whether the maternal grandmother and M.W. would come at the same time, or whether they would attend separately during her visits. The Society was empowered to remove either, if there were inappropriate discussions with the children, or amongst the adults in front of the children. The children were made access holders, not the maternal grandmother and M.W. , consistent with her ruling that neither the grandmother nor M.W. were to be added as parties.

H. The Mother’s Motion for Access and a Plethora of Other Relief, and H.’s Father’s Contempt Motion

149In the meantime, while these party status and access motions, and the resulting decision were pending, more motions were brought. The mother, now acting on her own, brought a motion dated October 6, 2025, for a plethora of relief, not just the extra access for which leave to bring a motion had been granted. She asked for various rulings about evidence, for disclosure, to have the fathers and the children submit to psychiatric assessments, and again she asked to prohibit any contact by R. and F. She also asked for more access for not only herself, but for the grandparents and M.W. too, even though McCarty J. was dealing with that. She asked for the recognition that “alienation from siblings, cousins, and maternal caregivers has caused harm and must be remedied by meaningful access”, for OCL “oversight” and for an order that the OCL must conduct “an independent investigation and not rely exclusively on CAS disclosure”, for a determination that the mental health assessment, that Tellier J. had ordered, not be given any weight, and for further orders to “ensure compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Ontario Child Protection Standards (CPS), and the best interests of the children.”

150H.’s father, also then acting on his own, brought a contempt motion dated October 10, 2025, for a finding that the mother had violated various sections of two temporary Orders made now in this child protection case. He filed a separate 14B Motion dated October 15, 2025, asking for substituted service of his contempt motion.

151On October 16, 2025, McCarty J. dismissed H.’s father’s request for substituted service, and directed the parties to appear before the Court on October 23, 2025, in the nature of case management to address what was now transpiring. On October 23, 2025, Tellier J. granted leave for the mother’s access motion only, and scheduled a Trial Management Conference and the trial. She ordered that leave for any further motions was required. On October 23, 2025, McCarty J. released a separate endorsement making a different procedural order about service and disclosure. The father’s contempt motion, it seems, was never brought back on.

I. The Mother’s Access Motion Heard December 8, 2025

152Tellier J. heard the mother’s access motion on December 8, 2025. At it, the mother raised a complaint that the Society had not provided its notes regarding her access with T. Tellier J. made provision for further limited written submissions about any missing records, and reserved. She otherwise again ordered that there would not be any further motions prior to trial without leave. She made another scheduling order regarding the Trial Management Conference and the trial.

J. The Mother’s Request to Bring a Motion About H.’s Swollen Eye

153In the meantime, on January 9, 2026, the mother brought another motion (a 14B Motion), now seeking leave to bring another motion (which she characterized as an “urgent motion”). The body of this 14B Motion states that there was an “urgent issue relating to the children’s circumstances”, specifically one concerning “the immediate medical safety of the child”.

154McCarty J. disposed of this 14B Motion in her Endorsement on January 19, 2026. Apparently, the mother’s affidavit stated that H.’s eye looked swollen at an access visit, and she believed the father was not seeking medical attention for it. But both the Society and H.’s father responded, confirming that the father addressed the issue, after noticing the swollen eye after school.

155I heard testimony about this, at this trial. The father first consulted with a pharmacist who recommended Benadryl, as the symptoms were consistent with a localized allergic reaction, and then he arranged for an optometrist appointment, who recommended the same treatment. After the mother continued to allege that he was not addressing the child’s health, he also went to the family doctor, and it was determined that no further treatment was needed. The father had informed the mother about the outcome, but the mother still alleged that the father was not being truthful, and that child was being neglected.

156McCarty J. found there was no merit to the motion, or urgent risk to the child, and denied the request for leave. In short, there had been three separate professionals involved, the symptoms receded, and H. went to school the next day. None of the evidence at this trial revealed anything materially different about the swollen eye incident.

K. The Mother’s 14B Motion Regarding Disclosure and Evidence dated January 20, 2026

157On January 20, 2026, the very next day, the mother brought yet another 14B Motion, this time for leave to file evidence briefs, consisting of “multiple indexed and paginated volumes of documentary records” into the court file and for “any subsequent appellate review”. In the body of her 14B Motion, she said she was “pursing interlocutory appeals arising from procedural deficiencies” and while the scope of any appeal record “is governed by appellate rules, ensuring that relevant materials are properly filed on the court record avoids disputes about provenance, timing and authenticity in later proceedings”.

158I did not see a ruling on this 14B Motion, but I dealt with the filing of trial material at the two Trial Management Conferences over which I presided on February 23, 2026 and March 12, 2026.

159This 14B Motion is notable to me. Although the mother had been simultaneously complaining that she did not have disclosure, yet she brought a 14B Motion back in January of 2026, to file “multiple indexed and paginated volumes of documentary records” into the record for no apparent reason. Incidentally, the mother’s trial material that she later saw fit to file for this trial, is contained in 7 different binders, consisting of thousands of pages of material, only a small portion of which she then tendered as exhibits.

L. The Trial Scheduling Conferences Held February 23, 2026 and March 12, 2026 and this Court’s Supplementary Endorsement of April 15, 2026

160I completed the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form with the parties on February 23, 2026. In a separate Endorsement of that date, I addressed various disclosure issues, the amendment of pleadings, various witness issues, how various evidentiary issues would be handled at the trial, and how the trial material should be filed. At the second Trial Scheduling Conference on March 12, 2026, I made further disclosure Orders. The mother raised again, a complaint about redactions in the Society’s disclosure, that counsel for the Society said had already been resolved. Although McCarty J. dealt with a process to resolve a similar complaint before, I directed that the mother should be resolving this issue with the Society in advance of the trial, failing which she could point the Court to a problematic redaction during it.

161While police records were later produced to the parties directly pursuant to my February 23, 2026 Order, the Belleville Police Service separately delivered to the Court an envelope containing four pages of records involving criminal charges against a health care professional. I informed the parties of this in a supplementary Endorsement of April 15, 2026. I did not order their release pending submissions.

162I invited submissions about these records at the trial. I declined to order their release to the parties. These records are likely subject to the WAGG Screening process, that had not been followed, and had questionable relevance to the issues at this trial anyway. The Belleville Police delivered these records to the Court according to an improper procedure. The four pages of records shall remain in the Court file, but shall be sealed and shall not be accessible to any of the parties or counsel, subject to further Order, such as by an appellate court if there is an appeal of that particular ruling, for some reason.

163My supplementary Endorsement of April 15, 2026 disposed of another 14B Motion dated March 31, 2026, again brought by the mother, this time seeking leave to bring yet another motion about disclosure, with the mother now complaining about what Dr. Rowe had been provided at the time of the section 105 mental health assessment. The mother’s 14B Motion states that Dr. Rowe had been provided certain disclosure by the Society on January 9 and 24, 2025, while equivalent disclosure was not provided to her counsel until nine days before the February 14, 2025 hearing (i.e. the temporary care and custody hearing before McCarty J.). She further says that what was provided to Dr. Rowe differs by about 47 pages, raising a concern that Dr. Rowe’s opinion may have been formed on a different evidentiary record than what was before the Court, and that this discrepancy could not have been raised earlier as she only discovered it upon “receipt and review of the March 31, 2026 disclosure”.

164Although this appeared to be a different disclosure complaint from those that both McCarty J. and I had been told about before, in the April 15, 2026 Endorsement I reconfirmed that I had already indicated that the mother could raise whatever her disclosure complaints are, at trial. The mother did not then at trial, specifically point to the alleged “47 pages of discrepancies” in the disclosure, explain what exactly the problem was, and explain why whatever was in these alleged “47 pages of discrepancies” was significant.

M. Tellier J.’s March 26, 2026 Ruling About the Mother’s Access

165Tellier J. released her ruling about the mother’s access on March 26, 2026, a little less than a month before this trial started. Applying Sherr J.’s decision in Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 784, Tellier J. expanded the mother’s access somewhat, to allow for supervised community visits. She did this, to give the Society an opportunity to assess, prior to trial, the mother’s current ability to meet the children’s needs in a setting outside the Society’s offices, and to give the OCL an opportunity to take views and preferences after those community visits.

166Tellier J. ordered a monthly community visit which could be partially supervised by the maternal grandmother. But Tellier J. also ordered a check-in by the Society before and after the visits, with a society worker also supervising during a portion of the supervised community visit, first. She ordered the mother to refrain from discussing adult matters with the children, and to refrain from making negative comments about the fathers or blaming their current situation on others, during these visits.

167By the time of the trial, only one of these differently supervised community visits had occurred. While the visit itself went fine, the mother engaged in conflict before and after the community visit. She threatened H.’s paternal grandparents with trespass.

168On May 20, 2026, the mother brought another 14B Motion regarding a post-trial community visit that occurred. I dispose of that particular 14B Motion below, in the section of this Judgment that addresses the mother’s access (Part VIII, F. of the Judgment).

PART IV: CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY

169At ¶ 36 of Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283, the Court wrote that there are many tools for assessing credibility, namely:

(a) the ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’s evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and the testimony of other witnesses;

(b) the ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness’ testimony;

(c) the ability to assess whether the witness’ testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”, but in doing so the Court is not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behavior;

(d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanor of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution (R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 ¶ 70-75); and

(e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence (R. v. J.H., 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA) ¶ 51-56).

170At ¶ 41 of R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, Watt J.A. wrote:

Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness’ veracity, reliability with the accuracy of the witness’ testimony. Accuracy engages consideration of the witness’ ability to accurately observe, recall and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue is not credible cannot give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility on the other hand, is not a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence.

171I will address credibility and reliability as needed, as I analyze the various issues in this case throughout this Judgment. But by way of overview here, I will say that I found the Society workers to be credible and their evidence reliable. Although H.’s father was involved in a lot of the conflict with the mother, including by making numerous calls to the police and the Society post-separation, he was also a credible witness. He explained and acknowledged his role in the past conflict, and I accept his evidence that he was calling the police and the Society so much, trying to get help, to get the conflict to stop.

172I found H.’s father’s partner, and his parents to be credible, and their evidence was reliable. That said, H.’s paternal grandparents gave differing evidence about the frequency of their visits to the mother’s and H.’s fathers’ homes. H.’s paternal grandfather had less observation than his grandmother did, about certain matters such as the conflict in the household between the mother and H.’s father, but he readily acknowledged that there were things that he did not witness.

173R. and F. were powerful witnesses, for the reasons already expressed. I do not accept that they had chronic substance misuse problems, that they reported the mother to the Society after the removal out of malice, or that F. was manipulative as the maternal grandmother accused her of being.

174T.’s father was mostly credible, with the exception of two inconsistencies in his evidence about his prior use of physical discipline, and he omitted some information about some childhood issues that he needs to deal with. It was his partner who later identified clearly what I now understand the issue to be.

175But as the Court also wrote at ¶ 37 of Re Novak Estate, “[t]here is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’ testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’ evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’ evidence. (see R. v. D.R., 1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996 2 SCR 291 at ¶ 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).” For the reasons that follow later, I am generally satisfied that T.’s father has a good plan for T.’s care, and any deficits can be addressed by further programming, in which he is prepared to engage. The Society is prepared to monitor that until it gets set up.

176Both T.’s paternal grandmother and T.’s father’s partner were credible, and their evidence reliable. I found particularly helpful T.’s paternal grandmother’s evidence about all the assistance she is providing to support T.’s father’s plan, including abandoning plans to relocate to Victoria, BC, to stay in Ontario, to help out. T.’s paternal grandmother’s, and T.’s partner’s evidence goes some distance to reduce the two concerns that the Court had about T.’s father.

177The professional witnesses (doctors, teachers, the mother’s academic advisor) who testified about the mother’s and the children’s health, about the children’s education, and about the mother’s academic career, were also credible. There were some issues with certain witnesses’ recall of events as a result of the passage of time and the fact that they had brief, issue specific involvements. But in those instances, they relied on the contents of their contemporaneously made notes and reports to support the evidence that they were prepared to offer. None of the health care professionals strayed from the scope of their involvement or expertise to opine on other matters, or when they did not have independent recollection of events. For example, each of Dr. McArthur, the psychiatrist the mother went to in April 2025 seeking another diagnosis after being dissatisfied with the results of the court ordered assessment, and some of the mother’s therapists, were appropriately reluctant to offer additional opinions, beyond what was in their records or beyond their interactions with the mother.

178Even though Kim Salvador, the mother’s current therapist, could offer opinion as the mother’s treating therapist within the parameters of what a participant expert/ therapy witness might say, she was very cautious at the outset of her testimony, to make it clear that she thought she had been called to testify by the mother as a fact witness only. Several times she said she felt uncomfortable answering some of the broader questions that had been put to her.

179Dr. Lezhanska was credible, but she could not recall the September 9, 2024 call that she had with Ms. Johnson initially, as it was not recorded in H.’s hospital chart. Dr. Lezhanska was a diligent witness. After she testified and was cross-examined about that call, she became concerned that she might have missed something, since she could not remember the call that had clearly happened on September 9, 2024, that she had been just asked to testify about. So after testifying she searched her records, found a missing note of the call and contacted counsel to correct her evidence. She was then recalled to testify.

180The contents of Dr. Lezhanska’s note of the September 9, 2024 call with Ms. Johnson aligned closely with Ms. Johnson’s own contemporaneous note of it. This bolstered the reliability of that important evidence, and is discussed in more detail below.

181The mother and her lay witnesses were another matter.

182The mother was incredible on countless occasions throughout this trial. In addition to the fact that she admitted to lying to the Court about a mid-trial social media post that she made in violation of McCarty J.’s June 5, 2025 Consent Order (discussed elsewhere in this Judgment), she and her witnesses told a number of stories that are not supported by objective documentary evidence, and the weight of the other testimony I heard. It often appeared as if the mother was making up stories on the spot, to respond to questions put to her in cross-examination.

183The mother is denying her current and most accurate mental health diagnosis, as well as insisting that H. has autism, which he does not. The mother advanced a theory, that her mental health was the cause of her past problematic behaviour, but once she got put a proper diagnosis for ADHD, once she was put on Vyvanse (in around February of 2023), and once she availed herself of therapy, things improved. When presented with an abundance of conflicting information that undermined her theory, the story changed multiple times. She made claims that her medication was mismanaged, and that things actually got better later, when her dose increased. She claimed that she started going to the gym in the early morning hours to compensate for being unable to take medication in the morning (which if true, meant she left the young children home alone unmonitored to do so). She claimed that she lacks social cues on account of the fact that she thinks she has autism too, with which she has never been diagnosed.

184Another of the mother’s explanations when not wanting to answers questions put to her in cross-examination, was that she had “memory recall issues”, a circumstance that her friend M.W. also said she was suffering from, as a biproduct of her own mental health. If this is even true, this calls the reliability of their evidence into question.[14]

185The mother coached H. to make a false allegation of sexual abuse. This was irresponsible, harmful to the child, harmful to the child’s relationship with the father, and indeed dangerous.

186The mother otherwise offered up a number of other excuses and justifications for various problematic behaviours in which she has engaged over the years, some of which she doubled down on during the trial. In so doing she showed a significant lack of insight into her own health, and her behaviours.

187The mother’s witnesses acted as partisan cheerleaders for her. They mostly adopted her positions and views, uncritically. M.W. and the maternal grandmother showed poor judgment when refusing to acknowledge their own past actions were problematic.

188For example, M.W. testified that the Society was rude to the maternal family, and misinterpreted the mother; a position the mother has taken.

189M.W. admitted that the mother had given her access to the AppClose account that the mother uses to communicate with H.’s father, and she admitted to having sent H.’s father messages, while pretending to be the mother. She minimized the significance of this, and claimed that the content of any messages sent on the mother’s behalf was not substantive.

190M.W. tried to give opinions about autism based on her own supposed knowledge of autism in response to questions from the mother, to support the mother’s argument that H. has autism.

191M.W. avoided answering questions about the lawsuits and complaints in which she has participated with the mother, claiming that she had “memory recall” issues.

192I was frankly concerned that the mother and M.W. colluded respecting the evidence that M.W. gave. It was not just the “memory recall” claim that was eerily similar (i.e. identical language used). M.W. told the same incredible falsehood to the Court about the mid-trial video that the mother had made and posted online. She also admitted to having been present when the mother made the video, and she laughed about it, in the background, in the video.

193The maternal grandmother was an incredible witness. She made contradictory and sometimes exaggerated statements. For example, the maternal grandmother spoke positively about her own upbringing during examination-in-chief, even though the mother had already testified that her grandmother was violent and abusive.

194Each of the mother, M.W. and the grandmother claimed that the children were shielded for significant family conflict in the home. The maternal grandmother used the word “never” when explaining that the children had not been exposed. She even said that she had “never” spoken negatively about the fathers at all when cross-examined (in an attempt to suggest that the children were not exposed to that kind of talk in the household). Yet earlier she had already attacked H.’s father during her testimony, and called F. a manipulator and a liar. As Ms. Smith-McGurk later submitted, the maternal grandmother had nothing positive to say about H.’s father.

195The maternal grandmother criticized gifts that T.’s paternal grandmother had sent, suggesting that they were culturally inappropriate, as indicated earlier.

196The maternal grandmother is so headstrong about what she thinks happened with R. and F., she even refuses to maintain a relationship with her own son now, the result of which is she has not been introduced to her new grandchild.

197It is doubtful that her views had “never” been stated in the household within the children’s earshot before.

198The maternal grandmother said the mother had “never” hit the children before the incident captured on the Ring Camera videos, even though the mother had already admitted otherwise.

199The maternal grandmother adopted the same theory of the mother’s, to excuse both the mother’s and indeed her own prior bad behaviour. Just like the mother, the grandmother now has an ADHD diagnosis. Hers came in 2025 apparently, but with proper medication, she too has been able to have a less conflictual relationship with her daughter, with the two now knowing how to communicate better, so she said.

200The maternal grandmother claimed to have been unaware of T.’s absences from school and his lateness, despite having earlier claimed to have had daily involvement in the children’s lives.

201Finally, during the trial, I indicated it would be helpful to have some evidence about what resources might be available, including private services, such as for access. In response to that, the mother chose to elicit evidence from the maternal grandmother, about the family’s tight resources (i.e. that there is little to no money available for private services, like private supervision or even for drives to Guelph), rather than focusing on solutions. When testifying about that, the grandmother focused on the trip with F.’s parents yet again, that I had already heard about several times. The failure to come forward with a solution, contributed to the limited remedial options that now exist.

202B.S. is a friend of the maternal grandparents, who the mother also called to testify. She presented as a very partisan witness, and indeed she was an unquestioning advocate for the mother. B.S. overstated the extent to which things were positive when the children were in the mother’s care, and she minimized the problems that she was aware of, going on in that household. In so doing, she said things such as:

(a) not every family has to have a “kumbaya” atmosphere, and that a family environment can still be “loving and nurturing” even if there is tough love;

(b) that a child observing a parent throw an item at another adult in the household isn’t necessarily traumatic, and it “depends on the child”;

(c) that these children wouldn’t have understood any talk of the mother’s threats of suicide, given their ages at the time when these things were said;

(d) that she is “old school” and she does not have a problem with a parent giving a child a “spank on the butt once”; and

(e) that while she doesn’t approve of yelling and swearing, parents do that, and “if a parent says they don’t do that, they are lying”.

203B.S.’ evidence was not even probative. It was exposed in cross-examination, that B.S. had not observed much directly. It seems she even had misinformation about the mother’s mental health (she thought the mother had ADHD and autism), on which a number of her opinions that there had been positive improvements had depended.

204B.S. claimed that she thought the grandparents would be willing to assist the mother with financial assistance for transit, and to pay for therapy. But then in re-examination, the mother once again elicited evidence of financial strain. B.S. re-iterated the family mantra, that the grandparents had not been paid back for the aforementioned trip taken with F.’s family, the implication being there is no more money to provide.

205Finally, the mother (and some of her witnesses like the grandmother and B.S.) made significant allegations about other witnesses, including certain Society witnesses and R. and F., without having confronted those witnesses with their allegations earlier in the trial. Those other witnesses were not given an opportunity to respond. This too undermines credibility.

PART V: PRELIMINARY ISSUES

A. The Mother’s Constitutional Challenge

206The mother served a NCQ dated October 6, 2025 on the parties, and to the Attorneys General for Ontario and Canada. I was told that the Attorneys General declined to participate in this case.

207The mother’s NCQ states that the mother intends to “question the constitutional validity and applicability” of sections 74 and 87, and Part X (the privacy and disclosure limits) of the CYFSA, as well as the Ontario Child Protection Standards, pursuant to sections 2(b), 7, and 15(1) of the Charter, and upon establishing these constitutional violations, she intends to seek a remedy under section 24(1).

208The mother’s NCQ says she wants any “fabricated and unverified evidence” to be excluded, and there should be full and equal disclosure orders, psychiatric evaluations of both fathers, the restoration of meaningful access for the mother, the grandparents and M.W., a direction that the OCL conduct an independent investigation, and any further relief necessary to ensure compliance with the Charter and the Child Protection Standards. None of which requires the Charter to achieve, incidentally.

209Whether the mother was actually pursuing these constitutional questions has been a moving target since the mother first launched her NCQ. On the first day of trial, the mother informed the Court that she had filed this NCQ in the past, but it had not been adjudicated. What actually happened is that she had been given leave to bring her access motion by McCarty J., but instead of just brining that motion for increased access, the mother proceeded to create this NCQ and she added plethora of other relief in her Notice of Motion for that matter, too.

210The mother then withdrew her NCQ on March 16, 2026. When the Society brought that to my attention on the first day of trial, the mother said that she tried to file the Notice of Withdrawal, but the Court rejected it, so therefore she wanted to proceed with it, as no judge has adjudicated it.

211I allowed the Notice of Withdrawal to be filed so that it would form part of the trial record. It states that the mother withdrew the constitutional questions as against the main parties to this case, but not as against the Attorneys General.

212At the same time, I also took the NCQ sand marked it as an Exhibit. [15] This put the Society in the position of having to call some evidence, in particular about the mother’s disclosure complaint.

213Although she called some evidence that had some relevance to these various claims, nothing specific was elucidated during the mother’s examination-in-chief, when I specifically asked whether she wanted to testify about any of the matters raised in the NCQ in particular. During closing submissions, the mother was inconsistent again, at one point saying she was not pursuing the NCQ, but I was clear with her, that it was now or never. She then made arguments.

214For the reasons that follow, the mother’s constitutional claim is devoid of merit and was a nuisance. Like many of her other lawsuits and regulatory complaints, the mother launched the NCQ in a cavalier fashion without a proper understanding of what the Charter rights she asserted, provided. The mother’s constitutional question is not going to sit in limbo any longer, to be re-raised at some point in the future, as another tool or piece of litigation, yet still related to this case that is now over. [16] I intend to dispose of it and bring to an end, these various constitutional challenges that she has been launching.

B. The Mother’s Complaint that Her Freedom of Expression Has Been Infringed

(1) The Mother’s Position

215When the mother was asked on the first day of the trial, what exactly she was asking the Court to determine was unconstitutional using section 2(b) of the Charter, I learned that the mother’s reference to section 87 of the CYFSA in her NCQ, was in fact intended to be a reference to section 87(8). That provision reads:

No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

216 Section 24(1) of the Charter does allow a person whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by the Charter, have been infringed or denied to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a remedy that is appropriate and just in the circumstances. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that Canada’s Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. But what theoretical constitutional remedy the mother wanted for a section 2(b) violation, the Court was never told. There is no remedy to which the mother is actually entitled.

217On the first day of this trial, the mother said that she was not actually asking the Court to declare section 87(8) of the CYFSA invalid (nor any other section of the CYFSA for that matter); rather she was asking the Court to find on the evidence, that she did not violate section 87(8), and that the Society had misinterpreted her actions in this regard. That did not require a constitutional challenge or a remedy. What the mother said she wanted, was a finding of fact. To decide if she is entitled to that is a simple exercise of applying the statutory provision to the evidence.

218That said, the mother was also subject to the Consent Order of McCarty J. dated June 5, 2025. McCarty J.’s Order is broader in scope than section 87(8) of the CYFSA. It prohibits the mother from posting on the internet about this case and related matters to protect the children, not just information identifying a connection to this child welfare proceeding.

219I repeat verbatim, the terms of McCarty J.’s non-publication Order of June 5, 2025, found at ¶ 1 of that Order. Paragraph 1 reads:

[The mother] shall remove all social media posts (including but limited to[17] comments, photos videos, and other social media) pertaining to this matter from her social media accounts and shall not make any further social media posts about this case and the associated Human Rights Tribunal Cases, Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society employees, or other caregivers. [The mother] shall instruct any of her social media followers/subscribers to delete any social media posts that were made about this case and the associated Human Rights Tribunal Cases, Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society employees, or the other caregivers.

220This Order was in effect throughout this trial; no appellate court has set aside or varied this Order; the mother was bound by it. And she violated the Order mid-trial, as I explain.

221Because I made a mid-trial temporary without prejudice Order compelling the mother to remove what she posted mid-trial in violation of the June 5, 2025 Order, and because I also intend to make an Order at the end of this trial that limits the mother’s internet activity to protect these children, I am prepared to provide some further analysis that addresses this Court’s jurisdiction to have made the mid-trial Order and its jurisdiction to make an end of trial Final Order about the mother’s internet activity, which analysis includes Charter values. Although unnecessary, in so doing, my analysis will also explain McCarty J.’s jurisdiction to have made that June 5, 2025 Consent Order in the first place, too.

222The bottom line here is that the mother’s section 2(b) right to freedom of thought, opinion and expression has not been infringed in an unconstitutional way, as a result of this Court’s Orders, either.

(2) Applicable Legal Principles

223Section 2(b) of the Chater reads:

Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other medica of communication.

224The Supreme Court in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 confirmed that the open court principle is constitutionally guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter: see ¶ 1 and 30. There is a strong presumption in favour of the open court principle: see ¶ 2. A valid legislative enactment can operate as a limit to the open Court principle: see ¶ 38. Discretionary orders that limit publication are not subject to a lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be: see ¶ 39.

225Despite the strong presumption in favour of the open court principle, courts can still also make discretionary orders that impose limits on the principle (or that restrict expression), such as a ban on publication: see ¶ 3. Exceptional circumstances may arise where competing interests justify a restriction to the open court principle, or limits on expression. At ¶ 37-38 of Sherman Estate v. Donovan, the Supreme Court set out the test to order a discretionary publication ban. Such an order may be made where openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest, where necessary to prevent the serious risk because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and as a matter of proportionality, where the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

226But in some sense, McCarty J.’s Order and my mid-trial Order are not just about court openness per se. Although unquestionably related to this litigation and a limit on openness, they are broader, in the sense that they additionally prevent the mother from posting about various persons who have or will be involved in the children’s lives, and they require her to do an act; i.e. remove offensive postings. While they do place limits on the mother’s expression, they do so because of a concern of harm to children.

227I recognize this is a child protection where the Charter is engaged, unlike private parenting litigation between two parents. Even in the “private litigation” context though, in her majority decision in Young v. Young, 1993 CanLii 34 (S.C.C.), McLachlin J. assumed, without finding it necessary to decide, that the Charter could apply to access provisions, when an Order made touched upon a Charter right. But she went on to find that the rights being asserted in that case (religious expression, and related freedom of expression, with religious expression dominating the analysis) were not protected by the Charter, because the manner in which the right was proposed to be exercised was not in the best interests of the child, as it posed a risk of harm to the child. In separate reasons, Sopinka J. agreed with McLachlin J. in the result, but found that Charter values could play a role to review discretionary orders made by a judge, pursuant to general best interests’ language in a statute.

228In dissent but concurring in the result, L’Heureux-Dube J. held that an order restricting a parent’s access to his children did not infringe his section 2(a) and (b) Charter rights at all, because constitutional questions did not even arise. She found that the broad judicial discretion in the application of the statutory best interests test in the Divorce Act was insufficient to attract the application of the Charter; rather it was crucial to the proper implementation of the test. She concluded that the dispute between the parties was private in nature, although she said in obiter that Charter values remain an important consideration in judicial decision-making. In so doing, she recognized the competing interests at stake, writing “it is obviously inadequate to merely invoke freedom of religion or expression of an access parent without considering the effect on children and their inability to assert their own desires and rights.”

229Young v. Young concerned whether a particular access Order violated the Charter. Even more squarely on point, there are many decisions in which Courts have made conduct Orders regulating parents’ internet behaviour, both in child protection litigation and in private parenting proceedings. At ¶ 151-161 of B.M. v. J.G., 2025 ONCJ 72, Kapurura J. reviewed various statutory authorities, and several cases about this.

230Kapurura J. found courts have jurisdiction not only to prohibit internet activity, but to order the removal of offensive internet material incidental to section 87(8), where a breach of the section is found. This Court itself has made such an Order before: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.T.L. v. S.S., 2019 ONCJ 530.

231But even where there hasn’t been a breach of section 87(8) of the CYFSA, there are a number of other statutory provisions that allow courts to make conduct orders governing a parent’s internet behaviour where children’s interests are at stake. In child protection proceedings, each of sections 94(6) and (8), 101 and 102, and 104 of the CYFSA, empower courts to impose terms and conditions on caregivers and access parents at both the temporary and final stages of child protection proceedings. When making a final custody Order under section 102 of the CYFSA (which I am making at the end of this trial), a court may impose any terms that the Court could make pursuant to section 28 of the CLRA, as if this was a non-child protection parenting proceeding under the CLRA: see section 102(2) of the CYFSA. One of the sources of jurisdiction that Sherr J. cited at ¶ 14 of Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.E., 2023 ONCJ 156 to order the removal of offensive internet material, is section 28(1)(c) of the CLRA. So in a case where a section 102 order is made, the Court may rely on section 28(1)(c) of the CLRA specifically, to do so.

232To this I would add that the Court may, when making a Restraining Order under section 35 of the CLRA, impose terms respecting a parent’s internet behaviour: see section 35(2)(4.) of the CLRA. And section 102(3) of the CYFSA allows a court to make a section 35 CLRA Restraining Order in a child protection proceeding when making a custody Order under section 102, even without a separate application for that Restraining Order under the CLRA.

233It also bears repeating that this Court’s April 23, 2026 mid-trial temporary without prejudice Order compelling the mother to remove her mid-trial posting, flows from its ability to enforce the Order of McCarty J. dated June 5, 2025 itself. There is power in rule 1(8) to do so: see Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709 ¶ 49-52; see C. v. C., 2026 ONSC 2217 ¶ 37-39; see also Marchewka v. Diluciano, 2025 ONSC 7007.

234Resort to those statutory provisions and rules is not likely even necessary. At ¶ 14 of Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.E., Sherr J. wrote that courts are starting to react more forcefully to inappropriate social media postings in family and child protection cases. He found that the jurisdiction to order the removal of a parent’s offensive postings, includes the Court’s right to control its own process.

235Sherr J. cited Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. E.L., 2022 ONSC 4508, in which Krause J. ordered the mother to remove postings about child protection workers. Based on my review of Krause J.’s decision, not all of the mother’s posts in that case contained identifying information.[18] Regardless, a prohibition against publishing broader kinds of information related to the case had been ordered earlier. Krause J. incarcerated the mother for three days, as punishment for her contemptuous behaviour.

236In the result, I accept that an Order prohibiting the mother from posting on the internet engages her right to freedom of expression. I also find that courts can make Orders regulating a parent’s internet activity, when the competing considerations are balanced properly. Even if the mid-trial Order I made, or the Order I intend to make at the end of this trial goes beyond merely placing a limit on court openness, the test in Sherman Estate v. Donovan still provides a neat framework to balance the competing considerations, and to take the applicable Charter values into account.

237With these principles in mind, I turn now to how the mother has behaved online.

238The mother has been very active, and inappropriate, on social media. The evidence at trial was that she has used social media immaturely and inappropriately during her relationship with H.’s father in particular, after the separation, and throughout the lifespan of the pending litigation.

239For example, H.’s father described being the recipient of numerous belligerent written communications from the mother, prior to and after the separation. He testified that during the relationship, if the mother had a grievance, she would post about it on social media. This he said happened at least weekly. Another form of the coercive behaviour that he felt was directed at him, included her threatening self-harm to him (and others), which is something she also did on social media.

240Examples of the mother’s pre-trial social media behaviour include:

(a) H.’s father pointed me to a Facebook post that the mother put online on August 19, 2021 (referable to the windshield incident), in which she wrote “I just don’t want to breathe anymore I really don’t”;

(b) H.’s father testified that after he was acquitted at the criminal trial before Bonn J., the mother posted online that he was “her abuser”, a “predator”, and a “child abuser”. He said she called him “cummy” and [term omitted], a use of sexualized language that was a play on his last name. She also posted other sexual innuendos. H.’s father testified that the mother posted medical information about him online too, which he did not wish to repeat in court, embarrassed by its personal and sensitive nature;

(c) H.’s father tendered a number of the mother’s other social media posts that he found. These posts include the mother publicly accusing the father of having sexually assaulted her. He explained that in one message, she referred to him as having a narcissistic personality, and she called him a manipulator;

(d) The mother made the post about F. and her family, and the trip, referring to them as “scammers” and referring to F.’s “beautiful $3,000 + ring that was never paid for and will be reported stolen to the police”;

(e) The Society introduced the mother’s Tic Tok video chat referenced above, respecting the shower incident; and

(f) H.’s father told Ms. Johnson on October 30, 2024, that the mother had posted about his partner and her co-workers online, in addition to having submitted complaints to the College of Registered Psychotherapists about her (H.’s partner is a registered psychotherapist).

241Others have taken issue with the mother’s social media posts as well, not just the Society and H.’s father. I heard some evidence about some conflict between the mother and a person named D. The mother claimed that D. is a past board member of an apparent charitable foundation that she is running, but that D. had been fired for “breaching confidentiality”, whatever that means. The mother launched a complaint about D. to the Human Rights Tribunal. The mother claimed that she was not the instigator of conflict, yet the Society established that the mother had also posted about this D. person online. The mother was then charged with harassment for her actions. Those charges resolved by way of a peace bond, that is still in force until June of this year. The peace bond contains a term that prohibits the mother from posting online about D.

242Related to this, someone named “Megan” called the mother in 2025, and left an irate voicemail. The mother saw fit to take the voicemail and impose it into a video, showing different AI generated females twirling around in circles, in fields. The mother posted this video/voicemail recording online, on her Facebook Page.

243On this video/voicemail recording, this “Megan” person can be heard yelling, screaming and swearing. “Megan” warns the mother that she knows where she and her family live, and threatens her that she had better take a post down about this “D” person, or else.

244The mother’s response to this when questioned about it, was that she had also posted about either “Megan’s” or “D.’s” partner’s alcoholism and cocaine use (I am not clear which one had the partner with the addiction), and this “Megan” person did not want the mother to “air dirty laundry”. The mother went on to call “Megan” a “crack cocaine addict”.

245When counsel for the Society accused the mother of having inserted herself, to disseminate private and identifying information about these other people in an irresponsible and frankly dangerous way, the mother claimed again, that she was being assessed for autism due to a “lack of social cues”, and reverted to her often given explanation, that she is now in therapy and has learned that she did things in the past that she shouldn’t have done, before treatment. Yet although the mother agreed that her posting led to the receipt of the voicemail, which contained threats towards her and the children, she also justified her actions saying she was not going to “cower” when someone was threatening her, so yes, she was going to make it public because “people shouldn’t be acting like that in public”. She would not acknowledge that any of her original actions that triggered this, were antagonizing or intimidating.

246The mother’s problematic social media behaviour continued throughout the time that this child protection case has been underway. Below, I address the litany of lawsuits and other complaints that the mother has launched, some of which the mother also posted about online. The mother admitted to having posted online a copy of a Human Rights Tribunal application with certain persons’ names identified. She claimed to have then taken that down after McCarty J.’s June 5, 2025 Order, as she had been ordered to do.

247The mother admitted to having posted online a complaint that the Society was minimizing her feelings of unsafety. She admitted to having posted the names of Society workers online. She accused them via her online post of having a motive to lie, but she said she removed those posts too, after the June 5, 2025 Order.

248Ms. Johnson said that the mother found out the name of her child somehow, and posted that online, on a forum that had 10,000 followers. When cross-examined by the Society, the mother admitted to having complained about Tellier J. on social media.

249The mother admitted to “probably” having posted a statement on Facebook, that the Society had taken the children and placed them with abusers. She did this shortly after the removal. That particular post would have been a violation of section 87(8) of the CYFSA, since it identified the subjects of a child protection proceeding. When she was confronted about an earlier denial that she had posted identifying information, the mother claimed to have “memory recall” issues as a result of her ADHD, once again.

250The mother’s problematic social media behaviour continued during the trial. Psychologist Dr. Rowe testified during this trial on April 22, 2026. F. began testifying during the afternoon of April 22, 2026, and her testimony continued during the morning of April 23, 2026. I heard evidence from F. on April 23, that the mother has referred to her in the past as “Salt Shaker”. F. testified that the mother had made that reference in two other social media posts. Apparently this “Salt Shaker” person, is a “drag queen” on social media.

251On the morning of April 23, 2026, the Society brought to the Court’s attention that the mother had made another social media post (a video) the night before, that Ms. Brooks had found. On the evening of April 22, 2026, the mother posted a video on Facebook following Dr. Rowe’s testimony the day before, and while still in the middle of F.’s testimony. Her video contains a threat of criminal proceedings.

252In this video, the mother talks about “transcripts” from court proceedings and about “hav[ing] you criminally charged”. She says “You are so wrong, so wrong”. She specifically says she is not using “identifying information”, but she is talking about a “certain psychologist”. She also talks about another individual who could “definitely not be Saltina Salt Shaker”. She says that person could not be “Saltina Salt Shaker” because “Saltina Salt Shaker is skinny” and doesn’t have “kankles” or a “double” (she then gestures towards her chin, as if to reference a “double chin”). She says, “doesn’t say any identifying names, for the record, but you know who you are”. She concludes by saying “Once this party is all said and done, good luck”.

253It was fairly clear that the mother was making reference to what had gone on in court the prior day, including now threatening criminal proceedings as a consequence of testifying against her (for what, I do not know). When asked squarely by the Court about this on April 23, 2026, the mother offered up a ridiculous explanation, that her post was not about this case. Rather, the mother claimed that she is acting as a “Mackenzie friend” (a “Mackenzie friend” seems to be reference to an American legal term, but the mother said it meant she is assisting several others in other court proceedings), and she submitted that she “could have” been talking about those cases. She also claimed that F. “could not” be the “Salt Shaker”, because in her video she had talked about an alleged other person with fat “kankles”, yet F. did not have “kankles”.

254I invited submissions on April 23, 2026, about whether the Court should order the immediate removal of this video. Because the mother had not yet testified nor had she been cross-examined about the video, I made a temporary without prejudice Order for its removal, pending that testimony and further submissions at the end of the trial.

255During those initial submissions on April 23, 2026, the mother claimed that the video had already been removed. I directed the Society to verify that the video had in fact been taken down overnight, and to confirm it with the Court on April 24, 2026.

256The following morning, the Society advised the Court that it had been blocked from access to the webpage on which it had found this post in the first place. The mother responded by first complaining that the Society had not reached out to her to coordinate its access to the video. The Court directed the mother to immediately unblock the Society then and there. The mother refused to do so, claiming it was “physically impossible” for her to do so, as she had so many “blocked” followers that she would have to sift through (whatever that is supposed to mean), in order to find Ms. Wylde and unblock her.

257When the mother later testified in this case, she continued to maintain that stance about the “physical impossibility” of unblocking the Society.[19] If true, which I seriously doubt, this highlights the dangers of making irresponsible posts on the internet in the first place, the control over which may be lost once something is put out into the world.

258During her testimony, the mother made a number of other claims about her internet behaviour, namely:

(a) She claimed that although McCarty J. made the June 5, 2025 Order, she had not made any findings against her (this is true; the Order was a consent Order – but it is also beside the point);

(b) She claimed she did not understand the scope of what had been ordered (I addressed that one earlier; she had counsel at the time);

(c) Like she said about the voicemail/video about “Megan”, she was strident. She said that she tries not to post, but she also has a right to her “opinion and freedom of expression” and there are “situations that are not really talked about in public”;

(d) She went on to tell the Court about her involvement with Vernon Beck, and the research and submissions to the government that she has apparently participated with him in making;[20]

(e) She admitted that she was referring to F. when she made reference to “Saltina Salt Shaker”, directly contrary to what she had said during submissions on April 23, 2026; but

(f) She still maintained that the psychologist she had referred to in her posted video was not Dr. Rowe, but rather one of two other psychologists involved in some other case that she is allegedly involved in; yet

(g) She was unable to advise of the name of the other psychologist, referring to him only as Dr. B. She didn’t have the court file number. She said that she would have to ask other people on the “Board of Directors” of the foundation that she is apparently involved with, to get that information.

259The mother admitted that she had “fabricated the truth” and “lied” to the Court during submissions on April 23, 2026, with reference to her claim that the video was not about F. The Society also established that during a court break on April 23, 2026, the mother even went on the internet and made another post about “Salt Shakers”, referring to exotic dancers, in some kind of attempt to create evidence of other posts, to lend credibility to her earlier story that the video could have been about them, rather then about F.

260When M.W. later testified, she claimed that the mother used the term “salt shaker” frequently as if to help keep this rouse going, even though by this point the mother had already admitted the video was about F., and even though M.W. would later say in cross-examination, that she assumed the video was about F. She admitted that she was in the car with the mother, when the mother made her video.

261M.W. tried to distance herself from what she clearly knew had occurred. She too then claimed that she is a “Mackenzie Friend” and the psychologist was someone else, but she too was unable to supply the details, other than saying his name was Dr. B. The Society asked for an order that M.W. search her records and supply a court file number. After a break M.W. could not do so, because she said the case was a “protected case matter”. She went on to make up a further tale about how this apparent foundation that the two are running, will be having some kind of “board meeting” about this other case, to address the internet posting, just as the mother had earlier talked about the “Board of Directors”.

262There are important public interests at stake here. It bears repeating that this is a child protection proceeding. Child protection cases are amongst the most serious and important cases dealt with by Family Courts in the Superior Court, and in the Ontario Court of Justice, in the parts of the province that do not have a unified family court. Child protection cases are held in the absence of the public to begin for good reason; the protection of children. One of the statutory tools that exists to maintain the privacy of these proceedings, is section 87(8) of the CYFSA. But it is not the only tool, as indicated, and that does not mean that parents should have carte blanche to post whatever they want while skating around and coming dangerously close to the prohibition against making public identifying information, in section 87(8).

263It is well established that the protection of children is an important public interest worthy of protection. In A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, 1982 CanLii 14 (S.C.C.), at pages 186 and 187, the Supreme Court wrote that the protection of the innocent is a “social value of superordinate importance”.

264It is well established that the publication of private or sensitive information about a child is harmful. Although Abella J. was writing about the non-publication provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, it is well known that publication can make children more vulnerable to greater psychological and social stress: see R. v. S.B., 2008 SCC 25 ¶ 87; see also Kirby v. Woods, 2025 ONCA 437, which addresses the importance of protecting children’s privacy rights.

265It is well-established that protecting the integrity of a trial is an important public interest, worthy of protection: see Sherman Estate v. Donovan ¶ 41. There was a witness exclusion order in effect in this case when the mother made her post. While I accept that the mother didn’t discuss the contents of either Dr. Rowe’s or F.’s evidence per se, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that the mother has been threatening others, and actually taking legal and regulatory steps against others, including Dr. Rowe and F., for their involvement in this case at different points in time. In this regard, I agree with T.’s father’s counsel’s submission made on April 23, 2026, that other witnesses, who had yet to testify, should not face the prospect of intimidation, like by having threatening internet postings made about them, just for having participated in this trial.

266More broadly beyond just this case, this kind of behaviour needs to be sanctioned. Certain persons have a statutory duty to report protection issues, by virtue of section 125 of the CYFSA. Even those who are not subject to the statutory duty should still be encouraged to come forward in the interests of the protection of children. As it is, I heard evidence in this case that R. and F. were fearful of reprisal such that they only came forward after the removal. Inappropriate and threatening social media posts can create a chilling effect, which runs counter to the paramount purpose in section 1(1) of the CYFSA, to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. The Court is not prepared to simply turn a blind eye to this.

267The mother did not seem to recognize that this kind of behaviour can result in service providers declining service, a consequence that Tellier J. averred to in her November 6, 2024 ruling. She did not recognize the impact that some of these posts have had on H.’s father, and his partner. Not only were they distressing to him personally, both he and the Society have had to devote time to monitoring the mother’s social media activity, in H.’s interests, to ensure compliance. He alone will be left to do this after the case is over. This takes time away and distracts from where his focus should be: caring for H.

268In my view, orders for the non-publication about this case, about those involved in it, about the mother’s spin-off legal proceedings and complaints, and for the removal of offensive internet content, regardless of whether identifying information was used or not, are necessary to prevent serious risk to these identified interests.

269Reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risks. The mother cannot seem to control herself when it comes to her internet activity. She was already subject to McCarty J.’s June 5, 2025 Order, and she violated it. She demonstrated no insight whatsoever into what she has done, choosing instead to focus on her own right to have an opinion and express it. Her use of social media has been a tool in an arsenal of weapons that she has deployed, alongside her propensity to complain, threaten and sue others whom she feels have wronged her. While in cross-examination, the mother claimed that she has deleted a lot of her social media posts, I don’t know what “a lot means”. Even then, she clarified that she hadn’t gone back over “six years” to do so, implying that it was too much work to do. If that is true, then that is too bad. She will have to invest the time required to undo what she has done.

270The mother talked as if she was immune from consequences during this trial. During her testimony, the mother claimed that in June of 2025, an OPP officer came to her home, because Ms. Hawn had called the police on her, “insinuating” that she had discussed and put online the place of safety motion material. Although it was hearsay, inaccurate and a distraction from the real issue about whether the mother had breached section 87(8) or not, the mother claimed that the police officer told her that section 87(8) of the CYFSA was not police enforceable. In other words, what this supposed police officer said that to her (if that even happened), empowered her.

271There is no doubt in my mind, as a matter of proportionality, that the benefits of non-publication orders that I intend to make in this case, which go beyond the already legislated prohibition against publishing identifying information, outweigh their negative effects. There is very little social value to the mother’s posts that are offensive, demeaning, threatening, conflict laden, and which have even spurred on other community members to lash out at, and threaten her and the children. If the mother has legitimate complaints about a professional or an actual cause of action against someone who has had some involvement in this case, there is a proper outlet for that. Posting on the internet, is not it.

272In conclusion, I find that the mother breached section 87(8) of the CYFSA in the past, by posting identifying information online about the removal, after it occurred.

273I find the mother made other posts about the children’s other family members. This was harmful to the children, not in their best interests, and it contributes to the risk of emotional harm.

274I find that the mother made a post about this case mid-trial. Even without the use of identifying information, that was a breach of McCarty J.’s Order of June 5, 2025. I do not believe the mother’s original explanation that her post was not about this case. I find that she clearly went online and posted about both Dr. Rowe and about F., on the evening of April 22, 2026, and then she created more posts about “Salt Shakers” and exotic dancers on April 23, 2026, in some kind of attempt to create a diversion.

275Nor do I believe the mother, when she said that it was “physically impossible” to give the Society access to her Facebook page, unblocked, to allow the Society to double check that she removed her mid-trial post. I specifically told the mother in Court on April 24, 2026, to unblock Ms. Wylde, and she would not. As far as I am concerned, after having posted this video mid-trial which ought not have been done in the first place, the mother engaged in an act of blatant defiance, in the face of the Court on the morning of April 24, 2026. The mother put her mid-trial video online recklessly, and in a hurried fashion blocked the Society to protect herself.

276Having engaged in the balancing act that Sherman Estate v. Donovan requires, I find there is no violation of the mother’s section 2(b) right in such a fashion as to entitle her to a remedy. The Court intends to make a final Order regarding future social media postings at the end of this case, to protect the children from harm.

277Because of her claim that she spoke to a police officer about the non-enforceability of section 87(8), her stridence, and her mid-trial defiance, I intend to use the restraining order powers in section 35(2)(4.) of the CLRA to regulate her behaviour, at least insofar as the Order being made that pertains to H. is concerned. H.’s father had also testified that he is fearful of the mother. So did other witnesses at this trial, for that matter. That subjective fear is objectively reasonable. There are reasonable grounds for H.’s father to fear for his and H.’s safety. H.’s father proved his claim for a Restraining Order. Terms about the internet will not be the only aspect of the Restraining Order. Because T.’s father did not claim a restraining Order, internet terms in the separate Order relating to T. will be made under section 28 of the CLRA.

278The Court intends to issue a caution to the mother given her claims of ignorance and that she relied on advice from a police officer about her posts. The consequences of her prior actions, and of any future, repeat behaviour may include:

(a) Section 87(8) of the CYFSA is enforceable, in that it is an offence under section 142(3) of the CYFSA to violate section 87(8), punishable on conviction by fine of not more than $10,000.00 or up to three years in jail, or both. She can be prosecuted under the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 33, as amended for violating this section. There is no limitation period on these kinds of provincial prosecutions: see section 142.1(2) of the CYFSA;

(b) A contempt motion may be brought against her if she violates any Orders. If she is found to have committed contempt, sanctions can include fines, penalties, and imprisonment. Although Krause J. sentenced the parent in the case before her, to 3 days in jail, the mother needs to be made aware that prison sentences can vary depending on a number of factors, including the magnitude of the wrongful conduct involved (i.e. it could be more than 3 days);

(c) Costs, fines and monetary penalties can be imposed for a breach of a court order, even if the mother is not found in contempt;

(d) The police can charge the mother if she disobeys a court order, whether it is a conduct Order made under section 28 of the CLRA, or a Restraining Order made under section 35: see section 127(1) of the Criminal Code;

(e) The mother has launched what appear to be nuisance lawsuits against others, so she knows very well what a civil lawsuit is. The mother could find herself on the receiving end of a valid action for damages if she keeps this internet nonsense up. In Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279, the Court awarded $300,000.00 against Mr. Yenovkian arising from the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, the tort of invasion of privacy, and punitive damages, respecting his internet behaviour;

(f) The mother could find herself on the receiving end of a lawsuit for the tort of internet harassment, too;

(g) The mother could be on the receiving end of a lawsuit for the new tort of intimate partner violence, which can include post-separation behaviour: see Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 ¶ 72, 97; and

(h) The Court may in the future suspend the mother’s access altogether if she continues to act out online: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.T.L. and S.S. ¶ 224-226; see also Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.B., [2012] O.J. No. 3241 (C.J.)

D. The Mother’s Complaints that Her Section 7 Rights Have Been Violated

(1) The Mother’s Position

279Like her apparent challenge to section 87(8) of the CYFSA, the mother was also unable to identify why section 74 of the CYFSA was unconstitutional either, despite having referred to it in its entirety in her NCQ.

280The mother’s principal arguments under section 7 of the Charter, as I understood them, are that she believes that the children’s removal from her care was unlawful. The mother has intertwined with that argument, various historic and current complaints about disclosure. But whether a removal was justified or not, is also something that a court can decide based on the evidence before it theoretically (if it is even necessary to do so); it does not require resort to the Charter either.

281Both Tellier J. and McCarty J. already felt that the removal was justified on the evidentiary records then before them. There is a real issue here about whether it is even appropriate for me to consider the correctness of those rulings, as the trial judge. This Court is not sitting on appeal of the prior interim decisions of my colleagues, and while the circumstances surrounding the removal are not irrelevant, the legal considerations that apply at trial are different than those that apply at the temporary stage of a child protection case.

282In that context, I turn now to this aspect of the mother’s constitutional question.

(2) Applicable Legal Principles

283 Section 7 of the Charter reads:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[284] It is well established that section 7 Charter rights are engaged in child protection proceedings. But it is not only the mother’s security of the person that is engaged, so are children’s rights: see New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 1999 CanLii 653 (S.C.C.). But just because section 7 Charter rights to security of the person are engaged by the removal, does not mean that they have been deprived contrary to principles of fundamental justice.

(3) The Mother’s Complaints About the Disclosure That She (and Others) Have Been Given

285The mother’s argument about unfairness to her, is more broadly tied up in a number of complaints, advanced several times during the lifespan of this case, about the disclosure she claims not to have been given to her.

286One of the mother’s chief complaints has been that all of the disclosure needed for her to respond, and for the Court to then have made proper Orders in the past, had not been supplied to her at the material time when she needed it. As such, she says that she was deprived of the ability to mount a defense fully, before prior Orders were made, perhaps even creating an unfair status quo that she cannot now overcome.

287Different versions of this core complaint continued through to the end of the trial. For example, she complained prior to trial at the Trial Scheduling Conferences about her inability to prepare for trial, also relating to disclosure. On the first day of the trial, the mother showed me a full redacted piece of paper in a binder, that she said was just one example of 22 similar pages of “constant redactions”, amongst many more other pages of redactions that she said existed throughout her disclosure.

288But Ms. Hawn then pointed out that the mother has received disclosure as a party throughout. In addition, she had also been making disclosure requests herself, under Part X of the CYFSA. When the latter requests were made, the mother would get disclosure that was more heavily redacted, as Part X requires. But that did not mean that the mother did not get the same, unredacted documents, as was her right, as a party. In other words, Ms. Hawn told the Court that the mother had in fact obtained duplicates of the documents, one set not redacted, and another pursuant to her Part X requests, more heavily redacted. The mother’s 22 pages that she showed to the Court, came from her Part X requests.

289This issue was alluded to, but not fleshed out, at the Trial Scheduling Conferences before me in February and March, 2026. Then, the Society indicated that it might need to call the evidence of a disclosure clerk to put this issue to rest, but a plan was devised for the Society to wait and see if that was necessary, depending on what happened at the trial. When this dispute re-emerged on day 1 of the trial, I just directed the Society to call some evidence about the disclosure that had been supplied, so that the Court could resolve the issue, once and for all.

290The Society called Anne Mullin to testify. Ms. Mullin is a disclosure analyst with the Society. She testified about her role as a disclosure analyst, and the disclosure process that the Society follows, when requests are made by both parties, and pursuant to Part X of the legislation. Her evidence was in line with what Ms. Hawn had told the Court. She testified that she has provided disclosure to the mother directly between 5 and 7 times. Another employee of the Society’s also supplied disclosure separately. Disclosure had been provided to the mother’s lawyer too, when she was represented.

291The disclosure given to the mother had been provided by way of a link to the documents electronically. Ms. Mullin was able to see on the Society’s computer system whether the disclosure links had been viewed by the mother. She testified that the mother had accessed about 4 of the links that she sent, but not all of them. That was the mother’s choice, and not the fault of the Society.

292Through Ms. Mullin, the Society also tendered as exhibits numerous emails that had been sent by herself and another person who handles the production of disclosure at the Society, to the mother. These emails confirmed when disclosure had been sent.

293As a result of my Endorsement of February 23, 2026, the Society embarked upon a disclosure audit and discovered that no more than 20 notes or records, from the thousands of pages produced, had been omitted in error from the previous packages of documents that had been given out. The situation was immediately rectified by March 17 and 23, 2026, almost a month before the start of this trial. A previous letter from the Society dated January 6, 2026 indicates that notes of missing access visits had been supplied, too.

294One of emails in the exhibit that the Society tendered, revealed that the mother continued to obtain the most recent, updated Society disclosure, covering the period February 23, 2026 after the Trial Scheduling Conference, right until April 10, 2026. She received that last batch of updated disclosure 7 days before trial, ensuring that the updated file disclosure was complete. Before that, on March 27, 2026, she received updated disclosure through the Society, from the Guelph agency.

295During her cross-examination of Ms. Mullin the mother did not establish that anything of significance had been omitted by the time of the trial, or for that matter prior to important past events in this case. She chose instead to focus on the fact, already known to the Court, that disclosure is continually created throughout the lifespan of a child protection case as more contacts or events occur, and that she had to ask for disclosure several times over the lifespan of this case, “as a self-represented litigant”. But that is a normal process; it is routine for parties to ask for updated disclosure as a case unfolds. Ms. Mullin testified that the Society does its best to provide updates in a timely manner upon request.

296Notably, despite her complaint alleging that she had been given heavily redacted disclosure, and despite her complaining about its alleged impact on her to prepare properly for events in this case, the mother used several, not particularly redacted case notes, beginning right on the first day of trial. The maternal grandmother testified that she helped the mother review 6,000 pages of disclosure to prepare.

297Also notably, in an email from the mother to Ms. Mullin and others dated July 28, 2025, sent almost one year ago, the mother responded to some of the disclosure that Ms. Mullin then gave her, taking issue with the contents of several notes and records that she had been given. She made substantive arguments about the contents of the records, and complained that the Society had not amended “clearly false records”. In other words, this email makes no mention of redactions; quite the contrary it takes issue with the contents of various records, that clearly the mother was able to review and comment about.

298During closing submissions, the mother expanded her disclosure argument to include that Dr. Rowe did not have all relevant health information he needed about her, and so therefore it was unconstitutional for the Society, and I suppose the Court, to rely on his assessment. This missing disclosure that Dr. Rowe was allegedly not given, included alleged health evidence that did not even then exist (i.e. evidence of other “long standing” treatment providers, being other psychiatrists, therapists and her family doctor).[21]

299To dispose of the mother’s disclosure complaints here and now, it is important to differentiate between problematic disclosure conduct on the part of a Society, versus normal disclosure practice. At ¶ 48-110 of Durham Children’s Aid Society v. G.S., 2022 ONSC 547, and at ¶ 221-272 of Durham Children’s Aid Society v. D.F., A.V. and C.S., 2023 ONSC 4804, this Court was critical of the Durham Society, for a pattern of behaviour of refusing to disclose to the Court, and to the parents, evidence already in its possession that it was relying on in support of a child’s removal. Other courts have expressed similar criticisms: see ¶ 42 of Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. S.M. et al., 2023 ONSC 3373; see also ¶ 190-191 of Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society v. J.S., 2023 ONCJ 333.

300But this is not a situation of withholding documents or information. The mother is conflating that kind of inappropriate action, with the reality that in a child protection case, not every single document readily exists at the outset of a case, or even at the time of subsequent steps taken in a case; the record develops over time.

301I heard no evidence at this trial, that the Society did anything other than rely on the best available evidence it had, at different points in time during this proceeding. It goes without saying that when Tellier J. and McCarty J. made temporary Orders, this case was at its temporary stages. Trial worthy evidence was not even required for those events. Rather the evidentiary standard that applied at the temporary stage of this child protection proceeding was that in section 94(10) of the CYFSA i.e. the Court may act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances.

302In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.(A.), 2002 CanLii 45665 (Ont. C.J.), Katarynych J. discussed the calibre of evidence that is required under that “credible and trustworthy” standard. She wrote that while actual evidence, as opposed to “supposition, conjecture, leaps of hyperbole, innuendo, gossip and unqualified opinion where qualified opinion is required” should be provided, she also noted that at the early stages of a child protection case, the record may be less developed, as I have just indicated. Kukurin J. explained this too, and in so doing, he explained the reason why the lower evidentiary standard exists earlier on in a child protection case: see ¶ 15 and 16 of Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. H.P., 2011 ONCJ 679.

303In summary, I do not find that the Society withheld anything of significance from the mother. The mother received disclosure, as a party, on an ongoing basis, throughout the lifespan of this case. She received updated file disclosure, as a party prior to trial. She has separately received redacted disclosure (i.e. redacted duplicates) pursuant to her Part X requests, which frankly she did not need to make. The mother has not persuaded me of any inability to have responded in the past, due to a lack of disclosure, nor that she was unable to prepare for trial. It is worth repeating that she was represented at the time of both the first motion before Tellier J., and then at the temporary care and custody hearing before McCarty J. She was unable during closing submissions to identify anything later discovered, that would have materially impacted the outcomes in Tellier J.’s and McCarty J.’s November 6, 2024 and May 13, 2025 Orders. She was unable to identify anything that Dr. Rowe ought to have had either, for that matter.

304The fact that this disclosure issue continued to get raised throughout this case, right up until the end of the trial (which required the Society to compel Ms. Mullin to attend and testify), took time away from Ms. Mullin discharging her time consuming role to provide disclosure for other families. It also wasted court time unnecessarily. The mother is responsible for this.

(4) The Mother’s Complaints About the Children’s Removal From Her Care

305Before leaving this procedural fairness complaint, it is worthwhile to point out that the mother has not challenged section 81 (the warrant and warrantless removal provisions of the CYFSA), nor section 94 of the CYFSA (which addresses what Orders can be made during the adjournment of a protection application), nor section 94(10) (the evidentiary standard at the temporary stages of a child protection case). Had she, I would point out to the mother, that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the removal of children from a parent where justified, provided the statutory processes followed (i.e. the processes in sections 81 and 94 that she did not challenge) are themselves constitutionally compliant.

306In Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., 2000 SCC 48, L’Heureux-Dube wrote that a child welfare statute may provide for the removal, even without any prior judicial authorization at all, in situations of serious harm or risk of serious harm to the child, without necessarily offending the principles of fundamental justice. She further upheld the constitutionality of a statute where it provides for a post-apprehension hearing with reasonable dispatch.

307Notably, in this case before me, the Society did not even act without prior authorization first; it obtained warrants before acting. That was followed by the prompt first hearing before Tellier J. within 5 days. The contested care and custody hearing took place before McCarty J. three months and 7 days later. The mother was represented at both events, as I have now repeated multiple times.

308While the mother has said she is pursuing an appeal of temporary Orders made during the prior proceedings in this case (I am frankly unclear what is being appealed, if anything), I am not aware of an appellate court ever having disturbed the temporary Orders made in this case. And quite frankly it is not this Court’s job at the trial stage, to sit in review of the temporary Orders that have been made. At least one Ontario decision that has applied Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W. to consider the constitutionality of the removal provisions in Ontario’s predecessor legislation (the Child and Family Services Act), opined that the time to challenge the removal is at the post-removal hearing itself, not now: see Family and Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin County, v. R. (W.)., 2003 CanLii 54117 (Ont. C.J.) ¶ 235.

E. The Mother’s Complaints that Her Section 15 Charter Rights Have Been Violated

[309] The mother did not specifically identify how her section 15 equality right had been violated either, until closing submissions. Although she made reference during this trial to her various mental and physical health impairments, and accused the Society of being insensitive to those, she did not point to this at the end of the trial. Although she had earlier accused the Society of being unsupportive of her physical health issues, such as by not recognizing that she needed to drive to Guelph for access on the 407, and therefore pay her 407 Bills, she did not rely on this during closing submissions either, in support of a section 15 Charter argument.

310At the end of the trial, the mother instead claimed her equality right was violated because:

(a) Once again, she relied on disclosure. She said Dr. Rowe had diagnosed her by relying solely on Society disclosure rather than what she had provided. This is not accurate, and is addressed elsewhere in this Judgment;

(b) She said that H.’s father had previously said she had bi-polar disorder, and that was not true. But this was not relied upon by Dr. Rowe, or later by the Society at trial. Dr. Rowe did not find the mother has bi-polar disorder, nor am I finding that; and

(c) She said that her parenting capacity is being judged, for not having engaged more with the children at access visits, when the reason for that was her fibromyalgia. But the Society made no submissions about fibromyalgia at the end of the case. For that matter, independent medical evidence about the mother’s fibromyalgia was not even called.

311While this may not have been advanced by her as a section 15 argument per se, the mother also argued that the Society preferred the fathers over her because they live in a two-parent household, whereas she is a single parent. Buried in there, may be an argument about her family or marital status. Yet that is not what the Society was arguing either. The Court was clear with the mother that this case would not turn in any way, on her status of a single parent.[22]

[312] Reframing any of the health related arguments for the mother, of course discrimination based on a mental or physical disability can engage section 15 Charter rights. Section 15 of the Charter reads:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability [my emphasis added].

313However, when the Society, and ultimately the Court, takes into account in a child protection case, relevant mental health issues, and remains focused on the impact on the children, that is not a violation of the equality guarantee: see for example Jewish Family and Child Service of Toronto v. JZ, 2014 ONCJ 119 ¶ 169; see also Sagkeeng Child and Family Services v. A.R.W. et al., 2006 MBQB 256 ¶ 93-96.

314In Children and Family Servies for York Region v. K.D.S. et al, 2024 ONSC 4626, citing other authorities such as Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2018 ONCJ 866 and Gerasimolous v. Sambirsky, 2024 ONSC 2368, I wrote that it does not automatically follow that a child will be in need of protection just because a parent has mental health (or for that matter physical health) challenges. The focus is on whether health poses a risk of harm, and if so whether a child can still be placed in that parent’s care. That is the approach the Court is taking to the health evidence in this case.

F. The Mother’s Other Arguments

(1) The Mother’s Argument that the Children Are Not In Need of Protection

315The mother doesn’t need to persuade the Court that the removal was unconstitutional or even unlawful, or the Orders made following it should be set aside, to obtain a remedy. If I reframe this argument of the mother’s for her also, she can still argue at trial, that the children are not in need of protection, and accordingly the protection application should be dismissed. Were the Court to find that, the children would be returned to her care, with the underlying CLRA orders reactivating. Once again, this does not require any resort to the Charter; it simply requires the Court to apply the statutory provisions in the applicable legislation applied to the evidence at trial.

316But there are numerous problems with this reframed argument on its merits.

317First, the mother pointed the Court to this Society’s prior file closures, and in particular to the case note of a worker Andrew Wright dated March 28, 2024, closing the file on the grounds of there being no protection concerns. She also pointed to the Durham Society’s note of May 6, 2024 closing its file, a few months before the removal. The point she sought to make, was that the Society had in the recent past, inconsistently determined that protection concerns did not exist.

318In furtherance of this argument, the mother pointed the Court to another record, dated as early as January 22, 2022, in which the Society did not verify “caregiver with problem” or “emotional harm” (back then before much more evidence was fleshed out and obtained). But this was only a partial read of that record. This particular note that she highlighted, did verify that there was already parent conflict regarding custody and access very much occurring.

319During her cross-examination of Ms. Johnson, the mother asked Ms. Johnson to confirm that there was no evidence that she had physically harmed H. at the time of the removal. Ms. Johnson said that there had been “medical neglect” and “parent conflict”. A verification of physical harm would come later, as a result of the investigation that ensued following receipt of the videos that F. had taken.

320The mother is over-emphasizing what she believes the circumstances at the time of the removal to be (i.e. no risk) to make these arguments. But not only were there many risks at the time of the removal, this entire argument is misplaced.

321The Court at trial in a protection proceeding, is not singularly focused on the circumstances prior to the removal, or at the time of the removal. Nor does the Court exclusively focus on the circumstances at the time of the trial, for that matter. The case law is clear that courts can choose a flexible approach that would admit evidence arising at any time up to the date of trial: see Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. T. (J.A.), 2005 ONCJ 302; Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. K.R. and C.W., 2001 CanLII 28090 (ON SC), 2001 O.J. No. 5752 (S.C.J.); Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex, 2017 ONSC 3460; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.M.T., 2018 ONCJ 540; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2018 ONCJ 690; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.T., 2019 ONSC 3191; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N., 2019 ONCJ 8; P.W. v. CAS, 2022 ONSC 268; and see also K.R. v. The Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex, 2023 ONSC 3798 (Div. Ct.).

322Now at ¶ 42 of Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v. D.C., 2024 ONCJ, the Court did find that a protection finding may not be mandated, if by the time of the trial, past protection concerns have resolved. But that is not the situation in this case before me either. Protection concerns with the mother persist.

323In any event, even though there is a flexible approach to determining if a child is in need of protection, which invites the Court to examine evidence across time when conducting its assessment, the evidence at trial satisfies me that the children were in need of protection at the time of the removal nevertheless. They are also in need of protection at the time of the hearing, based on subsequent events, and the mother’s failure to address the protection concerns. The protection concerns haven’t resolved, except to the extent they resolved naturally through the removal of the children from their environment with the mother. Any argument in support of a dismissal of protection findings, fails.

324All that said, in pointing out certain prior and perhaps inconsistent positions taken by the Society, the mother did highlight something, albeit not about the point that she wanted to make (that there are no protection concerns). I do find it somewhat surprising that files were opened and closed so many times. At that time of the March 2024 closure that the mother focused upon for example, there was very much a high degree of parental conflict happening, there were serious concerns about the mother’s mental health that were not being managed, and there was an active dispute about H.’s health diagnosis and treatment. Yet the Society closed its file.

325The importance of judicial oversight in child protection cases is well established: see B.J.T. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 24 ¶ 63-67. At some point between 2021 and 2024, this history of opening and closing files without bringing the matter before the Court, started not to reflect well on the Society. There are a number of child protection decisions in which Courts have been critical for societies doing this: see as one example only, the decision of Himel J. in CFS for York Region v. JF and JE, 2023 ONSC 681 ¶ 9-19. Exposing itself to arguments about prior inconsistent positioning is not the only risk a children’s aid society subjects itself to when it does this; more importantly children can be left in intolerable situations of harm.

326On the other hand, courts must also be mindful, as L’Heureux-Dube recognized at ¶ 100 of Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. KLW, that there are evidentiary difficulties particular to the child protection context. Child welfare workers are often concerned with situations taking place within the intimacy of private homes. They are frequently called upon to make time-sensitive decisions in which it is often difficult, if not impossible to determine the actual level of risk. The Society is subject to criticism later on, when the Court has the benefit hindsight, if it misjudged the situation. It can be blamed for not doing enough. It can also be blamed, especially now with reference to current policy objectives in the CYFSA, of being overly intrusive.

327As Ms. Hawn submitted in this case, I did not hear evidence from any individual worker in the past as to why decisions to close were made. No one called worker Andrew Wright to testify about the March 2024 file closure for example; the mother could have done that if she wanted. In my view, but with the benefit of hindsight, while the Society did misapply the legislative goal of acting in the least intrusive way, by waiting so long to intervene with a court application (to the extent that bringing the matter before the Court qualifies as an “intrusive” step), when Ms. Johnson became involved in 2024 and reviewed the history, she was quite concerned, and she took appropriate steps.

328Finally, just because the Society may have opened and closed files in the past for whatever reason at the time, does not mean that it cannot now call evidence about the mother’s past parenting at those times. While I agree that it is fair game for the mother to point to the past openings and closings to challenge that past parenting evidence, there is still broad scope for the Court to receive such evidence if it is relevant, necessary and probative: see Fakhim v. Shrazi, 2007 ONCJ 126 ¶ 7.

(2) The Mother’s Complaint that the Society Workers Did Not Follow the Child Protection Standards

329The mother’s NCQ makes reference to the Society not following the Child Protection Standards. In cross-examination of the various Society witnesses, the mother did not specifically put any specific child protection standard to them, to confront them about any alleged misstep. I nevertheless explored this in closing submissions to give the mother a chance to address her argument. Ms. Hawn also provided the Court with the particular Child Protection Standards that were engaged by the mother’s arguments, so that they would form part of the documentary record, even though the mother had not introduced them earlier during the trial.

330The mother’s arguments are fourfold:

(a) The Society didn’t respond/call back after H.’s August 20, 2024 disclosure, within 48 hours;

(b) Ms. Johnson talked to the H.’s father first before she interviewed H. regarding the August 20, 2024 disclosure;

(d) The Society did not have monthly meetings with her after the removal.

331I have reviewed the Child Protection Standards that Ms. Hawn supplied, I listened to mother’s allegations, and I heard Ms. Hawn’s explanations in closing submissions. The mother did not prove that a child protection standard had not been followed. As Ms. Hawn said, the mother misunderstood what the standards required. Even if a standard hadn’t been followed, the mother did not prove the impact of that on the result in this case, such as interview tainting (which she suggested could have happened respecting the Society’s August 2024 interview of H.).

332Regarding the latter two complaints, the Society’s post-removal contacts with the mother, the difficulties it experienced with those, and how the mother acted and engaged with the Society post-removal in this case, are well documented elsewhere in this Judgment.

333Once again, these arguments about the Child Protection Standards do not require the Charter. The mother isn’t entitled to a remedy when the evidence and arguments about the standards are considered.

(3) The Mother’s Other Complaints of Procedural Unfairness

334The mother has argued that the Society could have sought a parenting capacity assessment of her during the lifespan of its case. It did not do so, and instead sought to amend is pleading late in the case to seek a “permanency order”. During the trial, she made a point of saying that Dr. Rowe did not undertake a parenting capacity assessment of her either, and the Society workers were not experts as to parenting capacity.

335I am well aware that Dr. Rowe did not perform a parenting capacity assessment. While the Society workers are not experts, they are able to provide evidence about a person’s parenting through their interactions and observations with the person, and through gathering collateral information. There is nothing procedurally unfair about this. This is typical in child protection investigations. The Society did not need a parenting capacity assessment to prove the impact of the mother’s mental health and of her other behaviours, on her parenting. The Court can draw its own conclusions from the evidence called.

336Regarding the amendment, the mother was given adequate notice of it. Following the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 23, 2026, the Society amended its protection application to seek Orders pursuant to section 102 of the CYFSA. Notably, the mother prepared a fresh Answer and Plan of Care the next day, on February 28, 2026. She responded to it.

337Although the fathers did not file new Answers, T.’s father had already claimed an Order under section 102 of the CYFSA in his Answer and Plan of Care dated January 31, 2025. While H.’s father, when self-represented, did not check off the box for a section 102 Order in his Answer dated November 25, 2024, the Schedule to his Answer includes as part of his plan that H. will reside with him primarily. In other words, the fathers claimed section 102 Orders even before the Society amended. The mother had a lot of notice, starting before this case was even listed for trial.

338Regardless, this is a case involving children. While parents’ and children’s rights must be balanced together, the underlying philosophy and policy of child welfare legislation “is about protecting children from harm; it is a child welfare statute and not a parents’ rights statute”: see Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W. ¶ 80. The Court is not bound by the Society’s position, nor those of the parents: see A.M. v. C.M., 2019 ONCA 764 ¶ 29. The Court must apply the applicable legal tests to the evidence, and make the Order it feels is appropriate in the circumstances.

339Relatedly on this question of fair notice, there is a different issue. I have been asked by both fathers, by the Society and by the OCL to impose restrictions on the mother’s ability to bring a Motion to Change in the future in varying degrees. There is jurisdiction to make such an Order through a combined reading of rules 1(6), 14(21) and 15(27) of the Family Law Rules. But notice of this was not specifically sought in the pleadings; rather it was included in the draft Orders at the end of the case.

340I tend to agree with Ms. Shaw though, that such an Order imposing conditions on future Motions to Change can also be made either as an incident of a parenting Order, or as term and condition, under sections 28(1)(b) and (c) of the CLRA. Section 102 Orders have been pleaded, so the notion that the Court might order terms and conditions under section 28 of the CLRA, was on the table and the mother had notice of it: see section 102(2) of the CYFSA. The parties had an opportunity to make arguments about whether a leave requirement should be imposed, during closing submissions.

341And to some degree, the basis to impose conditions before bringing future Motions to Change probably emerged further, during the trial as the evidence unfolded. It became apparent to some by the end of the trial that such an Order was needed. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at ¶ 29 of A.M. v. C.M:

The mother’s conduct and its effect on the child was front and center in the father’s pleadings. Sometimes warring parents lose sight of their children’s best interests. Under such circumstances, no one should be surprised if the trial judge fashions a parenting regime which is not in the precise terms sought by either party.

(4) The Conduct of this Trial

342Before leaving the subject matter of the mother’s complaints of unfair treatment, I intend to address the conduct of this trial in this Judgment, because numerous steps were taken, recognizing the mother was self-represented, both prior to and during the trial proper.

343While the mother made several statements to remind the Court that she is a self-represented litigant, she was a skilled, self-represented litigant, who has become quite familiar navigating her way around the Court system. Nonetheless, in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, the Supreme Court endorsed the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) established by the Canadian Judicial Counsel. Some of the principles contained in the Statement include that where appropriate, judges should engage in case management activities, and depending on the nature and circumstances of the case, the presiding judge may do things like explain the process, inquire into whether the self-represented person understands the process and the procedure, make referrals to agencies to help the litigant in the preparation of the case, provide information about the law and evidentiary requirements, modify the traditional order of taking evidence, and question witnesses. These steps have been taken by the Court.

344First, it bears repeating yet again, that the mother was not always self-represented, although she complained about unfairness even when she had a lawyer.

345Second, this case has been case managed throughout, first by McCarty J. Tellier J. heard two motions. Although I only became involved at the trial management stage, and then for the trial, I continued to case manage the organization of this trial. The trial itself continued to be case managed throughout.

346In particular, this Court held two Trial Scheduling Conferences, the first of which was several hours long. During those appearances, especially the first one, the Court canvassed the evidence that everyone intended to call, the mother included, the Court discussed whether some evidence was needed, or could go in through documentary evidence, the Court addressed disclosure issues that the mother (and others) had raised, the Court made disclosure orders to avoid the need for another motion, and the Court set a process for voir dires where needed, based on the evidentiary issues that I was then told about. More voir dires became necessary during the trial when the mother sought to introduce new evidence.

347Pursuant to the trial directions that emanated from the Trial Scheduling Conferences before me, the Society, each of the parties, and most of the witnesses, other than certain professional witnesses, gave evidence-in-chief by way of affidavit. Those affidavits were due prior to the start of the trial. While each witness who gave evidence-in-chief by way of affidavit was also permitted to testify in chief in addition, and they were all cross-examined, everyone had an opportunity to review the majority of most of the witnesses’ evidence-in-chief, in advance of the start of the trial. All were on an equal footing in that regard. Where professional witnesses did not have affidavits, the parties either had, or would have had access to, records of their involvement or reports, in advance, for use during their questioning.

348The Society prepared a helpful trial record, also in advance of the start of the trial, that included all of the trial affidavits that it had by the time of the filing deadline. It even included affidavits that formed part of the parents’ cases, filed for them. Each of the Society, the fathers and the OCL prepared Exhibit Books containing a manageable number of exhibits. These books were required to be filed in advance, too.

349The mother’s Exhibit Books were not manageable. Despite her complaints that she was not provided with disclosure and was unable to prepare for trial, she filed 7 large binders of documents, containing years of case notes and records from the Society, police records, voluminous health records for herself and the children (some of which duplicated those that the Society supplied), correspondence, AI generated transcripts of hours of audio recordings she had made, case law, and other documents. These books were thousands of pages in length. I gave her further direction about this during the trial proper, discussed below.

350By the end of this trial, there were 121 exhibits, and two lettered exhibits, which shall now become exhibits 122 and 123 for the reasons set out later in this Judgment. This included the relevant excerpts from the Ontario Child Protection Standards, that I directed the Society to file, as indicated.

351Several of the exhibits were introduced by the mother. To the extent that more exhibits were introduced by others than her, that is due in large part to the fact that the Society introduced targeted and focused health records about the mother and the children, and the OCL introduced the children’s educational records. At the end of the trial in closing submissions, the mother claimed she had not been allowed to file exhibits. While she first referred to a ruling I made about the proper scope of her re-examination, she then broadened her complaint, referring to earlier on during the trial.

352When I now read her January 20, 2026 14B Motion again (seeking to file briefs in the court file to avoid discrepancies on her apparent appeal of temporary Orders), in tandem with the binders of documents that she would later file in advance of the trial, and some of the statements she made during the trial, it has occurred to me that the mother seemed to think that a judge (me or someone else) would read the thousands of pages of documents, and listen to the 40 hours of audio recordings she put into the Court file, just because that volume of material is what she decided to put in briefs and file. Courts do not generally review documents that do not get admitted into evidence. Nor is the Court required to review material to which a party does not specifically direct its attention: see the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings ¶ 186-187.

353The Court at this trial, was not going to let her enter multiple binders containing thousands of pages of paper, just because she saw fit to put seemingly every Society case note and record, every health record about herself and the children, every police record, and perhaps even every piece of correspondence into binders. Nor did the Court advance mark any of the other witnesses’ binders. Everyone was told to enter exhibits properly. The mother was given a fair opportunity to file focused and relevant documentary exhibits, and the Court came up with a process with her, to help her do so, during the trial. That process is explained further below.

354The parties were supposed to prepare charts of the children’s hearsay statements that each intended to introduce. Only the Society did so in a succinct way. The mother prepared a 143-page chart. Her chart includes comments on entries in various notes and records, that were not admitted into evidence.

355Given the volume of the entries in the mother’s chart, I indicated that I would give the parties an opportunity to highlight hearsay objections in the trial affidavits before each particular witnesses’ testimony. The time to object to other documentary evidence was at the time those documents were entered. No one then took issue with the admissibility of any of the statements summarized in the Society’s chart prior to each witnesses’ testimony, the mother included. Nevertheless, I will deal with the children’s statements in this Judgment, later on, as I said I would.

356The Court held a voir dire concerning Dr. Rowe’s qualifications. This was discussed at the Trial Scheduling Conference; the mother said she intended to challenge Dr. Rowe’s qualifications. The Court held voir dires and permitted certain other professionals to give evidence as participant expert witnesses, too. Ms. Hawn assisted the mother when she called some of her professional witnesses to testify, to do this.

357The Court held a voir dire regarding the admissibility of the video that F. had supplied to the Society. This too was discussed at the Trial Scheduling Conference. A ruling on its admissibility remains outstanding, and is dealt with below, as is a ruling on another video that the mother provided with additional documents to the parties on a USB key mid-trial.[23]

358The Court discussed with the parties, at the Trial Scheduling Conference of February 23, 2026, their various proposed witnesses, why they were being called, and in the mother’s case, what she intended to elicit from them, and whether some of that evidence could be introduced via alternative documentary means. Witnesses from several parties’ lists, not just the mother’s, were removed as a result of that discussions. The Court still ended up hearing from an incredible 33 witnesses during this trial. Included amongst the 33 witnesses who testified were eight child protection workers or employees of this Society or the Guelph Society, Dr. Rowe, two medical doctors (Dr. Spreadbury, and Dr. Lezhanska- who testified twice), a pediatrician (Dr. Gupta), a child and adolescent psychiatrist (Dr. Savenkov), a psychiatrist (Dr. McArthur), two therapists (Ms. Wright and Ms. Salvador), a case worker from the Canadian Mental Health Association (Ms. Henderson), and two teachers (C.M. and L.G.).

359In addition to testifying themselves, each of the parents called family members or friends to testify (H.’s father’s called his partner and both of his parents; T.’s father’s called his partner and his mother; the mother called her mother, her friend (M.W.) and her parents’ friend (B.S.)). The Society called the mother’s brother R. and his partner F., as well as the mother’s university academic advisor (L.G.) to testify, as well.

360Where health practitioners had been removed as witnesses, their reports (to the extent the Court was directed to them specifically), went into evidence under section 52 of the Evidence Act, without the need for their attendance to testify. This had been agreed upon in advance at the Trial Scheduling Conference.

361The mother arranged, in advance of the trial, to call one of the doctors (Dr. Lezhanska), and one of the psychiatrists (Dr. McArthur). The Court gave her the opportunity to add as a witness, mid-trial, Dr. Savenkov, a child and adolescent psychiatrist who had assessed H. for autism, for the reasons set out below. She was the one who called the two therapists and the case worker from the CMHA. In the end, she called 9 of the 33 witnesses as part of her case. With the exception of Dr. Savenkov, whose attendance the Society organized for the mother to help her mid-trial, the mother managed to organize summons to compel the attendance of her other professional witnesses, and she arranged for her own lay witness’ attendance too.

362During the trial itself:

(a) The mother advised the Court that she may need to take additional breaks during the sitting day on account of her health. That was accommodated each and every time the mother asked for a break;

(b) The Court allowed the mother to continue with her constitutional question, even she had withdrawn it prior to trial as indicated;

(c) The Court rendered daily trial Endorsements that dealt with procedural issues, where required. On several days throughout the trial, the Court held end of day discussions with the parties about the trial plan for the next day. The mother was permitted to ask questions during the trial, and where possible, I answered those questions;

(d) In the original Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form that had been filed for the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 23, 2026, the mother had included as one of her witnesses, Dr. Oleg Savenkov. Dr. Savenkov had previously diagnosed H. with autism, and the mother wanted to call him as a witness. I would come to learn that there was a subsequent report by a different doctor (Dr. Gupta), that contradicted that. The reports were not before me at the Trial Scheduling Conference;

(e) But I was told at the Trial Scheduling Conference, that Dr. Savenkov’s report would be in Dr. Spreadbury’s file. Because Dr. Spreadbury was being called to testify, the mother agreed to remove Dr. Savenkov from her list. My Endorsement of February 23, 2026 noted what I was then told, that the details of Dr. Savenkov’s involvement in diagnosing the child were not likely to be challenged;

(f) It became apparent otherwise during the trial. And after I heard that Dr. Spreadbury was not really able to comment in a material way about these assessments, and that at least one of the parties intended to make arguments about the lesser weight that should be ascribed to Dr. Savenkov’s assessment (when compared to the more recent, and more thorough report of Dr. Gupta), I inquired whether the mother wanted to re-add Dr. Savenkov as one of her witnesses, mid-trial. When she said she wanted to do that, the Society to arranged to summons him for her, as indicated. He then testified;

(g) The mother asked, and the Court allowed her to add another witness, Kim Salvador, her current therapist. This was permitted mid-trial;

(h) While the Court was not prepared to mark thousands of pages as exhibits at the outset of the trial to avoid creating a situation of confusion as to what the evidentiary record actually consisted of, the Court did ask the mother to prepare lists of the specific documents from her thousands of pages of Exhibit Books upon which she intended to rely, which she did. The Court then went through these lists with her as she called evidence during the trial, to ensure that she had a fair chance to introduce them. The Court reminded the mother when she forgot to introduce specific Exhibits that she said she wanted to introduce. At some point the mother stopped introducing documents on her list, which was her choice. But she then complained about this at the end of the trial, in closing submissions;

(i) The Court had a discussion with the mother about how to make an Opening Trial Statement, before she was called upon to make one. The Court waived the requirement and instead had her testify under oath, so that anything she might say that was really in the nature of evidence in her Opening Trial Statement, would be included as her evidence. The mother did however include three draft Orders with her trial affidavit. When the mother testified, the Court asked her to explain her position in the three draft Orders that she filed;

(j) The Court assisted the mother with her own examination-in-chief too. I talked to the mother about organizing her oral evidence before she testified. Based on that discussion, the mother prepared a list of topics that she said she wanted to testify about. While I told the mother that it was ultimately her responsibility to decide what she wanted to testify about, the Court reminded the mother of additional topics that she had omitted from her list, that she might want to add, to ensure that she did not miss anything and that her position was put before the Court;

(k) The Court sometimes circled back to topics that the mother said she wanted to address, when she veered off topic;

(l) The Court asked questions of the mother during her examination-in-chief;

(m) In addition, the Court also had the mother’s 38 page trial affidavit, which I read before she testified;

(n) When she was examining other witnesses, the Court sometimes helped the mother by reframing questions for her, and it asked questions of certain witnesses for her at times;

(o) Dr. Lezhanska was an important witness whom the mother wanted to call in aid of arguing that she had not coached the child, and the child’s removal was not justified. The Court obtained an agreement from the parties as to basic background facts before Dr. Lezhanska started to testify, so that the mother could focus in on what she wanted to elicit from this witness;

(p) Ms. Hawn for the Society assisted the mother to conduct some of voir dires about the qualifications of some of the doctors and therapists the mother called, as indicated;

(q) Some of the mother’s witnesses that the mother wanted to call, such as her therapists and Drs. McArthur and Lezhanska, were called out of Order to accommodate their schedule. So was Dr. Savenkov, when he was re-added as one of the mother’s witnesses;

(r) The Court agreed to receive some documentary evidence from the mother, even though it was filed late (i.e. mid trial), as indicated;

(s) The Court had to add into the mix another voir dire when the mother told the Court for the first time, that she intended to introduce up to 40 hours of audio recordings of her access visits that she had made. The Court could have summarily rejected her request for not having complied with a prior scheduling Order and for other apparent problems with the mother trying to do this, but it didn’t, and it held the voir dire to give the mother her hearing about them. The voir dire took a considerable amount of time to address;

(t) At the end of the day on the penultimate day of the trial, the Court informed the parties of the questions it then had and would be asking during closing submissions the next day. Regarding the mother specifically, the Court gave her some direction about how to proceed with her closing submissions;

(u) The Court questioned the mother during closing submissions to ensure I fully understood her arguments;

(v) In the mother’s draft Orders filed, she asked the Court to make findings in respect of the boys’ fathers. The Court took this request seriously; in fact this was one of the questions that Court raised at the end of the day before; and

(w) In this Judgment, I am giving the mother’s arguments their due attention, even though the majority of her process related, unfairness, or rights-based complaints are devoid of merit. Where the mother made valid points, I have said so in this Judgment.

G. Summary and Conclusions Regarding the Mother’s Constitutional Challenge and Her Other Complaints

363In conclusion, the mother’s NCQ, which includes a list of complaints that are not actually constitutional questions, is dismissed on its merits in full. The mother was treated fairly throughout the lifespan of this case.

H. The Admissibility of Various Video and Audio Recordings that the Mother Either Made, or in Which She Participated

364Each of the Society, the mother and on one occasion H.’s father, sought to introduce a number of recordings, mostly videos, into evidence during this trial. Some were admitted into evidence without objection. These were:

(a) the video that the mother sent to H.’s father with an AppClose message on August 20, 2024, before she took the child to the hospital. I am considering it as part of her narrative and explanation for what would transpire next;

(b) the video of the mother on Tic Tok live talking about the shower incident in which she degraded and humiliated the father. The mother freely participated in this, in the public domain;

(c) the video that the mother made of the voicemail message that she had received from “Megan” that she posted online in the public domain; and

(d) the mid-trial video that the mother posted online about this case, that I ordered her to remove.

365The latter three videos, which she herself put out into the public domain or participated in publicly, are probative as to her very problematic internet behaviour. These were not surreptitiously obtained, although the mother raised her grievance that the Society and H.’s father have been monitoring her internet activity. After having put them out in the world, the mother can hardly complain that the Society, or H.’s father, went online to find what she had done, and that they are now relying on these recordings, to prove their cases.

366The disputed videos for which a ruling remains outstanding, are the Ring Camera videos that F. supplied to the Society, and the video marked as Exhibit “B” in which H. makes another statement of potential sexual abuse.

367There were also approximately 40 hours of audio recordings that the mother made of her supervised access visits, that I ruled inadmissible following the mid-trial voir dire.

(1) Applicable Legal Principles

368The party seeking to introduce the recording, which is the Society in the case of the Ring Camera videos, and is the mother in the case of her video marked as letter Exhibit “B” and her audio recordings, bears the onus of establishing admissibility: see Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 OCJ 274 ¶ 13.

369The recordings first need to be authenticated. In order to do that, the recordings must accurately depict acts, they have to be verified by the person who made the recording, and there must be the absence of an intention to mislead: see Rodger v. Strop, 1992 CarswellOnt 386; see also Webster v. Suteu, 2015 ONCJ 538 ¶ 44.

370There are also policy considerations, especially when it comes to surreptitiously obtained recordings (although policy considerations still apply sometimes, even when a recording is not surreptitious). There are policy considerations because there has been an explosion of published cases in family law about the use of recordings in litigation, because mischief can be created in the litigation itself from recordings, and because harm can befall families and children, from these recordings.

371Writing about surreptitiously obtained videos specifically, at ¶ 41 of Van Ruyven v. Van Ruyven, 2021 ONSC 5963, Kurz J. wrote:

The only way that judges can effectively discourage such conduct is to refrain from rewarding it. To do that, courts must presume that the prejudicial effect of those secret recordings far outweighs their probative value to our system of family law and the best interests of the children affected by it. That presumption cannot be rebutted short of evidence disclosing serious misconduct by a parent, significant risk to a child’s safety or security, or a threat to another interest central to the need to do justice between the parties and children. Short of such evidence, courts must say “hands (or phones) off” the recording feature of parents’ smart phones when they seek to secretly record each other and their children.

(2) The Mother’s Position About the Ring Camera Videos

372The mother’s position about the Ring Camera videos is that they should be ruled inadmissible on two grounds. First, she says that F. “illegally obtained” them. Second, she says the timing of F. supplying the videos to the Society is suspect (i.e. not at the time she made the videos, but rather after the removal). She says that F. (and her brother R.) were acting out of vengeance against her on account of a debt dispute between F.’s parents and the maternal grandparents. I find there is no merit to either argument.

(3) Analysis About the Ring Camera Videos that F. Supplied

373First, the Society authenticated the videos during the trial.

374F. testified that when she made the videos, she could see what was going on in the living room via her cell phone. She hit screen record. Her cell phone ended up breaking up the recording into two parts, with a short seconds’ long break in between. She was unable to explain why she stopped recording at the end when she did, which did not capture the maternal grandmother’s alleged intervention into the incident. But it does not matter, as I explain next.

375Relatedly, regarding whether the videos accurately depict acts, there are three components to this analysis. Perhaps militating against authenticity, is the fact that the videos do not capture the entire sequence of events, given the few seconds of interruption, or the somewhat random timing of F. stopping the video. The second aspect to this, is that the videos do not show what was going on before, and indeed after the mother assaulted the child. Additionally, there were many other instances of conflict that I heard about going on in this home. As F. did not make any recording these other instances when she was living in the home, perhaps there was important other context that I was not able to consider as it wasn’t recorded.

376But in my view, the fact that there was a few seconds long interruption in the video, or that F. stopped recording when she did, or that the video does not capture what the grandmother did to intervene after the fact (grandmother was cross-examined about this), does not render these particular videos inadmissible in the circumstances of this case. These videos accurately depict the one act of physical violence itself, that the mother perpetuated on the child that day. That is what the videos were principally introduced to show, although they have broader import. Whatever caused it beforehand does not matter, as much as the fact that the mother assaulted this child, and how she assaulted this child. Her actions were extreme and disproportionate.

377Regarding the aftermath not caught on video, the maternal grandmother testified about her so-called intervention. She claimed she was in the kitchen and could not hear what was going on, because she was cooking. She claimed to have told the mother afterwards, that she should not yell at the child. Notably, she did not testify that she admonished the mother for having hit the child, saying that spanking the child over his snow pants was “allowed”. When asked about why she was not rushing to intervene as shown on the video, the grandmother said “why would I run”. Her own explanation is that she barely intervened after the fact, so no further, but missing video corroboration is needed here to contradict any suggestion otherwise.

378I have also considered the mother’s evidence that she apologized to the child after the fact, and then went to get mental health assistance, also not on the videos. But that evidence can be dealt with as a matter of credibility. And for that matter, the mother was extensively discredited on that point, discussed later in the part of this Judgment that deals with the assessment of the mother’s health evidence.

379Finally, just because other incidents of chaos and conflict were not filmed, does not mean that they did not happen. I heard an overwhelming amount of evidence that they did occur. Regardless, the absence of recordings of that, does not detract from the mother’s assault of the child on January 31, 2023, which the video clearly depicts.

380Perhaps, had I not heard other evidence about the mother’s volatile behaviour, one might have concluded that the mother’s assault was a one off, bolstered by the failure to record other events. But that is not what the record at this trial reveals. While the mother denied having ever spanked H., even the mother herself admitted to having spanked T. on one other occasion. T.’s statement to the Society, addressed later, was that it was a more frequent occurrence, and that H. was subjected to this form of punishment too. The mother contradicted herself about the frequency of her hitting during this trial. So too did the grandmother give inconsistent evidence.

381Regarding whether there was an intention to mislead, F. did not make the recording to catch the mother in a bad act, or to use it against her later, as the mother argued. She explained that she recorded the incident at the time, with the purpose to send it to the mother, so that the mother could observe what was going on, and explain herself. And that is what F. did.

382While the mother did establish that F.’s parents do apparently owe her parents some money for the family trip to Italy, I don’t see how this helps the mother in this admissibility analysis. Even if F. sent the video to the Society out of spite after the removal as opposed to being worried about the children (which I do not find), the video still speaks for itself.

383Regarding the policy arguments, I do not find these videos were “illegally” (or surreptitiously) obtained. When she testified about this, the mother maintained that F. was not given access to the Ring Camera videos, and told a story about how one gets access to Ring Cameras. She took issue with the fact that F. said she had been given a code, and claimed that Ring does not give out codes. She showed the Court an email from Ring confirming that M.W. had access, but that email did not prove that F. did not have access, which was the apparent point of trying to introduce M.W.’s email. The mother was told by me, to try to find other records from Ring if she wanted to prove that F. improperly accessed the Ring Cameras. She did not do so, nor in the end could she explain how F. had access the cameras, if she had not been given access. She said, “I’m still trying to figure it out”.

384Even if the Ring Cameras had been improperly accessed (which I do not find), it goes without saying that the outcome of any one particular case may differ from another depending on the application of the applicable legal principles concerning the admissibility of video recordings, to the facts. For example, in F.(A.) v. A. (B.J.), 2017 ONCJ 108, Sager J. admitted recordings, finding that they were not surreptitiously made. Sager J. would have admitted the tapes even if they had been surreptitiously made though: see ¶ 24. Her reasons for that were seven-fold. She focused on their value being so probative as to outweigh the prejudice, notwithstanding the policy that recordings made for use in family law proceedings should be discouraged.

385More recently, at ¶ 126-129 of T.I. v. C.B., 2025 ONCJ 392, Justice Joanna Harris relied on the fact that there were family violence allegations in the case before her, to admit a recording. The recording showed family violence. She cited how challenging it is to prove family violence, in admitting the recordings in the case before her. I would follow this approach, too.

386These videos, although short, are highly probative. They depict the mother’s anger, the mother tone of voice (yelling), and the physical force that the mother used when she could not handle the child (hitting, pulling, shaking and throwing) during the morning routine on January 31, 2023. While the videos are just one piece of corroborating evidence, they sit alongside much other evidence in this case. They corroborate the other evidence I heard, that the mother had difficulty managing T. in the morning. They sit alongside T.’s school records of numerous school absences and lates, which also corroborate that. They provide a visual and audio depiction of what the chaos in the mother’s household looked like, when she couldn’t get the child to school. In that regard, they corroborate the other adults’ oral evidence about that (R. and F.). They sit alongside other witnesses’ testimony about the mother’s volatility, that she is quick to frustrate, and about her lack of parenting skills. They provide another example of the house being in a state of disarray, which I separately heard about. They corroborate T.’s statements to the Society after the removal, that the mother used physical discipline on him and his brother, which the mother herself partially admitted, but minimized. In other words, when it comes to the children’s hearsay analysis, these videos aid in the Court’s threshold reliability analysis.

(4) The Mother’s Evidence About Substance of the Events Depicted in the Ring Camera Videos

387And, even though she challenged their admissibility, the mother proceeded to give evidence about the contents of the videos. She offered up a plethora of excuses for her behaviour, which she has referred to as “context”. Her excuses were:

(a) She said that physical discipline was part of the culture in which she was raised, but that she had already begun “unlearning that part of [her] own parenting development”;

(b) She said that despite that, she did not use the forms of punishment that she had been subjected to by her maternal grandmother’s “strict Brazilian cultural background.” She compared the more severe physical abuse that she had experienced from her grandmother in Brazil, to what she had done;

(d) She agreed she used the word “fucking” as shown in the video, when she yelled at T., but she said that she uses swear words as a “form of expression”;

(e) Like she said in defense to the suggestion that she breached section 87(8) of the CYFSA, she claimed that she showed the video to an OPP officer and asked for his opinion about whether she had abused the child, and the police officer said no. When she was asked to point the Court to a police report to this effect, the mother said that she thought she had an email. Counsel for the Society asked the mother to bring the email to Court before the end of the trial. The mother then tendered an email during re-examination, that did not dispositively address her claim. But it does not matter at this point what she told to an OPP officer, and what if anything that officer said or did about it. It is beside the point whether a police officer felt there were grounds to lay charges; this is a child protection trial, not a criminal case;

(f) She said that in January of 2023, she was struggling to wake up in the morning. She said this happened before she obtained her ADHD diagnosis and was put on proper medication management;

(g) She said her mother was in the kitchen helping to get lunch ready, when this incident occurred. She said she couldn’t get T. ready for school and get his lunch ready, without being able to identify other strategies that she might have employed to multi-task, such as making lunches the night before after T. was in bed;

(h) She testified that she “can only do so much”, and referred to the fact that she was still doing her undergraduate degree, while “still healing from childhood traumas that [she] did not know [she] had”; and

(i) She blamed H.’s father for what had occurred. She testified when cross-examined by counsel for the Society, that she did not use physical discipline (or yelling) as a form of discipline, until she was in the relationship with H.’s father.

388In keeping with the mother’s claim that she immediately apologized to the child and told him that she would go to her doctor to get help, the mother further said that she immediately got an “emergency referral” to a psychiatrist. Yet on December 12, 2022, before this incident on the videos occurred, the mother had already obtained a referral from her family doctor at the time, Dr. Steffler, to go see a psychiatrist named Dr. Mammoliti. As it happened, the mother did see Dr. Mammoliti on February 9, 2023, nine days after the video, but the referral was already in progress. She was unable to point the Court to any note of another emergency referral between January 31 and February 9, 2023, in Dr. Steffler’s chart. In other words, the referral to Dr. Mammoliti had nothing to do with her actions of January 31, 2023, her supposed apology, or her claim that she would go to see the doctor about it. There is also no mention of the video or this incident of violence contained in it, in Dr. Mammoliti’s report of February 9, 2023 either, even though the mother claimed that was the reason for the health appointment.

389Despite all these excuses, the mother did agree that she had emotionally harmed T. though, when cross-examined by counsel for the Society. But she then repeated again, that she has since obtained the assistance that she needed.

390I find these videos are admissible. The videos currently labelled as Exhibit A shall now be marked as Exhibit 122.

(5) Exhibit “B”: The Mother’s Video Interview of H. Making A Statement of Sexual Abuse

391The mother’s video of H. making a statement of sexual abuse by his father is another matter. I am prepared to admit it, because it is evidence, that the mother herself supplied, of her coaching the child. It is not admissible for the truth of the child’s statements contained therein.

392Notwithstanding the directions I gave at the lengthy, pre-trial Trial Scheduling Conferences about the manner in which evidence was supposed to be presented, and about how certain voir dires would proceed, the mother produced a USB key containing additional evidence, apparently on the morning of April 27, 2026 (i.e. the sixth day of the trial). I was told that the USB key included additional videos, not just this one. It was H.’s father’s counsel, not the mother, who tried to play this video during one of her examinations, before the Court had an opportunity to address how this evidence would have to be dealt with. I indicated that if it was to be admitted, it had to go in through the mother.

393When the mother later testified, she sought to introduce the video. She testified that she had made it, on October 28, 2024. She claimed she knew that to be so, because she had picked H. up after a visit, and during the drive home the child made another statement about the father having hit his penis, so she started recording this. She said she then sent the video to Ms. Johnson on the same day. Ms. Hawn confirmed that October 28, 2024 was the day that the Society first received the video from the mother. She did not accept that the video was made that day. Incidentally, October 28, 2024 was also the day that the Society tried to inform the mother of the outcome of its sexual abuse investigation, but the mother would not talk to the worker.

394This particular video does not actually show the child; rather the mother had her phone camera pointed upwards, filming the car’s interior roof. The video nevertheless contains audio of the child making statements, and the mother also talking to him.

395The mother testified that after the August 20, 2024 emergency room visit, but before H. went into be interviewed by Ms. Johnson and Ms. Brooks a few days later, all she said to him was to “tell his truth”. Now she said, H. can be heard on the video to say that he was “telling his truth” (supposedly two months later). But that is not what H. said on the video.

396In this 53 seconds long video:

(a) The child can be heard to say something;

(b) After the mother says “what” – the child says “he says he can pinch my penis”;

(d) The mother asks when, and the child says “yesterday”, which makes no sense, as the allegation had been brought forward in August;

(e) The mother then says “Is that what happened” and the child says “yeah”;

(f) The mother says “are you OK”, and the child says “yeah”;

(g) The mother then asks the child “are you telling mommy what happened”;

(h) To this the child responds, twice, that he is going to “tell the truth on him” (not “tell his truth”);

(i) When the mother repeats this, it appears that the child says he is going to tell “the penis doctor”, my dad “pinched my penis”; and

(j) The video ends with the mother saying are you “ok though”, and the child says “yes”.

397Unlike the Ring Camera videos, what happened beforehand matters very much. There is no recording of what went on before the mother started recording (i.e. any ‘set up’) and the mother very much lacks credibility respecting her evidence surrounding the child’s August 20, 2024 disclosure, discussed below. There is not even clarity as to when the mother actually took this recording. Just because she sent it to the Society on October 28, 2024, does not mean that was the day she recorded it.

398In this regard, counsel for the Society, counsel for H.’s father and the mother separately advanced three possible scenarios as to when the recording had been made: that she recorded it on August 20, 2024, on the way to the hospital (the Society’s position), that she recorded it on the way to the child’s interview with Ms. Johnson and Ms. Brooks (H.’s father’s lawyer’s position), or that she made it on October 28, 2024 (the mother’s position). In my view, the mother’s position is the least likely.

399Adding to the problems with its authenticity, this video engages significant concerns about public policy. It is a video of the mother interviewing a young child (in addition to the hospital examination and the professional interviews that the child was subjected to). At ¶ 304-306 of S.S. v. R.A., 2024 ONSC 2870 (appeal quashed by 2025 ONCA 724; leave to appeal to the SCC denied in 2026 CanLii 23210 (S.C.C.)), this Court was critical of the father for having conducted a mid-trial video interview of his child to “set the record straight”. This Court did not rely on the child’s statements in that video for their truth, but found it probative of the father’s attitude and conduct, the lengths to which he was prepared to go, and of his lack of insight and good judgement. This Court drew an inference that the father caused the child to suffer anxiety in that case, and found that the father’s actions amounted to psychological abuse.

400In this case before me, I don’t accept that this was a spontaneous statement by the child. Whether the video was made on August 20, 2024, before the professional interviews later that month, or on October 28, 2024, doesn’t matter. Either scenario doesn’t assist the mother.

401I find it more likely than not, that either the mother was preparing the child to make a statement at his hospital visit or at his later Society interview. If in fact she made this video on October 28, 2024 as she claimed, then she was trying to gather up more evidence, when the Society had already disbelieved what the child had said at the hospital for good reason. The fact that the mother interviewed this child on video, contributes to the Court’s finding that the children are in need of protection on the grounds of risk of emotional harm.

402The video currently marked as Exhibit “B” shall now be marked as Exhibit 123, for this purpose, but not for the truth of its contents.

(6) The Approximately 40 Hours of Audio Recordings that the Mother Made at Her Supervised Access Visits

403Although I already ruled orally during the trial on the inadmissibility of the mother’s 40 hours of recordings of her supervised access visits, I intend to address briefly what she did here, because it is differently problematic and relevant to emotional harm

404April 28, 2026 was the seventh day of this trial. At the end of the day, the Court had another ongoing trial management discussion with the parties. Like with how she proceeded with Exhibit “B”, on this day, the mother advised the Court that she now had multiple of hours of audio recordings of her access visits, plus various transcripts that she intended to introduce.

405I asked why these particular recordings had not been raised at the Trial Scheduling Conferences before me. The mother said that they had been. I did not recall that, and the story then changed, suggesting that perhaps it had been raised in the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form. This lead to trial time being wasted looking for the original draft Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form that had been submitted, to verify this statement. No such intention had been included in the form.

406In any event, during the voir dire that ensued, I learned that the mother began audio recording her supervised visits. She said she knew that there were some parts of what she was doing that were “not legal or ethical”, but accused Ms. Johnson of being in a conflict of interest, so she began recording. Originally the mother used her telephone, but she said that if she received a phone call while recording, the recording would stop automatically. The mother said she deleted those recordings because they were considered “altered at that point”. There was another recording that the mother said that H. had started and stopped, that she deleted on similar grounds. She eventually started to use a different device to record, to avoid interruption.

407While I gather the mother’s position was that these recordings were ostensibly being made without the children knowing initially, the mother said she became aware that the children would come to know about the recordings later, because the matter was raised in court at the motion before Tellier J. on December 8, 2025. Counsel for OCL was aware that the mother was making these recordings at some point in the past too, and she wrote to the mother’s former counsel to object. The mother said that the Society was aware she was making these recordings for that matter, because she had had sent an email to Ms. Johnson, and she also let Ms. Wylde know. The point of all this, I gather, was the mother wanted the Court to find her recordings were not surreptitious.

408What the mother wanted to introduce at trial originally, was approximately 20 recordings, of about 2 hours each (approximately 40 hours). Although her recordings had been delivered to the Court mid-trial, she said they had been produced by her in October of 2025, when she launched her constitutional question. The mother had also included within her very voluminous trial productions, hundreds of pages of transcripts that she made using AI, that had not until this point, been drawn to my attention specifically. Counsel for the OCL told the Court that the AI tool the mother used to make these transcripts, had added its own commentary, such as opining that it sounded like the children were playing. The mother said that she used AI because she didn’t have the time to transcribe the recordings herself, yet she seemed to expect, at least initially when the issue first came up on April 28, 2026, the Court to listen to all 40 hours itself. Her use of AI in this fashion was probably a breach of the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings on the use of AI: see ¶ 222 of the Practice Direction. During the voir dire, the mother changed her approach, and said that the Court could instead listen to a sample, perhaps only 3 hours, for economy.

409I did not admit any of these recordings into evidence for various reasons, orally delivered. Among the several reasons delivered, I indicated that had there been some specific statement that the Society had made about her visits that she wanted to rebut, that might have been one thing. But that was not what the mother wanted me to do; she wanted me to listen to her recordings so I could hear for myself how she interacted at visits, in general.

410To those oral reasons I would just add this. The fact that these videos were not completely “surreptitious”, in that the other trial participants or Society employees knew about it at some point during the prior proceedings, is not dispositive in my view. On policy grounds, courts should be disapproving of this kind of behaviour at supervised visits. The mother’s complete focus should have been spending time with the children, and accepting feedback and coaching from the Society workers involved in facilitating those visits. Instead, she embarked on evidence gathering.

I. The Children’s Hearsay Statements

411The children’s hearsay statements in this case are of three general categories:

(a) Each of T. and H. have made a number of statements about their views;

(b) There are H.’s statements about his father having hit his penis, said on the mother’s video (Exhibit “B”, now Exhibit 123), to Dr. Lezhanska at the hospital, and when H. was interviewed by the Society afterwards; and

412There are a number of other statements in the Society’s affidavits, summarized in its hearsay chart, some of which I do not need to rely upon to dispose of this case. I do however note that the mother admitted to some of the events described by one the children, either in whole or in part, but while sometimes providing her own context.

J. The Children’s State of Mind Statements

413At ¶ 19 of Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.S. 2018 ONCJ 123, Sherr J. wrote:

The state of mind hearsay exception includes a child’s wishes and preferences and statements made by the child about his or her physical, mental and emotional state. The statements must assert a contemporaneous physical, mental or emotional state. They cannot include the reason for the child’s statement and should not be made under circumstances of suspicion.

414In this case before me, the children’s state of mind statements are statements about:

(a) T. enjoying living with his father (after the removal);

(b) T. saying his misses and loves his mother (after the removal);

(d) H. saying he is afraid of getting in trouble from his mother;

(e) At an early interview after the removal, H. saying that he missed his mother and wanted to return home;

(f) At subsequent interviews, H. saying that things are very good at his father’s home;

(g) H. saying he likes coming to the Society’s office for visits with his mother;

(h) H. saying he wanted to see his brother more often; and

(i) H. saying he wanted to see his mother more.

415These statements were made contemporaneously to Society workers who have a duty to record. The statements asserted a contemporaneous mental or emotional state of mind. Not all of the workers, like Andrea Knight, a family services worker employed with the child welfare agency in Guelph, who conducted home visits and met with T. in his father’s home, necessarily recalled things like T.’s demeanor and spontaneity, or the questions that she used during interviews, when some of his statements were made. But she testified that she had interviewed T. privately and had natural conversations with him.

416The mother did not establish that these kind of state of mind statements were made under circumstances of suspicion, such as coaching. In fact, the mother agreed when cross-examined by the OCL, that she would believe it, if either child had said they were happy in his father’s care. Notably, some of these statements speak to the children missing their mother too, which I have considered.

K. Analysis Regarding H.’s Statements that His Father Hit His Penis

417The Society sought to introduce some, but not all of the other children’s statements under the principled approach of establishing necessity and reliability. At ¶ 9-18 of Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.S., Sherr J. summarized those legal considerations respecting the admissibility of child hearsay, which I adopt here.

418The Society submitted that the necessity part of the principled approach to the admission of child hearsay was established in view of the children’s ages. No one took issue with that.

419Regarding reliability, citing R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35 and other cases, Sherr J. summarizes that hearsay dangers can be overcome and threshold reliability can be established by showing that (1) there are adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability) or (2) there are sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy (substantive reliability). These two approaches to establishing threshold reliability may work in tandem, and are not mutually exclusive.

420At the Trial Scheduling Conference before me on February 23, 2026, the mother said that she wanted Dr. Lezhanska to testify, to prove that she was not present when H. made his statement at the hospital, that the statement was not coached by her, and that ultimately the Society’s removal of the children from her care was not justified. During that same appearance, it seemed that the mother intended to ask this Court at trial, to find that the child’s statement should be admitted for the truth of its contents, and that the Court should make a finding that sexual abuse occurred.

421At the further Trial Scheduling Conference before me on March 12, 2026, the mother confirmed that she intended to ask the Court to rely on the child’s statement for its truth, and she now asks the Court to find sexual abuse, in one of her draft Orders for this trial.

422The Society did not seek to introduce H.’s statement for the truth of its contents. It does ask the Court to find the mother coached this.

423For the seven reasons that follow, I find that H.’s statements, that his father hit his penis, lack threshold reliability and will not be admitted for the truth of their contents. The child’s statement that his mother told him what to say however, is admitted and contributes to the Court’s finding that there has been coaching.

(1) Analysis Regarding Dr. Lezhanska’s Evidence

424Dr. Lezhanska testified twice during this trial, on May 1, 2026. When she was first called to testify in the morning, she only had with her, her handwritten note of the emergency room visit itself of August 20, 2024. She did not really have an independent recollection of what had happened, apart from reading what she had written in her note. She could not recall who was present in the room, or when, or whether the children were originally sleeping as the mother had said. Her hospital note did not indicate if she thought that the mother had told the child what to say. She could not initially recall whether she spoke to the Society again, on September 9, 2024 either; she believed her only call with the Society was at the time of her initial referral, based on her only hospital record.

425Over the lunch break, Dr. Lezhanska recalled that she had in fact had a second with Ms. Johnson on September 9, 2024. Dr. Lezhanska sent an email to counsel and to the mother, to correct her earlier evidence, advising that she had located a note of that September 9, 2024 telephone call.

426Dr. Lezhanska was recalled to testify in the afternoon. She explained that she had kept a note of that call in her computer, but it was not in the child’s medical chart, and that is why she did not have it when she originally testified. After being questioned about the September 9, 2024 phone call earlier in the day on May 1, 2026, she did a further search, and found the note of the September 9, 2024 call.

427Dr. Lezhanska’s note of September 9, 2024 reads as follows:

Called Sep 9 to discuss case further. Phone call around 1430 pm

I provided the following details:

I outlined the details of the presentation: mom was in the room with two boys (the patient and his older brother) and had been discussing her suspicions of abuse from the father in front of them. Pt was at times nervous when she would tell him things like “sit up for the doctor” sternly.

When mom asked the patient why his penis hurt he did say “daddy hit it”

Mom did ask the older brother to step out of the room once the patient had said that his dad hurt his penis. However, the patient did not have any other details to share about the incident.

He did have a urinalysis that was negative. He presented with one day of fever but at this time I could not recall if he was febrile in the ED or not.

I told Lindsay that I could not make any inferences about the mother’s intentions but could only share my objective observations.

428Nothing further of substance came from Dr. Lezhanska’s further testimony, as she could not remember the events in question beyond what was documented in her note.

429Frankly, it was unnecessary for the mother to have called her to testify at all. Her evidence did not establish that the mother was not in the room and that she had not coached H., as the mother had earlier claimed. In fact, it established the opposite.

430The best evidence from Dr. Lezhanska, comes from the contemporaneous documentation. Ms. Johnson’s case own note of the call on September 9, 2024, is consistent with Dr. Lezhanska’s note.

(2) The Society’s Interactions With the Mother on August 28, 2024, Prior to H.’s Interviews the Next Day Are Concerning

431When reviewing the file during her investigation of this incident, Ms. Johnson noticed a pattern whereby the mother often called to make reports before H.’s access exchanges were to occur. Different society workers had investigated those other calls, and did not verify other allegations, sometimes with the assistance of doctors.

432Following the hospital visit, Ms. Johnson contacted the mother on August 28, 2024. She said the mother was loud and expressed frustration, and objected to “give my child over to a known sexual abuser”. She said the mother accused the Society of corruption. She said the mother yelled and swore, and referred to H. as a “non-verbal autistic child” (he was not). When Ms. Johnson told the mother to stop yelling at her, and to adjust her tone, the mother said she would find “your governing authorities and I will report you and everyone else at CAS then”, before handing up. Ms. Johnson later learned the same day, that the mother had complained about her, to a supervisor.

433In her trial affidavit sworn March 18, 2026, society worker Sandra Brooks says that she too spoke to the mother on August 28, 2024. She said that the mother had admitted to her, that she had “went off” on Ms. Johnson. Ms. Brooks also found out from the mother, that there had been a court date in the family matter, the day before she took H. to the hospital. The mother however claimed to Ms. Brooks, that she found out the day after court, that the father had hit the child’s penis.

434During the mother’s cross-examination of Ms. Johnson, the mother tried to raise a “circumstance of suspicion” by pointing out that Ms. Johnson had informed the father of the allegation the day before the interview, suggesting that this could have “contaminat[ed]” the interview. But there was no indication of this during either Ms. Johnson’s or Ms. Brooks’ later interviews of the child, nor was any evidence elicited during this trial, that the father had “contaminated” the child’s interview, beforehand. To the contrary, in my view it was the mother who had done this.

(3) Ms. Johnson’s and Ms. Brooks Interview of H. on August 29, 2024

435Both Ms. Johnson and Ms. Brooks interviewed H. on August 29, 2024. Ms. Brooks in particular has much experience interviewing children, including in forensic settings.

436In addition to having worked as a child protection worker since 2012, Ms. Brooks trained in 2014, in Team Investigation Child Sexual Abuse in 2014. Ms. Brooks was then working as a child protection worker in Alberta. In her trial affidavit, she describes this training as “joint training for Child Protection workers, Edmonton Police Services (“EPS”) and Royal Canada Mounted Police (“RCMP”) officers.” Ms. Brooks says that she was then mentored by staff at the Zebra Child and Youth Advocacy Center in Edmonton, a multidisciplinary team of police officers, child protector assessors, internet child exploitation unit officers, medical professionals and advocates. Her role there was to facilitate any forensic interviews that she, and a police officer, were assigned to conduct.

437Ms. Brooks says she was qualified to forensically interview child and youth between the ages of three and sixteen, who have been “the victim of physical assault, sexual assault/other sexual crime, or who have witnessed violent crimes.” Her interviews were recorded and would be used as evidence in legal proceedings, or as a tool to help the child or young person prepare for court.

438Ms. Brooks says she completed over 300 hours of mentoring with the Zebra Centre and covered for full-time assessors when on vacation. She would also be asked to go to the Zebra Centre to assist with interviews when they needed to be completed urgently, and other assessors were unavailable. She says the Zebra Centre used the StepWise Interviewing model, and two recordings of her interviews were then used to train others across the prairie provinces. Ms. Brooks supervised intake workers and assessors between 2018 until she moved to Ontario in 2022. She was promoted into a supervisory with the Society here, in 2024.

439Ms. Brooks met with Ms. Johnson to help her prepare for the interview of H. They discussed questions using the StepWise model around truth, how to understand if a child’s language skills are developed enough for an interview, and how to use questions at the start of an interview in order to assess if the child is able to understand the questions asked of him.

440In other words, the Society approached this interview very seriously. And what H. actually disclosed, was that his mother had coached him, and in the process, he said that he was afraid to get in trouble from her.

441Ms. Johnson’s trial affidavit says that during her interview, H. first told her his name, and how old he is. During her in court testimony, Ms. Johnson said that H. understood that he was being interviewed by her. She says she asked him questions to ascertain his understanding of the difference between a truth and a lie. She says he was sometimes a little shy, but did not have difficulty answering questions. She says he did not give consistent answers throughout his interview in certain respects.

442In her trial affidavit, Ms. Johnson says that when asked if he knew why he was at the office, H. told her “because dad hit my penis”. When questioned further, H. told her that he did not know why the father hit his penis. He initially said his father was not mad when it happened, but then said his father was mad.

443Ms. Johnson asked H. when this happened; he said “yesterday”. He did not know how often the father had hit him and said that the first time was yesterday. The child had not been with his father “yesterday” and notably, in the mother’s video (Exhibit “B”/Exhibit 123), allegedly recorded two months later on October 28, 2024, the child also said he had been hit “yesterday”.

444Ms. Johnson asked H. how hard the father had hit him. She held out her hand, and H. gently tapped it.

445In her trial affidavit, Ms. Johnson says that H. had also told her, that his mother told him, that the father had said the “f word”. She asked what kinds of things the mother says to the father, and H. said that his mother says the “f word” to his father.

446Ms. Johnson asked H. what happens at his mother’s house when he gets in trouble or breaks the rules. H. told Ms. Johnson that his mother will spank him. H. told Ms. Brooks that his mother will get mad if he goes with his father. He said he was scared to go with his father, because he will get in trouble. These are some of the state of mind statements that I referred to above, although they probably also address the question of “why” H. feels that way (i.e. because the mother is not supporting the child’s relationship with the father and is using physical discipline). Ms. Johnson testified that she was concerned that H. was fearful of repercussions from the mother, as a result of statements made during the interview. I agree with her assessment of the situation.

447In this context, in her trial affidavit, Ms. Johnson says that she then asked H. if anyone told him what to say before coming to the office. H. said that his mother had told him what to say. During her in court testimony, Ms. Johnson said that she felt that this statement had definitely been “rehearsed”.

448Ms. Johnson asked Ms. Brooks for a second opinion. Ms. Brooks then came in and interviewed H. To Ms. Brooks:

(a) H. confirmed that he knew the difference between the truth and a lie, and gave examples;

(b) After Ms. Brooks explored H. understanding about telling the truth further, H. then confirmed that his mother told him he was coming for a “talking appointment”;

(c) When asked if his mother had told him what they were going to talk about, H. said “mommy told me to say daddy hit my penis”;

(d) H. was unable to tell Ms. Brooks why or how his father had hit him in a free narrative;

(e) When asked when it occurred, he said “yesterday”, yet again;

(f) H. did not know how his father had hit him. When Ms. Brooks gave an example, and asked if he had been hit with a toy, H. said he did not know. When later asked if he had been hit with a doll, H. said yes;

(g) When asked if the father had hit his penis while in the bath, H. said yes;

(h) When asked why, he said he did not know;

(i) H. knew that he went to the doctor. He explained that his penis hurt when he pees;

(j) H. demonstrated how the father hit his penis, by using a light tap on the table;

(k) H. did not know how he reacted, when his father hit him; and

(l) H. was not worried about seeing his father, but he did say he was afraid of getting in trouble from his mother. He then focused on a toy he brought with him and stopped responding to questions. The interview ended.

(4) The Events After the Interviews

449In her trial affidavit, Ms. Johnson says that following the interview, on both August 29, 2024, and again at an exchange on August 30, 2024, the mother objected to sending H. on a visit with his father.

450Ms. Johnson supervised the exchange on August 30, 2024. During H.’s father’s counsel’s cross-examination of Ms. Johnson, Ms. Johnson testified that she observed the mother got down to H.’s level at the exchange, to comfort him that he would be ok. Ms. Johnson testified that H. was fine and didn’t need comforting, suggesting later on when cross-examined by the OCL, that the mother was projecting her own worries onto the child.

451Ms. Johnson also supervised the visit afterwards, with H.’s father. She observed that H. did not seem fearful to her, and she says she observed positive interactions.

(5) H.’s Father’s Testimony

452The father “categorically” denied the abuse when he testified. He opined that perhaps if the child had any pain in that area, it was caused by the buckles in his car seat. But he is of the view that the mother coached the child to make this statement. He gave other examples of other allegations the mother has made after H., an active boy, had minor scratches or bruises from time to time from play, in his care.

453A number of other witnesses who have observed H. since the removal, testified that they have never seen H.’s father physically harm him in any way. Nor have they heard H. ever make such a statement, nor have they observed H. to be afraid of his father.

454Separately, regarding the use of any physical discipline, witnesses who testified on H.’s father’s behalf, all testified that his discipline includes talking to H., and at worst, removing a toy for a short period of time. There was no evidence called during this trial that H.’s father uses physical discipline.

(6) Dr. Spreadbury’s Evidence

455As indicated earlier, the mother questioned the child, again, in Dr. Spreadbury’s office and in his presence, on September 10, 2024. She did not follow through with the further testing that he requisitioned.

(7) Exhibit “B”/Exhibit 123: The Mother’s Video of the Child in the Car

456The mother made this video. As I have already found, the video does not reflect well on her.

L. Summary and Conclusions About H.’s Statements that His Father Hit His Penis

457H.’s statements that his father hit his penis are not admitted into evidence for the truth of their contents. They are lacking in threshold reliability. I find that the mother coached the child to say these things. I reach this conclusion because:

(a) H. himself said this;

(b) In general, there are numerous issues with the mother’s credibility, that I have flagged throughout this Judgment;

(d) H. had not been in his father’s care “yesterday”;

(e) I don’t believe that the mother told Dr. Lezhanska about the earlier SCAN referral, that had been cancelled, without elaborating about her alleged concerns;

(f) The mother claimed not to be in the room when Dr. Lezhanska examined the child. Yet each of Dr. Lezhanska’s and Ms. Johnson’s notes of the September 9, 2024 call reveal the opposite, and that she was coaching. I find the mother the mother was untruthful with this Court when testifying about this. I find that she left the room with T., only after first eliciting that statement from the child in Dr. Lezhanska’s presence;

(g) The mother inappropriately made the video (Exhibit “B”/Exhibit 123), most likely either before the emergency room visit, and if not then before the child’s interviews by Ms. Johnson and Ms. Brooks. She did this in aid of having the child make a statement to someone else, whether a doctor or a Society worker;

(h) The mother questioned the child at Dr. Spreadbury’s office;

(i) The mother unnecessarily told H.’s teacher that there had been “SA” after she already knew that the Society was not verifying the child’s statement. At the same time, she lied to H.’s teacher in her email of September 10, 2024, when she indicated that the father had initiated Society involvement. When the mother was cross-examined by the OCL about this email, the mother invented a new explanation to explain her claim that the father had involved the Society, saying that the father had initiated “subsequent events”, the “next thing you know, I’m mentally unstable” and the children were removed. She also claimed that she has “communication issues”; and

(j) The other observation evidence of H.’s father with H. does not corroborate the truth behind this statement.

458These findings and conclusions also dispose of the mother’s request in one of her draft Orders for a finding that H. is in need of protection as a result of “sexual abuse by his father”. That claim is dismissed.

M. The Children’s Statements that the Mother Uses Physical Discipline and Yelling

459H. told Ms. Johnson during the interview on August 29, 2024, that his mother will spank him if he breaks the rules at home. But it was T., more so than H., who reported the mother’s physical discipline and yelling to the Society.

460For example, at the home visit on January 7, 2025, Ms. Knight asked T. about the video that she had seen (i.e. the Ring Camera videos). Throughout her interview, T. reported that his mother yells and swears at him, but said that it is “not on purpose”. T. reported two incidents where the mother spanked him, and one occasion where she “accidentally” hit him in the stomach. He said the mother treated H. in the same fashion. He also said that the maternal grandmother once hit H. with a belt.

461T. rationalized this behaviour, saying it was “Ok” because he was “not listening”. He also told Ms. Knight about an argument that he remembered between his mother and R. when the family lived together, during which the mother got mad and threw a ladder down the stairs. He rationalized this, by saying that “nobody was there” and “nobody got hurt when his mother did this”.

462I find these statements to have threshold reliability. In addition to the fact that there is procedural reliability, there is substantive reliability. There is an abundance of evidence about the mother’s unstable and erratic behaviour. That the mother had difficulty in the mornings managing T., was admitted to by the mother.

463There are also the mother’s own admissions, about her use of physical discipline, albeit minimized. Regarding the ladder, the mother claimed that she accidentally knocked a step ladder down the stairs, that R. and F. were downstairs, and that F. assumed she had thrown it. The mother said that she then got “verbally attacked”. This was eerily similar to the explanation offered up when she threw the letter box that injured H.’s father, an injury caused accidentally as H.s’ father just happened to be walking by when this projectile was thrown by her.

464Finally, I find that T. was protecting his mother during Ms. Knight’s interviews of him. To do so, he was taking responsibility for the mother’s mistreatment of him. This is unhealthy.

PART VI: STATUTORY FINDINGS

465The Court is required to make the statutory findings in section 90(2) of the CYFSA. No one took issue with any of the required findings being made for either child.

466T. is a FNIM child. His West Coast Samish Indigenous heritage is though his father and his paternal grandmother.[24] In its closing submissions, the OCL sought to confirm the FNIM finding would be made again, and made some limited submissions about this.

467Earlier in this proceeding, when the mother’s friend M.W., and the maternal grandmother brought motions seeking access, and party status, they also sought to challenge the early FNIM finding that Tellier J. and then McCarthy J. made. The maternal grandmother and M.W. were not added as parties by McCarty J., and consequently they were not given permission to insert themselves into this case to challenge that finding. That no one else was challenging T.’s FNIM status since that time, was confirmed in McCarty J.’s Endorsement of August 21, 2025, almost one year ago.

468As T. is a FNIM child, the Court intends to apply the appropriate legislative provisions in the CYFSA and the Federal Act, to address the issues concerning T. Even if T. had not been found to be a FNIM child, the mother would not have prevailed under the CYFSA’s provisions respecting disposition. For example, in the result of any consideration of sections 101(3) or 101(8) of the CYFSA for example (which I still consider for H.), neither child can be returned to his mother’s care. Similarly, had I only applied the best interests test in section 74(3) of the CYFSA for both children, as opposed to the enhanced best interests in the Federal Act for T., neither child can be returned to his mother’s care. In other words, on the facts of this case, the result for T. would be no different under either statute.

PART VII: ANALYSIS REGARDING WHETHER THE CHILDREN ARE IN NEED OF PROTECTION

A. The Protection Findings Sought by the Society, and by the Mother

469The Society seeks findings that the children are in need of protection pursuant to sections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii), and 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA. Those sections read:

A child is in need of protection where,

(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charged of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(h) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) and that the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to treatment to prevent the harm;

470The emotional harm of the kind described in section 74(2)(f)(i)-(v) is serious anxiety, withdrawal, self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or delayed development.

471The Society has satisfied the Court that both children should be found in need of protection based on all three kinds of risk of harm.

472In one of her alternative draft Orders, the mother makes reference to a risk of emotional harm arising from exposure to ongoing parental conflict, which I assume is referable to the section 74(2)(h), which the Society also pursues. In another alternative draft Order, she claims that H. is in need of protection from his father as a result of sexual abuse, which I assume was referable to section 74(2)(c). That section also requires a finding that the mother failed to protect the child, a finding I doubt she would want the Court to make. In any event, sexual abuse was not made out on the facts.

473In that same draft Order, the mother seeks a finding that T. is in need of protection as a result of [actual] emotional harm “and the failure of his father to protect him from exposure to known safety concerns”. I’m not clear on what she means by that, although I assume here, she is referring to T.’s father arranging for contact with R. and F. since the removal. The Court has not found a danger from exposure to R. and F. For that matter, the “known safety concerns” to which T. might have been exposed, are the result of her actions.

B. Risk of Physical Harm

474 Section 74(2)(b) of the CYFSA involves the risk of physical harm to a child. The Society must establish a risk that the child is “likely” to suffer physical harm. “Likely” to suffer has the implied connotation of “more probable than not”. There are three separate circumstances which may qualify for a finding on (b) grounds. The risk may be a likelihood that physical harm will be inflicted, it can result from inadequate care, provision for, supervision of or protecting the child, or it can result from a pattern of neglect in doing those things.

475Principles in the case law reveal that:

(a) There must be a causal connection between the risk of physical harm and parental conduct: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.A.L. 2025 ONCJ 348;

(b) The risk of harm must be real and likely, not speculative: see Children’s Aid Society of Rainy River v. B. (C.), 2006 ONCJ 458;

(c) A child may be at risk even if the conduct is not directed specifically towards the child: see Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251;

(d) Physical abuse, inappropriate discipline, inadequate supervision, domestic violence, untreated mental illness, and untreated addictions, are common circumstances leading to findings of either actual physical harm or a risk of physical harm: see Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. E.M.T., 2019 ONCJ 767; and

(e) Verbal abuse, aggression, and inappropriate situations that children are exposed to can constitute risk of physical harm: see Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251.

476All of the above examples of the kind of behaviour or circumstances from these cases, are present in this case.

C. Risk of Emotional Harm

477The kinds of emotional harm listed in section 74(2)(f) of the CYFSA are qualified by the use of the word “serious”. However the Society has not sought a finding of actual harm pursuant to section 74(2)(f); it is pursuing a finding of risk only, under section 74(2)(h).

478Expert evidence is not required for the Court to make a finding of a risk of emotional harm: see Chukwunomso v. Ransome, 2017 ONCJ 121, Footnote 5; see also Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.A.P., 2020 ONCA 208 ¶ 6. Because I am not being asked to find actual emotional harm, I need not decide if the impact already visited upon the children from the events in this case rises to the “serious” level that is required by section 74(2)(f). Rather by constraining is request to section 74(2)(h), the Society must prove that the risk of emotional harm of the kind in (f) is more likely than not to occur. This section is future looking, and focuses on the types of harm, its degree and any causal connection between harm and parental conduct. Although no actual emotional harm symptoms are needed, the Society does have to establish risk on a balance of probabilities: see Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. J.B., 2019 ONCJ.

479On this point, I find helpful, ¶ 206 of Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N., 2019 ONCJ 8, at which Zisman J. wrote:

In this case, no expert evidence was called however, there was evidence from several experienced family service workers who expressed serious concerns about the risk of emotional harm to the children. I also draw on my own common sense conclusion that children who are exposed to years of domestic violence, turmoil and conflict in the parents’ relationship and children who have been the subject of litigation for the last 4.5 years and as a result have been subjected to numerous investigations are at risk of suffering emotional harm.

D. Analysis Regarding the Numerous Risks of Both Physical and Emotional Harm

480The record in this case before is overwhelming; there are a multitude of risks of physical and emotional harm to these children. Quite frankly, this inescapable conclusion is patently obvious.

(1) Parental Conflict and Family Violence

481Without needing to repeat all of the factual findings already made, first T., and then T. and H., have been directly and indirectly exposed to extreme parental and other family conflict, across the mother’s relationships with their fathers (during it and then post-separation), and throughout their exposure to the mother’s relationships with her own mother, her brother and her brother’s partner, in the mother’s various households. The conflict has included direct and indirect exposure to family violence, perpetuated by the mother towards their fathers, and other family members. I did not find persuasive, the mother’s and her witnesses attempts to claim that she insulated the children from the conflict and her violence, or that arguments never occurred in their presence. Those suggestions were contradicted by a multitude of other evidence, and were not credible.

482Expert evidence is not required here. Although she was writing about family violence in the context of a different kind of case, at ¶ 143 of Barendregt v. Grebliunas, Karatkatsanis J. said:

The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al., “A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth” (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497.

483Given the extreme conflict and the acts of family violence that the mother perpetuated towards both of her former partners and other family members, to which the children have been exposed, the Society has satisfied me that there is a risk of both physical and emotional harm. The risks have continued given the behaviour that the mother has continued to engage since the children’s removal.

(2) The Use of Physical Discipline

484The mother’s physical discipline of T., shown on those Ring Camera videos, which included yelling and swearing at him, is alarming. She didn’t recognize the severity of her actions during the trial. As far as I am concerned, it was an assault. The mother’s evidence that she only used physical discipline on two occasions, and only on T. and not H., is not credible. Nor is her evidence that she recognizes her actions and got meaningful help to address her mental health.

485In the result, the Society has satisfied me that there is a risk of both physical and emotional harm relating to the mother’s use of physical discipline.

486The Court became concerned when it heard, in the context of the record as a whole, that T.’s father also spanked T. on two prior occasions prior to the removal (his evidence changed to three times, in cross-examination). T.’s father’s also attempted to provide some context for his actions.

487In tandem with this evidence, the Court heard some evidence, that T.’s father has unresolved issues that may impact his parenting. Erin Swayne is a child, youth and family support worker employed by the Society, who worked with T.’s father after the removal. She is a trained facilitator for the Circle of Security parenting program, a kind of a parenting course or training, that she did with the father. Ms. Swayne worked with T.’s father on this program between February 20, 2025 and July 8, 2025. While she gave evidence that the father successfully completed it and T.’s father himself also testified about what he learned from it, there was a period of time that the father disengaged during it.

488T.’s father vaguely explained that he disengaged for a while because the program triggered him to re-assess his own relationship with his father from childhood. What exactly this meant was not then really explored. When T.’s father’s partner later testified, she explained that T.’s father had expressed to her being upset on one occasion after he spanked T. Although she didn’t expressly say it, I understood her evidence to relate back to this evidence of disengagement in the Circle of Security program, and to T.’s father’s childhood issues with his own father. In other words, although no one came out and said it, the evidence suggested that T.’s father himself had been subjected to physical discipline or perhaps abuse in his childhood. Whatever it is, this does not seem to have been explored fully prior to trial.

489The evidence about the impact on T., from exposure to conflict and physical discipline (discussed below), included some behavioural issues in T.’s father’s home, more so when he first transitioned there. The Court had additional concerns, that a recommendation was made for T. to receive some therapy in February of 2025, and T.’s father declined it, “for now”. Although a pediatric referral was made (Ms. Shaw said the referral was made right away in February of 2025), T. later saw the pediatrician only in October of 2025, due to a wait list. That was an eight month delay. He is finally now on another wait list for therapy, as of December of 2025. My concern here is that when an obvious need for therapy for this child was identified, T.’s father responded in such a way that may have contributed to the delay to its the start.

490I considered making a finding that T. was at risk based on this evidence too. But balanced against that, and unlike the mother’s plan, there was a considerable amount of other positive evidence about T.’s father’s supports, the fact that there has been no physical discipline since the removal, about T.’s improved school attendance, about his access to proper health care (apart from the therapy), and about T.’s father’s willingness to continue to work with the Society. The Society consented to stay involved, to oversee T.’s father getting two services into place.

491In other words, when I balance T.’s father’s past behaviour and even some of the unknowns respecting his own childhood issues and whether he has dealt with them, against these various supports he has in place, coupled with his willingness to work with the Society voluntarily, I find it is not necessary at this time to make a further finding about this.

(3) The Impact of the Mother’s Physical Discipline on T.

492It is alarming to this Court, that in conversations with T. after the removal on June 17, 2025 and September 9, 2025, Ms. Knight said that T. deflected or redirected when she tried to talk about his visits with his mother. T. also told Ms. Knight that it was “Ok” that the mother hit him, because he “was not listening”, or she didn’t do it “on purpose”, as indicated. That is equally concerning. When Ms. Knight asked follow up questions, T. said that at times it made him feel sad, but not “really, really sad” and “just sad”.

493It appears to me that he was internalizing and taking responsibility for the mother’s conduct. It also appears to me that he may have been repeating the mother’s view, that her actions were not her fault (because of her diagnosis and medication).

494It is concerning to the Court, that on June 17, 2025 (after the removal), T.’s father reported to Ms. Knight, that since coming into his care, T. imposed punishments on himself. For example, T.’s father said that T. has reacted badly to being redirected at bedtime. If redirected, T. would clear off his bed, sleep without a pillow or a bedsheet and say things like “I am a bad kid” or “I am grounded”. He has also had some discipline issues at school. T.’s current teacher reviewed T.’s report cards, and confirmed that emotional regulation issues occurred. In my view, this is a causal connection to his exposure to dysfunction and violence while under the mother’s watch.

495Perhaps there were even grounds to find actual emotional harm here, based on this evidence, had it been pursued. This evidence certainly adds to the Court’s conclusions, that there is a risk of emotional harm.

(4) The Mother’s False Sexual Abuse Allegations

496As a by-product of the mother’s ongoing conflict with H.’s father, the mother has coached the child and is making false allegations of sexual abuse, as indicated. H. is at risk of emotional harm arising out of these false sexual abuse allegations.

497In her quest to have someone find abuse, she has subjected this child to one medical examination, and to questioning by, or in the presence of two doctors (Dr. Lezhanska and Dr. Spreadbury), as well as by two Society workers. She has also questioned the child herself, and filmed it. This followed earlier allegations of physical abuse.

498I have no confidence that the mother won’t engage in repeat behaviour of this kind in the future, were H. to be left in her care, unmonitored or even under a supervision Order. This risks exposing H. to more examinations and interviewing, and the disruption of the father-son relationship. This poses a risk of emotional harm.

(5) Concerns About the Children’s Education

499The children’s education, while under the mother’s watch, is concerning. The mother has been unable to manage this; indeed she outright neglected T.’s education over a sustained period of time. The neglect of a child’s education can lead to a finding of a risk of emotional harm depending on the impact on the child: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N. ¶ 233.

500Under the mother’s watch, T. went to three different schools for junior kindergarten, senior kindergarten, and grade one. There was a fourth school change in grade two, as a result of the removal.

501The OCL called T.’s current teacher to testify. T.’s teacher reviewed his Ontario School Record going back over the past few years since he started school. Starting during the 2021-2022 school year until the end of the 2023-2024 school year (specifically until June 28, 2024), T. missed an incredible 129 school days, between junior kindergarten to the end of grade one. He was late to school 223 times. Lates and absences had been less of a concern for H., but notably H. only started school during the 2024-2025 school year, and soon into the school year, the removal happened.

502The mother testified that after she heard the OCL call evidence about the sheer number of T.’s school absences and lateness, it was “eye opening” and she was “flabbergasted”. She said she went home and compared the numbers as a proportion of the total days in a school year, and acknowledged she could “see why this is an issue”.

503The mother then offered various explanations for this. She said that T. needed a lot of “mental health days”. She made the issue about herself, and claimed that she prides herself on education, and so she was really “pissed”. At another time she claimed that T. missed school on Fridays because he had to be removed early from school before weekends when his father had access.

504When cross-examined by T.’s father’s lawyer, she said there were days that T. had severe asthma, and said that by the time of the removal, he had medication (whereas before, I supposed he did not was her point). She said the father does not have animals to inflame his asthma, and so that would contribute to the improved attendances after the removal. Which begs the question: why were there so many pets in the maternal grandparents’ house, if they made T. sick with asthma? When Ms. Shaw pursued that, the mother defended her decision to have pets, saying that she couldn’t control the fact that her parents had dogs. But she also obtained cats for the boys. To this, she claimed that she did not let the children’s cats go into the boys’ room. She said that the house was not clean when R. and F. lived there, but now it is.

505The mother admitted what others had been saying, that there were often “difficulties” in the mornings. Although she had earlier tried to explain away her prior behaviour due to not having a proper diagnosis or yet being on Vyvanse, when it was put to her that absences and lates continued after the diagnosis and the Vyvanse, the mother then explained that she was on the wrong dose of Vyvanse, but that is no longer an issue as it has now been gradually increased to a higher dose. At another point she said that she couldn’t take her Vyvanse until later in the mornings, because otherwise it would wear off too early, and so she was essentially unmedicated in the mornings.

506When the Court asked how her how she would handle that situation in the future, the mother claimed to have implemented change, starting as of April of 2023, wherein she would get up early to go to the gym, to get energy, in lieu of taking Vyvanse too early, that would wear off. The mother claimed to have done this at the time when she was living on her own in an apartment with the children, and not with her parents, so the children would have been left alone in the apartment, perhaps sleeping those mornings. When she was challenged about the wisdom of that, she said that they were monitored by her friend M.W., who had access to her video cameras. And when that was explored further, more stories emerged about how the children were not at risk being left alone, because the gym was nearby, or M.W. had been watching the children through these cameras, or that some neighbours apparently knew about it. The mother also claimed to have bought “hundreds of dollars” of workbooks for homework, to compensate for the absences through at home learning. Once again, the story kept changing and the mother’s made up excuses did not make sense.

507Basically, after purporting to acknowledge the problem, the mother made up a series of falsehoods, on the spot, as her evidence unfolded, to try to explain all this way. Incidentally, she also had M.W. testify that she monitored the children over the ring cameras, to try to bolster these tales.

508Finally, the mother also threatened H.’s teacher, in January of 2026 (discussed below). This is concerning, too.

509This is a case where neglect of T.’s education was impactful on him, and therefore it is a child protection issue. H. is also at risk even though he had just started school before the removal; it is doubtful that the mother would have done any better of a job getting him to school on time. H. already had issues with delayed development as it was, and T. was emotionally dysregulated. I find that both children are at risk of emotional harm due to the mother’s neglect of T.’s education.

(6) The Mother’s Internet Behaviour

510The risks of harm associated with this are also obvious, and have already been addressed extensively above. I need not repeat this evidence.

511During this trial, the mother demonstrated no willingness to cut it out, often choosing to focus on her own rights instead of putting the needs of her children ahead of hers. The mother is so strident, that the Court has found that the only way to possibly stop her, includes a Restraining Order. I find that the children are at risk of emotional harm from the mother’s internet behaviour. Frankly, there is also risk of physical harm, if in the future someone like “Megan”, (whom the mother referred to a “crack cocaine addict”) comes looking for the mother (and her family) for retribution, as “Megan” seemed to imply she might do on her voicemail.

(7) The Mother Has Mismanaged the Children’s Health Care

• T.’s Health Care

512I will begin with T’s health care.

513Dr. Spreadbury is the children’s and mother’s current family doctor. The mother used several of these appointments as an opportunity to inform Dr. Spreadbury of her conflict with H.’s father. While Dr. Spreadbury said that he did not have to admonish the mother for bad behaviour in his clinic, he was aware of a high degree of conflict between the parents and said that systems had to be put in place to ensure that both parents were given what they were entitled to. At a minimum, this would be an irritating nuisance for any health care provider, but it also poses a risk that the children’s health needs will go unmet in the future, if the focus of appointments is on parent conflict, and not on health. There is a risk that health care professionals will decline service.

514This already happened with the previous family doctor, although the mother’s version is that she “fired” him. For example, at an appointment on May 25, 2023, notably three months after the mother had her diagnosis and a Vyvanse prescription, the mother told Dr. Spreadbury that she was close to the end of her rope with T. She said he was “annoying and malicious”. Mother told Dr. Spreadbury that T. had “serious anger issues”, but his note indicates that it was the mother who looked more angry than the child. The mother reported to Dr. Spreadbury, that she had asked for an assessment from Dr. Steffler, but he would not assist, and his note says that the mother had reported “fir[ing]” Dr. Steffler, because he refused to engage in some kind of “back and forth” debate with H.’s father, regarding what was being said at appointments. In addition to demonstrating an example of parenting conflict filtering into medical appointments, this note reveals yet again, the mother’s challenges parenting T. at a time she was supposedly properly diagnosed and taking medication.

515The mother was given some forms for her and T.’s teacher to complete, in relation to exploring whether the child had ADHD. There is also a reference to the need for a referral to “pediatric psychiatry”, due to “stresses on mother”. Dr. Spreadbury did not know whether T. was ever assessed for ADHD or ODD after that. He did not know that he ever got the forms back from her. In other words, the mother did not follow up, after having made these complaints about T.’s behaviours. This is an example of neglect.

516The mother has projected her own issues onto T. I heard evidence at this trial, that during supervised access, the mother told T. that he might have ADHD. She also talked about dyslexia when T. mispronounced some words while the two read together. In cross-examination by the OCL, the mother denied that she ever told T. that he might have ADHD, but admitted to having told him that she has ADHD, there is a genetic component to it, and so perhaps he has it too. She also admitted that she told T. that his reading reminded her of dyslexia, and that she has dyslexia. As far as I am concerned, this is splitting hairs.

• H.’s Health Care

517The situation respecting the mother’s management of H.’s health care was even more egregious.

518Dr. Steffler (the doctor the mother “fired”) used to be H.’s doctor, before Dr. Spreadbury took over. On March 17, 2022, after her 2021 separation from H.’s father, the mother began to express concerns as to H.’s gross motor and speech and language development, and she obtained a referral for an autism assessment.

519According to the note of a now retired doctor, Dr. White, dated May 31, 2022, at this first autism assessment, the mother and the maternal grandmother reported that H. was still not walking independently, he had poor language skills, and he had poor social interactions.[25] Dr. White’s note reads that the child “does appear to have autism”. He used a “MCHAT-R questionnaire”, that showed a score that tended to corroborate this diagnosis, so he made a referral to the Children’s Treatment Centre.

520In another note of December 13, 2022, the mother reported that there was now a dispute about who was going to deal with H.’s testing. Regarding H.’s apparent behaviours, the mother reported that H. was pulling hair, acting aggressively, and having diarrhea, after visits with the father. The note says that the mother had arranged for private speech therapy for his delayed speech and language, but it is unclear to this Court whether this was even properly pursued. For example, in her trial affidavit, Ms. Wylde says that H. was to be engaged in a Toddler Talk program, but he was removed from this service due to the lack of involvement by the mother.

521Meanwhile, by March 29, 2023, an occupational therapist at the Children’s Treatment Center discharged H., as he was doing “very well” and did not require the service. The report states that H. was interested in learning activities, he had sustained attention and he showed perseverance in a one-to-one setting. He had brief, but consistent initiation of social interaction with pointing, eye contact and facial expressions. His fine motor skills were within the average range and seemed to be developing steady. Recommendations included that H. participate in a day care or pre-school. The report also noted that the mother was going to continue with speech therapy though. I heard no evidence of either a day care or pre-school enrollment after this recommendation had been made.

522According to the note of April 5, 2023 in Dr. Spreadbury’s file, the mother at this appointment reported conflict again; she said that she had a traumatic relationship. Dr. Spreadbury testified that the mother would have made these statements to him, with the child in the room. Regarding H., a plan was formulated to complete new questionnaires for use in another autism assessment, at the next appointment.

523Meanwhile, according to a report from Sawyer Michael, a service Navigator at the Children’s Treatment Centre dated May 5, 2023, the Children’s Treatment Centre had received a referral on June 3, 2022 for ADOS testing (testing for autism), but within the same referral the diagnoses of both ASD and Developmental delay were already identified, so the testing was not then done at that time. Instead, H. started therapies and it was noted once again, that he had made gains. Upon further investigation, the Children’s Treatment Centre would later discover that a formal diagnosis of ASD had not been provided. So ADOS testing was then done, on a delayed basis.

524H. then had a formal autism assessment on June 7, 2023 at the Children’s Treatment Centre. H.’s ADOS score reflected a “Minimal-To-No Evidence of autism spectrum-related symptoms and his overall total indicates an ADOS-2 classification of Non-Spectrum”, although the report states that it should be provided to the child’s referring pediatrician, to be used in the context of a full history and not used for diagnostic purposes independently.

525Next, the mother took H. to the emergency room on January 10, 2024, this time alleging physical abuse after an access visit with H.’s father. The mother also contacted Dr. Spreadbury’s office on January 10, 2024 about this, asking to speak to Dr. Spreadbury urgently. Dr. Spreadbury testified that that may have been on a day that he wasn’t in the clinic. He testified that had he been, he could have conducted a physical examination, but it would have been preferable for the mother to attend at the hospital emergency room for a more “accurate forensic recording” anyway. While Dr. Spreadbury testified that he had noted complaints of abuse from the mother more than once, he did not see anything that was an injury, although he felt that others could better assess that.

526The mother persisted. She went to Dr. Spreadbury’s office the next day, on January 11, 2024. Regarding the abuse allegations of the day before, the mother took the opportunity to raise concerns, this time about bags under the child’s eyes, and marks. Dr. Spreadbury testified that the bags under the eyes were nothing unusual, and that one of the marks that he could recall was not a bruise and would not have been caused four days earlier, when the father last saw the child. Whatever it was (he described it as a “blush”) would have been caused more recently (in relation to the timing of this appointment). Despite the results of the Children’s Treatment Centre obtained just 7 months earlier, now the mother obtained yet another referral from Dr. Spreadbury to Dr. Savenkov, for another autism assessment.

527Dr. Oleg Savenkov is a child and adolescent psychiatrist. He was educated as a medical doctor abroad, but completed his post graduate training in psychiatry in 2006. He is licensed to practice medicine in Ontario. Part of his practice includes the routine assessment of children for autism. He was qualified to give evidence as a participant expert in the diagnosis of autism.

528Dr. Savenkov undertook his assessment of H. following the aforementioned referral from Dr. Spreadbury. Notably, he conducted his assessment by videoconference.

529The father did not participate in the video appointment. That is because there had been some conflict between the parents beforehand about whether the father could attend, or not. The father says he was told to leave before the meeting started. The mother admitted that there had been conflict, and that H.’s father had been excluded. I find she was the cause behind that.

530Now with the father out of the way, only the mother supplied information about H. Dr. Savenkov testified that he relied entirely on information from the mother. Dr. Savenkov did not have other medical documentation from H.’s chart. He testified that any observations of the child would not have contributed in a material way to his assessment. While he added in cross-examination that symptoms of autism are longitudinal, and it would not be uncommon to rely on parent reports, he did not hear from the father, and as would be the case in a later assessment of Dr. Gupta, he did not really make any of his own observations of the child. The information that the mother supplied to him was misleading.

531Dr. Savenkov’s letter states that the mother reported a prior diagnosis by Dr. White in 2022, and that H. began receiving various therapies at the Children’s Centre. The Children’s Centre requested an update in May 2023, but Dr. White had retired. After another referral to a pediatrician was unsuccessful, the Children’s Centre did its own assessment, and ruled out autism in July of 2023. But Dr. Savenkov did not have these records to review. The mother went on to report a significant family history of ADHD, PTSD and anxiety (in the mother), she said that the maternal grandmother was awaiting an ADHD assessment of her own, and the mother claimed that other relatives had histories of both autism and ADHD.

532The mother reported delayed speech, “severe daily tantrums over minor frustrations”, poor motor skills, loud noises distressing him, picky eating, and other reports, Notably, to the extent that Dr. Savenkov did observe the child over video (which again he said did not significantly factor into his examination), his letter says that H was not disruptive or hyperactive, he maintained appropriate eye contact and could sit still. His mood was fine. But his speech was “extremely limited”, since he uttered random words.

533Although the mother was at this appointment to discuss autism, just as she had done with Dr. Spreadbury, she took the opportunity to throw into the mix, some comments about the parental conflict that she said had been going on. Dr. Savenkov’s report begins by stating that the mother reported abuse from the father, and said the Society and police had been involved, without providing meaningful help or protection.

534In the result, Dr. Savenkov wrote that the child “likely [met] criteria for autism spectrum disorder”, and recommended pursuing behavioural and speech therapies. According to H.’s teacher, the mother would later fill out a school form indicating such a diagnosis.

535When cross-examined by counsel for the Society, Dr. Savenkov said that his use of the word “likely” in his report probably meant that he had not given an actual diagnosis, in that it was a “high likelihood” as opposed to a “definite diagnosis”. He went on to say that where there is conflicting information, the child should have a “multidisciplinary assessment” (which his January 2024 assessment was not). He agreed that an assessment, like the one that Dr. Gupta would later do, that took into account information from both parents, a teacher’s report, ADOS testing and the assessor’s own observations, would indeed be more thorough. He also testified that a diagnosis can change as a child ages. Towards the end of Ms. Hawn’s cross-examination, Dr. Savenkov qualified his evidence further, said that he wasn’t quite sure of the diagnosis, which is why he used the word “likely”.

536The mother next attended at Dr. Spreadbury’s office on February 20, 2024. At this meeting, Dr. Spreadbury discussed with the mother, Dr. Savenkov’s letter of January 24, 2024, and discussed referrals for treatment. The mother also asked for a referral for a pediatrician who specialized in abuse, likely in Toronto (i.e. another discussion of alleged abuse). The next several interactions with the health care system focused on the mother pursuing abuse allegations (i.e. between June of 2024 and September of 2024). As these were abuse allegations, that then fed in and morphed into sexual abuse allegations, they have been dealt with already above, and will not be repeated here.

537Following the removal, H. underwent another assessment, now for ADHD, ODD and autism, so that there could be some clarity. Dr. Chandan Gupta, a consultant pediatrician, did this assessment. The mother attempted to suggest to Dr. Gupta, that he was not an “autism specialist”, and that most “autism specialists” are psychiatrists. Dr. Gupta testified that there is no such thing as an “autism specialist” in pediatrics, and that while psychiatrists do diagnose adults, for children it is common for either a medical doctor, a pediatrician or a developmental pediatrician, to diagnose.

538Before this assessment even got underway, the mother tried to interfere. Dr. Gupta testified that the mother threatened to sue him, if he went ahead with H.’s autism assessment. The mother would later threaten to complain to the College of Physicians and Surgeons about Dr. Gupta. Apparently during Dr. Gupta’s meetings with H.’s father and the child, the father had reported that the mother has bipolar disorder. In another written communication from the mother sent March 24, 2026, just a month before the start of this trial, the mother asked Dr. Gupta to delete the reference to bipolar disorder in his records. Dr. Gupta said that he sent a registered letter to the mother explaining that he could not amend the earlier record, but he would add an addendum to note her requested correction, and he did in fact do this. Dr. Gupta testified that the registered letter was returned to him. He said the mother said that she would be writing to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding the erroneous record. He did not however hear from the College subsequently.

539Dr. Gupta’s review during the assessment once underway, included information from the father, from the child’s teacher, and from the child’s medical history. While the mother was not involved in supplying information to Dr. Gupta and the father was, Dr. Gupta had Dr. Savenkov’s report, which contained the mother’s information.

540Dr. Gupta saw the child multiple times, on April 3, 2025, April 22, 2025 and July 10, 2025, and not over a video camera like Dr. Savenkov had done. He testified that he undertook his own physical examination and carried out his own observation of the child throughout his appointment.

541According to Dr. Gupta’s report of July 10, 2025, the child did not meet the criteria for either autism, ADHD, or ODD. Dr. Gupta testified that H.’s emotional regulation issues were typical for a child of H.’s age. He recommended counselling, which H.’s father now has in place.

542In one respect, perhaps it is unnecessary for the Court to make a finding about H.’s diagnosis. I have no doubt based on the evidence that follows later, that the father will follow the recommendations of any health care providers, whatever they may be. But the finding is important to make, because it is tied up in the Court’s finding that the mother has exposed this child to emotional harm through her behaviour in the health care system.

543The mother testified towards the end of the trial, after she had heard all the health evidence. She still maintained that H. has autism. But he doesn’t. The previous assessments that suggested otherwise, were flawed, and premised on the mother’s not credible reports. Dr. Gupta undertook the most thorough and comprehensive assessment, and the results of his assessment are consistent with other observation evidence about this child, apart from the mother’s. The mother has been unable to incorporate the results of Dr. Gupta’s assessment into her own thinking, and accept the results.

544Incidentally, the mother is now shopping for a new diagnosis for herself, for autism. And on the question of whether she is projecting her own issues onto the children, I find that she is. Autism is not the only example.

545During her cross-examination of Dr. Spreadbury, the mother asked him to confirm that she has asthma. She asked this question because she believed that asthma can be hereditary, and she claimed that H. has asthma. Dr. Spreadbury confirmed that H. did not have asthma (at least not yet as he is too young to participate in testing for it), and that it is not hereditary. While there were two notes in Dr. Spreadbury’s file about H. coughing and being prescribed a puffer, he also testified that such things can be caused by viruses.

(8) Summary and Conclusions About the Mother’s Mismanagement of the Children’s Health Care

546In conclusion, these children are at risk of emotional harm due to the mother’s actions and her neglect their health care. Her actions have been twofold at almost every appointment that was highlighted at this trial. A large focus of these appointments involved either discussing, or on one occasion engaging in conflict at appointments, resulting in the exclusion of H.’s father from an important autism assessment. Her discussions at appointments manifested as the mother making statements to health care providers about parent conflict in the presence of one or both children, making abuse allegations to health care providers in the presence of one or both children, and trying to elicit statements of sexual abuse from H. at two appointments. When it comes to actual health care, her other focus has been to supply misinformation to health care professionals and pursue unnecessary assessments, while projecting her own issues onto the children.

547The risks include misdiagnoses, incorrect treatment being prescribed, the children not getting the actual health care that they need, the creation of false evidence for use against H.’s father, and health care providers withdrawing from providing services, if they get fed up with this kind of thing. This evidence not only goes to the finding of risk of emotional harm being made, but it also leads me to the conclusion that restrictions need to be placed on the mother’s involvement in health care and on her access to information.

(9) The Mother’s Lawsuits, Complaints and Threats to Others

548I heard an overwhelming amount of evidence at this trial, that the mother and sometimes others aligned with her (her mother, her friend M.W.) have been launching lawsuits, applications to the Human Rights Tribunal, and filing complaints to professional oversight bodies, or issuing threats to do so. These maneuvers have been directed at most involved in the children’s lives.

549The mother claims in her trial affidavit that she has been motivated by wanting to correct “inaccurate or unjust information about [her]”. She says took these steps in good faith, and within her “legal rights as a Canadian”, as opposed to with the intention of being threatening or inappropriate. She demonstrated little insight into the fact that other perceive her actions as threating.

550While some of this litigation, complaints and threats are undoubtedly referred to elsewhere in this Judgment, it is useful to list what the mother has done here, all in one place. If anything, this demonstrates the sheer magnitude of energy that she is directing at these pursuits.

551Chronologically, the first piece of evidence about a series of complaints that I heard about came from L.G., an academic advisor at the university the mother attends.

552L.G. testified about the assistance she provided to the mother generally, but aspects of her evidence focused on conflict that the mother had with one of her professors. Apparently the conflict surrounded an assignment that the mother wanted to deliver late. L.G. testified that the mother had escalated two complaints to get results, although in the case of the late assignment, L.G. did so too on her behalf. [26]

553Next, in the Endorsement of Tellier J. dated November 6, 2024, there is a reference to correspondence from the mother to H.’s father, and to a society worker, dated January 24, 2024, in which she indicated that she intended to commence a lawsuit against the Children’s Treatment Centre, and complain to the Law Society of Ontario about H.’s father’s then counsel.

554In her trial affidavit, Ms. Johnson says that in addition to yelling at her, the mother threatened to report her to “governing authorities” and in fact said that she had been so reported. Ms. Johnson repeated when cross-examined, that the mother had threatened to sue her. She also said that the mother somehow found out where she lived, she sent messages to a family member of hers, and she posted her child’s name online, already mentioned earlier. This worried and scared Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson said that the mother forwarded to her an email dated September 7, 2024, that she had sent to the Children’s Treatment Centre, in which she threatened a lawsuit against the Centre for speaking and engaging with H.’s father, regarding H.’s speech and language therapies, too.

555Next, in her trial affidavit, Ms. Wylde says that she too has received many emails from the mother, with various threats of litigation and complaints. She has found it difficult to work with the mother. Ms. Wylde experiences the mother as not open to her interpretation or assessment of the situation, or to her direction. Ms. Wylde says that the mother has used demeaning language when expressing her displeasure.

556Next, on September 27, 2024, the mother forwarded to Ms. Johnson, various emails and some medical records. Included therein, was a note that the mother had been recently banned from attending at the Walmart Pharmacy in Belleville, after an incident she had with the pharmacist.

557In the Belleville Police records, there is a General Report of July 29, 2024, that documents that the mother came to the pharmacy to refill a prescription, but the pharmacist required a new prescription. The mother became upset, caused a scene, and made “unkind remarks” to the pharmacist. The mother was restrained from attending there for a year due to trespass.

558When the Society’s lawyer cross-examined the mother about this, the mother admitted an incident had occurred, but portrayed herself as the victim. She said that the pharmacist had called the police because the mother asked for her registration number. The mother went on to claim that the law in Ontario, was that she was allowed a refill, even though her prescription had run out of refills. She demanded the pharmacist’s registration number so she could make a complaint. She even tried to photograph the pharmacist in the process, and that is when security came. The mother then left, but claimed she was not banned from the premises. She said she did not perceive her actions as threatening on this occasion, and maintained that she had the right to enforce her rights in relation to the pharmacists’ alleged illegal behaviour.

559Next, on October 30, 2024, two days before the removal, H.’s father’s partner told Ms. Johnson, that the mother had submitted complaints about her to her work place. She also reported that the mother had made Facebook postings about her and coworkers, and submitted two complaints to the College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario about her.

560Next, on November 1 and 2, 2024, immediately following the removal, the mother threatened legal proceedings against T.’s father, and threatened that he would never see T. again. This was done by text message, and is described already above.

561Next, Ms. Johnson says that during her meeting with the mother on November 14, 2024, the mother said that she had complained about Tellier J. for discriminating against her cognitive disorder. To Ms. Johnson, she accused Tellier J. of not having taken into account the fact that she has ADHD.

562The mother was asked during this trial whether she complained about McCarty J. Her answer was that she did not think that complaint ever went through. I infer from that, that she was planning to complain, but she didn’t follow through.

563Next, on November 29, 2024, Ms. Johnson said she received email correspondence from the mother, addressed to the Child and Family Services Review Board, alleging that she is biased, and that also attached a copy of her “convocation record”.

564Next, prior to the first visit that she supervised between the mother and T. on November 29, 2024, shortly after the removal, the mother told Guelph child protection worker Andrea Knight, that she had lawyers involved, and that Guelph better not get involved or they would be in trouble too.

565Next, H.’s father reported to Ms. Johnson on December 9, 2024, that the mother had submitted another complaint about his partner to her college, in which she had also threatened lawsuits.

566Next, Ms. Johnson went on parental leave in around December of 2024. Soon thereafter, she received a Human Rights Tribunal Application initiated by the mother, and she would be later served with a civil lawsuit.

567Next, in her trial affidavit, supervisor Ms. Sonnenberg says that the mother has accused her of bias. She says that she has never had interactions with any of the external parties in this matter outside this case, nor had she previously met H.’s father, as the mother had apparently claimed.

568Next, T.’s father says that the mother sued him civilly, and attempted to take him to the Human Rights Tribunal. She also threatened to start another civil action against him, once this trial is over.

569M. (T.’s father’s partner) says that although she has had no interaction with the mother at all, the mother named her in a civil lawsuit for defamation, claimed over $1 million in damages, and alleged that she had been “interfering with access and negligent as a caregiver”.

570R. also says that he was named in a civil lawsuit about six months after the removal.

571Next, as indicated later on in more detail, Dr. Rowe said he was prepared to review his assessment report with the mother soon after its release. Before he could do that (i.e. within hours), the mother made a complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal against him, followed by a complaint to his College. A month or two after that, the mother launched a civil lawsuit against him and others. In June of 2025, she made a complaint to the Information Privacy Commissioner, alleging that she had not consented to the assessment. Apparently the mother’s complaints to the Information Privacy Commissioner and to his College are still ongoing.

572Next, as indicated earlier, the mother threatened to sue Dr. Gupta, and to complain to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

573Included in the Society’s Exhibit Book were applications to the Human Rights Tribunal dated January 26, 2025 seeking damages of $8,800,000.00 against someone named A.L., Kathleen Sonnenburg, Candice Wylde, and Sandra Brooks, with the Society, someone named V.D., a receptionist with the Society, someone named B.N., Andrea Knight with the Guelph agency, the father, his partner, R., F., a “professional, ex board member” named D. (the debacle involving D. is discussed earlier), T.’s father, T.’s paternal grandmother, and S.A., who is apparently a “government body director of services”. There was also a separate application claiming damages of $500,000.00 against Ms. Hawn.

574Also included in the Society’s Exhibit Book are two Statements of Claim. One was launched by the mother, the maternal grandmother, M.W. and various others, against Ms. Johnson, Ms. Brooks and Ms. Sonnenburg, R., F., T.’s father and his partner, H.’s father’s partner, and T.’s paternal grandmother, claiming damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00, declaratory relief that there had been various Charter violations, and remedies in relation to the “Privacy Act and Records Retention policies under CYFSA”. The body of the claim alleges negligent misrepresentation of facts in court affidavits, defamation, accessing and distributing confidential health records without authority, suppressing exculpatory evidence and denying sibling access, and failing to fulfil legal mandates under child welfare legislation, among other things.

575The other claim was launched by the mother, the maternal grandmother and M.W. for $1,350,000.00 in damages, for an alleged pattern of discriminatory conduct, and various Charter violations, and it included further allegations of negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, defamation, the breach of fiduciary duty, and Human Rights Code violations.

576Apparently there was a third civil action, that was not included in the trial materials, but documents disposing of all three actions were filed as Exhibits, after the Court requested information about their status, so that it could understand what had happened with this litigation.[27] The plaintiffs in this third action were the mother, the maternal grandmother, and M.W.; Ms. Hawn, Ms. Leitch and Dr. Rowe were identified as defendants.

577Two of these civil actions were discontinued by notice of discontinuance. According to the Notices of Discontinuance, which I note include not only the mother, but the maternal grandmother and M.W. in one action, and those three persons plus several others in the other, the various plaintiffs “wholly discontinued [the actions] at this time due to a sudden and overwhelming family emergency” (i.e. because the mother and M.W. were allegedly assisting with the “end-of-life care and medical coordination” for another family member, and because M.W.’s maternal grandfather, underwent “brain surgery” and was dealing with cancer). The Notices also say that the plaintiffs are redirecting their remaining energy and resources toward “immediate family needs and healing”, but the discontinuance is “without prejudice” and the plaintiffs may “revisit and consolidate these claims except for [the Society] litigation, which will be revisited separately as part of a forthcoming class action involving over 20 plaintiffs”. I assume based on the language in these notices, that this is why some witnesses like R., thought the civil law suit against him was only “on hold”, when they testified.

578The third action was also discontinued, but this was memorialized in two civil Endorsements of Hurley J. dated June 25, 2025 and January 6, 2026. According to the Endorsement of Hurley J. dated June 25, 2025, the Court was considering dismissing the claim pursuant to rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as it appeared to him it may be frivolous, vexations or an abuse of process. Hurley J. started the process for that determination to be made, and also stayed the action pending a written hearing under rule 2.1.01.

579According to the Endorsement of Hurley J. dated January 6, 2026, before this was ruled on, another Notice of Discontinuance got filed (on August 3, 2025). So Hurley J. later endorsed that an order under rule 2.1.01 had become unnecessary. But what is notable is that when facing a dismissal, the mother tried to withdraw, not unlike some of the inconsistent positions she tried to take with her constitutional claim throughout this trial.

580Next, in cross-examination by the Society, the mother testified that she is involved with over 50 people who have reached out to her apparent non-profit foundation, with stories, for the purposes of potentially starting a class action law suit against the Society. She admitted that her foundation has posts and flyers on various internet groups inviting people to share stories about the Society, and she says that there will be a lawyer involved. The mother denied improperly eliciting confidential information, and claimed that there were NDAs to sign. She and M.W. also claimed that there were various other “board members” involved with this, although they both refused to identify the identities of these other board members. Ms. Shaw suggested that there are no other board members.

581Next, in the first half of 2025, H.’s father launched a separate Application for a restraining Order, that he later amended to address child support (discussed below). When she was served with the Amended Application (after McCarty J. ordered the father to serve), the mother sent an email to the Court on June 24, 2025, threatening court administration with another constitutional challenge if they did not “[flag and review H.’s father] under vexatious litigant provisions”.

582Next, on September 14, 2025, the mother sent H.’s father an email stating that the Toronto Police Service was now investigating the Quinte West OPP, and specifically three named officers. She told him that the investigation will “include your own actions, particularly the allegations of abuse of the child, and may result in the laying of criminal charges by the Toronto Police Service. From there, the inquiry is also expected to proceed into the conduct of the Belleville Police Service and likely the Highland Shores CAS, given the concerns already raised regarding collusion and procedural misconduct.” The email goes on to tell H.’s father and his partner to prepare for “the fact that both of you may be subject to further scrutiny and potential criminal accountability”. The email ends with “I wish you the week that you deserve”.

583When cross-examined by T.’s father’s lawyer, the mother explained this one, by saying that she filed a Human Rights Tribunal application, which resulted in criminal charges against her (I assume this relates to the incident with D., and the call from “Megan”). She said that one of the police officers is “directly linked” with H.’s father, and also that is why the Toronto Police are supposedly investigating.[28]

584Next, the mother threatened to sue H.’s paternal grandmother. Apparently H.’s father’s grandmother had sold her home. When she testified, H.’s paternal grandmother confirmed that the mother had found this out, by accessing real estate documents online, which she then forwarded to her. H.’s paternal grandmother testified that the mother was upset because she had looked the mother’s apparent non-profit organization up online. The mother figured this out by tracking her IP address somehow. The mother accused the paternal grandmother of harassment. The paternal grandmother in turned called the local OPP.

585Next, on January 9, 2026, the mother sent an email to H.’s teacher and school principal. That email included as an attachment, another email that the mother had sent to Ms. Wylde and others the day before, alleging yet again, that H. had been physically abused.

586In her email to the teacher and the principal of January 9, 2026, the mother writes:

Good morning,

This is notice that you will be summoned to court therefore, you are to preserve all documentation pertaining to [H.], including all school reports regarding injuries, random medical developments, contact with CAS, contact with [H.’s father] and affiliates etc.

Once the child protection trial concludes, you will be served individually with civil lawsuits for your involvement in this unlawful intervention. And lastly, you will be held accountable for your involvement in the continued abuse.

587In the forwarded email of January 8, 2026, sent to the Society and others, the mother said that she would “escalat[e] to the Ministry” and proceed:

…with a mandamus application alongside the appeal to address the ongoing failure to act where a clear statutory duty exists to investigate and protect a child presenting with unexplained physical injury or swelling.

This matter will not be delayed or minimized. Continued inaction will be addressed formally through the courts and oversight bodies.

588H.’s teacher testified that she was “overwhelmed with emotion” when she received this email. She had never been accused of child abuse or neglect, and this made her feel upset. Yet again though, when cross-examined by the OCL, the mother did not see her email as threatening. She justified her action by saying she had sent her a legal notice, and was trying to protect her rights as a parent.

589Next, on March 10, 2026, the mother sent an email to counsel in this case, plus to Ms. Wylde, and to an email; OCL.Complaints@ontario.ca. In it, she said that she had already faxed letters to the physicians and a nurse practitioner involved in the medical care of T. and H. She said that she reviewed the health records (I gather after I made the production Order on February 23, 2026, or in any event as she was preparing for trial) and she was now extremely concerned by statements that the fathers had made, as documented in the health records. She went on to say that “at the conclusion of the child protection trial, regardless of the outcome, [she] will be pursing appropriate legal remedies against [both fathers] arising from these statements. This includes claims relating to defamation and damages associated with the dissemination of false allegations within medical and institutional records.”

590Next, in cross-examination, the mother denied complaining to the Law Society of Ontario about Ms. Oudyk, for looking at her social media as part of this case, but she said that she had complained to Ms. Oudyk directly. The mother also decided to post a “1 star review” of Ms. Shaw on google, justifying this action by saying that she has the right to an opinion.

591Finally, although some are overlapping, I note that there are even other complaints identified in McCarty J.’s temporary care and custody ruling, dated May 13, 2025, at ¶ 55(a)-(l).

(10) Summary and Conclusions Regarding the Mother’s Lawsuits, Complaints and Threats to Others

592In Tellier J.’s Endorsement of November 6, 2024, she wrote:

Individuals and litigants are certainly entitled to make complaints arising from services or interactions they experience from those employed by public agencies or others from whom there is professional oversight and accountability. Investigative and adjudicative bodies exist to protect the public. That said, the sheer number of threats and complaints made by [the mother] suggests that either she has a perception problem rooted in a mental health disorder or she is simply being hostile and vexatious, casting a wide net of targets. Whatever the underlying cause or motivation, the children’s exposure to their mother’s perpetual combative mode cannot be calm or healthy for them.

593In her ruling of May 13, 2025, McCarty J. was confronted with similar evidence. At ¶ 55 McCarty J. wrote that the mother “has a right to complain about issues that she feels are unjust; that is the purpose of the complaint processes. The challenge in this case is the extent of the complaints”, noting that when the mother is confronted with things she doesn’t agree with, her response is to threaten legal action, lawsuits, or complaint processes, which was then, and still is now, impacting her ability to work with service providers and family members.

594Having now heard the evidence about the mother’s complaints at this trial in the context of the complete trial record, I find these were charitable comments, previously expressed by my colleagues. While it is not the function of this Court at this trial to make determinations about the merits of any particular one of these lawsuits, Tribunal applications, or professional regulatory complaints, I find it important to point out, given the wide swath of persons who are caught up in these various proceedings or complaints, that I heard no information during this trial that was suggestive of any merit to any of this.

595The mother is entitled to bring legitimate grievances forward; she is not entitled to launch countless actions and complaints that are devoid of merit. It was fairly clear to me during this trial, that neither the mother, nor her co-plaintiff or co-applicant, M.W., had a proper understanding of the nature of the claims or the processes that they launched. I also saw this first hand, when I reviewed with the mother, her meritless constitutional claim, that I have subsequently had to spend much time to consider, to reframe in some kind of intelligible way, and to rule on.

596I saw this again, when M.W. was cross-examined. She had no real understanding whatsoever what the Human Rights Tribunal does, yet she was an applicant. Frankly, I am not even persuaded that M.W. had much of a say in the processes that were launched, that named her as a plaintiff or an applicant. I strongly suspect that the mother prepared these documents, just as I suspect she prepared her mother’s and M.W.’s mid-trial motions for party status and access, on which she named other people as moving parties with her, dragging them in for the ride. And if she didn’t prepare them herself, then these were done at her initiative at a minimum.

597I do not in any way accept the mother’s explanations, that she was just exercising her rights, as any Canadian is entitled to do. Most Canadians do not spend their days launching complaints and legal proceedings, or issuing threats to do so when something doesn’t go their way. What the mother is doing, is weaponizing the legal system. These abundant actions that the mother has taken, or threatened to take, appear to be a nuisance, vexatious and abusive. I heard evidence about the fear and anxiety that the mother has caused to others from receiving this. I can only imagine the time they would have had to invest in responding to these kinds of things.

598I considered whether now is the time to find that the mother is a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act. But I am reluctantly refraining from doing so, only because a remedy under section 140 wasn’t claimed, no one asked for this in closing submissions at the end of the trial, and there is a process to follow: see Rahman v. Peel Standard Condominium Corporation No. 779, 2023 ONCA 108. The mother is hereby warned though, that if she keeps it up, she may very well find herself on the receiving end of such an application, in the near future. If she reactivates her civil lawsuits after this trial, then any one of the named defendants may wish to expeditiously bring a motion to have them disposed of, with costs.

599So while I do not make an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, this evidence has however, contributed to my conclusion that the parenting Order to be made, needs to contain restrictions on the mother, so that she cannot launch litigation directly concerning the children. The mother’s email of March 10, 2026, above, sent after she reviewed children’s health records, forms part of the evidentiary basis, for my conclusion that the disclosure of information to the mother about the children, like health and education records, needs to be tightly constrained.

600Returning to the analysis about the risk of emotional harm, these behaviours have exposed H. and T. to risk. The mother has placed stress on others involved in the children’s plans of care. It is distracting, for H.’s and T.’s fathers in particular, to have to deal with all this, while trying to care for the boys. It also runs the risk that service providers will not care for T. and H. It would be particularly worrisome if people like health care providers, for example, were to get fed up and quit, declining to service the family. Incidentally, what the mother has also served to do for the most part, with this incessant complaining, is alienate herself from a myriad of people, who might have formed part of a better plan with her. Apart from the maternal grandfather, who was not called to testify, and various unidentified aunts and uncles (also didn’t testify), who the mother is left with, is her mother and her friend, M.W., and B.S., all of whom were problematic witnesses in their own right.

E. The Mother’s Improperly Managed Mental Health Condition Poses A Risk of Physical and Emotional Harm

601Underpinning all this behaviour are significant concerns about the mother’s mental health.

602By the time this trial was nearing its end, counsel for the OCL had compiled a panoply of conditions that she and the Court had already heard the mother or others mention over the course of the trial. The mother agreed when counsel for the OCL recited her list. The list was that the mother has physical health issues, like fibromyalgia and osteoarthritis. The mother had testified about recovering from a gall bladder surgery in 2024, too (she is still recovering to this day, apparently).

603Regarding her mental health, the mother said she has ADHD, PTSD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. The mother is now pursuing an assessment for autism , although that could take another two years apparently. Several times during the trial, the mother talked as if that yet to be procured autism diagnosis was a foregone conclusion, by making reference to what she already knew about autism, for example from having observed it in others in her environment. She repeatedly cited her supposed inability to fully understand social cues, a symptom of autism, as a justification for her behaviour.

604In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., Sherr J. developed a list of factors to assess whether a parent’s mental illness places a child at risk of harm, and if so whether a child can still be placed in his or her care.

605The list includes factors like:

(a) the kind of mental illness;

(b) its severity;

(d) the impact on functioning and parenting;

(e) the impact on the children;

(f) the insight of the person with the illness;

(g) whether they are meaningfully engaging and are compliant with treatment; and

(h) the strength of the person’s support plan.

606In order to properly apply these factors, it is first necessary to identify what the mother’s diagnoses actually are. This should be done based on the objective health evidence at trial, and not the plethora of statements otherwise made. I intend to focus on the mother’s mental health, as that was the focus at trial.

607The mother’s confirmed diagnoses are ADHD and BPD. The mother does not accept the latter, and started the process of searching for an autism diagnosis, a short two to three months after the court ordered mental health assessment diagnosing her with BPD was complete.

608I find on this record that the mother does have this significant personality disorder, along with her ADHD diagnosis. These co-morbidities have a significant impact on her functioning and on her ability to parent. Her BPD diagnosis is particularly challenging to treat. And that is rendered further problematic because the mother is not even accepting of the diagnosis, posing an additional, significant barrier to treatment.

609Based not only on the expert opinion evidence, but the overwhelming amount of other evidence that was also called during this trial, all of the parties involved in this case need to come to a stronger realization that the mother may be untreatable. Aspects of the draft Orders tendered at the end of this trial did not seem to reflect that necessarily. All of which places the children at significant risk of both physical and emotional harm.

610The facts upon which this analysis and these conclusions are based, includes the findings of fact about the medical evidence, that follows next.

F. Summary of the Evidence and Findings of Fact About the Mother’s Medical Condition

(1) Psychiatrist Dr. Stakheiko

611Psychiatrist Dr. Stakheiko, with Quinte Health Care’s Outpatient Psychiatry, assessed the mother during a 1 hour and 15 minute appointment in the fall of 2015.

612To Dr. Stakheiko, the mother reported long periods of sadness, low motivation, low energy, long periods of sleeping and staying in bed, and being unable to function. She described her mood as “an emotional roller coaster”, with many mood swings. She reported having issues with peer groups at school, compulsive lying, poor self-esteem, and engaging in attention seeking behaviour. The mother then reported suicidal thoughts and prior attempts, although at the time of her assessment, there were no signs of psychosis or immediate suicidal ideation, but “chronic suicidal thoughts” presented. The mother reported smoking marijuana, sometimes on a daily basis. While she talked about mental health issues in her family, and was convinced that her mother had bipolar disorder, she would later take issue when others reported her prior statement of bipolar disorder.

613Dr. Stakheiko believed that the mother met the criteria for “marked social anxiety”, dysthymia (persistent depressive disorder), major depressive disorder, recurrent with atypical features, but without being able to identify any clear manic or mixed episodes. She did not believe that the mother met the criteria for bipolar disorder. However, right from the get go, Dr. Stakheiko observed symptoms suggestive of BPD traits, avoidant personality disorder, and very pronounced anxiety. Dr. Stakheiko prescribed the mother an increasing dose of Zoloft, and Clonazepam as needed. She recommended Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (“CBT”) and Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (“DBT”). This would be the first recommendation for DBT, that the mother did not meaningfully pursue.

614About one month later on December 10, 2015, the mother had a follow up appointment for thirty minutes. By then, the mother was taking the medication prescribed, but she had not started any the therapies recommended. The mother reported feeling better and having experienced change. Dr. Stakheiko wrote that she was pleased with the mother’s progress. She nevertheless advised the mother to continue with her recommendations, and discharged the mother back to her family doctor.

615Just over two months later, the mother was admitted to the hospital on February 17, 2016, with suicidal ideation. The mother reported improvement after her appointment with Dr. Stakheiko in December, but said she felt she had “swung too far” in the other direction. She reported having trouble sleeping, so she started smoking 1 gram of marijuana daily, having spent about $400.00 on marijuana during the past month. The hospital resident’s note indicates that the mother had “significant psychiatric comorbidities”, presenting with acute suicidal ideation and self-harm behaviour. The resident recommended medication, individual counselling with a named person, addiction counselling, and reiterated the previous recommendation for CBT.

616In her follow up report dated March 31, 2016, Dr. Stakheiko wrote that her working diagnosis was still BPD, or at least traits of it. She noted that the mother had still not then yet accessed the therapies previously recommended, nor the individual therapy referred to in the resident’s note. She declined to adjust the mother’s medications.

617According to Ms. Wylde’s trial affidavit, there was a long gap in the records that the Society had about the mother’s psychiatric treatment after that, between 2016 and 2022 or so. There were more expressions of suicidal ideation during this gap period, however.

(2) Psychiatrist Dr. Mammoliti

618The mother saw Dr. Maryna Mammoliti for a psychiatric consultation on February 9, 2023. This was the assessment that the mother claimed to have pursued to obtain the ADHD diagnosis, supposedly to get help after the incident captured on the Ring Camera video. This assessment was done virtually, with the mother in her car, outside her home.

619A number of entries in Dr. Mammoliti’s report are notable:

(a) The mother reported that she was co-parenting T. with his father, and that she had recently participated in a criminal trial with H.’s father on January 16, 2023. She reported that it was hard for her to re-live the abuse in that relationship;

(b) In addition to advising about her past hospitalization in 2016 and the nature of the diagnosis at the time, the mother reported that she had attempted to lay down on the train tracks “multiple times” when in an abusive relationship with her “ex”, between January 2020 and October 2021 “in the context of abuse and hopelessness”. She said this had not happened since October of 2021;

(d) The mother reported that H. had autism;

(e) The mother claimed to have participated in CBT through the hospital, yet Dr. Stakheiko’s health record of March 31, 2026 highlighted a lack of follow through;

(f) The mother said that her medications, which included Cymbalta, “made her homicidal towards her ex”, although she also said that when that medication was stopped, the homicidal thoughts then stopped; and

(g) The mother continued to report issues with sleep.

620Dr. Mammoliti diagnosed the mother with “unspecified trauma and stressor related disorder”, “ADHD, combined”, a social anxiety disorder, and she wrote that it was necessary to rule out binge eating disorder. Dr. Mammoliti recommended trauma therapy, Vyvanse for the ADHD diagnosis, and CBT for the social anxiety disorder. She also recommended accommodations at school and at work, and ADHD coaching. Several pages of her report are in the nature of providing patient education. One of the suggestions under the heading “Therapy Suggestion” refers to DBT therapy again.

(3) Psychiatrist Dr. Epelbaum

621The mother next saw psychiatrist Dr. Mikhail Epelbaum on September 20, 2023, following a referral from Dr. Spreadbury.

622Dr. Epelbaum writes that he “reviewed the file [not specified], performed a standard psychiatric interview, and discussed the relevant diagnostic findings and therapeutic considerations”. He wrote that the mother had a “complicated picture of multiple severe stressors”, a “complex family history, dysfunctional situations with her previous conjugal partners”, a history of postpartum depression, and at least “two para-suicidal events”. He wrote about an issue with binge eating and self-mutilation, as well as pain-seeking behaviour.

623Unlike previous reports, Dr. Epelbaum wrote that the mother slept well, although stress could interfere. He wrote that her anxiety “in the interview is relatively mild”, but her mood was “dysphoric” (i.e. meaning profound unease, anxiety). To Dr. Epelbaum, the mother denied suicidal or homicidal ideation, and psychotic symptoms were “not in evidence”. As I explain later though, the mother’s academic advisor testified that the mother had expressed throughs of suicide to her, just about three months earlier.

624Dr. Epelbaum agreed with the “preliminary diagnosis” of ADHD and general anxiety disorder, but he also indicated that there were Cluster B traits.[29] Based on the mother’s reports that her Vyvanse was wearing off mid-day, Dr. Epelbaum recommended increasing the dose of her medication.

(4) Psychiatrist Dr. Jain

625On November 12, 2024, despite the Court’s order for a specific mental health assessment just six days earlier, the mother underwent another assessment with a different psychiatrist, Dr. Umesh Ravi Jain (although perhaps the referral had already been in progress). Dr. Jain was on the mother’s original witness list. She said at the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 26, 2026, that she wanted to call him, to confirm her ADHD diagnosis and that she was taking medication. But I was told that neither were likely to be contested and these facts could be confirmed by the mother’s family doctor, Dr. Spreadbury. Dr. Jain was therefore removed from the mother’s witness list, and his report went into evidence on consent under the Evidence Act.

626According to Dr. Jain’s report:

(a) The children’s removal from her care created a lot of emotional strife for the mother, but she said that she was in a better place right now than a year before, and she was handling the situation “significantly more mature and capable”;

(b) Dr. Jain questioned why the referral had been made, since the mother felt “comfortable in terms of her current treatment, diagnosis and current management plan”. He suspected that things were a bit more “messy” when the original referral had been made;

(c) Dr. Jain wrote that he did not have a “very long interview and frankly, much of it was simply my opinion as to options and ideas that might be on the table”;

(d) Referring to whatever he was told about the past instances of suicidal thought, he wrote that the mother did not feel that she would have ever killed herself, but was reacting in a moment of crisis;

(e) He wrote that he did “not get a history of significant substance use”, referring to alcohol, and then went on to discount cocaine, methamphetamine, opiates, or over the counter medication misuse, without referring to the marijuana use;

(f) He said there was a presumptive diagnosis of BPD, but the mother had done “a significant amount of active therapy including DBT” (which was not true). He said that DBT can also be referred to as trauma based therapy, which “is exactly what she needed”;

(g) Regarding her family history, he wrote that there were many diagnoses that “could be thrown in this family”, but the pervasive context would definitely be trauma. He “discounted [autism] immediately” in the mother. Yet the mother is now still pursuing this;

(h) His view was that the mother had dysthymic disorder (unresolved issues from the past with low-level depression), PTSD from childhood issues leading to features that appeared to look like ADHD, cluster B personality traits “now in partial remission”, learning disabilities, marital problems and psychosocial conflicts because of the apprehension.

627Dr. Jain did not recommend a change in medication. He wrote “the real agenda is therapy”, and referred to both CBT and DBT. He wrote “I think these are all being done and she has an active therapist involved”. He also recommended accommodations in a learning environment.

(5) The Mother’s Claim that She Suffers from OCD

628According to Ms. Johnson’s trial affidavit, during an in-person access visit on December 16, 2024, the mother made a comment to her, that her “OCD” was acting up. In her trial affidavit, Ms. Wylde says that the mother told her that she was awaiting a new assessment with respect to OCD. When Ms. Wylde asked the mother why she was pursing this, she said that she had simply asked for it, like all of her other assessments, without sharing the details of what triggered that.

629No additional evidence was called during this trial about any OCD assessment, or that there has been any such diagnosis.

(6) The Court Ordered Psychological Assessment of Dr. Rowe

630The mother submitted to the psychological assessment of Dr. Robert Rowe pursuant to Tellier J.’s Order for an assessment under section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, dated November 6, 2024. Dr. Rowe’s report is dated January 27, 2025.

631Dr. Rowe is a clinical and forensic psychologist. He holds a Ph.D. in Psychology from Carleton University and is a member of the College of Psychologists and Behaviour Analysts of Ontario. Since March of 2010, he works as a clinical and forensic psychologist at the Family Court Clinic, at the Kingston Health Sciences Centre. He has undertaken various mental health assessments for use in family, child protection and youth criminal justice proceedings. He has been qualified to testify as an expert in family, child protection, youth criminal, and adult criminal proceedings in the past.

632Dr. Rowe did not conduct a parenting capacity assessment, but as part of his mental health assessment of the mother, he nevertheless identified risk factors that may impact her parenting. The Court can draw its own conclusions from the other evidence called: see for example J.K.L.D. v. W.J.A., 2020 ONCJ 335 ¶ 98; N.T. v. P.T., 2022 ONSC 5263 ¶ 205-208, 213-217; Children and Family Services for York Region v. K.D.S. et al., 2024 ONSC 4626 ¶ 38-39, 104; H.S. v. D.N., 2025 ONSC 4032 ¶ 116, 122; and M.N. v. J.D.R., 2026 ONSC 870 ¶ 173-174.

633Dr. Rowe was assisted by Rayna Edels. Ms. Edels is a doctoral candidate in the school of child psychology at McGill University, whom he supervises.

634At the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 23, 2026, the mother signaled her intention to object to Dr. Rowe’s qualifications. But upon exploration of this during the voir dire at trial, the mother’s objection was not about qualifications per se; rather she said that her previous mental health assessments had been more brief in nature, she did not know that Dr. Rowe’s assessment would take several hours longer to complete and that it would be more extensive in nature, and that she did not consent to this. But it bears repeating that the mother was represented at the time of Tellier J.’s Order for this assessment, the assessment was ordered, and she did not have to consent to it. [30]

635The Court qualified Dr. Rowe to give expert opinion evidence in clinical and forensic psychology, and to undertake mental health assessments pursuant to section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

636Regarding his methodology, Dr. Rowe reviewed the mother’s social background and current functioning. He reviewed “case file documentation” and conducted “one in-person semi-structured interview” as well as two virtual interviews with the mother. Ms. Edels administered a battery of psychological testing in addition, some of which Dr. Rowe reviewed and interpreted. His report says the interviews of the mother totaled 4 ½ hours, although in Court he clarified this evidence and said that the testing and interviews together, took about twice longer. He also interviewed Ms. Johnson and Ms. Wylde.

637Although Dr. Rowe agreed that he predominantly had information from the Society (which he said he would have gathered up anyway had he been doing this assessment privately and not by way of section 105 Order), his collateral information reviews were not just with Society employees; he reviewed the mother’s health records, and also considered information from a caseworker, Ms. Smith (not called to testify at this trial), Ms. Williams, another mental health caseworker (also not called to testify – but whom the mother identified as one of the therapists who assisted her in the past – see below), and Ms. Wright, one of the therapists the mother called to testify.

638To be clear, Dr. Rowe did not just have records supplied by the Society, even though the Society was the principal supplier. The mother did herself supply documents too. Now the mother supplied documents that were not requested, some of which she even sent before the assessment was underway. These documents, which Dr. Rowe said included screenshots of text messages, emails, photos, videos, and affidavits from families and friends, some of which were not dated or “certified” (to use his words), were not considered by him. He testified that the mother was given an opportunity to provide him with other information though, on “multiple occasions”, including by way of documentation and during lengthy interviewing. And the mother did that, after the assessment was underway.

639As indicated, prior to trial, the mother brought the 14B Motion dated March 31, 2026 in which she took issue with alleged discrepancies in the documentary records that had been given to Dr. Rowe. During Dr. Rowe’s examination in chief, the Court asked the mother about this, and the mother said that she was no longer pursuing this. The mother then took issue, although perhaps differently framed, with the documentary record. She tried to suggest during her cross-examination that she had not supplied unsworn affidavits beforehand, and that she instead provided Dr. Rowe with a stack of other documents, a foot thick, after the assessment was undertaken. But Dr. Rowe confirmed, that what he or Ms. Edels had been properly given, after the assessment started, was reviewed by him. Except for a birth certificate respecting her background and identity, the mother did not specifically point me to any particular record in this foot of documents, that she claimed Dr. Rowe did not consider. The mother was later unable to identify during closing submissions, what exactly Dr. Rowe did not consider, that could have impacted his opinions and conclusions.

640The documentary record upon which Dr. Rowe relied, which underpinned his opinions and conclusions, was substantially proven at trial. For example, regardless of whether it was the Society or the mother who had supplied him with these, Dr. Rowe had various health records, including the various reports of Dr. Stakheiko, the resident at the hospital, Dr. Mammoliti, Dr. Epelbaum and Dr. Jain, all of which were separately admitted into evidence during this trial, without any challenge from the mother. Dr. Rowe’s health review correctly noted, as have I above, that the mother had been given multiple mental health diagnoses at different points in time, albeit often reliant on the mother’s self-reports.

641In regard to his interviews with the mother, Dr. Rowe said that the mother reported a “complicated” relationship with her mother throughout childhood and adolescence. She reported multiple adverse childhood experiences, including frequent criticism and denigrating comments by her mother. She said that her mother had hit her twice, and referred to her mother has having been physically and emotionally abusive, her whole life. She also said she was repeatedly emotionally and physically abused by her grandmother. She shared that there were various mental health disorders amongst members of her family of origin, all evidence that was called at this trial.

642The mother reported various challenges in school. Dr. Rowe noted twice, that little information was presented to show that the mother had an IEP or received any form of individualized support, either in elementary or high school, but based on his review of a transcript, he did note that the mother struggled in post-secondary education. I heard an overwhelming amount of evidence about that during this trial too, including from the mother herself, who was unable to indicate when exactly she would be able to finish her degree.

643Dr. Rowe found that the mother had misrepresented her educational background, by declaring she is in “pre-med”. I have read in some of the documentation entered as exhibits at this trial, and heard evidence, about the mother’s shifting claims about what educational path she has been pursuing. Her statements included that she wants to be a family doctor, a police officer, and most recently a lawyer. She has claimed to have been in both “pre-med” and “pre-law”.

644During this trial, the mother said that her current plan is to go to law school. She said she abandoned her previous desire to go to medical school, due to its cost. When cross-examined, the mother was repeatedly unable to identify, where she planned to go to law school, while claiming she would commute in order to meet her parenting responsibilities. She could not say how that would work, given the distance between where she lives, and law schools in Ontario.

645Dr. Rowe identified limitations respecting he mother’s ability to maintain paid employment. I heard similar evidence about this at trial, too. Dr. Rowe wrote that the mother reported being involved in multiple volunteer and philanthropic endeavours, none of which were particularly long lasting. During this trial I heard about the existence of some kind of foundation, an alleged board of directors, the firing of one of these so-called board members, criminal charges relating to that and a peace bond. The evidence at trial was that long lasting or not, whatever the mother is doing with this foundation involves her engaging in conflict, inserting herself into others’ lawsuits apparently as a “Mackenzie Friend”, and supposedly gathering up information with the intention of initiating a class action lawsuit.

646Dr. Rowe reviewed police reports, that alluded to conflict with others. Evidence of that ilk is also before the Court.

647Dr. Rowe noted a history of instability in the mother’s romantic relationships. That has been well established at this trial, too.

648In other words, the history that Dr. Rowe gathered up, was substantially similar to the evidence about it called at this trial.

649Now Dr. Rowe was concerned about the mother’s credibility. His concerns were based on several things, including some of the mother scores during the psychological testing. At some point, Dr. Rowe stopped interpreting the testing based on the mother’s self-reports, as he concluded these were likely invalid and should not be interpreted.[31]

650While I take the point that Dr. Rowe concluded he should approach what the mother was reporting with some caution, that aspect of his testimony goes not further. I wish to be clear that the Court is not relying on expert opinion evidence to assess the mother’s credibility. The Court does not require expert evidence for this, and has its own views about credibility, which are accentuated repeatedly throughout this ruling.

651Another of the tests that Dr. Rowe administered, was the Child Protection and Parenting Risk Management Inventory. This tool offers a relative judgment of parental fitness through a structured process, but is not an evaluative measure. It compares the person being tested relative to other similarly situated persons. In other words, this test revealed that the mother, when compared to other parents going through the family court system, shows many more risk factors and severity, than the vast majority of other parents. Like Dr. Rowe’s credibility analysis, I found this evidence to be less helpful than some of his other conclusions. The degree of risk that this mother poses relative to others in the justice system is not the issue before me. The Court can assess on its own, without regard to a non-evaluative test, the degree of risk that this mother poses to these children.

652What was consistent with the other evidence called at this trial though, as Dr. Rowe separately explained, was that there has been a consistent theme of impulsivity, hyperactivity, and personality traits, i.e. symptoms of ADHD and BPD. Diagnostically, Dr. Rowe concluded that the mother had a history of attention and executive functioning difficulties, and that she does met the DSM-5 criteria for ADHD, Combined Presentation, Moderate Severity. She also does have symptoms consistent with a DSM-5 diagnosis of BPD. He found her symptoms appeared to be longstanding, and significantly interfered with her functioning across settings. Although Dr. Rowe did not conclude that the diagnostic criteria for a Cannabis Use Disorder had been met, he felt that her use should be monitored in the context of stressful life events, given the history of her use.

653Dr. Rowe explained that BPD is diagnosed by the presence of several symptoms, the most prominent including emotional dysregulation, marked volatility, reckless self-control, impulsivity, suicidal gesturing, and volatile interpersonal relationships. I agree with Dr. Rowe that all of these symptoms are present here, based on a multitude of evidence before the Court.

654According to Dr. Rowe, ADHD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that impacts executive problem solving, self-control and the ability to self-regulate. He testified that the features of BPD can be somewhat exacerbated when one has ADHD too, because of the difficulty with regular functioning that comes with ADHD in the first place. In other words, he said, one diagnosis can “feed into” the other.

655Dr. Rowe was asked whether he confused trauma when concluding a BPD diagnosis. He agreed that the mother’s symptoms could be explained by both, but he felt the mother’s presentation was most reflective of a BPD. Regardless, he said that the label mattered less; it was the behaviour being exhibited and its impact on parenting that mattered more, to him

656In summary, the mother has been told four times by three psychiatrists, and now by a psychologist who undertook a comprehensive assessment of her mental health, that she had Cluster B symptoms or traits, and now a confirmed BPD diagnosis. She was told this by Dr. Stakheiko in November of 2015 and again in March of 2016, by Dr. Jain in November 2024, by Dr. Rowe in his assessment, and even by Dr. McArthur, less than three months later, in April of 2025 (below). DBT has now been recommended to treat this four times, by Dr. Stakheiko, Dr. Mammoliti, Dr. Jain, and Dr. Rowe.

657I find the mother’s mental health diagnoses are ADHD and BPD.

(7) The Mother’s Suicidal Ideation and Gestures

658Continuing with the evidentiary basis that supports Dr. Rowe’s BPD diagnosis, repeated suicidal ideation or gestures are a Cluster B trait. And this was not just a one-off in this case. The mother has made varying statements about the number and frequency of her past suicidal ideations and actions, over a prolonged period of time.

659There were at least seven instances of suicidal ideation, or gestures, spanning an almost eight-year period between 2015 and 2023. There have been reports of additional ideation and gestures before 2015 as part of the mother’s historical account to doctors, too. While some of these statements and actions have already been alluded to elsewhere in this Judgment, I list them here together in chronological order; they are staggering in number. They were:

(a) In the fall of 2015, the mother reported to Dr. Stakheiko that she had been thinking about suicide “pretty much on a daily basis”, with four previous attempts, between 11 and 15 years of age;

(b) According to the consultation note of hospital resident Ryan Shields in 2016, the mother felt significantly overwhelmed, grabbed a razor while in the shower and cut her left wrist. She also called out to her mother to communicate that she was having suicidal thoughts. The mother at that time, reported at the hospital, that “stress just hit her like a pile of bricks”, and she said that her mood had been worse over the past two weeks. She reported daily suicidal ideation again on this occasion. Her plan after cutting her wrists, was apparently to sit in the car and funnel the exhaust into it. She also reported having previously cut her wrists approximately 7 years ago, she said she tried to eat a bottle of Tylenol at age 12, she said she also tried to hang herself at 11 years old, but the belt she was using snapped, and she said she had written suicide notes in relation to this current 2016 incident, relying on previous ones she had written when younger;

(c) At ¶ 252 of her trial affidavit, the mother took issue with the evidence that there was a razor involved in 2016, but she admitted suicidal ideation in the process. The mother said her recollection was that the incident did not involve a razor, but rather “a car exhaust set up”;

(d) T.’s father reported that once, after an argument, the mother left. When she returned, she told him that she had stood on the edge of a bridge, debating whether to jump off;

(e) To Dr. Mammoliti, during her February 2023 consultation, the mother reported that she had attempted to lay down on the train tracks “multiple times”;

(f) I heard several accounts about the train tracks during this trial. In the end, what was disputed was whether the mother had the children with her when she went to the train tracks, or whether she parked the car on the tracks versus lying down on the tracks, but not whether she tried to go on the tracks herself in some fashion;

(g) H.’s father pointed me to the mother’s Facebook post from August 19, 2021 (the day of the windshield incident – referred to above), in which she wrote “I just don’t want to breathe anymore I really don’t”. He added that the mother at another time accused him of making her want to be “six feet under”;

(h) H.’s father said that on one occasion, the mother held scissors to her wrist, and on another she held a knife to her throat. Both occasions required the intervention of her mother, and of her brother; and

(i) The mother’s academic advisor L.G. testified that she received some emails from the mother indicating that she was not mentally well. She testified that the mother sent two emails referring to thoughts of suicide, one sent on June 13, 2023, around the time that the mother made the decision to withdraw from summer courses. The portion of the mother’s email referrable to suicide, stated:

An attempt of suicide was enough for me to solidify me needing a break.[32]

G. Summary of the Evidence and Additional Findings of Fact About the Mother’s Treatability

(1) Dr. Rowe’s Evidence About the Mother’s Treatability

660While Dr. Rowe noted that the mother reported participating in various community based individualized and group interventions over the years, he was uncertain whether the therapeutic services that she accessed have been an appropriate match. He found her attendance was inconsistent, and any DBT that she pursued was brief in nature. All of which was proven at this trial, too.

661Apparently the mother told Dr. Rowe that she was open to participate in future therapy (she told the Court that she was against DBT, and in particular group therapy), but she portrayed herself at the assessment of someone relatively free of mental health challenges. Dr. Rowe characterized her amenability to treatment as “moderate”, but found there were barriers that would limit the effectiveness of interventions. When asked whether someone who lacked insight and was unaccepting of a diagnosis could still be treatable, he said yes but this would (a) raise additional barriers to treatment (b) require lengthier treatment to first overcome those barriers and (c) significantly increase the likelihood that treatment would be unsuccessful.

662While I am not certain that I accept his use of the descriptor “moderate” when describing the mother’s amenability to treatment in these circumstances, I do agree that there are multiple barriers here, which is a problem.

663Dr. Rowe recommended weekly counselling with a therapist who employs Cognitive Behavioural or Dialectical Behavioural methods. He referred to DBT as the “gold standard”. He recommended parent skills training. There are also recommendations about the mother using a case worker to help her explore future career options. Unfortunately, the mother no longer even has the support of her academic advisor, let alone is she pursuing DBT.

664While Dr. Rowe indicated that DBT could be done virtually, he strongly emphasized the preferability of in person treatment. Notably, the therapy that the mother is currently doing, is administered virtually.

665When giving this evidence, he added that BPD is one of the most difficult mental health conditions to treat in a significantly positive way. He said that there needed to be a long-term commitment, with a skilled therapist, and even then significant changes are not a foregone conclusion. By significant commitment, he did not mean a “6 session” course of treatment (or reviewing internet DBT videos for that matter), but rather “months-long”, or perhaps even a year or two, with the possibility of a return thereafter as needed. He said that DBT should be supplemented with other components like group work and coaching, which he feels cannot be done effectively online. The mother testified more than once, about her unwillingness to do group work.

666In response to questions from the OCL, Dr. Rowe recommended that there could be reassessment in the future, but not solely for the sake of it; rather if there was a marked change in circumstances. He testified that the goal of treatment should be for the mother to try to compensate for the deficits that she experiences, not just by acquiring knowledge (i.e. learning what the skills are), but also by demonstrating an actual ability to implement those skills regularly.

667Notably, less than three months after the release of his assessment, the mother went to see a new psychiatrist, in search of a different diagnosis, autism. This had already been “immediately discounted” by Dr. Jain.

668Other than his use of the word “moderate” when describing amenability to treatment, I accept Dr. Rowe’s opinions about the mother’s treatability, and the recommendations that he made for treatment.

(2) Events After the Release of Dr. Rowe’s Assessment

669The mother instantly started complaining about Dr. Rowe and his report, upon the report’s release.

670For example, Ms. Wylde testified that she was unable to discuss Dr. Rowe’s opinions and conclusions with the mother, because the mother took the position that the report was inadmissible, and said she was not going to follow through with the recommendations.

671Dr. Rowe testified that he was prepared to make himself available to go through the Report with the mother. But “within hours” of its release, the mother made a complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal against him. Shortly after that, she made a complaint against him to his College. A month or two after that, the mother launched a civil lawsuit against him and others. In June of 2025, she made her complaint to the Information Privacy Commissioner.

672Incredibly, the mother then tried at this trial, to challenge Dr. Rowe’s credibility, regarding whether he was prepared to meet with her to go over his report. She tendered an email dated January 23, 2026, she sent almost a year later, as this trial was approaching. In her email, she wrote to Dr. Rowe that she now wanted to start weekly therapy with him, despite her Human Rights Tribunal Application, her two complaints and her civil lawsuit against him. Understandably, Dr. Rowe did not respond to this on the advice of his lawyer, and he was not prepared to act as her therapist. Incidentally, this email was not about reviewing the report; it was about pursuing therapy a year later, and after she had already launched legal proceedings and complaints. Dr. Rowe is not to be criticized for not responding to this incredible January 23, 2026 email; it is patently obvious why he didn’t respond.

673The mother confirmed at this trial, that she disagrees with the majority of Dr. Rowe’s recommendations. She feels he undertook a one-sided assessment. She feels he misrepresented her background information. She specifically took issue with Dr. Rowe’s BPD diagnosis, based on her own research and her observations of other people that she knows who have BPD. Inconsistently, the mother separately claimed to have implemented Dr. Rowe’s recommendations for therapy, despite disagreeing with most of the Report. What the mother has in fact done respecting treatment, both before and after Dr. Rowe’s Report, is not harmonious with either his recommendations, or her claims that she has implemented them.

(3) Psychiatrist Dr. McArthur’s Evidence

674Less than three months later, on April 2, 2025, the mother went to see psychiatrist Dr. Katherine McArthur, looking to be diagnosed with autism. Dr. McArthur wrote in her consultation note (and testified during this trial), that the mother attended with multiple forms completed by herself and “her sister” (i.e. M.W.) reporting various symptoms. She wrote “[n]o matter the outcome of this assessment I think explanation of how she does or does not fit into this diagnostic criteria may be of benefit to help her with her own understanding, self-knowledge and personal self-assessment”.

675Dr. McArthur wrote that in reference to BPD, the mother had a pattern of unstable relationships. Dr. McArthur noted that the mother presented with some cluster B traits, borderline and antisocial, but it was difficult to make a diagnosis due to effects of stress and psychosocial stressors. She wrote that “ASPD” (i.e. Anti-Social Personality Disorder) traits could be misconstrued or be more consistent with an autism disorder. Dr. McArthur was advised (incorrectly) that the mother had only “one previous suicide attempt in 2016, with no other suicide attempts, suicidal ideation with plan and does not have any pattern of nonlethal self-harm behaviour”, so this contraindicated the diagnosis. But she had been inaccurately advised.

676Nonetheless, on page one of the note, the mother’s diagnosis is said to be ADHD, acute on chronic adjustment disorder with anxiety and disturbance of conduct, rule out autism spectrum disorder, and once again (as others had done before hand) she identified cluster B traits, borderline plus/minus ASPD.

677It was the mother who called Dr. McArthur to testify. She did so, because she wanted to take issue with the reference to Cluster B traits in Dr. McArthur’s report.

678Dr. McArthur’s evidence did not assist the mother. Dr. McArthur was reluctant to opine on matters that went beyond the scope of her one-time assessment of the mother. The mother had not given her an accurate history. When counsel for the Society cross-examined Dr. McArthur, she described the best practice for diagnosing BPD. Her description was not too dissimilar from the process that Dr. Rowe had embarked upon. She added that BPD is behaviorally driven, not chemically driven, and it is challenging to manage (as Dr. Rowe had already testified).

679In addition to making the referral for the autism assessment that the mother had sought (Dr. McArthur herself does not assess for autism), she made a referral for the mother to Ontario Shores for structured psychotherapy. I heard no evidence during this trial, that the mother followed through with that therapy referral, either

(4) The Mother’s Therapy

680In her trial affidavit, the mother says that she has consistently engaged in therapy, complied with prescribed medication, participated in supervised access, and cooperated with service providers. In reality, she has not consistently done any of these things.

681The mother testified that she participated in CBT after the 2016 suicide attempt. She said that she did three, one-hour long sessions at a Belleville Hospital. She claimed to have learned how to calm herself down in times of stress and said she learned other techniques at the time. At the same time, the mother said that CBT was “redundant at the time”. She noticed that “CBT and DBT didn’t work for me”, until she started Vyvanse. She said it was impossible for her to have done that CBT class back in 2016, because she was not “mentally clear” and she could not calm her thoughts.

682I do not have a clear picture of the mother’s therapy after that, although it seems that she either did not participate in much therapy, or if she did it was intermittent and there was certainly no continuity of care. The mother testified that several years later, she had some therapy through Fanshawe College, there were the few sessions of relationship counselling that H.’s father testified about, in 2021 or 2022, the mother says that she saw a psychotherapist named Donna Milton in 2022, she says she saw a social worker through a bariatric program in the Kingston Hospital, and then after she started taking Vyvanse in 2023, the mother says she saw counsellors named Santina Williams, and someone named “Billy Jo”.

683The mother testified that she saw Donna Milton, Santina Williams and “Billy Jo” through Victim Services, perhaps accessed around the time of H.’s father’s criminal proceedings. “Billy Jo” apparently referred the mother to someone else named John Crusius. None of these people were called to testify, nor were their records tendered into evidence. The mother also reminded the Court about some therapy she obtained at her current university, after she disclosed thoughts of suicide to her academic advisor, and the academic advisor made a referral for her. L.G. was unaware as to whether the mother had followed through.

684Rachel Wright is a registered psychotherapist with the CMHA who saw the mother for six therapy sessions between February 2, 2024 and June 18, 2024 in the CMHA’s counselling treatment program. She also saw the mother briefly, in a group setting, focused on managing her ADHD. The mother followed through with neither of these services.

685Ms. Wright testified that arrangements had been made to provide the mother with bi-weekly therapy. She did a counselling intake with the mother on February 2, 2024. Goals of therapy were to address trauma, and the mother’s challenges with her relationship with her own mother, and other “abusive relationships”. Ms. Wright testified that she tried to employ the “ABC model” of therapy, focused on identifying a triggering event, taking a breath, and then choosing to either react, or respond, the choice of which could lead to negative or positive consequences.

686The mother then failed to attend or cancelled therapy sessions on March 6, 15, and 27. May 31, July 5, and August 8, 2024. During this time frame, the mother was making physical and then sexual abuse allegations. Ms. Wright’s counselling file with the mother was closed on August 8, 2024, due to the CMHA’s policy, about the number of “no shows and participation”. Twelve days later, the August 20, 2024 hospital incident occurred.

687Regarding the Managing ADHD group that the mother was supposed to attend, Ms. Wright’s letter says that the mother actually tried to attend this group on two different occasions, not just in 2024, but again in 2025. The first group ran between March 20 and May 22, 2024. The mother only attended 3 sessions out of 10. Her non-attendance was similar in the 2025 group program held between October 2 and November 13, 2025.

688After the first CMHA file was closed, the mother re-connected with the CMHA, again, beginning on October 3, 2024, as a result of a referral by the Society. Stacey Henderson, a case manager at the CMHA, was assigned to work with the mother, starting in June of 2025. Ms. Henderson saw the mother seven times between June 9, 2025 and October 14, 2025. On August 7, 2025, Ms. Henderson made a referral for the mother to attend the “Managing Powerful Emotions” group. That particular program was a 12-week program, that began on September 17, 2025.

689The mother was discharged from the CMHA entirely, one month later. It goes without saying that the mother did not complete the “Managing Powerful Emotions” group. She missed three of its weekly sessions after September 17, 2025, before her discharge. She didn’t even attend the orientation date, apparently reporting that she had woken up ill that morning. Ms. Henderson said that just prior to her testifying at this trial, the mother told her out in the hallway of the court house, that group sessions weren’t for her. When cross-examined by H.’s father’s lawyer, the mother said she couldn’t have completed this Group, because she was then, and still is now, dealing with the effect of gall bladder surgery that she had in 2024.

690Before the mother’s work with Ms. Henderson stopped in mid-October of 2025, the mother declined even to identify any need for the CMHA’s services at all. Ms. Henderson explained that she had met the mother and completed the Ontario Common Assessment of Needs Form with her. Some of the needs on the form included shelter and food security, that the mother said she did not require. However the mother also identified that her physical health needs were being met, and she did not have any needs regarding psychological distress (i.e. where symptoms of depression or anxiety have interfered with her daily life), regarding safety to her-self (i.e. thoughts or acts of self-harming behaviour), regarding safety to others (i.e. thoughts or acts of harming others), regarding intimate relationships (i.e. where close personal relationships have been a problem), and regarding transportation (i.e. getting to and from appointments and daily activities), and finances. Yet during this trial, each of these areas have been identified as problem areas for the mother, including from the mother herself.

691Most recently, the mother is now working with Kim Salvador, another registered psychotherapist, who is in private practice. Her work with Ms. Salvador, is not DBT or CBT therapy either, although her curriculum vitae says that she does use DBT approaches. Ms. Salvator is using a treatment called Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (“EMDR”), to address trauma. Ms. Salvador testified that the mother had made her aware of diagnoses that she may have had, as part of her intake. The diagnoses that the mother reported were ADHD, binge eating, PTSD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. The mother reported that she had been diagnosed with BPD by Dr. Rowe as well, but indicated she was disputing that diagnosis. Ms. Salvador did not review any mental health assessments, such as that of Dr. Rowe.

692By the time of her testimony on April 30, 2026, Ms. Salvador said that she had seventeen, 50 minute (online) sessions with the mother so far, at first weekly, and later bi-weekly. Ms. Salvador testified that the goals of the mother’s therapy have been to increase her emotional regulation skills. But Ms. Salvador qualified her evidence to say that she could only comment or make observations about what the mother had told her in sessions, and about what had occurred during therapy sessions. For instance, she testified that the mother was able to identify emotions and apply strategies “at the moment” (meaning in therapy). She testified that the mother had reported trying to use strategies learned during therapy sessions, to better manage conflict and emotions outside sessions. She did not note whether the mother had told her she had been successful in this regard.

693The mother said she is separately seeing someone named Shynimol Bhaskaran, since January 28, 2026 for parent coaching. Ms. Salvador made this referral, hence why their therapy sessions went from weekly to bi-weekly. The mother testified that she is seeing this person, because the Society did not offer her any services to teach her how to engage properly with the children. While this is a recommendation in Dr. Rowe’s report, the mother waited to start doing this for a full year, and then she did not call Ms. Bhaskaran to testify. I learned from the OCL’s cross-examination, that the mother is doing this work online, too.

694In summary, the therapy evidence that I do have reveals the mother either failed to participate in, or follow through with recommended therapy or services on 10 occasions between 2015 and now (i.e. Dr. Stakheiko’s recommendation in December 2015, the recommendations after the February 2016 hospitalization, the recommendations in Dr. Mammoliti’s assessment in February of 2023, the recommendations in Dr. Jain’s letter in 2024, with Ms. Wright’s course of therapy in 2024, with the three groups through the CMHA in 2024 and 2025, the CMHA’s services were cancelled entirely in 2025, and with Dr. McArthur’s referral to Ontario Shores in 2025).

695The mother’s failure to call every single person from the above list of therapists is of no moment, in my view. I can only assume that she selected the therapists that she chose to call, with a view to putting her best foot forward. The evidence that she did call reveals that there has been no continuity of care. It reveals that the mother has been going from therapist to therapist for years, likely from crisis to crisis, or in the case of her current therapy, as this trial approached, after waiting for a year after the release of Dr. Rowe’s report. It reveals an inability to follow through and implement meaningful change. It reveals a refusal on the part of the mother to acknowledge one of the diagnoses she has, and to access the kind of therapy that has been repeatedly recommended: DBT.

696At one point during this trial, when claiming that the removal was not justified, the mother even said “my children have nothing to do with my mental health”. She contradicted herself at another time, admitting, that her mental health had impacted the children negatively, resulting in emotional harm. But once again, the mother said she had rehabilitated herself through getting diagnosed, and taking therapy and medication. She could not identify when she last emotionally harmed either of the children. I find the mother’s evidence of change based on post-2023 ADHD medication and therapy is not credible or reliable in light of this history, nor does the evidentiary record as a whole demonstrate a mitigation of the numerous risks.

H. Summary and Conclusions About Whether the Children are In Need of Protection

697In conclusion, the Court finds these children are in need of protection on all of the above statutory grounds, for the many reasons expressed.

698In short, these children are at risk of physical or emotional harm, or both, arising out of the conflict and family violence to which they have been directly or indirectly exposed, the mother’s use of physical discipline, the mother’s false sexual abuse allegations, the mother’s neglect respecting T.’s education, the mother’s internet behaviour, the mother’s mismanagement of the children’s health care (for which the risks are multi-faceted), the mother’s combative approach to others in the children’s sphere, the mother’s mental health diagnoses, her lack of insight into her mental health, and her failure to access proper and consistent treatment.

PART VIII: ANALYSIS REGARDING DISPOSITION

699The protection concerns in this case are so numerous and varied, the mother’s health conditions are complex, and the prospect of success regarding the mother’s treatability is quite frankly low. This poses great challenges for the Court, when it comes to disposition.

A. The Disposition Options In this Case

700 Section 101(1) of the CYFSA sets out the disposition options, where the Court finds that a child is in need of protection, and is satisfied (which I am), that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future. While all options are theoretically on the table, this trial was really about whether there should be some kind of a supervision Order, or a custody Order under section 102. Section 102(1) provides that the Court may make a custody Order to one or more persons, other than a foster parent, with the person or persons’ consent, if the section 102 custody order instead of an order under section 101 “would be in the child’s best interests”.

B. The Assistance Provided Prior to Intervention

701Regardless of which Order is made, section 101(2) requires the Court to ask the parties what efforts the Society or another person or entity has made to assist the child before intervention under this Part of the CYFSA. The mother has accused the Society of not providing services or assistance.

702It is well established that the Society has a duty to provide assistance and services. In addition to the inquiry required by section 101(2), the other purposes of the CYFSA in section 1(2) include supporting the autonomy and integrity of the family unit, and taking the least disruptive course of action that is available and appropriate in a particular case to help a child, including the provision of prevention services, early intervention services and community support services. Sections 35(c) and (d) of the CYFSA set out that the functions of a children’s aid society include providing various services for prevention or for protecting children, and to supervise children assigned to its supervision under the legislation. There are various provisions respecting services in sections 11 to 15.1 of the Federal Act too, which apply respecting T.

703The focus of section 101(2) though, is not just on the Society (although the Society is certainly part of it). I have already commented upon the Society (and the police) for their inaction at times, and in particular in the case of the Society, for not bringing this matter to court sooner. But this is not a comment upon its failure to provide other services.

704In fact, the mother herself submitted during closing submissions, that between 2021 and 2024 before the removal, various services were in fact provided to her including monthly and sometimes bi-weekly contact, “a parenting engagement program worker”, and services through the CMHA. I note again, the Society’s pre-removal referral to the CMHA, with which the mother did not in the end follow through.

705Other services providers, especially doctors and the Children’s Treatment Centre, provided assessments and some therapy for H., before intervention. There were a plethora of problems. The mother sought numerous mental health assessments. She has been told by more than one psychiatrist (and now a psychologist) that she needed DBT and related treatment.

706It emerged during closing submissions, that the mother’s complaint was really about what happened after this case started, not about services before intervention. But even then, the Society still provided some services and tried to work with the mother. The Society provided supervision services, to facilitate the mother’s access. The Court ordered the mental health assessment. The Society paid for it. The Society provided the mother with gas money so she could get to access visits in Guelph, but drew a limit when the mother presented a 407 Bill in excess of $1,000.00 that she wanted paid. The Society does not have limitless financial resources; and it services many other families and children. Other health care professionals continued to be involved in relation to the children, too.

707The duty to provide services is not without limits. This is not a case of insufficient services before intervention. The mother’s criticisms against the Society about what happened around the removal, are made without regard to her own behaviour. In order for an out of court voluntary working arrangement, or even a supervisory relationship pursuant to court order, to work, there needs to be a relationship of trust between the mother and the Society, and the ability to work cooperatively. There needs to be compliance with court orders. The Society needs to be able to monitor the mother’s compliance. None of which can happen here, because of the mother’s conduct and attitude, leading up to, and after the removal.

708The mother demonstrated a healthy refusal to work fully and cooperatively with the Society, from the start of Ms. Johnson’s and then Ms. Wylde’s involvement. She was belligerent and combative. Ms. Johnson testified that it was never easy to address the Society’s concerns with the mother. Ms. Wylde explained that when the mother became dysregulated, she raised her voice, changed her tone, and made gestures. Supervisor Ms. Sonnenburg testified that she fielded complaints from the mother, about the workers that she supervised.

709Ms. Wyle says she had been unable to progress the mother’s access either, despite attempts. She listed numerous dates that she provided updates to the mother, and she listed numerous attempts to meet with the mother. The several meetings that she was able to have between March of 2025, and the present, sometimes lengthy meetings, are set out in her trial affidavit. Some of the scheduled meetings (seven of them) got cancelled by the mother, or she did not attend. On November 13, 2025, the mother terminated any future meetings.

710The mother complained that Ms. Wylde had refused to meet with her previously and alleged it was only after she filed her constitutional question in October 2025, that Ms. Wylde met with her. In cross-examination though, the mother admitted that she refused monthly meetings between October 2025 and March 2026, saying she has a neurodevelopmental disorder, the situation was overwhelming, and she did not have the mental capacity to sit in a meeting where she was being “degraded”.

711The mother cancelled consents for the release of information as indicated. The mother has launched a litany of complaints, as indicated. I am not persuaded that the mother is willing to engage in the specific recommendations that Dr. Rowe made, i.e. DBT and group therapy, with a dedicated professional for a committed period of time and preferably in person rather than virtually

712I fail to see how she can now mount a successful complaint, that she was under-serviced, under the circumstances.

713If social workers and other helping professionals cannot trust the mother to be honest, and to work cooperatively with them without fear of reprisal, there is little chance for a genuine alliance and a successful outcome: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.D.E., 2012 ONCJ 530 ¶ 39-41.

C. Less Disruptive Alternatives

714Relatedly, in H.’s case section 101(3) of the CYFSA requires the Court to be satisfied that less disruptive alternatives would be inadequate to protect a child before making an order removing the child from the care of the person who had charge of him before intervention.

715Regarding T., he is subject to the Federal Act. The Federal Act, which applies at every stage of a child protection proceeding, operates as a minimum standard. “Where standards under the CYFSA surpass or exceed those in the Federal Act, the CYFSA will apply. Where standards set out in the Federal Act surpass or exceed those in the CYFSA , the Federal Act will apply: see Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. S.S., 20022 ONSC 744 ¶ 64-64; see also section 4 of the Federal Act.

716In order to determine the proper disposition for T., sections 9, 10, and 16 are of the Federal Act are engaged: see Valoris v. J.W., C.R. Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, 2022 ONSC 2901. Section 16(1) provides a different order of priority for the placement of an Indigenous child. Under section 16(1)(a), both of the child’s parents have priority.

717To the extent that 16(a) of the Federal Act is in conflict with section 101(3) the CYFSA respecting T., and the Federal Act applies by virtue of section 4, the result is that the mother and T.’s father are placed on an equal footing when it comes to T.’s placement. But the result of this case wouldn’t change from what the outcome would be, if the Federal Act didn’t apply and section 101(3) instead applied to T. too, as it does for H.. All other things aren’t equal. Even if I applied section 101(3) of the CYFSA for both children, I would not place either with the mother.

718Returning the children to the mother without any terms and conditions under section 101(8) of the CYFSA is not an option. A court order is needed to protect the children in the future. The Court cannot place the children with the mother under a supervision Order either. She would need to address her mental health during the period of supervision. The maximum period of a supervision Order under the CYFSA is 12 months. The evidence about the length of the treatment the mother is going to require, exceeds that period of time. This is not the only reason. Others include her lack of insight, her lack of willingness to access the treatment she needs, and her refusal to work cooperatively with the Society, that a supervision Order requires. A supervision Order with the mother is not viable or workable. Ordering it would just create more chaos and conflict, and delay the inevitable permanency and stability that both children require.

719I find the least disruptive option is to place both children with their fathers. I don’t need to consider section 101(4) of the CYFSA for either child, or in T.’s case section 101(5) of the CYFSA because he is being placed with his father, a parent, and his Indigenous heritage lies there. Nor do I need to consider the other placement provisions in section 16(1)(b)-(e) of the Federal Act, for the same reasons.

D. A Supervision Order With Either of Both Fathers versus A Section 102 Order

720I must now decide whether, when placing each child with his father, should the Court make a supervision Order under section 101, or a custody Order under section 102 of the CYFSA. This is a best interests’ determination.

721The best interests test under section 74(3) of the CYFSA makes both children’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity unless they cannot be ascertained, and in T.’s case, the importance of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community for a FNIM child, mandatory considerations.

722In T.’s case, section 10(2) of the Federal Act provides that in the consideration of that Act’s best interests test, primary consideration must be given to his physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being, as well as to the importance, for that child, of having an ongoing relationship with his or her family and with the Indigenous group, community or people to which he or she belongs and of preserving the child’s connections to his culture.

723The Orders I am making achieve these objectives.

724 Section 74(3)(c) of the CYFSA then lists 11 non-exhaustive best interests circumstances to consider, if relevant. Regarding T., section 10(3) of the Federal Act contains a non-exhaustive list of best interests’ factors that apply to an Indigenous child. The list is similar, but not identical to the best interests’ factors under the CYFSA. The list has been described as an “augmented best interests test”: see Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. S.S. and T.F. ¶ 71.

725In the result of the best interests’ determination (below), I find there is no need for a supervision Order with H.’s father. He has a strong plan, H.’s needs are being met, H. has shown much improvement since coming into her care, and provided that he, H. and other family members are insulated from the mother’s behaviour, there is no further need for Society involvement.

726I paused regarding T.’s father, because of the concerns raised earlier. But in the end as I have said, I am generally satisfied that they can be addressed through terms and conditions in the section 102 Order. T.’s father’s plan also ensures his connection to his Indigenous heritage as required by the Federal Act.

727A heavy factor in deciding to grant a section 102 custody Order instead of a supervision Order is the need for all this litigation to end for these children. At ¶ 119 of Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M., 2024 ONCJ 607, Sherr J. opted for a custody Order over a supervision Order where the children had been before the court for over 3 years, there were no protection concerns about the caregiver, the children had already been exposed to too much chaos and instability, the children needed to know where their long-term home would be and the parents would undermine the placement and engage in continuous trials until the matter was finalized. These reasons are remarkably on point.

728In this case before me, both of the children have been the subject of CLRA proceedings off and on for years. They have been the subject of this CYFSA proceeding for 1 year and 7 months. The last thing that either child needs, is to be subjected to Status Review litigation, required under section 113(1) of the CYFSA were I to make a supervision Order.

729Finally, before the Court may make a section 102 Order, it must address the fact that there are two Final parenting Orders already in place regarding T. and H. Section 102(6)(a) of the CYFSA would have prevented me from making a section 102 Order, had those Orders been made under the Divorce Act, but they were not; they are both CLRA orders. As such, there are no conflict of law issues here within the meaning of section 102(6).

730Nonetheless, despite the absence of a statutory conflict of laws, there is another threshold issue. Where a section 102 Order made in a CYFSA proceeding has the effect of varying an existing Final CLRA Order, a material change analysis is required. The preconditions to making a section 102 Order in those circumstances are:

(a) all persons who are parting to the final Order under the CLRA must be parties to the CYFSA proceeding;

(b) all parties in the CYFA must be served with the claim of any party who seeks an order under section 102; and

See Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.A.R., 2015 ONSC 2534

731These preconditions are met. There is no issue with party status, with notice, or with service here. Nor is there an issue with the material change threshold. At the risk of repeating myself, since the making of one or both of the Final CLRA Orders, there has been ongoing conflict, changes in the mother’s housing, school changes, continued school absences and lates for T., the revelation of additional medical information about the mother, another statement of suicidal ideation by the mother, the false sexual abuse allegation, and new evidence about whether H. has autism and about the services he needs. The Court has now made findings that the children are in need of protection based on numerous pieces of evidence, some of which post-dates one or both Final Orders. There have been positive changes in the children’s needs being met, since the removal.

732All of these are significant changes affecting the children. To use the statutory language in section 29 of the CLRA, they are “material change[s] in circumstances that [affect] or [are] likely to affect the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order [sought to be varied]”.

E. The Children’s Best Interests Respecting the Section 102 Orders

(1) T.’s Father’s Plan

733I consider T.’s father’s plan under section 10(3)(f) of the Federal Act, although much of this evidence has overlapping relevance to other statutory best interests’ factors.

734T.’s father lives in Guelph, with his partner M, and now with T. T.’s father and his partner M. have cohabited since March of 2021, and do not have any other children together or from other relationships.

735In regard to section 10(3)(b) of the Federal Act, T.’s father says in his trial affidavit, that since the removal, he has enrolled T. in school, and worked to ensure a good transition into his care. T.’s father describes his daily routine that involves getting T. ready in the morning. M. takes T. to school, and he is picked up at the end of the day by his paternal grandmother. T.’s father describes various activities, camps and other socialization activities that he has made available for T. M. offers some similar evidence in her trial affidavit, about the ways the two have parented, since T. came into their care.

736I note that each of T.’s father, M. and the grandmother have given evidence about the improvements that T. has experienced since coming into the father’s care. T.’s father says that apart from some initial behavioural issues, which he attributed to the transition, the child is in good health. M. says she has noticed a “huge change” in T., that he has many friends at school, and enjoys recess and playing. The grandmother describes T. as having acquired confidence during play. By contrast, there were significant issues with T.’s attendance at school, under the mother’s watch.

737T.’s father has taken steps to meet the child’s health needs, since the removal. He has enrolled T. in a local health clinic for medical care within 2 weeks of T. coming into his care. He has also taken T. to the optometrist for an eye test, which had not been done previously, and to the dentist periodically. Although I have some concerns about T.’s counselling, he is now on a wait list and the Society will remain involved with this.

738In regard to section 10(3)(c) of the Federal Act, T. has a good relationship with his father, his partner, and his paternal grandmother. T.’s father has also arranged for T. to have contact with T.’s maternal uncle R., and F., who previously cared for him, when they lived with the mother in the maternal grandparents’ home. R. and F. have a young child, and so T. has met his cousin. In the mother’s care, this would not happen.

739In regard to importance of preserving T.’s connection to his Indigenous heritage and culture required by section 10(2) and 10(3)(a) of the Federal Act, T. is being placed with his father, where his heritage lies. T.’s paternal grandmother says that she has created opportunities for T.’s participation in activities, including those that align with their Indigenous heritage and culture. T.’s grandmother has made a significant sacrifice to be part of this plan of care, by choosing not to relocate to Victoria.

740Although I also have concerns about T.’s father’s past use of physical discipline, there was no evidence that the father used physical discipline since the removal. T.’s father’s partner has not observed T.’s father to use physical discipline since the removal. Ms. Knight asked T., and T. said that his father gives him time outs for misbehaviour. Even though he disengaged from the circle of security program, Ms. Swayne still said that T.’s father was generally reflective and engaged throughout the sessions, and expressed the desire to have T. feel safe and secure in his care. In contrast, T. was both exposed to and subjected to family violence when in the mother’s households, it impacted him, and I have found a risk of harm in her care. This is a best interests’ consideration in section 10(3)(g) of the Federal Act.

741Finally, T.’s father has worked cooperatively with the Society, and he is prepared to continue to do so. Unlike the mother, this demonstrates his ability to work well with other professionals involved in T.’s care, and some insight.

(2) H.’s Father’s Plan

742Several best interest factors, particularly sections 74(3)(c)(i), (ii), (v), (vi), (vii) and (x) of the CYFSA, are engaged when the Court reviews H.’s father’s plan.

743H.’s father’s plan involves the support of his partner, and his parents. When he does shift work, he has his partner, his parents and other family members, help out. In his Answer and Plan of Care, H.’s father says he intends to provide a “stable and consistent environment” for H., and expresses the desire to minimize the parental conflict. He understands that the past conflict had a detrimental impact on H.’s mental health.

744H.’s father testified about H.’s routine since the removal, which includes making H. a healthy breakfast and getting him ready for school. H. has an early dinner after school, and the family spends time together. He ensures that H. has a shower or a bath at night, and has a bedtime routine. H.’s father’s partner gave consistent evidence about the routine in the household.

745H.’s paternal grandparents are now actively involved in his care. They used to live a several hours drive away, but have moved to the area. H. spends alternate weekends with his grandparents, when H.’s father and his partner have to work. H’s grandparents help with things like taking him to appointments, to access visits, and sometimes with getting him to and from his after school care. H.’s grandfather says that the grandparents follow the same routine that H.’s father maintains in his household, when H. spends weekends there.

746H.’s father has also been in contact with R. and F. H. too, has been able to have contact with R. and F. again, and meet his new baby cousin.

747H.’s father has taken steps to deal with H.’s health needs, since the removal. According to Ms. Wylde’s trial affidavit, since the removal, the father has taken H. to his family doctor for minor issues on a variety of days, plus for an annual check-up, and to the optometrist and to his family doctor’s office, to deal with the swollen eye issue referenced above. He took him to his hearing test in Kingston in June of 2025.

748During her cross-examination of the father, the mother read out 16 dates that the father has taken him to health appointments in 2025 and 2026, after the removal. It was not entirely clear what the point of this was supposed to be. In any event, the father explained that he did so to follow up about the child’s cough (above), to address the swollen eye issue (also above), and to address other issues. There is no real suggestion that the father has not managed H.’s health care well, since the removal.

749H.’s father says that after the removal H. had issues with emotional regulation, but he has worked to help H. overcome this. At first after coming into his care, H. had some meltdowns, which included kicking and slamming doors. H.’s father testified about the age-appropriate discipline that he has used in his household, and this behaviour has diminished over time through repetition and communication.

750H.’s father’s partner noticed improvements in H.’s communication. H.’s paternal grandmother testified that whereas before, H. couldn’t control his anger, H. has opened up since coming into his father’s care. His communication has improved, and he has developed trust. H.’s grandfather testified that H. has developed more confidence.

751H.’s father arranged for H. to have six free therapy sessions. H. has now started private therapy (2 sessions so far by the date of H.’s father’s testimony on April 24, 2026), at a cost of $125.00 per session. H.’s father has some health benefits after which the therapy cost is out of pocket.

752H.’s father testified about the child’s educational needs. He helps him with his reading. H. is being monitored at school with speech therapy. By contrast, the mother testified that under her watch, the child went to an intake appointment at the Children’s Treatment Centre, and then there was some conflict between the parents about who would attend the next session. H. did not continue with speech therapy after that, although she maintained that she had previously accessed private speech therapy, apparently.

753On October 29, 2025, H.’s teacher participated in a case conference with H.’s father and other educational professionals to discuss the emotional dysregulation that they were seeing in the classroom. Regarding the speech assessment, ongoing monitoring and indirect management were recommended.

754H.’s father is accepting of H.’s diagnosis (i.e. that he does not have autism). He said he would have accepted the autism diagnosis too, had it been confirmed. The mother is not accepting of the weight of the medical evidence, that H. does not have autism.

755The father testified about the activities that he has been able to put H. in (hockey and a YMCA summer program). He wanted H. to be in soccer last summer, but problems ensued because the mother made it known that she intended to be the soccer coach, and this was not approved by the Society. The Court’s Order below will prevent a repeat of this kind of dispute, moving forward. H.’s paternal grandfather testified about activities that the grandparents have done with the child, such as taking him to skating, and about playing baseball with him outside, too.

756Finally, H.’s father has also worked cooperatively with the Society. This too, demonstrates further his ability to work with professionals involved in H.’s care., and insight

(3) The Children’s Views and Preferences

757Regarding section 74(3) of the CYFSA and section 10(e) of the Federal Act, the children are happy living with their fathers.

758There is some evidence about the children missing their mother. While I have taken their wishes into account and the Court will try to accommodate these wishes to a point, it cannot do so at the expense of subjecting them to the numerous risks that present in this case.

(4) The Mother’s Plan

759The mother, by contrast, has no viable plan. Her support persons (the maternal grandmother and M.W.) have been enmeshed in the drama and conflict along with her. In closing submissions, the mother said her plan also included B.S., the grandfather (who didn’t testify), and various unnamed aunts and uncles in Belleville.

760It bears repeating that the grandmother called the Society to report the train tracks’ incident in 2023. She then tried to recant. She blamed F. for her earlier statement. This is a concern. She will not be able to act in a protective manner.

761Indeed, the grandmother tried to explain away any past behaviour and conflict on her part, by also saying that she did not then have her ADHD diagnosis yet. She claimed that the mother had never hit the children (other than what happened in the video – which is not true). She claimed to be unaware of T.’s absences and lates. These are concerns.

762The maternal grandmother even denied awareness of several protection concerns. When cross-examined by T.’s lawyer, the grandmother showed a lack of understanding about why the children were removed from the mother’s care. While she claimed she would work with the Society if the children were returned to the mother, when asked if she would ensure that the mother follows through on recommendations, she said “it depends on the recommendation”, and that she cannot force another adult, but “we will be supportive of whatever is determined”. This is a concern. She will not unequivocally encourage the mother to work with the Society under a supervision order.

763The mother described her friend M.W. as her “platonic life partner” and her “sister” at different points or to different people. The mother said that she, M.W. and M.W.’s partner, all “partner” as three individuals, although she does this more so with M.W. The mother and M.W. have referred to each other, perhaps with M.W.’s partner also, as being in some kind of co-parenting relationship, that supposedly involved T. and H., and M.W.’s several children, before the removal.

764In cross-examination by T.’s father’s lawyer, the mother testified M.W. lives an hour away from her. Apparently despite this, there is still some kind of ongoing arrangement where the mother and M.W. are together, in one location or another, with some or all of M.W.’s children. This is apparently so despite the distance, even though the mother simultaneously complained about her physical health and the financial barriers that allegedly impact her ability to drive to Guelph for access.

765M.W. claimed that in the past when the mother was parenting T. and H., there was some kind of division of parenting responsibilities, which involved “tapping” in and out, when one adult or another needed a break. At one point during this trial, the mother said that they are “still trying to figure out [their] dynamic”. I don’t know what that is supposed to mean.

766M.W. has been drawn into the mother’s lawsuits and complaints, and into the chaos associated with the board of directors of the mother’s apparent foundation, too. The maternal grandmother has been part of some of the lawsuits.

767This entire arrangement as described, sounds chaotic, disorganized and unstable. M.W. is not a protective factor.

768The mother’s principal proposal, is the status quo that existed prior to the removal. The mother’s alternative draft Orders impose restrictions on both fathers. These plans entail the continuation of a regime that was bordering on an unmitigated disaster. None of this is in the child’s best interests. In regard to section 74(3)(x) of the CYFSA, the risk of the children’s return to the mother is significantly higher than the risk of them remaining in the father’s care, with the consequential limiting of their contact with her, that entails.

769Pursuant to section 74(3)(iv) of the CYFSA, and section 10(3)(a) of the Federal Act, the children’s other cultural and linguistic heritage, and their religious upbringing are best interests factors. I agree that the application of these factors do reveal a deficit in the fathers’ plans, but only somewhat.

770The mother says that her mother tongue is Spanish, and that language and culture were incorporated in the household when the children were being raised in her care. The mother is concerned that the children’s removal has resulted in the interruption of the children’s exposure to her cultural and linguistic environment.

771H.’s father said that he was open to exploring Spanish lessons to try to address the mother’s concerns. The challenge here is that H. is working on his speech as it is, and he is in French Immersion, already learning Canada’s other official language. I accept H.’s father’s say-so that he might consider language lessons in the future, if it is appropriate. But it is up to him, when and if to incorporate this, based on H.’s other needs. Now may not be the time, to introduce studying a third language. The mother’s argument about culture, while valid, cannot overcome all of the other deficits with her plan.

772Regarding religion, the mother now identifies as an “immigrant mother and a visibly Muslim woman”, including as she says, that she wears a hijab during court proceedings. During her cross-examination of H.’s father, the mother seemed to suggest that since the removal, the children are not being exposed to her Muslim religion. She asked H.’s father, whether he was teaching H. about her Muslim religion or Sharia law. The father testified that he just learned that the mother was Muslim about eight months ago, when she attended court for the first time wearing a hijab.

773The children have been raised catholic and celebrated Christian holidays, like Christmas, although the mother said that they celebrated “commercialized Christian holidays” (in an attempt to explain, why she had an inappropriate conversation with T. about Christmas decorations and his Christmas presents, in early January of 2025 (see below)).

774When T.’s father’s lawyer cross-examined the mother, she said if the children are returned to her care, they could choose whatever religion they wish to follow.

775While the mother identifies as a Muslim woman, the weight of the evidence at this trial was that the children were not brought up in this religion. The fathers can decide which religious practices to which the children will be exposed, if any.

F. The Mother’s Access

776Access is dealt with under section 104 of the CYFSA. If the Court makes an access Order, it will also be a deemed order for parenting time under the CLRA: see section 102(2) of the CYFSA.

777Pursuant to section 105(2) of the CYFSA, when making these section 102 Orders, the Court is required to make an access Order for the mother unless it is satisfied that continued contact will not be in the children’s best interests.

778The Court grappled with whether it should terminate the mother’s access in this case.

779The mother’s supervised access visits since the removal have not been without notable problems. The Society’s evidence includes that the mother’s level of engagement has been passive, the mother has at times pressured the children, and there have been times where her questioning of the children has “bordered on an interrogation”.

780When the mother has brought M.W. to visits (after that was allowed by McCarty J. during the prior proceedings), M.W. did engage with the children. But there is other observation evidence, that the mother and M.W. talked amongst themselves more, with the mother often ignoring H.

781The observation evidence of several workers exposed that the mother had inappropriate conversations and she made comments to the children. T. himself has tried to re-direct the mother. There are a number of examples of the mother either missing numerous visits, or coming late. She even made the 40 hours of audio recordings of these visits referred to above.

782I will highlight just two examples of things that occurred at the mother’s visits, and contrast that with how the mother herself perceived the situation during her testimony at trial.

783On January 3, 2025, T. talked to his mother about his Christmas gifts, and said that he brought a gift for her. The mother said that she had gifts for him too, but they would celebrate when he returned home. I heard evidence that T. was adversely impacted by this.

784At trial, the mother focused on the impact of this conversation on herself, as opposed to having insight into the impact on the child. She said that while she was born Catholic, she is Muslim now, and the commercial idea of Christmas is not the true meaning of Christmas. She also said that she didn’t feel like celebrating, because she was sad and missed T.

785When cross-examined by T.’s father’s lawyer she admitted that she showed T. images of her house, to reveal that there were no decorations in the house that year. She made a point to show T. a dreary holiday season in her home, making this all about herself. She did and said these things about Christmas, to a young child, who was just excited about Christmas and presents. She then defended her actions in Court saying that T. was more upset by the fact that he did not get to see her on Christmas morning that year, for the first time in 7 years.

786At a visit on March 14, 2025, Ms. Knight asked the mother if T. could leave the visit 30 minutes early, because he had a LEGO presentation to make at LEGO camp in which he was participating. The mother became upset, said it was her parenting time, and she refused to agree, saying he had to stay the entire time. The mother then told this to T.

787Although he was unhappy, T. tried to engage with his mother. The mother disengaged from interacting with T. In cross-examination by T.’s father’s lawyer, Ms. Knight testified that the mother was giving T. the ‘cold shoulder’.

788When Ms. Knight tried to redirect the mother, telling her that her behaviour was inappropriate, she accused Ms. Knight of being a “robot” for Highland Shores. This behaviour continued to the point that Ms. Knight went to speak to her supervisor about ending the visit. When Ms. Knight ended the visit, the mother blamed T. for wanting to go to his LEGO camp.

789When the mother cross-examined Ms. Knight about the LEGO camp incident, the mother focused on the fact that it was her parenting time being curtailed, and that she did not have parenting time that often. The mother later testified that she acted like this about the LEGO camp, because there had been an accident on Highway 401, she almost got smashed into, and she arrived in a state of “high anxiety”. She said she was not going to be “cheery and happy” when she had almost died, only to discover that she had driven for 3 hours for no reason, to have to then go back home.

790These were not the only examples of challenges at the mother’s supervised access visits. Ms. Wylde says that concerns about the mother’s access were communicated to her in a Word document. She says she attempted to make the mother aware of further concerns on October 3, 2025 and November 25, 2025, but the mother has not been able to understand and instead became defensive, shut down and wanted to talk about all the things she believes the Society had done wrong. She says that to date, there has not been an incident during access that the Society has been able to work through with the mother, problem solve, or that the mother has gained learning from.

791In her March 23, 2026 Order, Tellier J. took a chance, and allowed for some limited expansion of the mother’s access into the community, although still supervised by the Society for part of the visit, followed by supervision by the maternal grandparents. This was a test run before the trial. This too was not without problems. The Society is partially responsible for changing the starting location/rules for the first relaxed supervised visit, but the mother very much had a disproportionate reaction.

792Tellier J. ordered that the visit was supposed to start at the Society’s office. I learned that there were then some discussions about this, and the plan changed for the visit to start at the grandparents’ office. That was where the visit was going to occur anyway, and so the revised plan removed the need to transit from point A to point B. Ms. Hawn said that the Society believed that there had been a consent for this; but the mother then didn’t agree.

793Even though according to the Society, the amended plan was for the mother to arrive first at her father’s office, for the T.’s father and H.’s paternal grandparents to bring the boys, for a Society worker to do the exchanges in the parking lot, and for the mother and the other adults not to interact with one another, the mother instead insisted on going to the Society’s office alone, citing safety concerns. When the mother later came to the grandfather’s office, the visit itself went fine.

794But after the visit, the mother sent another complaint email, expressing fear of H.’s father, and therefore not wanting an exchange in the public parking lot outside. Yet H.’s father was not even there. The mother accused H.’s paternal grandparents of trespass, for going onto the public parking lot. During cross-examination, the mother said that the new plan violated her rights and preferences.

795While complaints were foreseeable and the Society ought not have changed the starting location that Tellier J. determined (if in fact there was no consent to do so), the mother’s reaction was irrational and disproportionate. This penultimate incident highlights why it is very hard for this Court to address the mother’s access. The grandparents who were supposed to be supervising, were seemingly unable to stop the mother from sending this inflammatory email, right on the cusp of the start of this trial, where the mother’s behaviour was obviously going to be scrutinized. I was left wondering how exactly exchanges will work after the Society’s involvement comes to an end.

796On the last date of the trial, I reserved. I told the parents that there should be no need for a motion and that the Court expected everyone to be on their best behaviour. That said, I indicated that if a motion was brought, it should probably be addressed to me.

797On May 22, 2026, the mother’s 14B Motion of May 20, 2026 was brought to my attention. The mother now wants a Restraining Order against H.’s paternal grandmother and other family members from coming to the location of her parenting time, and other related terms.

798Based on the mother’s accompanying affidavit of May 20, 2026, it seems there was another visit pursuant to Tellier J.’s Order, now post-trial. The mother complains that H.’s paternal grandmother was outside the location of the visit and was gesturing to the maternal grandmother that she was observing or monitoring those inside the office. The mother says she found this intimidating and inappropriate, and after the visit, the mother, and the maternal grandmother, called the police. The mother’s affidavit goes on to address matters that were either discussed at the trial, or could have been.

799I do not have responding motion material about this from H.’s father, the Society or anyone else, yet. I do not need it, and they need not respond, for the Court to address this. I do not make any findings of improper conduct.

800Quite notably, even in the absence of a response, there is an email from Ms. Wylde dated May 15, 2026 attached to the mother’s motion material. In that email, Ms. Wylde refers to the fact that H.’s paternal grandmother seemed to be in the parking lot across the street. At the pre-trial expanded visit, the complaint became that the grandmother went into the public parking lot outside the maternal grandfather’s office to deliver the child. This time, it seems the complaint is that she was across the street; I assume once again, that H.’s paternal grandmother was facilitating the exchange, as she did for the first visit that Tellier J. had ordered, which triggered a similar but different complaint.

801The Court’s Order below imposes a new regime. In other words, it addresses this complaint, wherever the truth lies about what happened.

802The mother’s post-trial 14B Motion dated May 20, 2026 is dismissed. This kind of motion was precisely what the Court indicated at the end of the trial, should not have been brought pending the release of this Judgment.

803The distance between Guelph and Belleville has also posed some logistic issues. The availability of publicly funded supervised access centers limits what the Court can do. So during the trial, the Court indicated that it would be helpful to have some better information about supervised access centers, and about whether any financial resources might be available for some private supervision, to give the Court more options.

804The mother and the maternal grandmother just erected more barriers. The mother complained during this trial about the physical and financial impact on her of having to drive to Guelph to see T., as indicated. The mother and the maternal grandmother maintained that there was no money to fund something like private supervision, focusing again on the debt that F.’s parents owe the family.

805At ¶ 138-140 of V.S.J. v. L.J.G., 2004 CanLii 17126 (Ont. S.C.J.), Blishen J. wrote, citing M. (B.P.) v. M. (B.L.D.E.) (1991), 1992 CanLII 8642 (Ont. C.A.), that supervised parenting time is seldom viewed as an indefinite order or a long term solution. At ¶ 135-137, drawing from other cases, Blishen J. provided a list of factors to consider when a Court is faced with the difficult decision about whether to terminate parenting time altogether. The factors that she listed are also relevant to whether to order supervised parenting time. Multiple factors are generally existent in the cases.

806The factors that Blishen J. listed are:

(a) long term harassment and harmful behaviours towards the custodial parent causing that parent and the child stress and or fear;

(b) a history of violence; unpredictable, uncontrollable behaviour; alcohol, drug abuse which has been witnessed by the child and/or presents a risk to the child’s safety and well being;

(c) extreme parental alienation which has resulted in changes of custody and, at times, orders for no parenting time to the former custodial parent;

(d) ongoing severe denigration of the other parent;

(e) lack of relationship or attachment between noncustodial parent and child;

(f) neglect or abuse to a child on visits; and

(g) older children’s wishes and preferences to terminate parenting time.

807Blishen J. further wrote that where there had been an attempt at supervision that has proven unworkable, a termination must be considered. And if there is an unwillingness on the part of a parent to deal with the underlying issues necessitating supervision, then supervision may not be a viable option.

808A number of the above factors are alive here. The mother has refused to accept all of her diagnoses and commit to proper treatment, as indicated. The Court is concerned that even in a supervised access setting, with strict rules and conditions, that the mother may act out, argue or complain about the supervisor, risking more exposure of the children to conflict. One need only look at how the mother behaved, after her one any only pre-trial visit that Tellier J. tried to structure.

809On the other hand, despite the admonition that supervision is not usually a long-term solution, Blishen J. also recognized that there may be occasions, where medium or longer-term supervised parenting time will be in a child’s best interests, and it should be considered as an alternative to a complete termination. And despite the problems, not all of the visits have been negative. There is competing evidence that the mother’s visits, and the grandmother’s visits after McCarty J. first made the Order allowing the grandmother to attend, have been positive. There is some evidence that the mother came prepared, such as with food and toys. The maternal grandmother was described as being very engaged with the children. Finally, no one asked me at the trial to terminate the mother’s access. Some argued it may be harmful to the children.

810While the harm from a termination may in the end be less than the harm from continuing with visits if the mother doesn’t change her behaviour, the Court has strived to balance all of these many problems against trying to also preserve the children’s relationships with the mother. As such, I am prepared to make an Order for some supervised visits in an access center. I am not prepared to order anything other than that, because the risks are too great.

811I recognize that Tellier J. allowed the maternal grandparents to supervise the mother in the community, just before trial. The one visit did not end well. Yet another problem, and a call to the police, has been brought to my attention in the mother’s post-trial 14B Motion. I also heard the maternal grandmother testify at the trial. She is aligned with the mother, and is very much engaged in the mother’s narrative and in the conflict. She cannot be a functional supervisor. The paternal grandfather did not testify, so I cannot say whether he could act as a supervisor/protective factor. There needs to be strict consequences if the mother acts out, to protect these children. There is a high risk of conflict if exchanges were to occur in the community. Conflict has continued to occur post-trial, as revealed in the latest 14B Motion. This is another reason why visits must occur in an access center, where exchanges can be regulated and controlled.

812All that said, the mother can bring the grandparents to her supervised visits if she wants, but everyone has to follow the rules. The Court hopes, as the Society submitted during closing submissions, that the mother will alter her behaviour, and follow the rules now that this case is over, and that there is no longer the need to gather evidence. But the Court cannot base its decision on a hope that there will be meaningful change, when the record before me does not really suggest that to be likely. So if the rules are broken, and the center terminates the mother’s access, then I would see this as a contemplated event, and not a basis to bring a Motion to Change.

813M.W. testified that her four children constantly ask to see T. and H., and they are upset that they have been unable to do so since the removal. I considered these statements, but I am not continuing any term like the one in the temporary Order of McCarty J. about M.W . being able to accompany the mother to visits. She is not a party and her contact with the children at best, has been through the mother, when the mother spent time with her. I did not find persuasive her claim that these children are somehow attached to M.W.’s four children. The eldest of M.W.’s four children is 5 years old. That child would have been about 3 or so, when the removal occurred. Her youngest child would have been a very young infant. This case is not about M.W., or about what is in her children’s best interests; it is about T. and H.

814Even if I was inclined to make an access order that included M.W. and the children, there are too many logistics to sort out as it is. This is not a priority from these children’s perspectives. The mother should be focusing on her mental health and on having positive visits with T. and H. instead of trying to incorporate 8 different people into her visits (i.e. the grandparents, M.W., perhaps her partner, and M.W.’s four young children).

G. Virtual Visits

815Both fathers proposed that the children could have supervised virtual visits with the mother. They both propose to facilitate these visits, either themselves, or by a family member.

816Neither H.’s father or any other member of his family should be put in the role of monitor of H.’s virtual visits. A Restraining Order is being made. Were H.’s father or another family member called upon to intervene, I doubt the mother would listen to these people. I can only imagine the conflict that would ensue if H.’s father were to terminate a call, leading to the possibility of more litigation, and H.’s exposure to harm.

817While T.’s father’s counsel submitted that T.’s father thought he could better handle this task (since there has been less conflict between him and the mother), I am equally concerned about thrusting T.’s father into that role. T.’s paternal grandmother was asked by the Society if she could do it. She reluctantly agreed, but her agreement was equivocal. She apprehensively said there would need to be clear rules.

818In my view, if there are to be virtual visits, it is preferable that they occur through a supervised access center.

H. Sibling Access

819Sibling access is quite another matter, to which I give more weight in my assessment of the children’s views and preferences under section 74(3)(a) of the CYFSA. In T.’s case, this is an important consideration sections 10(3)(c) and 16(2) of the Federal Act. It is far easier to address this, given the boys’ fathers’ positive and cooperative attitudes.

820Other than placing both children with the mother, which cannot happen, there is no plan to have the children live near each other. The Court cannot place both boys in the same home to give effect to section 16(2) of the Federal Act in that way. But unlike the mother, who erected logistic barriers, both of the fathers are committed to maintaining sibling access, and they came to Court with solutions.

821Both fathers already recognized the importance of this before this trial started. For example T.’s father says that T. thinks about H. a lot. Each of T.’s and H.’s fathers had already arranged for T. and H. to have weekly Face Time contact. In addition, they have both facilitated in-person sibling visits, about once per month.

822Both fathers readily consented to a suggestion the Court made during closing submissions about how to make this work better, which will form part of the Court’s access Orders made under section 104 of the CYFSA.

I. Restraining Order, Conduct Orders, Contact with Service Providers for the Children and the Release of Information and Records

823When making section 102 Orders, any included terms and conditions will become deemed terms under section 28 of the CLRA: see section 102(2) of the CYFSA. The Court may also make a Restraining Order under section 35 of the CLRA, even if there is no separate application for that: see section 102(3) of the CYFSA. A Restraining Order of this kind made in a CYFSA proceeding, is a deemed final Restraining Order under section 35 of the CLRA: see section 102(4) of the CYFSA.

824A number of conduct orders binding on the mother are necessary in this case. In H.’s father’s case, those terms will be incorporated into a Restraining Order under section 35 of the CLRA, for the reasons earlier expressed when discussing the mother’s internet behaviour. I would have considered making a Restraining Order in T.’s father’s favour too, but unlike H.’s father, he did not plead that, so the terms and conditions in his Order, will be deemed under section 28 of the CLRA only.

825 Section 28(8) of the CLRA provides that unless a court orders otherwise, a person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to a child under a parenting order is entitled to ask for and, subject to any applicable laws, receive information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, from (a) any other person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to the child under a parenting order; and (b) any other person who is likely to have such information.

826I have already identified a multitude of risks respecting the mother’s involvement in the children’s health care, including flowing from her access to health records. In the case of the children’s education, four months before the start of this trial, she threatened H.’s teacher.

827The mother will neither be entitled to have contact with the children’s service providers nor to have access to the children’s records. The fathers can provide a periodic summary of important information about the boys to their mother, pursuant to section 28(8)(a) of the CLRA instead.

J. Moratorium on Motions to Change, and the Future Process and Terms to be Met, Before Doing So

828There needs to be a moratorium on motions to change the parenting Orders being made. I indicated earlier that in spite of the proposals for an 18 months’ long hiatus, the period will be two years. I disagree that the mother has started to implement meaningfully the recommendations so as to address properly her mental health. Based on the expert evidence (and the other evidence), the mother is going to need to engage in the recommended therapy, for a lengthy period of time, if there is any hope she can demonstrate meaningful change. Even then, it remains to be seen if she can demonstrate the required change.

829I am imposing a leave requirement to further protect these children, as indicated. The terms that the mother will have to satisfy, and the process to obtain leave at the end of the 2 year period, are set out below.

K. H.’s Father’s Claims for a Restraining Order and the Termination of Child Support in a Separate Proceeding

830Incredibly, both fathers have continued to pay child support to the mother since the removal. While H.’s father owed some arrears at the time of the removal, once those were paid off, there was no basis for the continued payment of child support. But accruals pursuant to the Final Consent Order of Tellier J. dated March 22, 2024 continued, and H.’s father continued to pay.

831H.’s father testified that he has continued to pay child support in the amount of $630.00 per month, since the removal. Now the Final Consent Order of March 22, 2024 also fixed arrears then owing in the amount of $4,095.00 as of April 1, 2023, to be paid off at the rate of $150.00 per month. Those arrears were paid off some time ago.[33]

832The Court inquired whether a Motion to Change child support had been brought after the removal, by either father. T.’s father has not started a proceeding. During his testimony on April 24, 2026, H.’s father told the Court that he had filed a 14B Motion, to which the mother responded by email, but that the 14B Motion had not been adjudicated for some reason. I told H.’s father he could bring his 14B Motion to my attention on the next date.

833At the conclusion of his testimony on April 27, 2026, I inquired about this again. What I learned is that the father had in fact brought a new Application for a Restraining Order (Court File Number 25-108). That matter went before McCarty J. on an ex parte basis on April 25, 2025. McCarty J. declined to grant the restraining Order without notice, and also noted that many of the issues raised in that Application, as it was then constituted, were being dealt with in the CYFSA proceeding.

834A copy of McCarty J.’s Endorsement was sent to the mother on April 28, 2025. The father then amended his Application on June 24, 2025, to ask that child support cease retroactively as of November 1, 2024. On June 24, 2025, H.’s father served this upon the mother using a process server, along with a new motion for a Restraining Order.

835Two days later, the mother wrote the email (referred to already above), to “Belleville Courthouse Administration”, to complain that H.’s father is a vexatious litigant, and to complain about the manner in which she was served. She wrote in her email that she wanted H.’s father “flagged and reviewed under vexatious litigant provisions” among other things. The mother ended her email saying:

If corrective action is not taken, I will be forced to escalate this matter by filing a Notice of Constitutional Question on the basis that your office’s inaction violates my Section 7 and Section 15 Charter rights, including my right to security of the person and equal protection under the law.

836While she found the time to send this email and threaten to bring a constitutional claim against the Court, the mother did not file an Answer in this separate proceeding. No steps have been taken on this Application since then, apparently. The father could have proceeded by way of a 23C Uncontested Trial, already.

837In submissions, H.’s father’s counsel asked me to address his child support matter under rule 2(3) of the Family Law Rules. While laudable, I don’t think that Rule 2 can confer upon this Court, within the child protection proceeding, jurisdiction to deal with child support.

838However, H.’s father did have his separate application pending before the Court, and the mother is in default of it. I am therefore prepared to address his request for the termination of child support in that proceeding, with further directions as to the next steps that can be taken if retroactive adjustments or repayments are being sought, or if H.’s father intends to pursue prospective child support. This will give H.’s father immediate relief now, since the mother is not entitled to ongoing child support.

839H.’s father’s counsel also agreed during closing submissions, that if the Court rules on the Restraining Order in this matter, regardless of whether it is granted or dismissed, it would be appropriate for H.’s father’s other claim for a Restraining Order in that other proceeding, to be dismissed. I intend to do so with H.’s father’s consent, in that other proceeding.

840Regarding T.’s father, a separate Statement of Arrears as of October 31, 2025 for T.’s father is also in Volume 3 of the Mother’s Exhibit Book. It appears he does not owe the mother any more money. But in the absence of a pending proceeding like that which H.’s father launched, T.’s father will have to deal with his child support separately, if he is seeking relief. I would suggest that at a minimum, the mother and T.’s father could withdraw that Order from FRO Enforcement right away, to give him immediate relief.

PART IX: ORDER AND DIRECTIONS

841I make the following Final Orders, pursuant to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, many of which are also deemed Orders under the Children’s Law Reform Act:

Orders Respecting Lettered Exhibits

(a) The videos currently labelled as Exhibit A shall now be marked as Exhibit 122;

(b) The video currently marked as Exhibit “B” shall now be marked as Exhibit 123;

Statutory Findings

(c) Pursuant to section 90(2) of the CYFSA, there shall be the statutory findings concerning T. and H. that are set out in ¶ 2-6 of the trial affidavit of Lindsay Johnson, sworn March 19, 2026. In addition, pursuant to section 90(2)(c), the Order shall state that T. was brought to a place of safety in Guelph, Ontario, and that he was removed from Trenton, Ontario. The Order shall state that H. was brought to a place of safety in Belleville, Ontario, and that he was removed from Trenton, Ontario. The actual draft Order shall have the precise details and identifying information in it. I have cross-referenced the paragraphs in Ms. Johnson’s trial affidavit for ease, and to avoid including identifying information in this Judgment;

Protection Findings

(d) This Court finds that both children are in need of protection pursuant to sections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii), and 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA;

Orders Concerning T. Pursuant to Section 102 of the CYFSA, Which Are Deemed Orders Pursuant to Section 28 and 34 of the CLRA

Placement and Decision-Making Responsibility

(e) T. shall be placed in the sole care and custody of his father, [name omitted but to be included in the draft Order];

(f) T.’s father shall have sole-decision-making responsibility for T.;

Release of Information and Parental Communication

(g) Except for the term set out below regarding the requirement for T.’s father to supply some information to the mother, the mother shall not be entitled to receive any information or documentation regarding T.’s well-being, including but not limited to information or documentation about the child’s health care, dental care, education, camps, or extra-curricular activities, or in general, about any other service provided for the child. This includes that she is not permitted to make requests for information or documentation from any service providers directly. The meaning of “service providers” includes but is not limited to the child’s health care providers, dentists, teachers, schools, summer or holiday camp providers, or extra-curricular activities providers;

(h) T.’s father and the mother shall maintain an App Close account at his and her own expense. AppClose shall only be used for the purposes set out in this Order;

(i) Commencing September 30, 2026 and then on or before each December 31, March 31, June 30, and the September 30 that follows, and so on, T.’s father shall provide to the mother by App Close a short written summary of any important decisions he has made for T. pursuant to his decision-making responsibility, and he shall advise the mother of the status of T.’s health, education and activities. T.’s father shall also supply the mother with a copy of T.’s latest report card not, previously provided, at the time of these quarterly updates. The mother shall not respond to any of these updates. If the mother makes any complaints to the school upon receipt of any report card, then the obligation to supply further report cards shall terminate;

(j) In the event of an emergency, T.’s father may send the mother an additional communication by AppClose to advise her;

T.’s Documentation

(k) T.’s father shall be the custodian of the child’s documentation, including but not limited to his passport, birth certificate, social insurance number and health card;

(l) T.’s father shall be at liberty to obtain or renew documentation for the child, without the need for the consent or a signature of the mother, which is hereby dispensed with;

Travel

(m) T.’s father may travel with the child out of Canada for vacations, without the need to obtain a travel consent from the mother;

Mutual Conduct Orders

(n) Neither party shall discuss the contents of this Judgment with T. T.’s father shall be entitled to explain to the child the new parenting schedule;

(o) Neither party shall make disparaging remarks to the child about the other, or members of his or her family;

(p) There shall be no physical discipline of T. by either parent or by any family member on the parents’ behalf;

Conduct Orders Concerning the Mother

(q) Except for service of legal documents, for participation in any future court proceedings, or to provide cards, letters or gifts by mail (only as authorized below), the mother shall not communicate directly or indirectly with T.’s father, except by AppClose, and only if any issue arises regarding the scheduling of her parenting time;

(r) Except for the supervised access centers provided for below, the mother shall not come within 100 meters of T.’s father’s residence, T.’s father’s workplace, T.’s school, or anywhere else T., his father or T.’s father’s family members might be reasonably expected to be. The address of T.’s father’s residence shall be included in the final Order to issue, so that the 100 meter perimeter is clear. If the mother needs to serve an originating document, she shall use a process server;

(s) The mother shall not attend at the locations of any of the child’s service providers, for any reason, including that she shall not attend medical or school appointments, parent-teacher interviews, other meetings concerning the child, and special school events or activities;

(t) The mother shall not communicate directly or indirectly with any of the child’s service providers. This includes communication for the purpose of requesting records, which is prohibited;

(u) The mother shall not audio or video record the child, his family members, any of the child’s service providers or any supervised access providers;

(v) The mother shall not discuss with the child these legal proceedings or any other legal proceedings, Human Rights Tribunal proceedings, regulatory proceedings, complaints or threats of lawsuits, regulatory proceedings or complaints against any person who was involved with this matter, or who will still be involved with the child, whether this pertains to any such steps or complaints that she has already launched/made in the past, that are pending or that she may intend to launch/make in the future;

(w) The mother shall not directly or indirectly post on the internet in any way, about anything regarding T., T.’s father, T.’s father’s family members; anything about this court case; anything about the Society and its employees insofar as it pertains to this case; anything about any witness who participated in this case as it concerns their involvement in this case; anything about any civil lawsuits, Human Rights Tribunal Applications, other regulatory proceedings, complaints, or threats of legal action or complaints, whether past, present or future, against anyone who had involvement in this case, insofar as it pertains to their involvement in this case;

(x) For clarity, the prohibition against posting directly or indirectly on the internet includes that she shall not have another person post on her behalf, nor shall she post on behalf of any foundation or charity that she may be running or working with, nor shall she post via another pretend identity, or anonymously. It includes prohibiting the mother or anyone on her behalf from participating in any forum, audio, video recording or live stream through other accounts not owned by her, but by someone else. And for further clarity, the Court’s reference to the word “internet” includes but is not limited to social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, Tik Tok, X., Threads, You Tube, Snap Chat, whether through a social media account owned by her or someone else;

(y) Within 7 days, the mother shall search the internet for any past posts that are captured by (w) and (x) above, and she shall remove them, regardless of when they were posted. If any such posts are on accounts not owned by her, then within 7 days, she shall ask the account holder to remove the post;

(z) The mother shall not block or restrict access to T.’s father from any of her social media accounts of the kind described in (x) above, so that he can monitor her social media from time to time to ensure that the mother has not violated the terms of this Order. If the mother has blocked T.’s father, then she shall unblock him within 7 days;

Terms and Conditions Concerning T.’s Father

(aa) T.’s father shall ensure that T. starts to receive therapy when his spot on the wait list comes up. T.’s father shall take T. to therapy at the frequency required, in consultation with his therapist, for so long as the therapist is of the view that T. requires therapy;

(bb) T.’s father shall enroll in, and complete a course of therapy, to address the circumstances of his relationship with the mother and its breakdown, the parental conflict to which T. has been exposed, and any unresolved childhood issues that contributed to his use of physical discipline in the past. He shall provide a copy of this Judgment to his therapist. He shall attend therapy at a frequency selected in consultation with his therapist;

(cc) On consent, the Society shall monitor the situation and ensure that both T.’s father and T. start therapy. This Order is made with the Society’s consent pursuant to section 102(2)(b) of the CYFSA and section 34 of the CLRA;

Orders Concerning H. Pursuant to Section 102 of the CYFSA, Which Are Deemed Orders Pursuant to Section 28 of the CLRA

Placement and Decision-Making Responsibility

(dd) Pursuant to section 102(1) of the CYFSA, H. shall be placed in the sole care and custody of his father, [name omitted but to be included in the draft Order];

(ee) H.’s father shall have sole-decision making responsibility for H.;

(ff) H.s’ father’s sole-decision making responsibility specifically includes the authority to change any of H.’s health-care providers, including his family doctor;

Release of Information and Parental Communication

(gg) Except for the term set out below regarding the requirement for H.’s father to supply some information to the mother, the mother shall not be entitled to receive any information or documentation regarding T.’s well-being, including but not limited to information or documentation about the child’s health care, dental care, education, camps, or extra-curricular activities, or in general, about any other service provided for the child. This includes that she is not permitted to make requests for information or documentation from any service providers directly. The meaning of “service providers” includes but is not limited to the child’s health care providers, dentists, teachers, schools, summer or holiday camp providers, or extra-curricular activities providers;

(hh) H.’s father and the mother shall maintain an App Close account at his and her own expense. AppClose shall only be used for the purposes set out in this Order;

(ii) Commencing September 30, 2026 and then on or before each December 31, March 31, June 30, and the September 30 that follows, and so on, H.’s father shall provide to the mother by App Close a short written summary of any important decisions he has made for H. pursuant to his decision-making responsibility, and he shall advise the mother of the status of T.’s health, education and activities. H.’s father shall also supply the mother with a copy of H.’s latest report card, not previously provided, at the time of these quarterly updates. The mother shall not respond to any of these updates. If the mother makes any complaints to the school upon receipt of any report card, then the obligation to supply further report cards shall terminate;

(jj) In the event of an emergency, H.’s father may send the mother by AppClose an additional communication to advise her;

H.’s Documentation

(kk) H.’s father shall be the custodian of the child’s documentation, including but not limited to his passport, birth certificate, social insurance number and health card;

(ll) H.’s father shall be at liberty to obtain or renew documentation for the child, without the need for the consent or a signature of the mother, which is hereby dispensed with;

Travel

(mm) H.’s father may travel with the child out of Canada for vacations, without the need to obtain a travel consent from the mother;

Mutual Conduct Orders

(nn) Neither party shall not discuss the contents of this Judgment with H. H.’s father shall be entitled to explain to the child the new parenting schedule;

(oo) Neither party shall make disparaging remarks to the child about the other, or members of his or her family;

(pp) There shall be no physical discipline of H. by either parent or by any family member on the parents’ behalf;

Restraining Order and Conduct Orders Pursuant to Section 102(3) of the CYFSA, Which Are Deemed Orders Pursuant to Sections 35 and 28 of the CLRA

(qq) Pursuant to sections 102(3) & (4) of the CYFSA, which shall be a deemed restraining Order under section 35 of the CLRA:

(1) Except for service of legal documents, for participation in any future court proceedings, or to provide cards, letters or gifts by mail (on as authorized below), the mother shall not communicate directly or indirectly with T.’s father, except by AppClose, and only if any issue arises regarding the scheduling of her parenting time;

(2) Except for the supervised access centers provided for below, the mother shall not come within 100 meters of H.’s father’s residence, H.’s father’s workplace, H.’s school, or anywhere else H. or his father might be reasonably expected to be. The address shall be included in the final Order to issue, so that the 100 meter perimeter is clear. If she needs to serve an originating document, she shall use a process server;

(3) The mother shall not attend at the locations of any of the child’s service providers, for any reason, including that she shall not attend appointments, parent-teacher interviews, other meetings concerning the child, and special school events or activities;

(4) The mother shall not communicate directly or indirectly with any of the child’s service providers. This includes communication for the purpose of requesting records, which is prohibited;

(5) The mother shall not audio or video record the child, his family members, any of the child’s service providers or any supervised access providers;

(6) The mother shall not discuss with the child these legal proceedings or any other legal proceedings, Human Rights Tribunal proceedings, regulatory proceedings, complaints or threats of lawsuits, regulatory proceedings or complaints against any person who was involved with this matter, or who will still be involved with the child, whether this pertains to any such steps or complaints that she has launched/made in the past, that are pending or that she may intend to launch/make in the future;

(7) The mother shall not directly or indirectly post on the internet in any way, about anything regarding H., H.’s father, H.’s father’s family members; anything about this court case; anything about the Society and its employees insofar as it pertains to this case; anything about any witness who participated in this case insofar as it concerns their involvement in this case; anything about any civil lawsuits, Human Rights Tribunal Applications, other regulatory proceedings, complaints, or threats of legal action or complaints, whether past, present or future, against anyone who had involvement in this case, insofar as it pertains to their involvement in this case;

(8) For clarity, the prohibition against posting directly or indirectly on the internet includes that she shall not have another person post on her behalf, nor shall she post on behalf of any foundation or charity that she may be running or working with, nor shall she post via another pretend identity, or anonymously. It includes prohibiting the mother or anyone on her behalf from participating in any forum, audio, video recording or live stream through other accounts not owned by her, but by someone else. And for further clarity, the Court’s reference to the word “internet” includes but is not limited to social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, Tik Tok, X., Threads, You Tube, Snap Chat, whether through a social media account owned by her or someone else;

(9) Within 7 days, the mother shall search the internet for any past posts that are captured by (7) and (8) above, and she shall remove them, regardless of when they were posted. If any such posts are on accounts not owned by her, then within 7 days, she shall ask the account holder to remove the post;

(10) The mother shall not block or restrict access to H.’s father from any of her social media accounts of the kind described in (8) above, so that he can monitor her social media from time to time to ensure that the mother has not violated the terms of this Order. If the mother has blocked H.’s father, then she shall unblock him within 7 days;

(11) The Restraining Order shall continue until it is varied or terminated by the Court, but if the restraining Order is varied or terminated these terms shall continue as a conduct Order, unless also varied or terminated. As such, these terms that form part of the Restraining Order, shall also form part of a conduct Order pursuant to section 28 of the CLRA;

Sibling Contact to be Included in Both Deemed CLRA Orders for Both Children

(rr) T. and H. shall have contact with each other one weekend per month, from Friday to Sunday, on a weekend to be selected by their fathers, with the start and end times on Fridays and Sundays to be agreed upon by them, to take into account the children’s schedules and driving time. Every 6 months, the fathers shall create a schedule for these visits to occur, but the visits should be spaced out 4 weeks apart. The fathers shall set the schedule in consultation with access’ centers’ availability to facilitate the mother’s monthly supervised visits, addressed below;

(ss) The siblings’ weekend visits shall occur at H.’s father’s home in Belleville (or at the H.’s paternal grandparents’ home if H.’s father decides that) in one month, and at T.’s father’s home in Guelph (or at T.’s paternal grandmother’s home if T.’s father decides that) in the next month, and the location of the visits shall alternate thereafter;

(tt) The fathers shall decide how to transport T. or H. to and from these weekend visits in their discretion, which may include an exchange at a mid-point between Belleville and Guelph, such as in Oshawa;

(uu) In addition, T.’s father and H.’s father shall arrange for the boys to have regular weekly video contact with each other;

Mother’s Supervised Access to be Included in Both Deemed CLRA Orders for Both Children

(vv) The mother shall have a monthly supervised visit at supervised access centers with both children, on a Saturday or a Sunday, for up to 2 hours, that the access centers can accommodate in Guelph and Belleville, on a rotating monthly basis, on weekends when the boys have their monthly visits together. When the visits take place in Guelph, they should ideally occur in the afternoon time slots to accommodate the mother’s travel time, and in Belleville, they should occur no later than Sunday morning if possible, to accommodate T.’s return to Guelph;

(ww) The mother’s monthly visit shall occur at the Supervised Access Service through Counselling Services of Belleville and District (CSBD) in the months when the children are together in Belleville for a weekend visit;

(xx) The mother’s monthly visit shall occur at Starling Community Services, Child and parent Place (CAPP) in Guelph in the months when the children are together in Guelph for a weekend visit;

(yy) If either access center can accommodate it, then the mother may also have a monthly supervised video call with both children for up to 30 minutes. Ideally both boys will be together for the call. If that is not possible to accommodate due to the boys’ and the fathers’ schedules, then the mother may have video calls individually with each child, but still supervised by either access center;

(zz) Based on the schedule above of the boys being together in either Belleville or Guelph in monthly intervals, the supervised video call shall occur in the second week (i.e. in between the boys’ monthly in person visit, at the mid-point (i.e. during the second week after the monthly in person visit);

(aaa) The schedule of the boys’ in person weekend visits shall be organized by the fathers, but also with the access centers’ schedule in mind, for the mother to have her supervised visits. They shall take into account the access centers’ abilities to facilitate the mother’s visits when fixing the schedule. In the event of a dispute about scheduling either the in person or the virtual visits, T.’s and H.’s fathers can set the schedule in consultation with the access centers’ abilities to facilitate the visits, and the mother will be informed of the dates and times. I ask the Society to assist the fathers with these logistics and scheduling, before closing its file;

(bbb) The mother shall be responsible for the cost of the supervision services, given the parenting responsibilities and the associated cost that each father is assuming for each child’s full time care. The fathers shall pay their own intake fees, if any;

(ccc) The mother shall be responsible for her own transportation to and from Guelph;

(ddd) If the mother either refuses to attend Guelph at all, or fails to attend reliably in Guelph, and the Guelph provider declines supervision services due to non-attendance or inconsistent attendance, then the mother shall only have one visit every other month, when the children are in Belleville;

(eee) Within 7 days, the parties shall complete any required intakes to get on wait lists for both supervision services;

(fff) The mother may choose to have either or both of her parents participate in any of her in-person or virtual visits, or she may choose to attend on her own. She shall not bring any other person with her to these visits, whether in person or via video;

(ggg) Each father, or his designate, is authorized to bring the boys to the supervised access centers for visits. The fact that one of the fathers or his designate is bringing the children to the center is not a basis for the mother to object or complain. The access center will undoubtedly make arrangements for staggered arrivals and departures from the access center;

(hhh) The access centers shall be given a copy of the full Final Order made in the CYFSA proceeding that contains all of the terms, including all of the conduct terms and the Restraining Order. If the access centers request it, they may be given a copy of this Judgment;

(iii) The parties are to follow all of the access centers’ rules;

(jjj) The mother shall not violate any of the access centers’ rules during her visits, or any of the conduct orders or the terms of the Restraining Order when communicating with the children during her visits. If she does, the access center(s) may terminate any particular visit;

(kkk) If either access center declines service due to a pattern of the mother failing to attend or violating the access center(s)’ rules, and if either access center declines to provide service again, then this is contemplated by the Court, and this is not a material change for the purposes of bringing a Motion to Change early, during the moratorium period. In other words, if an access center declines service altogether, then the mother’s access shall terminate;

(lll) The mother may send to either child, via mail and to the attention of his father, any cards, letters or gifts, which may include items from the maternal grandparents. She may do so up to four times per year. The fathers have the discretion to review the contents of any cards, letters or gifts before supplying them to the child, to ensure that they are appropriate and do not violate any restrictions set out herein;

Terms and Conditions Respecting the Mother to Be Included in Both Deemed CLRA Concerning For Both Children

(mmm) The mother shall provide a copy of this Judgment to any therapist with whom she is working;

(nnn) The mother shall provide a copy of this Judgment and a copy of Dr. Rowe’s assessment dated January 27, 2025, to any mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, or therapist) from whom she seeks further assessment, or treatment;

(ooo) The Court recommends that the mother participate in regular DBT therapy, and in any group programs for which her therapist makes a referral, for at least a two-year period, at a frequency of sessions that the therapist decides is appropriate. This is not an Order; it is up to the mother to decide if she will now follow through. But if she chooses not to do so, or if she starts but then does not follow through, that will be a relevant consideration if she brings a request to commence a Motion to Change after two years. Her failure to get treatment and to implement change will be considered by the Court when deciding whether to grant leave or not;

Moratorium of Motions to Change to be Included in Both Deemed CLRA Orders for Both Children

(ppp) The mother shall not bring any Motion to Change either Order (i.e. either of the parenting Orders concerning either child, or H.’s father’s Restraining Order being ordered herein), for a two year period;

Leave to Bring a Motion to Change Parenting Orders or Restraining Order, to be Included in Both Deemed CLRA Orders for Both Children

(qqq) After the two-year period, the mother still requires leave to bring a Motion to Change these Orders;

(rrr) To do so, the mother must demonstrate that she has received meaningful treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder, that she is having fewer outbursts, that she has abided by court orders, that she has maintained appropriate interpersonal relationships, that she can communicate with others appropriately, and that she has stopped launching/making frivolous lawsuits, regulatory proceedings and complaints;

(sss) Therefore, to obtain leave:

(1) The mother shall file a 14B Motion setting out which paragraphs of the Order(s) or the Restraining Order that she seeks to vary or terminate;

(2) The mother’s 14B Motion shall make reference to the existence of this Judgment, by specifically identifying the citation, identified on the top right side of this Judgment, so that the presiding judge can review this Judgment;

(3) The mother shall file an affidavit no more than 5 pages in length double spaced, explaining the basis upon which she is seeking leave. Her affidavit shall address how she has met the conditions in subparagraph (rrr) above;

(4) In particular, the mother’s affidavit shall explain whether she has worked with a therapist on a dedicated basis. It shall explain the duration and frequency of that therapy, and whether the therapy is DBT as recommended, or something else;

(5) The mother’s affidavit shall explain whether she has complied with this Court’s Orders regarding social media, and she shall explain what steps she has taken to remove offensive internet postings;

(6) The mother’s affidavit shall explain whether she has commenced any new civil proceedings, Human Rights Tribunal Applications, other regulatory proceedings, complaints to professional regulatory bodies, or issued threats to do the same. If so, she shall explain what she has launched or threatened to launch since this Judgment, the reason for that, and she shall explain the status of any such matters, and any disposition;

(7) The mother’s affidavit shall explain whether there has been any further involvement with the police or the Society since this Judgment, and if so she shall provide details;

(8) The mother’s affidavit shall include, attached as Exhibits:

a copy of Dr. Rowe’s assessment report dated January 27, 2025;
any further mental health assessments that she obtains after the date of this Judgment, but which shall include confirmation from the health care professional directly, that he or she was provided with a copy of, and has read this Judgment and Dr. Rowe’s assessment report dated January 27, 2025;
a letter from a qualified therapist, with his or her curriculum vitae, explaining that the therapist has read this Judgment and the report of Dr. Rowe dated January 27, 2025, explaining whether the mother has participated in therapy, the kind of therapy, and whether she has attended regularly on the schedule set by the therapist. The letter shall set out the frequency of the therapy and any missed sessions. The letter shall set out what the goals of therapy have been, the mother’s compliance with treatment, and the therapist’s views about any progress made or insight gained into the problems identified in this Judgment. The letter shall also set out what groups have been recommended, why or why not, whether the mother attended, the frequency of her attendance, and whether she completed the group sessions; and
a copy of the notes from the mother’s virtual and in person supervised access.

(ttt) The mother’s 14B Motion for leave to bring a Motion to Change shall be brought on an ex parte basis so that the father(s) do not have to respond, unless and until leave is granted;

(uuu) If leave is granted the Court can issue further directions about service and next steps;

(vvv) The fathers proposed that any future Motions to Change shall be brought in the Family Court in Belleville. The mother’s 14B Motion for leave to bring a Motion to Change may be brought in Belleville since H. lives there, and the potential variation of one Order may impact the other. However T. no longer resides in this jurisdiction. If leave is granted, the Court in Belleville may decide on a preliminary basis whether any Motion to Change for T. can also be brought here, or whether it should be brought in Guelph, depending on the circumstances at the time, and the extent to which the two cases need to be heard together This would then be subject to further arguments about the municipality in which any future case should be heard, once the father(s) is/are served and have had an opportunity to make submissions about that, if they wish;

(www) Nothing in this Judgment prevents the parties from taking steps to vary or finalize child support, either in H.’s father’s outstanding proceeding, or in a separate proceeding, for example that T.’s father may launch;

Non-Publication to be Included in the Comprehensive CYFSA Order

(xxx) In addition to the Court’s internet Orders, all parties are to comply with section 87(8) of the CYFSA. The wording of section 87(8) shall be included in the Court’s Order;

(yyy) Nothing in this Judgment prevents this Court from publishing its Judgment in the ordinary course. This Judgment has used initials and has removed from it, other identifying information;

Other Directions Regarding the Preparation of Draft Orders, and Costs

(zzz) The deemed CLRA Order being made concerning T. varies and replaces in its entirety ¶ 1-34 of the Final Order of Minnema J. dated March 1, 2023 in Belleville Court File Number FC-18-222-01;

(aaaa) The deemed CLRA Order being made concerning H. varies and replaces in its entirety ¶1 – 57 of the Final Order of Tellier J. dated March 22, 2024 in Belleville Court File Number FC-22-005;

(bbbb) The Society shall prepare one comprehensive draft Order in this child protection file that contains all of the terms of this Court’s Order;

(cccc) There shall be mirror Orders made under the aforementioned CLRA File Numbers containing the terms of the deemed CLRA Orders, as well as the Restraining Order, but with a new file extension identifier. Those Orders shall not make reference to litigation under the CYFSA;

(dddd) In addition, for each child, counsel may wish to prepare a separate, shorter CLRA Order that duplicates only the paragraphs above that provide each father with sole-decision-making responsibility, and that restrict the mother from obtaining information from third party service providers, from communicating with third party services providers, and from attending at their locations, so that each father can supply that shorter Order to a service provider as needed, without the need to provide the full Order containing all of the terms. H.’s father may supply his Restraining Order to the service providers instead, if he wishes, since the terms respecting H. are in there;

(eeee) Counsel for the Society and the fathers can decide amongst themselves who will prepare the various draft CLRA Orders and the draft Restraining Order;

(ffff) Counsel to ensure that the draft Restraining Order is submitted on the proper form, along with the necessary CPIC;

(gggg) The mother’s approval as to form and content of any draft Orders to be prepared and then issued, is dispensed with;

Sealing Order

(hhhh) The four pages of records that were delivered to the Court directly by the Belleville Police Service prior to the start of this trial, shall remain sealed in the CYFSA court file and shall not be accessible to any of the parties or counsel, subject only to further Order of this Court, or of an appellate court;

Dismissal of Mother’s Post-Trial 14B Motion dated May 20, 2026

(iiii) The mother’s post-trial 14B Motion dated May 20, 2026, is dismissed;

Costs

(jjjj) Recognizing that the approach to costs in child protection proceedings is different, I will still give the parties an opportunity to address costs, if someone is pursuing costs;

(kkkk) The parties shall confer amongst each other if anyone is seeking costs. If so, that person needs to identify against whom he or she is seeking costs, etc.; and

(llll) Within 14 days, counsel for the Society shall send me an email, copied to all others, that explains if anyone is seeking costs, and if so against whom. I will then issue further directions for the exchange of costs submissions, to include timelines, page limits, and the order in which the written costs material shall be exchanged and delivered.

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: May 25, 2026

CITATION: HSCAS v. M.S., C.D.S., and C.A.D., 2026 ONSC 3038

BELLEVILLE COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-420

DATE: 20260525

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society

Applicant

and –

M.N.S., C.D.P., and C.A.D.

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice Alex Finlayson

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society

Applicant

and –

M.N.S., C.D.P., and C.A.D.

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: May 25, 2026

1D. is not the mother’s biological father, but he acts as the children’s grandfather.

2In her ruling of November 6, 2024 following the removal, Tellier J. expressed a concern based on the record then before her, that the mother was self-medicating using marijuana.

3During this trial, the mother took issue with the fact that the Society supplied the transcript of Bonn J.’s reasons to Dr. Rowe, the psychologist who assessed the mother’s mental health pursuant to the Order of Tellier J. dated November 6, 2024 (discussed below). She alleged incorrectly, that this had been done in violation of Bonn J.’s publication ban, made in the criminal case.

There is an error on the face of the criminal transcript. It says that a publication ban was ordered under section 486(4) of the Criminal Code, which is not a publication ban provision. After inquiring further about this particular issue during the trial, it was discovered that Bonn J. had in fact ordered a publication ban under section 486.4 of the Criminal Code. That section prohibits the publication of information that could identify the victim or a witness. However section 486.4(4) contains an exception that allows for disclosure made in the course of the administration of justice, when the purpose is not to make information known in the community. There was no violation of Bonn J.’s publication ban.

4It may be that this is the same incident, and R. was mistaken as to its timing (or perhaps she did this twice).

5I am not clear as to whether the mother’s theft of $11,000.00 was part of the same incident as the significant argument the mother had with the maternal grandmother, that led to her moving out of the grandparents’ home in April of 2023; whether it was or not does not matter.

6R. and his partner have a new baby, who is 11 months old; he no longer maintains a relationship with his parents either.

7Notably, the mother never took the child to the SCAN appointment, and claimed at this trial that the SCAN appointment was “mysteriously” cancelled, suggesting some collusion.

8The Children’s Treatment Centre had been previously involved in exploring whether H. has autism, and in providing some speech therapy.

9T.’s father testified that there was a time that T. pricked his finger with an Epipen. It did not result in any harm, or medication being administered unnecessarily.

10It was not established during this trial, that the maternal grandmother issued much of a reprimand, if any at all.

11The maternal grandmother had made a statement that the mother had tried to commit suicide on train tracks. She reported this in 2023, when the two were estranged. Once the two reconciled, the maternal grandmother tried to recant. During this trial, she accused F. of having manipulated her into calling the Society in the first place.

12In M.W.’s motion, she asked that four other persons could have access, too.

13The mother did not prove at this trial, that either R. or F. coached the children, or interfered with the integrity of the proceedings.

14The mother would go onto claim that her “memory recall” issues pertained only to minor matters, but not overall, to larger events of significance.

15The mother made a hand gesture to indicate that her NCQ was in reality about a foot thick, because she said she attached to it, various documentary evidence in support of it. I told her she could file the NCQ itself, but not the documents then and there. She was at liberty to call that evidence at the trial, if she wanted.

16For example, the mother also referred to constitutional violations in the civil proceedings that she launched, and then withdrew, discussed elsewhere in this Judgment.

17I assume this is a typo and should have said “including but not limited to”. Even if the Order reads as drafted, that does not change the result of my analysis.

18For example, publishing the names of child protection workers (which had been done in that case) is not strictly a violation of section 87(8) of the CYFSA.

19Ms. Hawn said the mother sent her several screen recordings of her scrolling around a social media page in some kind of attempt to show that the video was no longer there.

20At ¶ 109 of C.S. v. M.S., 2007 CanLii 6240 (S.C.J.), Perkins J. wrote that Vernon Beck is a semi-retired heating and air condition is the “principal actor in the Court Watch organization”. He claimed to be a volunteer “investigative reporter, mediator “advocate for children and families”, interviewer, recorder and adviser of children, letter writer, affidavit drafter and website text writer”, without formal training in these fields. There are several examples in the case law of parties inappropriately involving Vernon Beck in their family and child protection litigation, or of Vernon Beck inserting himself into cases and creating problems and chaos. The cases span a 22 year period: in addition to C.S. v. M.S., 2007 CanLii 6240, see for example LA.G. v. M.E.F.G., 2004 CanLii 49975 (S.C.J.); Frontenac Children’s Aid Society v. C.N., 2007 CanLii 9886 (S.C.J.); V.S. v. I.M.B.,2021 ONCJ 398; V.S. v. I.M.B., 2022 ONCJ 154; and Rea-Cina v. Cina et al, 2025 ONSC 5130.

21While the mother had a number of prior psychiatric assessments which Dr. Rowe was given, there was no long standing relationship with a psychiatrist. The mother had never worked with a “long standing” therapist on a consistent basis at the time of Dr. Rowe’s assessment, either as far as I could tell from the evidence at trial. While the mother called her family doctor to testify, she did not identify any missing information that Dr. Rowe should have had, either from him or from her previous family doctor’s notes in her various binders. Ironically, she complained that the Society provided disclosure about her to Dr. Rowe, but when it came to her family doctors, her complaint became that it had not done so. All the while, she had access to all of her own health records, which she included in one of her proposed Exhibit Books. She could have put something of import from that book to Dr. Rowe when he testified and asked him whether it would have changed the outcome.

22The Court explained to the mother that any evidence the Society or the fathers’ called about their partners, was being relied upon to show the strength of the fathers’ plans. Although she is a single parent, she has different support persons in her plan. What the Society was doing in rejecting her plan, was pointing out its weakness, in part because the support persons around the mother are problematic, not because her supports persons are people other than a partner or a second parent.

23This video, marked as letter Exhibit “B” during the trial, had been supplied to the Society on October 28, 2024, but it was not part of the mother’s Exhibit Books required by the filing deadline in advance of the trial. She produced it again, mid-trial.

24The First Nation is not a party to this proceeding under section 79(4.). It is neither a listed band, or a FNIM community as prescribed in the regulations to the CYFSA.

25Both the mother and the grandmother attended together, to supply misinformation.

26Incidentally, it appeared to the Court that L.G. had a good and positive working relationship. I noticed this because it was very much the exception during this trial. The Court asked questions of L.G. in an attempt to see if she might form part of a plan to support the mother going forward. L.G. was upset about having been involved in this matter and called to testify. She told the Court that she had taken a leave of absence from work, because she felt she had violated the mother’s trust by being called to testify. The mother and L.G. are no longer working together. Ms. Hawn pointed out that it was the mother who had provided a consent for the release of information to the Society.

It is unfortunate that L.G. has been impacted in this way. She did not do anything wrong, or violate a relationship of trust, by testifying; in fact she was required to do so, upon receipt of a summons. Perhaps it will help if the Society can pass the Court’s comments about this, onto her.

27I requested this, after the mother told the Court that there had been discussion at a prior proceeding before Tellier J. in which counsel for the OCL allegedly argued “res judicata” (Ms. Leitch disagreed that she had argued that).

28At the Trial Scheduling Conference on February 23, 2026, I made a production Order for records from various police services, including Toronto. Nothing from Toronto was drawn to my attention during this trial.

29BPD is one of the four Cluster B personality disorders.

30Inconsistently, the mother also claimed that she did consent to an assessment at the time of Tellier J.’s Order, which I do not readily ascertain from Tellier J.’s Endorsement of November 6, 2024. Regardless, it does not matter.

31While I am prepared to defer to his professional judgment on this, in the circumstances of this particular case, where there have been multiple complaints of unfair treatment and incomplete information supplied, it would have been more helpful had Dr. Rowe just interpreted all the tests, even if he had concluded it wouldn’t change matters. His failure to have done so probably led the mother to raise questions in cross-examination about the completeness and accuracy of his conclusions.

32The mother claimed at this trial, that on that occasion she had just taken four Tylenol pills, mistakenly believing that could kill her.

33Buried within the mother’s Exhibit Book Volume 3, Correspondence Book, is a tab containing FRO documents. There is a Statement of Arrears dated October 31, 2025 that reveals that as of the date of the removal, the father owed $1,748.77, and by October 31, 2025, his balance was paid down to $0.00. The paying off of his arrears in the March 22, 2024 Order was in addition to the ongoing accruals of $630.00 per month that he has continued to pay.