C. v. C., 2026 ONSC 2217

COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-599

DATE: 20260414

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

N.C.

Applicant Father

– and –

T.C.

Respondent Mother

COUNSEL:

Kristen Normandin, Cara Sivry and Harold Niman, for the Applicant Father

Herschel Fogelman and Lauren Daneman, for the Respondent Mother

Stephen Codas, counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, although not in attendance as this hearing concerned only financial issues

HEARD: March 18, 2026

SUPPLEMENTARY Reasons for DEcision Regarding THE RETURN OF A LONG MOTION HEARD MARCH 18, 2026

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

PART I: OVERVIEW AND NATURE OF THIS MOTION

1The parties were married for almost 16 years, from July 5, 2008 until their separation on February 29, 2024. They have four children, a girl named I.C., now age 15, a boy named A.C., age 11, a girl named C.T.C., age 9, and a boy named C.C., age 6.

2On March 30, 2024, the father was charged with one count of uttering a threat contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. In April of 2024, I.C. and C.TC. reported acts of sexual abuse alleged to have been committed by the father. Fresh criminal charges against the father were laid at the end of April 2024. These criminal charges remain pending.

3This case originally came before the Court by way of the father’s urgent motion for parenting time. Daurio J. ordered in two Endorsements of April 29, 2024, that the matter could come before the Court as an urgent case conference about the parenting and support issues. I presided over that appearance on May 16, 2024, at which point the parties scheduled a long motion and asked for an Order that this Court case manage the progress of the litigation.

4This Court heard the father’s long motion for parenting time, and for a custody and access assessment pursuant to section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, and it the mother’s cross-motion for temporary child support of $20,224.00 per month, and spousal support of $19,432.00 per month, commencing August 1, 2024, on July 24, 2024. The Court released Reasons for Decision on August 1, 2024: see C. v. C., 2024 ONSC 4319 (“the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision”).

5The Court rejected the father’s proposed selection of an assessor, but left open the prospect of an assessment with Dr. Peter Jaffe, who had been proposed by the mother in the alternative. The Court adjourned the request for an assessment for more information and further submissions, and it adjourned the father’s motion for parenting time for certain reasons, including to hear from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (the “OCL”).

6At the July 24, 2024 motion, the father argued that there had been “catastrophic changes” to his income as a result of the criminal charges. He asked the Court to either dismiss or adjourn the mother’s support motion as premature. He undertook to maintain the “financial status quo” of him paying for various housing and other monthly expenses in lieu of the Court ordering a more conventional form of monthly child and spousal support. Although it was not in his Notice of Motion, in the Confirmation Form that he filed, he also told the Court that it would be necessary for him to move to sell the matrimonial home, and perhaps a cottage property.

7At ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, the Court ordered the father’s position about the “financial status quo” on terms. The Court found on the record then before it, that the “financial status quo” meant that he would depositing his, and the mother’s salary,¹ into a joint account, out of which all housing, vehicle, children’s section 7 expenses, including private school, and other expenses would continue to be paid. The Court found that the “financial status quo” also meant that he would continue to make a joint credit card available to the mother, that would be paid monthly by him.

8The Court set a return date in September to obtain updates about certain matters, and to schedule the return of the long motion. But the return of the long motion did not proceed for an incredible 19 ½ months. There were instead seven court appearances, three of which were scheduled to hear the return of this long motion, only for the father to abandon his motion for parenting time and the assessment in the end. Interim financial issues were eventually argued on March 18, 2026

9These are my further Reasons for Decision regarding the outstanding financial issues on a temporary basis pending trial. For the reasons that follow:

(a) Pursuant to rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the father is found in breach of this Court’s Order of August 1, 2024 for not having maintained the “financial status quo”;

(b) The father shall pay to the mother lump sum child support and spousal support, in the sum of $357,180.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(c) The father shall pay costs of his parenting motion to the mother in the amount of $30,000.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(d) The father shall pay an interim disbursement to the mother in the sum of $150,000.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(e) The father shall cooperate to ensure that the mother can access the net of tax equivalent of half of the date of separation value in the parties’ Independent Pension Plan (the “IPP”), plus the net of tax amount that corresponds to 34.2% of any post-separation increase;

(f) If the father fails to cooperate with whatever is required for that to occur, then the father shall instead pay the mother the sum of $100,000.00 from his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds as a further interim disbursement;

(g) The matrimonial home shall be sold. Counsel are to sort out any sale terms. Subject to further order of this Court in the event of any non-cooperation from the father, the mother’s claim for sole carriage of the sale is dismissed at this time;

(h) The mother shall be entitled to her 50% share of the matrimonial home’s net proceeds of sale;

(i) The father’s 50% share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds shall be used to make the above distributions to the mother. Any left over money shall be preserved and held in trust;

(j) The monies to be released from the father’s share of the matrimonial home’s net proceeds shall be first applied to costs, interim disbursements and the $100,000.00 sum (if the precondition for it to be paid is triggered) in ¶ (c), (d) and (f) above, prior to the funds being credited to support in ¶ (b) above. If there is any shortfall to the credit of support, then that shortfall shall be enforced through the Family Responsibility Office;

(k) Neither party shall make any withdrawals and otherwise deplete the children’s RESP, pending further agreement or Order of this Court; and

(l) Except for costs, the balance of the parties’ claims raised on the return of this motion are dismissed.

PART II: PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

10The following is a summary of what has transpired since the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision:

The Court Appearance on September 27, 2024

(a) This matter next returned before the Court on September 27, 2024. On that date, the parties, their counsel (multiple of them), counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, an articling student and Josephine Kiang, counsel for Children and Family Services of York Region (the “Society”) appeared before the Court. This was supposed to be a routine appearance in the nature of receiving an update and to set next steps, such as the return of the long motion. There were instead 11 persons in attendance, including 7 lawyers and an articling student;

(b) The Court on this date received an update from the Society that it had requested. Counsel for the OCL advised the Court that he required an adjournment to undertake his mandate, and said that he intended to hold a disclosure meeting in due course. The Court issued further directions about Dr. Jaffe’s appointment, should that eventually be ordered, particularly in the nature of setting out what he might require to do his job, respecting the father’s criminal charges;

(c) By this date, the father was already in breach of his promise to maintain the financial status quo, memorialized in the order at ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision. The record before the Court today, reveals that his breaching behaviour started a mere 15 days after the release of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision;

(d) The father said that he wanted to bring a “short motion” for the sale of properties, with which the mother did not agree in the absence of having her support motion brought back on. As the two issues are very much interrelated, the Court found that they had to be scheduled and heard together;

(e) The Court scheduled two further dates. The first, on November 20, 2024, was to hear the OCL’s position about the children’s views and preferences. The second, set for January 22, 2025, was for the return of long motion, at which the Court would now hear submissions and address the father’s request to sell property, the return of the mother’s support motion, and depending on what happened next, the outstanding motion for the parenting issues and the assessment;

The Court Appearance on November 20, 2024

(f) An appearance proceeded in the interim, on November 20, 2024, by which point the OCL’s disclosure meeting had occurred. For the first time, the father now reported that he no longer wished to pursue the outstanding parenting issues or the assessment, at least not yet, because of the pending criminal charges and the prospect of there being a preliminary inquiry in the early new year. The Court gave effect to this, but endorsed that at some point the father would have to choose whether he was going to proceed or withdraw his motion;

(g) The parties told the Court that they were trying to settle the financial issues, but the father might still want to move to sell the matrimonial home, if disputes about support and payment of the “financial status quo” could not be resolved;

(h) The Court did not vacate the January 22, 2025 date. It revised its purpose, for the father to confirm instead whether he intended to seek the rescheduling of his parenting motion, or whether he was seeking yet another adjournment, and if so, for the mother to advise whether she consented to another adjournment, or for argument of the adjournment and scheduling;

The Return of the Long Motion Date Did Not Proceed on January 25, 2025

(i) On January 25, 2025, the father now sought to adjourn his parenting motion, yet again until a date after his preliminary inquiry, which was not then completed. The mother wanted the motion dismissed, or marked as abandoned, with cost consequences. The father didn’t ask to proceed with the financial issues either originally, instead proposing to move them to a Settlement Conference. The mother disagreed, unless he complied with the order about the “financial status quo”. She asked for an advance of $100,000.00;

(j) As the request for a Settlement Conference was not on consent, there continued to be a dispute about compliance with the “financial status quo”, I was still seized of the motion, and it was by no means clear that it was going to resolve, I refused to convert the matter to a Settlement Conference so as to not disqualify me from finishing to hear it. The Court was then told that the father was financing the “financial status quo” by taking on debt, something that he had told the Court at the July 24, 2024 motion, was not possible. The Court was also informed that he was no longer drawing a salary either, and that he was obtaining additional expert evidence (to be ready in about one month) that was going to reveal a further decrease in income;

(k) The Court set another date for the return of this long motion, with a scheduling Order for the delivery of updating motion material;

The Next Return of the Long Motion Did Not Proceed on March 25, 2025 Either

(l) No new material was then filed; the parties tried to administratively adjourn the return date. When I got wind of what was transpiring, I directed the parties to attend;

(m) At the appearance, now in the nature of another TBST date, the Court was told that the preliminary inquiry would now be completed on April 6, 2025, that there were ongoing settlement discussions, and that perhaps the parties were closer to a resolution. The Court declined to allocate another long motion date, having regard to rule 2(3)(d) of the Family Law Rules. I endorsed that the parties could either submit their settlement to me for consideration by 14B Motion, or book a TBST date within 30 days of the completion of the preliminary inquiry, to seek to reschedule properly, the return of this long motion. The Court ordered that barring an actual urgent situation, no further motions were to be brought until that TBST date occurred;

(n) But the parties did not then come back before the Court within 30 days of the completion of the preliminary inquiry;

The TBST Date on January 6, 2026

(o) The Court did not then hear from the parties for almost a year. It seems that what triggered their return, was Notice of Approaching Dismissal issued on July 16, 2025. When the parties finally reappeared before the Court on January 6, 2026, the father had changed counsel. The Court was told that the father was no longer pursuing the parenting issues or the assessment. The Court noted this in the Endorsement, writing that if circumstances changed in the future and the case was still pending and not finally resolved for some reason, he could seek leave to bring a motion about his parenting time. The Court rescheduled the return of the motion to deal with the sale of property, preservation, child and spousal support, and the mother’s claim for costs of the father’s abandoned parenting motion. The Court also set a date for a settlement conference to proceed on June 23, 2026, after the long outstanding resolution of these interim issues would be finally achieved; and

(p) The return of the long motion about financial issues only, was argued on March 18, 2026. The Court reserved its decision.

PART III: THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

11The mother’s position is set out in her “Fresh as Amended Notice of Motion dated January 26, 2026”, in her Factum dated March 13, 2026, and in a draft Order that she filed for the hearing of the motion. It is admittedly confusing, in that some of the heads of relief in the Notice of Motion are set out as alternatives, as confirmed in the Factum, but the mother’s oral submissions suggested otherwise in certain instances.

12The mother had previously been opposed to the sale of the matrimonial home, tied in part to her request to have proper financial support in place. The mother now seeks the sale of the matrimonial home on various terms. Her change in position accompanies the fact that the home is at risk of being sold pursuant to a power of sale, as a result of the father’s breaches, described further below. The mother’s position includes terms that she wants sole carriage of the sale, in view of the father’s breaches.

13On the sale, the mother seeks orders that her 50% share be released to her, and that the father’s 50% share be held back, subject to certain distributions. She asks the Court to “stay” its order requiring the father to maintain the “financial status quo”, but this is in tandem with finding the father breached it, and ordering that he now owes her arrears of child and spousal support in the amount of $652,671.80, from his share. She asks that the father be ordered to pay her interim disbursements of $463,000.00 from his share. She also asks for an order that the father pay her temporary, “without prejudice” child support in the amount of $10,899.00 per month and temporary without prejudice spousal support in the amount of $13,191.00 per month, commencing April 1, 2026, or such other uncharacterized lump sum, subject to adjustment at trial.

14The mother seeks a ruling that a RESP be used as the first source of funds for the children’s post-secondary education. As I explain later, other than ensuring that the RESP is not depleted prior to trial, post-secondary education is not an imminent issue, and this request for relief was not seriously pursued at the motion. Finally, there is also a request that the Court deal with household contents, prior to the sale of the matrimonial home.

15The father did not file a new Notice of Motion, but he put his position in a Factum dated March 13, 2026 and in a proposed draft Order, and he confirmed through counsel his views orally during argument. The father also seeks the sale of the matrimonial home. He is prepared to agree that the mother can have her 50% share of the sale proceeds, and that his will be held back on a “without prejudice basis”, but he writes that there should be some ability to access his half share to fund the children’s educational expenses. When probed, it was revealed that he is envisioning another motion if the parties cannot agree. He does not agree with the mother having sole carriage of the sale.

16The father would have the Court simply replace his undertaking to pay the “financial status quo” ordered at ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, with a going forward Order that the mother can have access to funds to $20,000.00 per month from the IPP, provided he too receives $5,000.00 per month. But as I explain in more detail later, a portion of those IPP funds already belong to the mother by right of ownership, and to the extent that the father is the owner of a greater percentage, some of that difference will equalize to the mother in the equalization calculation.

17Neither in his proposal nor during oral submissions, did the father adequately explain how the IPP is structured and how withdrawals from the IPP will be treated for tax purposes. Notably, the father’s proposal does not even necessarily allow the mother access to the equalizable amount of this asset, let alone her own share of it all at once in full; he instead proposed to distribute it to her monthly over time, maintaining some degree of control. In response to a question from the Court, the father revised his position and his counsel said that the mother could have 50% of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home, and 50% of the IPP.

18At ¶ 9 of his Factum, the father writes, “For reasons [he] cannot understand, [the mother] has refused to accept the above proposal”. Yet neither in his proposal, nor during oral argument despite repeated questions from the Court, did the father adequately address the fact that he has breached ¶ 178 (n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision for the past 1 year and 8 months since the Decision, nor did he offer up a monetary remedy to pay the mother even some of the shortfall, but for his breaches. The father essentially approached this motion as if that August 1, 2024 Order had never been made, or as if it should be given no effect.²

19The father seeks a different Order regarding the division of household contents. He also argues that there is no need to address the RESP right now.

20By the end of argument and in the days that followed while this decision has been under reserve, some common ground emerged regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, but not fully. The parties consented to a process whereby the wife would propose the names of three realtors, and the parties agreed to co-author a letter to the lender asking it not to proceed by way of power of sale as the parties were now agreeing to the sale. I was informed post-motion on April 7, 2026 by way of a joint email from the parties, that they had sent the letter to the bank, and the father agreed to the mother selecting her preferred agent. I was informed that the father was awaiting confirmation of the mother’s selection of the agent and the listing agreement to sign, but he continued to oppose the mother having sole carriage of the sale.

21As can be seen, both sides have asked the Court to make different “without prejudice” orders. The meaning of a “without prejudice” order was explained by Justice E. Murray at ¶ 42-44 of K.A.P. v. P.P., 2007 ONCJ 217. In January, the father abandoned his right to return the parenting issues. The outstanding financial issues have now fully argued, pending trial. I do not intend to make another “without prejudice” order; the Court’s Orders will be temporary, pending trial.

PART IV: ADDITIONAL FACTS AND BACKGROUND FOR CONTEXT

22I will now set out some additional facts and background, for context. To the extent certain facts are not repeated or referred to in these Supplementary Reasons though, the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision should be read alongside these ones.

23As I wrote in the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision:

(a) The father is trained and worked a specialist surgeon. He was the medical director of a clinic that he owned, out of which he conducted surgeries and procedures. He also worked at various other medical facilities. He held various board and teaching positions: see ¶ 148;

(b) The father earned OHIP income by performing surgeries at various hospitals and clinics and well as at his own. He earned some non-OHIP income from various sources. His OHIP billings were paid into a professional corporation, that he solely owned, and the non-OHIP income was paid to a clinic, that both parties jointly owned: see ¶ 149-151;

(c) The father owns 100% of a numbered company, that owns a cottage, as well as 51% of a research consulting business, with another doctor. The parties co-own another holding company. The mother was unaware fully of its purpose, but she believed it engaged in consulting and leasing, that it held shares in two health and medical companies, and that it owned a commercial rental property, and equipment and machinery: see ¶ 152-153;

(d) On May 15, 2024, the College of Physicians and Surgeons posted a notice on its website about the father’s criminal charges: see ¶ 18(f). The father claimed that numerous organizations began severing ties with him after this, and that he experienced negative comments on the internet. He said his OHIP billings had been reduced by more than half, follow up appointments were no longer coming to his clinic, and a research fellow, who contributed to the clinic’s revenues, left following the charges: see ¶ 154-155;

(e) The father was then aware he was going to be required by the College, to post a sign in his waiting room, that he could not see or treat patients under 18 years old: see ¶ 155. I mention this again here, because during argument of the return of this long motion, the father relied on this signage. But the fact that this signage was going to be required, was already contemplated when he proposed an order for the “financial status quo” on July 24, 2024;

(f) Back then, there was an income report before the Court, that calculated the father’s income for 2023 using two different scenarios. These scenarios revealed incomes in excess of $1,500,000.00 and $1,700,000.00, depending on the beneficial ownership of certain of the corporations he held with the wife. The income report assumed and projected certain fairly drastic declines to the father’s income for 2024 as a result of the criminal charges, by about half: see ¶ 165;

(g) Although not specified in the August 1, 2024 Reasons, the mother’s affidavit sworn June 26, 2024 states that she received a salary from the clinic. In 2023, she got paid $127,544.00, and as is now revealed, she received a similar amount in 2024. Back then, the mother said her sole source of funds came from that salary, which got pooled into a joint back account, and from a joint credit card that she had access to: see ¶ 161;

(h) I found based on the record and the submissions then before the Court, that the “financial status quo” entailed the father paying at least $39,963.00 for housing expenses for the matrimonial home, car expenses, $7,875 per month for private school fees for the children, $2,790.00 per month for extra-curricular activities, and $833.00 per month for RESP contributions. The father also said he paid $10,000.00 per month to service a joint credit card as well: see ¶ 156-157; and

(i) Already by this point, the parties were incurring high legal fees, in the father’s case relating to the criminal charges, and in both parties’ cases, for their family law dispute: see ¶ 157-159. I return to this later, when addressing the mother’s request for an interim disbursement.

PART V: ANALYSIS

A. The Basis of the Court’s Financial Order of August 1, 2024

24There is no serious question about the mother’s entitlement to child and spousal support. This continues to be so now. There is a dispute in this case about which parent assumed brunt of the parenting responsibilities in this case (see for example ¶ 11 and 12 of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision), but the children have been in the mother’s sole care since the criminal charges in late April of 2024 (see ¶ 25).

25The mother has a compensatory and a non-compensatory spousal support claim. Regarding her need, the mother is not working. She is studying to be a teacher, with four dependent children in her care. She says that without the father’s financial support, she and the children are now relying on the Child Benefit Payment of approximately $1,155 per month. She says she is relying on donations from charity and a food bank. She has also availed herself of the return of funds paid for extracurricular activities, from which she had to withdraw two of the children, to make ends meet. She says she has also reallocated some of her OSAP funding, to pay for food and clothing.

26The real issues before the Court, then and still now, are the determination of the father’s income and his ability to pay, and whether a temporary support order should be made versus whether it should be deferred with some other financial arrangement put in place: see ¶ 142 of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision.

27When this long motion was first argued, the Court was not then in the position, to engage in the same kind of analysis about the determination of the father’s income, the support issues, and the extent to which they are intertwined with the other property and debt issues, as it would at a trial: see for example Politis v. Politis, 2015 ONSC 5997 ¶ 14; see also Gannon v. Gannon, 2021 ONSC 7160 ¶ 45-66. That remains the case today. On an interim motion of this nature, the Court’s task is to create “affordable, efficient rough justice to tide the parties through to the trial”: see Vali-Farhad v. Haeri, 2023 ONSC 3032 ¶ 5.

28When this long motion was first argued, it mid-year in 2024. One challenge that then confronted the Court, was that it was not fully known what the father’s full income for 2024 would turn out to be. His view, based on his expert’s projection, was that it would be $755,000.00, a significant decline from 2024. While there is now a better indication of what 2024 held (i.e. the father’s updated expert report of February 28, 2025 says $703,000.00), still today, the father’s income earning capacity into the future, remains uncertain, because of the criminal charges. Serious questions were raised by the father back then, about the affordability of any interim support Order, for so long as the matrimonial home was maintained. Even though the house will now be sold, he continues to advance similar arguments about affordability, although now based primarily on the decline to his income only.

29Above, I indicated that the father approached the return of this long motion almost as if the August 1, 2024 Order had never been made. That in my view, was inappropriate. It is important to reiterate exactly what the father said should happen back then, because almost immediately after the August 1, 2024 was made, the father disregarded it. The Court is not prepared to just pretend, or disregard its August 1, 2024 Order.

30When advocating to the Court on July 24, 2024, that it should adjourn the mother’s child and spousal support motion on terms that he maintain the “financial status quo”, the father’s former counsel specifically argued this:

(a) The Court had to engage in “rough justice”. The mother was going to go without support. Rather, what the father was then proposing would require him to maintain “significant carrying costs and obligations … with respect to section 7 and other expenses”. The mother’s motion was “premature under the circumstances”;

(b) The father argued that the Court is “obliged to use the most accurate and current income”. There was an early indicator of a “catastrophic decline in income”. Yet he still proposed to maintain the “financial status quo” despite that;

(c) As indicated already, the father knew, and told the Court, that he was going to be required by the College, to post the signage. Yet he still proposed to maintain the “financial status quo” despite that;

(d) The father argued that absent selling some real estate, there was no ability for him to “deplete capital to maintain a support arrangement based on imputed income”. Yet he still proposed to maintain the “financial status quo”;

(e) The father argued that if the Court made a support order, the Court should impose on the mother to pay for some of the monthly expenses out of her support. The mother’s DivorceMate calculations used an income for the father that was too high, and failed to take into account the section 7 expenses that he paid. The mother would not be able to afford to pay those on the quantum proposed once the calculations were corrected, particularly if the matrimonial home was not sold to reduce expenses;

(f) On these bases, the father argued that the mother’s support motion should be adjourned, with a review of the support arrangements “in the context of more practical carrying costs” once the matrimonial home is sold on consent, or on motion;

(g) The father’s former counsel specifically said “[u]nder all the circumstances, [the father] should continue to maintain the financial status quo. The motion should be dismissed or adjourned without prejudice, and there should be no interim support arrangement. [Or] in the alternative… [the Court’s Order] must consider an obligation of the respondent mother to contribute to the carrying costs and the section 7 expenses…”; and

(h) In Reply, the father argued that he could not obtain a line of credit, remortgage or obtain a personal loan, either. Former counsel specifically said he did not have the ability to obtain “further debt instruments, given the nature of the charges and the current decline in his income, and he has given, offered that evidence to [the Court]”.

31After I considered and revised somewhat the parties’ competing DivorceMate calculations, in the context of the submissions and the high monthly expenses, I acceded to the father’s arguments. In so doing, at ¶ 173-177 of the August 1, 2024 Reasons, the Court wrote this:

173On the one hand, the father’s position on the motion (i.e. to dismiss or adjourn) just defers the issue. On the other hand, the Court’s calculations do not work for this family’s current financial circumstances. And the father’s proposal to continue to pay for various expenses (while I question how it is affordable for this family), appears to be the only viable short-term solution.

174While I tend to agree with Mr. Fogelman that the longer this co-mingling of funds continues, the more of a mess will be created to unravel in a post-separation accounting, but a temporary Order right now creates a cash flow crisis. And any amount of support would have to be reviewed in due course, if it turns out at the end of the year that the father earns less (or for that matter more) than that upon which the Court would base its support order now. In other words, this is not a case, where temporary support can be adjudicated just once prior to trial. There would likely have to be a review or an interim variation anyway.

175The parties need to make some tough financial decisions. The father has told the Court that he wants to move to sell the matrimonial home. The mother and the four children live there. She may want to keep it. The father needs to think about how forcing the sale of the matrimonial home will impact his relationship with the children. The mother needs to consider how the matrimonial home will be maintained.

176There is a cottage property, the sale of which might be achieved on consent, but the assistance of the father’s valuator is going to be required. The parties should seriously pursue sorting this out on consent, well in advance of the return of this matte to Court.

177The parties may also need to revisit whether the high level of section 7 expenses being incurred is sustainable.

32Despite these comments, the father then turned around and immediately breached his promise to maintain the “financial status quo”. Both parties played a role in delaying the return of this motion, and incredibly, when the return of this motion was finally argued, there continued to be a debate about the high level of section 7 expenses, specifically the affordability of private school fees.

B. The Father’s Breaches

33On the father’s own submissions, a financial crisis was foreseeable. He knew his income was in decline, he knew he was facing serious criminal charges, and he knew about the impending sign requirement from the College. Yet he made the proposal to maintain the “financial status quo”. He was adamantly opposed to the Court making a temporary support Order, even based on his expert’s projected income then known. Within days of the release of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, the father began to breach the Order, and he did so in numerous and continuing ways. With the benefit of having now seen what transpired subsequently, I find it more probable than not, that the father deliberately misrepresented his intentions to the Court about his ability and willingness to maintain the “financial status quo”, to gain advantage, during argument of the July 24, 2024 motion, and to avoid some kind of more conventional support Order being put in place.

34Specifically, I make these findings because, after having made the aforementioned submissions on July 24, 2024:

(a) On August 16, 2024, the father’s former counsel wrote a letter to Mr. Fogelman stating that the College’s “warning” sign was now posted. She wrote that the father intended to close the clinic by the end of the year (from where he and the mother pooled their salaries into the joint account, required by the Order at ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision). She said “the financial status quo…” [that he had just argued for a mere 15 days earlier] “…cannot be maintained”. She said that he could not pay the monthly expenses on his reduced income, or the credit card payments. At that time, the father apparently served an offer regarding “the sale of the properties”, and his counsel wrote that a discussion regarding a formal support arrangement should occur once the property/properties are sold”. Yet there were no new developments whatsoever that justified this change in position from what had just been argued;

(b) Four days later, on August 20, 2024, the father advised the mother’s lawyer that he was paying the children’s 2024-2025 private school tuition by cashing in a joint RBC Cross-Border bank account, rather than as required by ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision. That letter from his former counsel dated August 20, 2024 states that he cashed in $38,820.00 from that bank account, leaving $6,000.00 in fees still outstanding. Yet during argument of the motion on July 24, 2024, the father’s counsel said that private school tuition had been paid;

(c) Twenty-one days after that, on September 10, 2024, the father’s former counsel advised the mother’s lawyer that the father would not draw a salary for September of 2024, nor would he be paying the outstanding balance on the joint credit card, another breach of ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision;

(d) Sixteen days after that, on September 26, 2024, the father’s former counsel advised the mother’s lawyer that he could not pay the mortgage on the matrimonial home for that month, and he repeated that he did not have the funds to pay the outstanding balance on the joint credit card for August and September;

(e) Fifteen days after that, on October 11, 2024, the father repeated that he was closing the clinic by the end of 2024, and he asked to liquidate the IPP. Had that occurred, the IPP would not now be available to form part of the father’s proposal on this motion;

(f) In November of 2024, the father began accessing the home equity line of credit on the cottage property. He continued to do so until August of 2025 apparently, at which point there was credit remaining of only $4,555.68. Not only was this not in compliance with ¶ 178(n), but at the July 24, 2024 motion, the father’s former counsel made specific submissions about the father’s inability to fund a child and spousal support Order with capital, short of selling real estate, which she said “would not result in immediate liquidity” anyway. The equity in the cottage on the valuation date is subject to equalization, but it has now been depleted, potentially leading to a collections problem for the mother;

(g) By the father’s former counsel’s letter of September 23, 2025, the father now said that he would no longer be practicing medicine as of September 8, 2025. He also said that he paid the 2025-2026 tuition in full, although he did not specify the source of the funds for that payment;

(h) Based on her review of certain bank statements, the mother now says in her affidavit of January 29, 2026, that the father allowed the joint account to go into overdraft every month from August of 2024 until March of 2025, after which he stopped depositing funds entirely, leaving the balance to quickly dwindle down to $16.80. She says that the father allowed the mortgage to go into default, such that power of sale proceedings have been commenced, rendering the sale of the matrimonial home to which she had been previously opposed, all but a fait accompli. The mother says that property tax of $8,679.34 was owing, as of September 23, 2025. The mother says that the father allowed the parties’ home insurance to get cancelled due to non-payment of insurance premiums. Apparently, since December 26, 2025, the home has been uninsured. She also raised various complaints about the non-payment of her vehicle expenses, and the joint credit card;

(i) As the mother’s counsel pointed out during argument of the return of this long motion, the father’s financial statement sworn July 10, 2024, then filed, did not show any debt to his parents. The father has since produced a promissory note dated February 28, 2025, that shows a principal amount of $1,058,032.08 payable to his parents on or before February 28, 2027. The debt may have since increased. The fact that he accessed this debt runs contrary to his counsel’s reply submission on July 24, 2024, about his inability to access any further credit;

(j) As indicated above, the parties had been income splitting before, and the “financial status quo” entailed the father continuing to pool both of their salaries into the joint account. But in 2025, the mother was told that her “employment” would be terminated on October 31, 2025. Meanwhile she believes that the father was still working somewhere, as a healthcare consultant; and

(k) The mother says that beginning in December of 2025, she made various disclosure requests, to try to understand the true state of affairs. She alleges these have gone unanswered by the father. She argues at ¶ 13 of her affidavit sworn January 29, 2026, that the father’s non-response was intentional, to put her in a position of having to argue the support issues “based on speculation as opposed to fact”.

35The father’s response to all this, in his affidavit sworn February 27, 2026, is the following:

(a) The mother does not accept responsibility. He says the mother refuses to acknowledge the catastrophic changes that have occurred. He says the mother was non-cooperative regarding the sale of property and his other attempts to settle, that would have obviated the need for this motion;

(b) The College made him post the sign;

(c) His updated income report of February 28, 2025, now dated a year ago, contains a “preliminary estimate” only of his 2025 income. It says it will be $84,000.00. We are now well into 2026;

(d) There are various explanations as to why he did not comply with ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision; and

(e) The father says he answered numerous disclosure requests.³

C. The Remedy For the Father’s Breaches: A Temporary Child and Spousal Support Order

36Having found the father breached the Order pursuant to rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, I turn now to the appropriate remedy.

37A similar situation confronted this Court recently in Marchewka v. Diluciano, 2025 ONSC 7007. There, a father who was incarcerated and claimed not to have income, obtained leave to bring a motion, while still in jail, to have his former spouse and his child, vacate a residence that he owned. Much of the motion then settled without argument. Despite his current circumstances, the father proposed to pay uncharacterized support to the mother in the amount of $1,000.00 per month, and to maintain alternative housing or to pay $3,700.00 per month for rent, on an interim basis. The mother agreed. The Court made an order for that substantially on consent, on June 4, 2025, and the mother moved out.

38But the parties were back before the Court within months, numerous times. The mother wanted to return to the property as a consequence for the father’s breach, saying that she was facing homelessness on account of the father’s non-payment. In its subsequent ruling of December 12, 2025, the Court found that the father had breached both payment terms in the June 4, 2025 Order in various ways: see ¶ 14. The Court found there to be no exceptional reason not to sanction the father for his breaches, in accordance with the approach set out at ¶ 64 of Ferguson v. Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1.

39The mother’s request to return to the property raised questions about the Court’s jurisdiction to award that relief. The Court found that the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of that case, was first to order the father to pay the arrears owing, and to pre-pay the ongoing amounts for a number of months to take the parties to trial, before resorting to an order permitting the return: see ¶ 26-50. There are some parallels here.

40I have considered the father’s evidence and submissions that he tried to negotiate a change to the situation after the July 24, 2024 motion and the mother would not engage. I have also considered the mother’s preliminary objection at the return of this long motion, the father has ‘cherry-picked’, making reference to portions of the overall settlement negotiations to paint a certain picture, to which she could not then respond fully, without also violating the rule against discussing settlement.

41Quite frankly, none of these arguments are worthy of much weight. If settlement privilege has been violated, it shouldn’t have been and the mother was correct not to exacerbate the error. But who was prepared to do what is not the real issue here, at this time.

42Although she was responding to a different question from this Court about something else, an unwarranted comment was made by the father’s current counsel about alleged scheduling restraints in Newmarket. This Court has made multiple Court dates available to this family, and it has made itself more than available to hear the return of this long motion. As far as I am concerned, regardless of whatever negotiations were going on or not, and regardless of whether any particular settlement proposal was reasonable or not, the father was motivated to delay the return of this motion for as long as possible in the hopes that the situation would change regarding the criminal charges and his parenting. While he appeared before the Court to complain several times for example about the need to sell the house, he never availed himself of court dates to argue for that. He breached the Order, which has all but resulted in a forced sale by the bank. While the mother may have benefited from some of the delay, in the sense that she didn’t want the house sold, the sale of the house was tied to her request for support. That was clear from the outset, as already explained in the summary of the prior proceedings.

43In any event, the parties are not on an equal footing here when it comes to the delay. At ¶ 64 of R.G.C. v. C.L.C., 2014 ONSC 2100, Conlan J. wrote:

…Court Orders are not “pleases and thank yous”. They are directives that shall be followed. If they cannot be followed for some legitimate reason, then it is incumbent on the party seeking a variation to have the Order amended, without delay. It is not for the party to modify the Order to suit his or her circumstances.

44This principle is well known. It was incumbent on the father, the party in breach, to seek to return the motion before the Court. What makes it worse, is that he had several opportunities to do so. He was represented throughout. I see no reason not to enforce the August 1, 2024 Order, at least until the motion was finally brought back on.

45The mother relies on the methodology at ¶ 12-14 of Freedman v. Freedman, 2020 ONSC 301, wherein Justice Sonia Jain calculated arrears when there was a breach of an interim order for the payment of expenses in lieu of support, by adding together the monthly expenses the payor was ordered to pay, multiplied by the number of months of the breach. There however, Jain J. found a continued inability to impute an income though, due to non-disclosure. The situation is somewhat different here, leading me to take a different approach. There is enough disclosure her for me to make a finding about income, at least for some point in the past.

46This Court was seriously considering making a child and spousal support Order in the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, based on the income projections at the time. While it declined to do so and instead adjourned the motion, it bears repeating that was heavily premised on the father’s promise to maintain the “financial status quo”, which he immediately did not do. It was also premised on his misrepresentation about his inability to access capital, and to borrow. In other words, the alternative back then, was to make a conventional child and spousal support Order, a remedy that is still open to the Court to make now, retrospectively in time. I intend to do so for the following reasons.

47First, it bears repeating that the mother is entitled to child and spousal support. The Court is not awarding this on its own as a remedy for breach, but in tandem with the fact that she is entitled.

48Cecond, as I have said, there is some ability to assess income, at least on the so-called “rough justice” basis, that motions analysis entails. At the time of the July 24, 2024 motion, the father then projected his income to be $755,000.00. The updated income report from February 28, 2025, revises the estimate for 2024 to $703,000.00. I intend use the updated analysis, of $703,000.00, for the father.⁴

49At the time of the July 24, 2024 motion, when the father argued that his projected income for 2024 was $755,000.00, that included the income splitting to the mother of approximately $127,000.00. In other words, if the $127,000.00 was deducted, his income was lower, in the $500,000.00 range. I cannot see in the updated income report how the income splitting with the mother was treated; in other words the $703,000.00 figure appears to be exclusive of income splitting: see for example Section 6.0 of the Updated Income Report, page 10.

50As shown on her 2024 Notice of Assessment that is attached to her updated Financial Statement sworn February 6, 2026, the mother was paid $127,519.00 in 2024. I have used that figure for the mother’s income, in the Court’s calculations.

51Had I made a more conventional support Order back then, I would have considered making an Order that the mother was responsible for some or all of various expenses, as was argued for by the father during submissions. But overall in the end result, the father argued against this approach in favour of the “financial status quo” argument.

52I am not in a position to apply any credits at this time. On the one hand, despite the father’s various breaches, based on the summary above, it appears that he did pay some of the expenses after the August 1, 2024 Order. But he did not quantify what he paid in any user friendly way. He also used debt, depleted capital (some of which the mother is entitled to in the property calculations), and he depleted a joint bank account (the mother is also entitled to that). I agree with mother’s counsel, that it was incumbent upon the father, to provide some kind of comprehensible accounting to quantify what he did and didn’t pay, using his own funds. In the absence of a clear accounting, I am not prepared to credit the father for amounts for expenses that the mother should have paid in a support order scenario.⁵ In adopting that result, I further rely on the fact that Mr. Fogelman himself, warned of this consequence, when the father sought the remedy he sought at the July 24, 2024,⁶ but the father still pursued that remedy.

53I have also considered whether the section 7 expenses, for example for private school and activities, should form part of the Court’s DivorceMate calculations, and consequently whether they should carry over into the interim support Order being made now. For example, the father’s former counsel correctly argued when the mother presented inflated support calculations in 2024, that they should be factored in. But I now know that they had not been paid in full, contrary to what I was then told. I now know that private school fees for the upcoming year were not paid, and the father turned around and used joint funds to pay for at least part of them. I do not have a proper accounting of this either.⁷ The mother also had to cancel some activities, to get some money back, to live, as indicated. As such, there will be no accounting for section 7 expenses in the Court’s interim support calculation.⁸

54The next question to decide, is for what period of time will the Court’s temporary child and spousal Order cover? I would not end the support in the calculation at the end of 2024. I recognize that for 2025, there is the very real prospect of reduced income. But the most weighty factor here, is the father’s breaches, coupled with his delay. As indicated already, the father could have argued the finances on January 25, 2025, and if not then certainly by March 25, 2025, by which point he had his updated income report. But he did not. That is a choice that he made. I am only prepared to grant some relief going forward, once the father finally acted. I am not granting relief for the time that he sat back, let the order be breached, and that he allowed the mortgage to fall into default.

55The next issue after that, is that the mother has asked for go forward support. I am not prepared to order this at this time either. Once the remedy for the father’s breaches is dealt with, there remains the reality, that there is a good enough indication, the father’s income has been adversely impacted. It may turn out at trial that the Order being made today for the period August 1, 2024 to March 1, 2026 amounts to an overpayment. While any such overpayment may be further offset against any further support found at trial to be owing for the period from the separation until August 1, 2024, and against any additional support after April 1, 2026, there may still be an overpayment.

56Or perhaps there will not be.

57For example, during submissions, some reference was made to a dividend the father took in 2005, that may be worth several hundred thousand dollars. But that too may be a double account with other funds, for example the equity from the cottage that he drew.⁹

58Perhaps there will not be an overpayment because the Court at trial will find it appropriate to impute an income to the father. Particularly if the father is found guilty at his criminal trial, perhaps the Family Court will find that he cannot escape his support obligations by relying on changes to his income flowing from criminal behavior: see Costello v. Costello, 2012 ONCJ 399 ¶ 34-43.

59Or perhaps there will not be an overpayment because a trial judge will impute an income to the father from the monies his parents advanced him, documented in the promissory note, as argued for by the mother at the return of this long motion.

60And it may also be that the situation respecting his income may very well change again for the better, after the upcoming criminal trial (that I now understand is being held in June of 2026) is over, if for example there is an acquittal. But the mother may likewise then attempt to prove, that the father has secretly been working somewhere else, as she claimed on this motion.

61All of these kinds of issues can be sorted out at trial. And even if there turns out to have been an overpayment, it appears to be fairly clear to me that an equalization payment will be owing to the mother. The majority of the valuation date assets on the mother’s updated Financial Statement sworn February 6, 2026, are joint. There are a myriad of corporate assets for which the father has placed “TBDs” for the valuation date, which may end up having some equalizable value. In other words, it appears that he owes the mother an equalization payment, quite apart from any accounting of the equity he depleted post-separation.

62So for these reasons, I am prepared to Order support for the past, until the long motion was brought back on, but not going forward on an interim basis, on account of these various uncertainties.

63Before concluding, I pause to note the inconsistency in the father’s position on this motion about this Court’s supposed inability to make a support order now. While he submitted that to order child and spousal support, the Court would have to use the most current income (which the Court does not have), determine an income and not order him to pay using capital, the father himself has never adopted that approach to the interim issues. He argued for an expenses based approach on July 24, 2024, that neither determined income, and then argued again, for the same kind thing, when he proposed to share the IPP with the mother going forward in lieu of an Order for the past or for the future. If implemented, the latter not only didn’t require an income determination, but used capital.

64Finally, in not ordering go forward support on a temporary basis after April 1, 2026, I have noted the mother’s inconsistent position, as drafted, in her Fresh as Amended Notice of Motion and at ¶ 61 of her Factum, that conflicts with the expanded position she tried to take orally, during argument. Her Fresh as Amended Notice of Motion claims going forward support in the alternative. In her Factum, the mother said that if she was awarded child and spousal support arrears, albeit as calculated differently from the approach I am prepared to take, she was prepared to forgo prospective support on a temporary basis, without prejudice to it being later reinstated.

D. The Quantum of Support Owing

65Using the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the mother argued for the mid-range on July 24, 2024), monthly child support is $13,596.00 per month and monthly spousal support is $8,532.00 per month: see the DivorceMate Calculation at Schedule “A” to these Supplementary Reasons. I recognize that this leaves the mother with more net disposal income than the father, but she has four children in her care.

66I also recognize that at least some of the spousal support, could be deductible and includable on the parties’ income tax returns. While the parties already filed their taxes for 2024, amounts attributable to 2025 may still be capable of being dealt with in their 2025 filings, or in any re-filings, if they have already filed, or later in 2026 if that is the more correct way to capture it. However I intend to order that the amount of support owing be paid out of the father’s share of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home. Those are net dollars. The simplest thing to do right now in my view, is to order a net amount of spousal support as a lump sum. Child support is already net of tax as we know. For spousal support, I have used the average between the parties’ tax positions on the DivorceMate calculations.

67Therefore, the father shall pay to the mother lump sum child and spousal support of $357,180.00, calculated as monthly child support of $13,596.00 for 20 months between August 1, 2024 and March 1, 2026, and net spousal support of $4,263.00¹⁰ for the same 20 month period.

E. Costs of the Parenting Motion

68The mother sought her costs of the father’s parenting motion. Her Bill of Costs claimed full recovery at $47,836.85, and partial recovery at $29,437.06, inclusive of HST. Orally, she asked for $30,000.00. The father’s counsel did not take issue with the quantum of $30,000.00 claimed, but argued that these costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

69The Court is supposed to deal with costs promptly after dealing with a step in a case: see rule 24(1)(a) of the Family Law Rules. While the Court can now expressly reserve the decision to a later step in the case under new costs rule 24(1)(b), I see no reason to do so here.

70The mother was completely successful in resisting the father’s request for parenting time, and his request for a section 30 assessment with the assessor he proposed. While I indicated in the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision that I was prepared to entertain a section 30 assessment with an assessor more qualified for this particular case, provided certain conditions were put in place, the father chose not to pursue this, choosing instead to prefer his need to remain silent for his criminal case. That is a choice he made, but having launched the motion in the first place, that choice comes with costs consequences. Incidentally, an assessment with the alternative assessor was also the mother’s alternative position, and her counsel’s submissions played some role in my crafting of the preconditions under which I was prepared to consider making the appointment.

71Regarding whether costs should be ordered now, or reserved to later, it is not the trial judge, but myself, who is the most familiar with what happened, because I heard the July 24, 2024 long motion, I wrote the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, and I presided over all of the subsequent appearances, until the parenting and assessment issues were ultimately abandoned by the father. It is me, and not the trial judge, who is best suited to assess costs, and I find that should be done now.

72Therefore, the father shall pay costs to the mother for the unsuccessful parenting motion in the amount of $30,000.00. The mother asked that they be paid now, as opposed to out of his share of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home. The easiest enforcement mechanism is to have the costs come out of his equity.

F. Interim Disbursements

73The mother sought interim disbursements of $463,000.00.

74To begin, I accept and will apply the statements of law regarding interim disbursements that are set out in ¶ 32-35 of the mother’s Factum dated March 13, 2026, and at ¶ 46 of the father’s Factum dated March 13, 2026.

75The majority of the interim disbursements sought by the mother is for her to get access to funds, to pay her lawyers for work done, and to take her to trial. The mother’s counsel are not prepared to continue to act, without being paid for work already done, and without a proper retainer going forward.

76The mother’s litigation budget attached at Exhibit “Y” to her affidavit sworn January 29, 2026, calculates amounts needed at $415,356.00, inclusive of HST. To this, she subsequently added an additional sum of about $42,500 or so (a mid-point of his estimate), to retain Martin Pont to review the father’s reports, and to prepare an expert report of her own, of the father’s income and business interests. Notably, at ¶ 6 of his Factum, one of the father’s arguments in support of a particular income determination at this time, is that the mother failed to produce an income report of her own to contradict his. Yet she can ill afford to consult with an expert, and she is seeking a disbursement in part to do so.

77But all that being said, the litigation budget is somewhat inflated. $124,254.80 of the above amount (i.e. fees of $109,960.00, on which $14,294.80 of HST is attached) pertains to anticipated fees for this motion, work in progress, some of which might pertain to this motion, and to an outstanding account. Costs of this motion have not been ordered yet either, but I am making provision for costs submissions below. As I understand it, the outstanding account of $51,186.00 includes fees in relation to the July 24, 2024 motion, for which costs have now been ordered. The $124,254.80 sum also includes a budget for two other possible motions, for which leave has not been granted. When I back that sum of about $124,000.00 out of it, the litigation budget drops to about $339,000.00 (i.e. $463,000.00 less $124,000.00).

78A number of the entries in the litigation budget also have charges for two lawyers. While the mother can choose to have two lawyers represent her at an hourly cost of over $1,300.00 per hour if she wants (the father is very likely doing the same), this may or may not very well not prove to be reasonable in the final analysis, when the Court deals with costs after the trial: see Iacobelli v. Iacobelli, 2020 ONSC 6128 ¶ 41-52. Already as it is, at ¶ 158 of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, this Court commented on the sheer size of the early legal fees that these two parties had already incurred to date.

79However, and also quite notably, the proposed litigation budget shows that a greater portion of the work is being done by Lauren Daneman, at more than half the hourly rate of Mr. Fogelman. This reveals an attempt to economize and save on costs, and it could be at trial, that the trial judge finds having two lawyers to be reasonable for some of the work: see S.S. v. R.A., 2024 ONSC 4379 ¶ 80-82. While the legal fees by the time of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision were already high, it doesn’t go unnoticed by the Court, that the father’s were almost double the mother’s. This is some indication as to what his reasonable expectation is, when it comes to expenditures for legal fees.

80In considering further the notions of fairness that I am required to consider, and whether the playing field is level here, I also accept the mother’s counsel’s submission, that while the father was not complying with ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, he depleted a joint bank account, and the equity in the cottage, and he borrowed large sums of money from his parents. He did all of these things, after telling the Court that he could do none of them at the time of the motion argued July 24, 2024. As Mr. Fogelman argued, the father likely used the funds he borrowed from his parents, this to fund both his criminal lawyer’s fees, and the multiple, expensive family lawyers, that he has used for this case throughout. There is a lack of debt for legal fees shown on his updated Financial Statement sworn February 27, 2026, and a lack of a budget item for legal fees too. In contrast, he disclosed significant monthly legal fees on his Financial Statement for the July 24, 2024 motion. Mr. Fogelman would have the Court infer therefore, that all of the father’s lawyers have been paid in full, or they are being paid by someone else. The mother by contrast, is using lawyers who are carrying an account receivable.

81For these reasons, I am prepared to order an interim disbursement, but not in the full sum requested by the mother. The question becomes how much to Order.

82If as Mr. Fogelman argued, the mother’s share of the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home will be $800,000.00 (it will perhaps be less), that she may very well need to use that entire amount for housing. Notably, she needs housing for a household of five. She may also be facing the prospect, for example if the father is found guilty, that there will be no renewed income stream out of which to pursue support. She needs to economize.

83But should her litigation budget therefore be entirely financed by the father, who is living with his parents and doesn’t have the same housing constraints. I find the answer to this must be no.

84The mother isn’t completely without resources. There is the IPP, that the father argued should be used to pay the mother some support (as well as to himself). While I did not give effect to this, I do find this asset is relevant to the request for disbursements. It is an asset that she can access and it reduces her need for a disbursement. I am prepared to allow the mother to access it.

85I am not entirely clear on the value of the plan currently. According to the Father’s Financial Statement sworn February 27, 2026, the plan was worth $401,650.53 on the date of separation. I was told the parties own that asset unequal shares. According to his updated Financial Statement sworn February 27, 2026, the father holds 65.8% of this asset, and the mother holds 34.2%.

86Regardless of their differential shares, the mother in the end, will be effectively entitled in the equalization payment, to 50% of the combined date of separation values. I don’t have a proper tax calculation of the disposition costs for this asset to know fully what that is worth in her hands in net dollars, or even a good explanation as to what tax will be triggered, when and how, as already indicated. But assuming disposition costs as high as 50%, there is at least $100,000.00 that the mother can access there, plus 34.2% of the growth after the date of separation, whatever that additional amount works out to be. This reduces the litigation budget shortfall by at least $100,000.00, to no more than $239,000.00.

87While I intend to order that some of the money used to fund the total amount of the mother’s litigation budget will come her own asset (the IPP), or by way of an advance on the equalizable amount of that IPP, if the father doesn’t cooperate to enable the mother to access the funds in the IPP, then there should not be another round of motioning. Instead, the further sum of $100,000.00 shall be paid to her from the father’s net sale proceeds.

88After taking that into account, I am prepared to order a further disbursement of $150,000.00 from the father’s share of the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home. I find that the mother will be hindered in advancing her legal rights without this disbursement. I find that this amount of a disbursement is necessary and reasonable, given the needs of the case and the funds available. I find that the mother’s claims (child support, spousal support, equalization) are meritorious, as far as I can tell at this stage. Her parenting claims may be too.

89Finally, I recognize that this does not provide the mother with 100% of her proposed budget. But both parties need to start living with the reality that there are not limitless resources here, and they will have to decide what steps they really need to take next, in this litigation. If their out to be a real shortfall, the mother may very well have to spend some of the support being ordered. This too satisfies the requirement listed in ¶ 33(e) of her Factum in my view, that the mother must demonstrate that she is incapable of funding the requested amount.

90In other words, based on the above analysis and calculations, I have essentially found that she is partially capable of funding it (through the costs order, her equity, an advance, and if necessary her support), and she is partially incapable of funding the budget, hence the additional disbursement.

G. The Sale of the Matrimonial Home

91I do not accept at this time, the mother’s position, that she should have carriage of the matrimonial home’s sale, pursuant to section 23(b)(iii) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3 as amended, for several reasons:

(a) While she may have opposed the sale of the matrimonial home in the past for good reason, the fact remains that it has been the mother, not the father, who has been opposed to the sale;

(b) On the one hand, the most significant factor militating in favour of the order sought by the mother in my view, is the father’s deliberate and ongoing breaches of ¶ 178(n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision. Payment of the mother’s child and spousal support and the other amounts provided for herein, is now dependent on the liquidity that will come consequent on the sale. This cannot be delayed;

(c) I also find that his interest, that the sale price be maximized, aligns with the mother’s. The mother will equally be motivated to maximize the sale price, because she is otherwise entitled to her share of the equity: see for example Wilson v. Wright, 2024 ONSC 1512 ¶ 47. That too militates in favour of awarding her control; but

(d) That said, the father’s failure to maintain the “financial status quo”, while perhaps an example of prior bad behaviour that could foreshadow what might happen the future, is not the unreasonable withholding of consent envisioned in section 23(b)(iii) of the Family Law Act; at least not yet.

92I wish to be very clear. The father should not in the future interfere with the sale, such as to delay that money flowing into the mother’s hands. If the father does however act out again, the mother can bring the issue to my attention, and the matter will be revisited expeditiously.

H. Preservation

93I agree with the mother, that preservation of any of the father’s remaining net proceeds of sale is appropriate. To this I would add that I intend to order the father not to take steps to deplete the remaining IPP.

94The father argued that the mother did not claim properly a preservation Order. The mother did not need to make reference to the preservation sections of the Family Law Act in her Fresh as Amended Notice of Motion for example, to achieve an Order preservation. This was little more than a technical argument. The mother asked for preservation of the net sale proceeds in the Notice of Motion. She addressed it in her Factum. I agree with the mother, that in repeatedly breaching ¶ 178 (n) of the August 1, 2024 Reasons for Decision, the father has already accessed and depleted various sources of the liquidity. At the risk of repeating myself, to make matters worse, he represented an inability to do so, when the motion was argued on July 24, 2024.

95This technical argument is also a bit of a distraction. Notably, in his draft Order, the father himself even agrees to preserve his half of the sale proceeds, although he says he might seek their release later, but with the mother’s consent, for the children’s education expenses. When probed, he said this may turn into a motion if the mother doesn’t agree.

96In regard to the IPP, it was the father who raised on this motion, the prospect of it being spent, including in part to himself. Apart from the IPP being made available for the advance, the Court is concerned that its remainder should be protected, to be available to satisfy any entitlements of the mother’s, to which she may be found at trial to be entitled.

97I am satisfied that there is a further risk of depletion of any funds that make their way into his hands.

I. Household Contents

98There is a petty dispute before the Court, raised by one side, and responded to by the other with a cross-claim, about the division of household contents. Quite apart from the fact that this issue was not supposed to form part of the subject matter of this motion, it is frankly surprising that the parties saw fit to throw this issue into the mix. They have four experienced counsel between them. Counsel and their clients can sort that issue out themselves.

J. The Children’s RESP

99The mother raised a concern about the future use of children’s RESPs. Both sides agreed to defer the question about how the RESP would in the future be used, until later (such as at the Settlement Conference or at trial). Post-secondary education is not imminent.

100That said, the manner in which this issue was framed was somewhat misplaced. The real issue in my view, is once again preservation. Given that the father already depleted a joint account to pay for private school, and the parties don’t agree to private school for next year, the Court finds that the RESP needs to be protected for now, until there can be a discussion, or a ruling, about what to do with it. The RESPs should not be unilaterally accessed.

PART VI: ORDER

101With the exception of the order in (h) below for the sale of the matrimonial home, which is a final Order, I make the following temporary Orders pursuant to the Family Law Rules, the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act:

(a) Pursuant to rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the Applicant father is found in breach of this Court’s Order of August 1, 2024 for not having maintained the “financial status quo”;

(b) The Applicant father shall pay to the Respondent mother lump sum child support and spousal support, in the amount of $357,180.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(c) The Applicant father shall pay costs of his parenting motion to the Respondent mother in the amount of $30,000.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(d) The Applicant father shall pay an interim disbursement to the Respondent mother in the sum of $150,000.00, out of his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(e) The Applicant father shall cooperate to ensure that the Respondent mother can access the net of tax equivalent of half of the date of separation value in the parties Independent Pension Plan (the “IPP”), and the net of tax amount that corresponds to 34.2% of any post-separation increase. Or if she takes the gross amounts, she shall be responsible for the corresponding taxes. The father shall not withdraw or deplete any other amounts from the IPP, pending further agreement of the parties, or Order of this Court;

(f) The Respondent mother may decide the most tax advantageous way to draw out the funds;

(g) If the Applicant father fails to cooperate with whatever is required for that to occur, then the Applicant father shall instead pay the Respondent mother the sum of $100,000.00 from his share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds;

(h) The matrimonial home shall be sold;

(i) If it has not already been done, within 7 days, the Respondent mother shall select her choice of agent and produce a listing agreement for the Applicant father to sign, in accordance with the agreement they reached as set out in the joint email from counsel dated April 7, 2026;

(j) The parties shall fully cooperate with the listing agent to achieve a sale. The parties and their counsel shall agree on any further terms required to effect this;

(k) If further sale terms are required in the event of a dispute, either party may contact me and seek a quick attendance to address the issue, but counsel are to make all efforts to sort this out between the parties, without the need for further court time on the issue;

(l) In the event of any non-cooperation from the father, the Respondent mother may contact me and seek a date to revive her request for sole carriage of the sale;

(m) The Respondent mother shall be entitled to her 50% share of the matrimonial home’s net proceeds of sale;

(n) The Applicant father’s 50% share of the matrimonial home’s net sale proceeds shall be used to make the above distributions to the Respondent mother. Any left over shall be preserved and held in trust pending further agreement of the parties, or Order of this Court;

(o) The monies to be released from the Applicant father’s share of the matrimonial home’s net proceeds shall be first applied to costs, interim disbursements and the $100,000.00 sum (if the precondition for it to be paid is triggered) in ¶ (c), (d) and (g) above, prior to the funds being credited to the support in ¶ (b) above. If there is any shortfall to the credit of support, then that shortfall shall be enforced through the Family Responsibility Office;

(p) Neither party shall make any withdrawals and otherwise deplete the children’s RESP, pending further agreement of the parties, or Order of this Court;

(q) The parties shall endeavor to agree upon costs of the return of this long motion. If they cannot, then the Respondent mother may file costs submissions, limited to 3 pages, double spaced, plus a Bill of Costs, and copies of any Offers to Settle. She need not supply case law, but may cite it, hyperlinked in her written submissions. The mother’s written costs submissions are due by May 8, 2026;

(r) The Applicant father may file his written costs submissions, subject to the same restrictions on length and attachments, by June 3, 2026;

(s) I note that the Applicant father has already filed a Bill of Costs for this motion, whereas I am not certain that the Respondent mother has. In case it needs to be updated, but regardless even if it does not, I ask that Applicant father simply file (again if applicable) with his submissions, the Bill that he is relying on, and I ask the mother to do the same; and

(t) Except for these costs, the balance of the parties’ claims raised on the return of this long motion are dismissed.

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: April 14, 2026

Schedule “A” DivorceMate Calculation