CITATION: R. v. A.G., 2026 ONSC 4367

COURT FILE NO.: 23-11403201

DATE: 20260728

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

A.G.

Defendant

Loc Welch, for the Crown

Nikolas Lust, for the the Defendant

HEARD: April 29, 2026

DECISION ON SENTENCE

MCVEY J.

Introduction

1A.G. was tried before me on a seven-count indictment alleging numerous acts of physical and sexual violence against three complainants, S.R., A. and T.G, all of whom were A.G.’s adopted children at the relevant time. On September 19, 2025, I found A.G. guilty of sexual assault and assault against S.R., contrary to sections 271 and 266 of the Criminal Code, and assault and assault by choking against T.G., contrary to sections 266 and 267(c) of the Criminal Code. I found A.G. not guilty of the remaining offences. A.G. now appears before me for sentencing.

2I found that A.G. engaged in serious and prolonged abuse of both S.R. and T.G. With respect to S.R., I determined that, over an approximately two‑year period beginning when she was about 12 years old, A.G. repeatedly sexually assaulted her in her basement bedroom. His conduct included various forms of sexual touching and invitations for sexual contact—most notably, repeated requests that S.R. place his penis in her mouth—as well as acts of digital penetration and other degrading sexual acts carried out on a frequent basis leading to A.G. at times ejaculating on S.R. I further found that, in December 2018, A.G. assaulted S.R. by chasing her down the stairs, entering her bedroom, and twice raising a clenched fist over her while she lay curled up on her bed in a state of fear, causing her to believe that he was about to strike her.

3With respect to T.G., I found that A.G. applied excessive and unlawful force to him on multiple occasions, including forcefully slamming T.G. to the ground and pinning him beneath A.G.’s body weight for extended periods. This conduct interfered with T.G.’s ability to breathe and, on one occasion, caused him to lose consciousness after being slammed onto a hard surface. I determined that these acts were disproportionate, at times motivated by anger or frustration, and not justified as corrective or defensive conduct.

Positions of the Parties

4The Crown seeks a global sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment following the application of the totality principle. It proposes a sentence of eleven years on the sexual assault count, together with a consecutive six-month term for the December 2018 assault. In addition, the Crown seeks consecutive sentences of six months and twelve months for the assault and the assault by choking committed against T.G. This produces a total sentence of thirteen years, which the Crown submits should be reduced to twelve years to reflect the principle of totality. The Crown further requests that parole eligibility be delayed pursuant to section 743.6(1) of the Criminal Code.

5The Crown also seeks a number of ancillary orders, including a prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of twenty years, a SOIRA order for twenty years, DNA orders in relation to the sexual assault and assault by choking counts as primary designated offences, and a weapons prohibition order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code.

6The defence, on behalf of A.G., seeks a global sentence of five years and two months. Broken down by count, the defence proposes five years for the sexual assault, consecutive terms of 30 days for the December 2018 assault and for the assault against T.G., and a concurrent 30-day sentence for the assault by choking. With respect to ancillary orders, the defence does not oppose most of the Crown’s requests, but objects to a condition in the s. 161 order restricting access to public parks and swimming pools and opposes the Crown’s request to delay A.G.’s parole eligibility.

Principles of Sentencing

7The purpose of sentencing is to promote respect for the law and contribute to a just, peaceful, and safe society through the imposition of fair and appropriate sanctions. In doing so, a sentencing judge must consider the objectives set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code, including denunciation, deterrence, separation of offenders where necessary, rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of responsibility.

8The fundamental guiding principle in sentencing is proportionality. A sentence must reflect both the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility, assessed in light of all relevant circumstances, including aggravating and mitigating factors. Related principles also inform this analysis. The principle of parity requires that similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances receive comparable sentences, while the principle of restraint directs that no more restrictive sanction than necessary be imposed to achieve the sentencing objectives.

9Parliament has, however, demanded that certain objectives assume heightened importance in particular contexts. Where offences are committed against children, denunciation and deterrence must be paramount considerations: ss. 718.01 and 718.04 of the Criminal Code; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 101. These objectives are not to be placed on equal footing with others in such cases: Friesen, at para. 104; R v T.J., 2021 ONCA 392, at para. 37. Therefore, the sentence I impose on A.G. must clearly and forcefully communicate society’s condemnation of his conduct and serve to deter both him and others from engaging in similar wrongdoing in the future.

10Although rehabilitation remains an important consideration in cases involving the abuse of children, it is secondary to the overriding objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and the protection of the public. The sentence must meaningfully reflect the gravity of the harm caused and the often profound and lasting consequences of this type of crime. At the same time, sentencing must remain principled and restrained. As emphasized by the Supreme Court in R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 80, retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment—nothing more and nothing less.

11Overall, my objective is to impose a fit and proportionate sentence by applying the foregoing principles to the circumstances of this case. This entails assessing both the gravity of the offences and A.G.’s degree of moral culpability, taking into account all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. It also requires ensuring that the resulting disposition falls within the applicable sentencing range and reflects the principles of parity and proportionality.

Aggravating Features

12The sexual offences committed against S.R. rank among the most reprehensible and serious crimes recognized by our legal system. Abuse of this nature strikes at the core of a child’s dignity and autonomy and predictably results in profound and enduring harm. Such offences engage not only physical violation, but also significant psychological and emotional injury, often affecting a child’s development and well-being long into adulthood. Their gravity is heightened by the inherent vulnerability of children and the lasting impact that flows from their exploitation.

13In respect of the abuse inflicted on T.G., physical abuse of a child is profoundly harmful, not only because of the immediate risk of injury, but because it undermines a child’s basic sense of safety and security. When violence occurs in the home—an environment that should provide protection and stability—it can instill fear, erode trust in caregivers, and impair the child’s ability to form healthy relationships, leaving lasting emotional and psychological harm.

14The foregoing observations are intended to provide context and to highlight the generally serious nature of this form of offending. They are not a comprehensive enumeration of the aggravating factors, which I address specifically and in detail below.

15The breach of trust in this case is exceptionally grave. A.G. was not simply a caregiver; he was S.R. and T.G.’s adoptive father. He assumed that role knowing that these children came to him after experiencing prior instability, having been placed for adoption through the involvement of the Children’s Aid Society. Their vulnerability was not incidental—it was foundational. They entered his home seeking permanence, safety, and belonging. As their adoptive parent, A.G. stood in a position of complete trust, charged with providing protection, care, and emotional security. Instead, he violated that trust in a profound and sustained way. That betrayal is magnified here by the reality that A.G. held himself out as a source of love and stability while, in fact, he was abusing these children behind closed doors. This constitutes a highly aggravating factor within the meaning of section 718.2(a)(iii).

16The profound breach of trust in this case not only amplifies the seriousness of the offences by deepening the emotional harm inflicted on the complainants but markedly heightens A.G.’s moral culpability and degree of responsibility.

17I cannot overstate that the assaults committed against S.R. are rendered more serious by the fact that the perpetrator was her adoptive father rather than a stranger; this circumstance is clearly aggravating, not mitigating or neutral. There is a risk that sexual assaults committed by individuals known to the victim may be perceived as less frightening or less serious than those committed by strangers, in part because offences by strangers are readily and vividly understood as posing an inherent danger to the broader public. That perception is misguided. It risks producing the very outcome Parliament sought to avoid: that offences committed by persons in positions of trust or authority—an expressly recognized aggravating circumstance—are treated less severely, rather than more.

18Where the offender is a stranger, a child often retains the protection and support of those who care for them. Parents may act to ensure the child’s safety, support recovery, and assist in navigating the reporting and legal processes, and the home may remain a place of refuge. When the offender is a parent or caregiver, that foundation collapses. The home becomes the setting of ongoing harm, not safety. The child may have no meaningful avenue to seek help, and the abuse may go unreported for months, years, or indefinitely. What should have been a source of protection instead becomes an inescapable source of fear. The resulting isolation and loss of trust is profoundly damaging in ways that have been historically underestimated: see Friesen.

19For these reasons and more, all else being equal, an offender who commits offences against a child in their care must receive a more severe sentence than one who commits a comparable offence against a stranger in order to properly reflect the profound breach of trust inherent in such conduct: Friesen, at para. 130; T.J., at para. 31.

20The seriousness of these offences is further exacerbated by the ages of the complainants, both of whom were young children at the time of A.G.’s abuse: see s. 718.2(a)(ii.1) of the Criminal Code; Friesen, at para. 134. T.G. was between ten and fifteen years old when A.G. repeatedly assaulted him, and the abuse of S.R. began when she was approximately twelve years old. At the time of the offending, A.G., who weighed approximately 300 to 330 pounds, was an imposing physical presence in the lives of these children.

21As noted, S.R. was approximately twelve years of age when the sexual abuse began. In my view, children at this developmental stage occupy a uniquely vulnerable position in the face of sexual abuse. While the imbalance of power between an adult and a child renders the child inherently susceptible, children of this age are also sufficiently mature to understand that the conduct is wrong yet lack the capacity and autonomy to meaningfully resist or respond. This combination often generates profound feelings of guilt, confusion, and humiliation. Those internalized emotions can silence a child, contributing to delayed disclosure or, worse still, non-disclosure.

22Further, sexual violence against children is deeply shaped by gender. Girls and young women are disproportionately affected which heightens their vulnerability to abuse. The vast majority of sexual assault victims are female and those accused of this criminality are overwhelmingly male: Friesen, at paras. 68-69. This pattern underscores that sexual violence is a broader social issue that reinforces existing inequalities. By disproportionately impacting girls, such violence contributes to enduring physical, emotional, psychological, and economic harms, and undermines gender equality by imposing lasting disadvantages on those already in a vulnerable position.

23Moreover, with respect to age as an aggravating feature, while Friesen recognizes that younger children are generally more vulnerable due to the pronounced power imbalance, it also cautions against minimizing the seriousness of offences involving adolescent complainants. Adolescent girls are, in fact, disproportionately affected by sexual violence, and their age does not diminish the aggravating nature of the sexual crimes perpetrated against them. Rather, their stage of development often exposes them to distinct and significant harms, which must be fully recognized in the sentencing analysis: Friesen, at para. 136.

24Finally, S.R. and T.G. were not only vulnerable by virtue of their young ages and the clear power imbalance between them and A.G., but also because of their personal histories. Each had experienced disruption and instability early in life, circumstances that heightened their need for safety, consistency, and care. As the Supreme Court observed in Friesen, the intentional and repeated application of sexual force against a child represents conduct of the highest moral culpability: at para. 88. That culpability is further elevated where, as here, the offender exploits a child whose vulnerability is compounded by their personal circumstances: Friesen, at para. 90. A.G. was aware of these heightened vulnerabilities and took advantage of them in furtherance of his own sexual interests.

25The prolonged and repetitive nature of the sexual abuse inflicted on S.R. is also a significant aggravating factor. Offenders who engage in ongoing abuse of children must receive substantially higher sentences than those whose conduct is limited to isolated incidents: Friesen, at paras. 131, 133. As the Court explained, “each instance of sexual victimization traumatizes the child victim anew and increases the likelihood that the risks of long-term harm will materialize.” This case is characterized by a sustained and deliberate pattern of conduct. A.G. regularly committed acts of sexual violence against S.R. over a period of approximately two years. The sentence must reflect the systemic and persistent nature of this wrongdoing.

26In particular, A.G. exploited S.R.’s vulnerabilities in a deeply harmful way. He reinforced her sense of insecurity by telling her she was unloved and that he did not want to adopt her, directly targeting the very fears that arose from her experience of displacement and uncertainty. S.R. described her desire to remain connected to her siblings and her family, and A.G. repeatedly made S.R. feel that her circumstances were the best she could hope for. In doing so, A.G. manipulated S.R.’s dependence and fear of abandonment to maintain control over her, all for his own sexual gratification.

27The repetitive nature of these offences not only increases their gravity, but also significantly heightens A.G.’s moral culpability. The risk of ongoing and compounding harm to S.R. from repeated sexual abuse was plainly foreseeable, yet A.G. chose to persist. His conduct was not impulsive or isolated, but part of a sustained and highly selfish pattern of sexually deviant behaviour. As emphasized in Friesen, such conduct warrants meaningfully increased sentences to account for both the cumulative harm inflicted on the victim and the offender’s elevated degree of responsibility: at para. 133.

28I also underscore the inherently violent character of the offences committed against S.R. In assessing their seriousness, care must be taken to avoid any tendency to minimize or understate the violent nature of child sexual offences. The absence of overt resistance, which is common in cases involving child victims, does not diminish the brutality of the conduct and may, in some instances, even obscure it.

29While comparisons between sexual assaults against adults and those committed against children must be approached with caution, the exercise can serve an important purpose in ensuring that the seriousness of child sexual offences is not inadvertently diminished. In cases involving adult victims, the violence of the assault is often more visibly apparent—there may be evidence of resistance, struggle, or injury that renders the violence unmistakable. Abuse of a child, particularly by a parent or authority figure, often presents differently. A child may not resist because of fear, dependence, confusion, or a learned compliance. The absence of overt struggle has the potential to obscure the true nature and extent of the violation. There is a risk that this dynamic may, at times, lead to a subconscious minimization of the harm, because the child is seen to have “participated” in the activity: see Friesen, at paras. 52, 149. In reality, the breach of trust, the exploitation of vulnerability, and the psychological damage to a child are every bit as grave—if not more so—as visibly violent assaults.

30Finally, both section 718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code and the common law obligate me to consider the impact on the victims. Sexual offences against children, in particular, inflict deep psychological trauma, including intense shame, guilt, confusion, and mistrust, which can resonate throughout a victim’s entire life. Many if not most of these impacts may also arise from the non-sexual abuse of children, as in the case of T.G.

31S.R.’s victim impact statement paints a deeply troubling picture of the lasting harm caused by the abuse. She describes ongoing nightmares and intrusive memories that continue to disrupt her daily life, despite efforts at therapy. She speaks of persistent feelings of helplessness, sadness, and emotional exhaustion, accompanied by profound shame for not having disclosed the abuse sooner. The impact on her sense of self and her relationships has been significant—she struggles with trust, fears abandonment, and finds it difficult to form and sustain meaningful connections. Even sleeping is distressing to S.R. because of the vulnerability it exposes; she experiences insomnia and anxiety tied to the loss of safety she experienced in her own home. She also reports body image issues and disordered eating, further reflecting the way in which the abuse has affected her physical and emotional well‑being.

32These are not transient consequences. They are life‑altering harms that have followed S.R. into young adulthood. This is a stage of life that should be marked by optimism, independence, and the excitement of building one’s future. Instead, S.R. finds herself grappling with the enduring effects of trauma—struggling to complete high school under the weight of what she endured, and now attempting to rebuild a sense of identity, security, and hope. Her experience reflects, in the starkest terms, the devastating and far‑reaching consequences of child sexual abuse.

33That said, S.R.’s resilience is both evident and deeply moving. In the face of profound and enduring trauma, she has not only survived but has taken meaningful and courageous steps to rebuild her life. She has secured her own apartment and begun college—milestones that reflect determination, independence, and quiet strength. While the harm she carries is undeniable, so too is her capacity to persevere, and her efforts to move forward deserve to be acknowledged with genuine respect and admiration.

34In addition to the harm already inflicted upon S.R., I must also consider the potential for long-term psychological and emotional consequences that have not yet materialized: Friesen, at para. 80. The sentence I impose for the offences committed against S.R. must account for the “reasonably foreseeable potential harm” that may emerge later in life. To ignore that risk would imply, wrongly, that S.R. is expected to simply “outgrow the harm done to her”: Friesen, at para. 84. Given the duration of the abuse and the fact that it was committed by her adoptive father, I find it entirely foreseeable that S.R. may experience significant long-term effects, including difficulty forming healthy and loving relationships, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, diminished self-esteem, and a predisposition toward substance abuse: Friesen, at para. 81.

35T.G.’s victim impact statement vividly conveys the lasting fear instilled in him by the repeated physical violence he endured. At trial, he described being repeatedly slammed to the ground and pinned beneath A.G.’s 300‑pound frame, unable to breathe—experiences that left him feeling powerless and terrified in his own home. That fear has followed him into his daily life. He now locks doors and windows in his new residence out of concern that A.G. might harm him again. He becomes anxious around individuals who resemble A.G., and even slight hand movements can trigger a fear response. Most tellingly, he expresses deep concern for his brother who continues to reside in A.G.’s home, fearing that he may be subjected to the same abuse. T.G.’s statement reflects not only the physical harm he suffered, but the enduring psychological impact of living under the constant threat of violence.

36I must also consider the broader harm caused by A.G.’s conduct, including its impact on S.R. and T.G.’s birth mother and, more broadly, other individuals emotionally connected to the children. As recognized in Friesen, a parent too is deeply harmed when their child is subjected to sexual abuse. The violation of a child can shatter a parent’s sense of trust, give rise to profound and persistent guilt, and leave them carrying significant emotional and personal burdens as they attempt to support their child’s recovery.

37The victim impact statement of S.R. and T.G.’s mother, N.N., is profoundly moving and heartfelt, and it brings into sharp focus these very harms. She speaks with raw honesty of the devastation she now carries—having made the extraordinarily difficult decision to place her children for adoption in the hope that they would have a safer, more stable life than she could then provide. She makes clear that this decision was rooted not in the absence of love, but in its deepest expression. That hope has been shattered. She now lives with the daily weight of knowing that, in seeking to protect her children, she entrusted them to the very person who caused them harm. Her statement reflects a loss of faith in the system she relied upon, and an enduring sense of heartbreak that is as sincere as it is profound.

38S.R.’s former guardian, N.R., with whom she lived for approximately four years after leaving A.G.’s home in December 2018, also provided a victim impact statement. Her statement speaks to the significant ripple effects that A.G.’s abusive conduct had on her own family. She describes how they welcomed S.R. into their home with the genuine intention of providing her stability, care, and support. Notwithstanding their best intentions, the behavioural impacts of the trauma S.R. had endured proved overwhelming, and despite their efforts, the strain became more than the family could bear. N.R. recounts how her once calm and stable household became unsettled and unpredictable, and how the effects of the abuse extended beyond her home into the broader community, dividing relationships and creating tensions in everyday interactions. Despite these challenges, she expresses deep care and concern for S.R., and a sincere hope that she will continue to heal and receive the support she so clearly needs.

39A community impact statement was also filed on behalf of foster and adoptive families, authored by P.P., a foster parent of over 25 years who cared for S.R., T.G., and their siblings for two years prior to their adoption. Her statement conveys a deep and abiding sense of shock and grief. She describes believing that the children were leaving her care for a “forever family” where they would be safe, loved, and supported. Learning that S.R. and T.G. were instead subjected to sexual and physical abuse has left her profoundly shaken. She speaks to the way this has altered her understanding of the very concept of permanence and safety in adoption, such that what was once a symbol of hope now carries with it doubt, fear, and sorrow. P.P. expresses a lingering sense of guilt and questions whether the system she trusted can truly protect vulnerable children.

40Taken together, these victim impact statements underscore, in a deeply personal and compelling way, the far‑reaching, enduring, and devastating consequences of child sexual abuse that were emphasized and underscored by the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen. The harm is not confined to the immediate victims, nor is it limited in time. It reverberates outward—affecting families, caregivers, and entire communities—and extends well beyond the period of the abuse itself. What emerges from these statements is a portrait of lasting trauma, fractured trust, and profound loss. They bring into sharp focus the reality that child sexual abuse leaves a legacy of harm that can persist for years, if not a lifetime, and that must be fully recognized in the sentencing of those who commit such offences.

41I also wish to emphasize that the seriousness and impact of child sexual abuse does not turn on the precise form of physical contact involved. The harm suffered by S.R. cannot and should not be assessed solely on how A.G. carried out the sexual abuse. As the Supreme Court made clear in Friesen, the focus must remain on the profound violation experienced by the child and the abuse of trust inherent in such conduct, rather than on the specific mechanics of the acts themselves: Friesen, at para. 55.

42That said, Friesen recognizes that certain forms of abuse, including penile penetration, constitute an aggravating factor because they represent a heightened intrusion on bodily integrity and may increase the risk of harm: Friesen, at paras. 138, 142. Indeed, the Court did not suggest that all sexual assaults be treated equally in sentencing. Rather, it cautioned against treating non-penetrative offences as inherently less serious in a way that diminishes the very real and often profound psychological and emotional harm they inflict: Friesen, at para. 144. In this case, while penile penetration did not occur, the abuse inflicted on S.R. was nonetheless extensive and deeply intrusive, involving repeated acts of invasive sexual touching, digital penetration, and conduct culminating in ejaculation.

43I am also mindful that many of the harms evident here are, regrettably, characteristic of child sexual abuse cases and formed part of the rationale in Friesen for increasing sentencing ranges. Care must therefore be taken not to double-count these harms when determining a fit sentence within the applicable range: see R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, at para. 59. At the same time, the impact of the offences must be assessed on the particular facts of a given case. As emphasized in Friesen, evidence of actual harm remains a “key determinant of the gravity of the offence”: at para. 85.

Mitigating Features

44A.G. was born and raised in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Both of his parents are deceased, and he has two siblings with whom he no longer has any contact. He describes his upbringing as lacking structure and discipline. According to A.G., his father was an angry individual who was physically abusive toward extended family members, and though A.G. could not personally confirm these stories, he heard from others that his father engaged in other forms of inappropriate, indecent conduct. He characterized his mother as kind and non-abusive.

45A.G. completed a degree in statistics and mathematics at the University of Winnipeg in 1998. He began working for Statistics Canada in August 2001 and remained employed there until 2024, at which point he resigned because his criminal charges created difficulties for him in renewing his security clearance.

46A.G. married M.G. in 2006, and together they adopted S.R., T.G., A., and P.G. in 2012. M.G. continues to support A.G. and maintains the view that the complainants’ allegations are untrue and influenced by S.R.

47A.G. cooperated in the preparation of the presentence report and was described as courteous and respectful in his interactions with the probation officer. With respect to the offences for which he has been found guilty, A.G. expressed limited remorse regarding the strict manner in which he treated his adopted children, consistent with his trial evidence acknowledging that aspects of his treatment of S.R., including her confinement to a “Spartan” room, were “cruel.”

48While this demonstrates some degree of insight, it is limited in scope. His expressions of remorse are directed primarily at his disciplinary approach toward S.R., rather than the full extent of his conduct, and there is no clear acknowledgment that his treatment of T.G. was excessive or, at times, motivated by anger rather than corrective or defensive purposes. In addition, A.G. continues to deny the sexual offences. While A.G.’s continued assertion of innocence is by no means an aggravating factor, his lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility are nonetheless relevant to his prospects for rehabilitation and to the role of specific deterrence in sentencing.

49A.G. sought support from religious advisors between 2018 and 2020 and subsequently participated in a cognitive behavioral treatment program with a social worker at Montfort Hospital from 2022 to 2023. That intervention focused on mood regulation and re-engagement in value-based activities, and the social worker reported that A.G. demonstrated an ability to identify maladaptive patterns and challenge negative thinking.

50A.G.’s lack of any prior criminal record is clearly a strong mitigating factor and makes the principle of restraint particularly applicable. That said, I must be careful not to place too much emphasis on A.G.’s prior “good character” as he undoubtedly used his good standing in the community to gain access to S.R. and T.G. and to hide his offending conduct. As Paciocco J.A. observed in M.V., at para. 69:

Similarly, his previous prosocial conduct has only limited significance in the sentencing of sexual offences, given that many sexual offences are committed by persons of prior good character and in many cases, prior good character helps enable sexual offences.

51Further, I understand that A.G. maintains a positive relationship with his spouse and biological children. Character references were filed by them, setting out A.G.’s purportedly positive and loving parenting. M.G. describes A.G. as a hardworking spouse and father who consistently supported his family, financially and otherwise. She notes that A.G. resigned from his job at Statistics Canada to access his pension to pay for the family’s bills while his criminal matter was pending. M.G. speaks to the difficulties of single-parenting three children on her own while at the same time single-handedly managing her family home in terms of upkeep and repairs.

52It is unclear whether familial dependence was being advanced as a mitigating factor: see R v Habib, 2024 ONCA 830; R v Brown, 2025 ONCA 164; R v Spencer (2004), 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 47 (C.A.). Nevertheless, I must consider it. While I am sympathetic to any hardship A.G.’s incarceration may cause M.G. and his biological children, I do not find this to be a particularly moving factor in the sentencing analysis given the enormity of the offences committed by A.G. This is not a scenario, for example, where enabling A.G. to continue to provide for his family may tip the balance in favor of a conditional sentence. In short, this is not a case where family circumstances moving forward warrant a particularly mitigated sentence. That said, the fact that A.G. has always financially supported his family in the past and has a solid employment history is undoubtedly a mitigating factor.

53Finally, I have considered that A.G. has been on bail since November 2023 during which time he has been unable to reside in his family home. He has been either renting rooms or living in a trailer while at the same time financially shouldering the costs of his family residence.

Sentence

54As noted above, the seriousness of A.G.’s conduct and his heightened moral culpability call for a substantial custodial sentence. His actions toward S.R. and T.G. represent a profound violation of their safety and dignity and are fundamentally incompatible with the basic norms of a caring and civilized society. The sustained and predatory nature of his conduct requires a sentence that gives clear and dominant effect to denunciation and deterrence. In these circumstances, the primary sentencing objectives are denunciation and both general and specific deterrence, with rehabilitation playing a more limited role to the extent that it can be reconciled with those overriding principles.

55In determining a sentence that fulfills these objectives, I must also be guided by the principle of parity. This requires consideration of comparable cases, particularly appellate decisions, to ensure that offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances receive comparable sentences. Adherence to parity promotes fairness and consistency in sentencing and guards against unwarranted disparity.

56While each case turns on its own facts, case law provides important guidance. Sentences for child sexual abuse commonly fall within a broad range, extending from mid- to high‑single digit penitentiary terms to double-digit sentences, particularly where the abuse is repeated or accompanied by significant aggravating factors. Lower single-digit sentences are generally reserved for cases involving meaningful mitigating considerations, such as a guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, and genuine insight, together with the absence of sustained or otherwise aggravating conduct such as repetition or penetration. As emphasized in Friesen, at para. 114, “mid‑single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper‑single digit and double‑digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances.”

57I also observe that the Court’s decision in Friesen was released in early 2020, at a time when the criminal justice system was confronting the extraordinary challenges of the COVID‑19 pandemic. During that period, there was a systemic emphasis on reducing custodial populations and mitigating the risks associated with incarceration. It is well recognized that individuals who served custodial sentences during the pandemic did so under significantly more restrictive and onerous conditions. In that context, shorter terms of imprisonment were often considered sufficient to satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence. Accordingly, sentencing authorities emerging in the immediate aftermath of Friesen, and during the pandemic period, must be considered with careful attention to those broader nuances.

58With respect to S.R., having regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors outlined above—including the deeply invasive and degrading nature of the abuse, its sustained duration, and the profound and far‑reaching impact on S.R. and those who care for her—I conclude that a penitentiary term of ten years is warranted. What occurred here was not momentary or opportunistic. For approximately two years, S.R. lived in conditions of isolation and deprivation, confined to a small, austere basement room deliberately stripped of comfort and dignity. Within that space—her supposed refuge—she was repeatedly and relentlessly subjected to sexual violence by the very person charged with her care and protection.

59A.G.’s conduct was cruel, predatory, and dehumanizing. Rather than providing love, safety, and stability, he exploited S.R.’s vulnerabilities and reduced her to an object he kept in the basement for his own sexual gratification. The emotional and psychological harm of such sustained abuse is incalculable.

60A child should be able to sleep at night in their own bed, secure in the knowledge that they are safe, cared for, and protected. That is the vision we expect for every child. S.R. lived a very different reality. As a vulnerable twelve-year-old, she was frequently kept awake in a basement bedroom that lacked basic comfort, where she was subjected to ongoing abuse, humiliation, and degradation by her adoptive father. A.G., a much larger adult male, repeatedly sexually assaulted S.R., by placing his fingers in her vagina and engaging in other forms of unwanted sexual touching. On some occasions, after he left, S.R. was forced to clean his ejaculate from her body. This pattern of abuse occurred with alarming frequency over a period approaching two years. The image of a small, frightened, and emotionally exhausted child, alone in a dim basement room, left to clean her adoptive father’s ejaculate from her own body after being shamed, digitally penetrated, and humiliated for his sexual gratification, is both repulsive and profoundly saddening.

61I recognize that this image is a stark one. It is intended to be. The law now requires courts to confront the reality of such offences with clarity, not understatement. The detailed nature of this description reflects the gravity of the conduct itself. Only by plainly setting out S.R.’s daily reality, rather than reducing it to general characterizations, can I properly discharge my obligation to impose a just and proportionate sentence.

62I note that for most individuals, the thought of being sexually assaulted even in a single time is distressing, terrifying, and difficult to fully comprehend. The prospect of such assaults occurring almost daily is nearly unimaginable—particularly where the victim is a child. Indeed, that difficulty in understanding may help explain the shortcomings in sentencing prior to Friesen: sentencing courts did not fully grasp the cumulative, devastating impact of this kind of prolonged and repeated abuse and it was treated almost like one, continuing act rather than a prolonged course of repeated and distinct sexual assaults.

63A.G.’s criminality is precisely the type of conduct that, as recognized in Friesen, demands a clear, forceful, and exemplary sentencing response. Those who repeatedly sexually exploit children must understand that such behaviour will attract severe and meaningful consequences. The sentence imposed must send an unmistakable message of society’s condemnation and affirm, in the strongest terms, that conduct of this nature is wholly intolerable in a civilized society.

64To be clear, I find that a ten-year sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the absence of penile or oral penetration, though I emphasize that A.G. repeatedly asked S.R. to put his penis in her mouth. I appreciate, however, that the absence of penile penetration is relevant. While non‑penetrative sexual abuse is profoundly harmful in its own right, Friesen does confirm that penetrative conduct represents a further aggravating feature that may warrant heightened sentences. But had A.G. subjected S.R. to penile penetration over the course of this sustained abuse, I would have had no hesitation in imposing an even higher sentence within the double‑digit range. Indeed, as Friesen makes clear, such sentences should not be regarded as rare or exceptional in cases of highly invasive, prolonged, and repeated sexual violence against children.

65The absence of penile penetration does not diminish the defining features of this case: the scale, persistence, and frequency of the abuse. Each incident represents a separate, deliberate decision by A.G. to descend the basement steps and subject his twelve‑year‑old child to invasive and degrading sexual acts, at times until he ejaculated on her. The scale of this repetition cannot be treated as a marginal or slightly incremental consideration in sentencing. Offending on this scale fundamentally alters the gravity of the conduct and the extent of the harm inflicted.

66In assessing the appropriateness of a ten-year sentence in this case, notwithstanding the absence of penile penetration, it is useful to consider the applicable sentencing range for comparable conduct involving adult victims occurring on a single occasion. It is well established that the range for a single penetrative sexual assault against an adult is generally three to five years’ imprisonment: R v A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487. If a single penetrative sexual assault against an adult ordinarily attracts a penitentiary term in that range, it follows that a comparable, single penetrative offence against a child—particularly if committed by a caregiver in a position of trust—must attract a more severe response in order to give meaningful effect to the principles articulated in Friesen and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code.

67And if a single penetrative assault against a child properly warrants a sentence in a range greater than the three-to-five-year range set out for adult victims—or the higher end of the adult range—the question then becomes: what is the appropriate response where that violation is not isolated, but is instead repeated hundreds of times over the course of years? As noted, the answer cannot lie in a modest or incremental increase. The cumulative harm arising from such sustained and relentless offending places the criminality in an entirely different category of seriousness—one that readily calls for sentences well into the double-digit range. This is precisely why the Court in Friesen emphasized that sentences of that severity should neither be rare nor exceptional. Indeed, in Friesen, the Supreme Court characterized the six-year sentence imposed on Mr. Freisen for a single instance of sexual interference on a guilty plea as “lenient.”

68In my view, there is a risk—absent careful attention—that the cumulative nature of harm in cases of repeated child sexual abuse may not always be fully reflected in sentencing. It is critical to guard against the notion that repeated sexual assaults somehow lose significance by their frequency. Such an approach must be firmly rejected. Each separate assault is a new decision on the part of the offender and a deeply traumatic violation for the victim. A child victim does not simply get used to being sexually assaulted, just as no adult would ever “get used” to the prospect of being sexually assaulted every time they left their home to go for a walk. Rather, each instance of sexual assault compounds the child’s trauma, reinforces their vulnerability, and deepens the resulting psychological harm. When that cumulative effect is properly understood, it becomes clear that cases involving sustained, systematic abuse—particularly where it is perpetrated by a trusted caregiver—will, as noted, often justify sentences in, and in appropriate cases well into, the double-digit range.

69As noted earlier, the almost daily repetition in this case not only magnifies the harm inflicted on S.R., but also profoundly elevates A.G.’s moral blameworthiness. Each act was a deliberate choice by A.G.—each one a separate decision to violate, exploit, and degrade S.R. for his own sexual gratification. To commit such an offence once is grave; to do so repeatedly, over a prolonged period and on a near‑daily basis, reflects a level of moral culpability that is difficult to adequately capture in language. The sheer number of assaults—well over one hundred—renders the conduct both unspeakable and indescribable in its severity and must be treated as a central and profoundly aggravating feature in the sentencing analysis.

70Viewed in the above light, the ten‑year sentence imposed here fully reflects both the absence of penile penetration but also the extraordinary, repeated, and deeply harmful nature of the abuse. Had penile penetration been present, the same analytical framework would have compelled a higher sentence still.

71I stress that a course of conduct involving more than one hundred invasive sexual assaults against a child should attract a sentence in the double‑digit range. That such offending occurred within the home, at the hands of a parent or caregiver, does not mitigate its seriousness; rather, it intensifies the gravity of the harm. By way of comparison, if an adult man deliberately sought out the same child—a stranger to him—at a school playground, their backyard, the park, and other public places, and sexually assaulted that child on more than one hundred occasions over the course of two years before being identified and apprehended, the predatory and terrifying nature of that conduct would be immediately apparent. It would be instinctively recognized as extreme, calculated, and dangerous, and would undoubtedly attract a sentence well into the double‑digit range without hesitation. Such a scenario is viscerally jarring because it is readily relatable: any member of the public can imagine their own child or a loved one in that position, repeatedly targeted and violated by a determined offender.

72By contrast, where the very same sexual acts are perpetrated against a child within their home and by a parent or caregiver, though more aggravating because of the profound breach of trust, there is a risk that the same immediacy of fear is less readily perceived. For many, offences committed in another person’s home, by someone known to the victim, can feel more distant and less threatening—because those offenders are not perceived as posing a direct risk to the public writ large. That distance can make the harm seem less immediate and vivid, even though the reality for the child is one of constant fear, control, and inescapability. A child has no ability to remove themselves from the situation, no capacity to seek out safety, and no meaningful way to resist. Far from diminishing the gravity of the conduct, the relationship of trust, the child’s complete dependence, and the isolation in which the abuse occurs render it even more terrifying and more damaging. The sentencing response must guard against allowing differences in perception or relatability to obscure the true and devastating nature of the harm inflicted.

73Standing back and considering the totality of the circumstances, I am satisfied that a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment is both just and proportionate and is truly the least restrictive sanction that can fully capture the extent of A.G.’s criminality. It properly reflects the scale, persistence, and profoundly aggravating features of the offending, while remaining consistent with the governing principles and applicable sentencing range. It gives full and necessary effect to denunciation and deterrence, acknowledges the extraordinary harm inflicted, and avoids any distortion of gravity arising from the private, domestic context in which the abuse occurred. In these circumstances, no lesser sentence would adequately capture either the seriousness of A.G.’s conduct and his profound moral culpability for having chosen to sexually assault his vulnerable daughter well over one hundred times in her own home.

74With respect to the assault against S.R. committed in December 2018, I find that a sentence of 60 days is appropriate. Unlike the sexual assaults committed against S.R., this was an isolated incident of physical aggression where thankfully no injuries were sustained by S.R., and no physical contact actually took place. That said, a jail sentence is appropriate because the offence took place within an overall context in which A.G. was otherwise abusing S.R. and on his own evidence A.G., a three-hundred-pound man, intentionally sought to have S.R., a young girl less than five feet tall weighing less than 100 pounds, believe he was going to strike her. I see no reason—beyond concerns regarding totality, a point I address below—to have this sentence run concurrently. As fairly conceded by counsel for A.G., this event was not part of a single transaction. It was a discrete assault committed against S.R.

75With respect to T.G., the conduct directed at him was profoundly aggravating. While I accept that T.G. presented behavioural challenges that would have tested any caregiver, including periods of volatility and difficulty regulating his emotions, those challenges cannot justify the level of force used against him. A.G., an adult weighing approximately 300 pounds, repeatedly used his size and strength to overpower a small and vulnerable child—at times in circumstances that may have begun as attempts to manage behaviour, but which escalated well beyond anything reasonable, and at other times in circumstances driven by anger. He forcefully slammed T.G. to the ground and, on numerous occasions, positioned his entire body weight on top of him, restricting his ability to breathe. On one occasion, the force used was so severe that T.G. lost consciousness after striking the ground. This conduct was dangerous and terrifying for T.G. T.G., who had already experienced instability in his young life and had been placed for adoption, was wholly at the mercy of an adult who vastly outweighed and outmatched him. The fear instilled by this conduct is evident and enduring as set out in T.G.’s victim impact statement. That such sustained physical domination and intimidation was inflicted on a child in these circumstances renders A.G.’s conduct particularly reprehensible and supports a custodial sentence. In my view, the assaultive conduct captured by counts six and seven flowed from the same ongoing transaction and concurrent sentences on these two counts of nine months are appropriate.

Totality Principle

76Where consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple offences, I must consider the cumulative effect of those sentences to ensure that the overall punishment remains just and appropriate in light of A.G.’s total culpability: see s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code; M. (C.A.).

77An aggregate sentence may offend the totality principle if it results in a punishment that is substantially out of step with the range applicable to the most serious offence or is unduly harsh having regard to the offender’s circumstances and prospects: see Clayton C. Ruby, Sentencing, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1994), at pp. 44–45. Properly applied, the totality principle ensures that the combined sentence remains proportionate and recognizes that the objectives of sentencing can often be achieved without a strict accumulation of otherwise appropriate individual sentences: R v Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339, 285 C.C.C. (3d) 120, at paras. 15–25. In essence, it is not ordinarily necessary for an offender to serve the full amount of each consecutive sentence to satisfy the purposes of sentencing: M.V., at para. 100.

78The aggregate sentence, prior to the application of the totality principle, is ten years and eleven months. In order to give effect to that principle, I will impose concurrent sentences across the counts, resulting in a global sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. While this remains a substantial sentence, particularly for an individual with no prior criminal record, it is one that properly reflects the seriousness and breadth of A.G.’s conduct. The application of totality must not dilute the overall gravity of the offending or the offender’s heightened degree of moral culpability: R. v. D.G.F., 2010 ONCA 27, at para. 20. A total penitentiary sentence of ten years for the prolonged, highly invasive, and profoundly harmful sexual abuse of S.R., together with the repeated physical abuse of T.G.—both children who were uniquely vulnerable and in A.G.’s care—falls well within the range articulated in Friesen.

Extended Parole Ineligibility

79The Crown seeks an order delaying A.G.’s parole eligibility pursuant to s. 743.6(1) of the Criminal Code. For particular enumerated offences, that provision authorizes the Court to require an offender to serve up to one‑half of their sentence before becoming eligible for full parole where the nature of the offence, the offender’s personal circumstances, the need for denunciation, or the objectives of general or specific deterrence so justify. In applying this provision, denunciation and deterrence assume primary importance, with rehabilitation playing a secondary role: s. 743.6(2). The onus rests with the Crown to demonstrate that such an order is warranted: R v Zinck, 2003 SCC 6, at paras. 29–31.

80As recognized in Zinck, at para. 23, decisions regarding parole eligibility now form part of the sentencing exercise, rather than being left exclusively to the Parole Board. Where an extended period of ineligibility is justified, section 743.6(1) provides the proper mechanism to achieve that result. Sentencing courts must not, however, increase the length of a custodial sentence solely to affect parole eligibility: Zinck, at para. 18.

81The analysis under s. 743.6(1) proceeds in two stages. First, I must determine a fit sentence based on the principles set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code, without regard to parole. Second, I must consider whether, on the same factual foundation, a delay in parole eligibility is necessary, with particular emphasis on denunciation and deterrence, while recognizing that other sentencing objectives remain relevant though subordinate: Zinck, at paras. 24, 29-30. This is not an order to be made as a matter of routine. Rather, the Court must be satisfied, based on the evidence, that imposing such a further restriction is required to meet the objectives of sentencing. Although exceptional, a delayed parole order will be appropriate in cases where the custodial term, standing alone, would be insufficient to achieve the necessary degree of denunciation and deterrence: Zinck, at para. 33.

82A.G. opposes the Crown’s request. As a preliminary matter, he urged me to summarily dismiss the application on the basis that the Crown provided only five business days’ notice of its intention to seek an order under section 743.6(1), which he submits falls short of the notice contemplated in Zinck. I do not accept that submission. Defence counsel did not identify any specific prejudice arising from the timing of the notice, nor did he indicate what additional evidence or materials he would have sought to place before the Court had further time been available. I offered an adjournment to permit the defence an opportunity to marshal additional materials, but that offer was declined due to concerns about delay. Counsel maintained that position even after I explained that a brief adjournment would likely have little to no material impact on the timing of the sentence given my existing schedule. I also extended an opportunity for defence to make further oral submissions at a later date and stated that I would accept supplementary written submissions within two weeks. Those offers were likewise declined. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that no unfairness arises, and I am prepared to consider the Crown’s request on its merits.

83I further note that considerations of fairness do not require that an offender receive advance written notice of the Crown’s intention to seek an order delaying parole eligibility. In many cases, such a requirement would be impractical, particularly where sentencing follows immediately upon a conviction or guilty plea. The Criminal Code imposes no such obligation, and, in Zinck, the Supreme Court recognized that the issue may be raised at the sentencing hearing itself, including on the Court’s own initiative. That said, the Court emphasized that sentencing judges should be “generous” in granting adjournments where necessary to permit a party to respond or marshal additional evidence: see Zinck, at para. 35. In this case, as noted above, I expressly invited submissions on whether an adjournment was being sought for that purpose. A.G. declined that opportunity.

84On the merits, I am satisfied that A.G.’s parole eligibility should be delayed. While, in Zinck, the Court emphasized that an order under s. 743.6(1) is “exceptional,” that characterization must be properly understood. Exceptional does not mean rare. As observed by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Golub, 1997 CanLII 6316 (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 3097 (C.A.), in the context of assessing the scope of warrantless searches on arrest, “[e]xceptional circumstances do not, however, refer to circumstances which rarely arise, but rather to circumstances where a state interest is so compelling that it must override a person's right to privacy within the home.” Further, when defining “exceptional circumstances” in the context of section 11(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court recently emphasized that “rarity is not a sine qua non of exceptionality” and that exceptional circumstances can and do arise frequently: see R v Jacques-Taylor, 2026 SCC 20, at para. 38. These statements underscore that the term “exceptional” describes the degree of justification required to drive a particular result, not how seldom the circumstances that might justify such a remedy or search power occur.

85In my view, in the sentencing context, the “exceptional” nature of delayed parole relates to the degree to which the offender’s conduct departs from acceptable societal norms and whether the ordinary operation of parole eligibility would be insufficient to give full effect to the principles of denunciation and deterrence. In my view, that threshold may be met in cases involving highly invasive, prolonged sexual abuse of particularly vulnerable children in an offender’s care, where the scale, persistence, and exploitation inherent in the conduct demand a sentencing response that goes beyond the ordinary.

86In my view, the troubling prevalence of child sexual abuse in our communities does not diminish the appropriateness of such an order; if anything, it reinforces it. The fact that this form of offending occurs with disturbing frequency cannot and should not render section 743.6(1) unavailable, as to conclude otherwise would undermine its very purpose. The more pervasive certain offending conduct becomes in society, the greater the need for sentences that clearly and forcefully denounce and deter it. To interpret “exceptional” as requiring rarity would therefore lead to illogical results. On that approach, criminal conduct that is sufficiently grave and troubling to justify a delayed parole order when it first arises would cease to qualify for delayed parole if the offending conduct became more prevalent in the community over time. In other words, the more normalized a form of serious criminality becomes within a community, the less available this sentencing tool would become—despite an increased need to denounce and deter the conduct. That cannot be what Parliament intended. The application of section 743.6(1) must remain responsive to the seriousness of the conduct and the objectives of sentencing and should not be constrained by whether the form of offending is “common” or “uncommon.” I would also note that the word “rare” does not appear in Zinck. The jurisprudence does not impose a requirement that a particular factual foundation be “rare” before a delayed parole order may be made. To frame the test in that way risks introducing an artificial and unhelpful threshold. It is not clear what would qualify as a “rare” case in any meaningful or principled sense.

87The proper inquiry, as set out in Zinck, is whether the circumstances of the offence and the offender require a longer period of parole ineligibility in order to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. To insist on waiting for a case to fall within some ill‑defined category of “rare” risks undermining the purpose of section 743.6(1) and could render it ineffective in circumstances where the seriousness of the conduct clearly warrants its application.

88In my view, where the facts disclose sexual misconduct that is highly invasive, prolonged, and directed at particularly vulnerable children in the offender’s care, the case may properly be regarded as “exceptional” in the sense contemplated by Zinck, notwithstanding the unfortunate reality that such offences are not uncommon in our courts.

89Further, while a delayed parole order should not be made as a matter of routine, it remains an important and legitimate sentencing tool that must be available for use in appropriate cases. Courts should not be hesitant to rely on this tool where the facts justify its application. There is a principled middle ground between an approach that would see such orders imposed automatically in every case and one that would render the section functionally unavailable out of concern that the circumstances are not sufficiently “rare.”

90In conclusion, section 743.6(1) has a legitimate role within the sentencing framework where the need for denunciation and deterrence calls for it. In Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada urged sentencing judges to ensure that the sentence imposed adequately reflects the full gravity of the offence and the offender’s moral culpability, which in my view includes consideration of parole eligibility as an integral part of the sentencing process. Delayed parole eligibility should be recognized as an important tool in ensuring a just and proportionate sentence in cases of extensive and highly invasive child sexual abuse: see also R v P.G., [2020] O.J. No. 5590; R v B.B., 2025 ONSC 3298, at para. 80.

91A.G. stands convicted of sexually assaulting S.R. not once, not several times, but well in excess of one hundred times. This was not a single longstanding incident of abuse. Rather, A.G. committed over one hundred discrete sexual assaults against his adoptive daughter. He repeatedly entered her basement bedroom when she was only twelve years old—a space he had deliberately stripped of comfort, describing it himself as “Spartan”—and subjected her to repeated acts of sexual violence, which included shaming her for her involuntary physical responses, placing his mouth on intimate areas of her body, grinding his adult body against her childlike frame, invasive digital penetration, and ejaculation. The scale and cruelty of this conduct are difficult to fully capture in words. The imperative of denunciation in these circumstances is overwhelming.

92I am satisfied that A.G. must serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for full parole. I recognize that the granting of full parole does not reduce the custodial sentence itself, as the offender remains under sentence until its expiry. However, while supervisory conditions remain in effect during parole, full parole affords the offender a “very substantial degree of personal freedom,” which inevitably lessens the sentence’s denunciatory and deterrent impact: Zinck, at para. 20. In my view, releasing A.G. after only serving one-third of the custodial portion of his sentence would fail to meet the pressing need for denunciation on these facts, as well as both general and specific deterrence, particularly given that A.G. has demonstrated little to no insight into his offending behaviour. While I fully acknowledge that a lack of insight is not an aggravating factor, it remains relevant to the assessment of specific deterrence and how a sentence must be structured to address the risk of reoffending.

93I acknowledge that, depending on the counselling or therapeutic interventions A.G. may pursue while incarcerated, it may not ultimately be necessary—strictly from a rehabilitative or public safety perspective—for him to remain in custody beyond one-third of his sentence. However, the sentence I impose today is not driven solely, or even primarily, by those considerations. Its central purpose is to meaningfully denounce A.G.’s conduct towards S.R., an objective that stands apart from A.G.’s potential dangerousness and prospects for rehabilitation.

94Stated differently, the sentence must respond in a principled and proportionate way to the profound harm that A.G. has already inflicted. It must reflect the gravity of the offences and A.G.’s elevated moral blameworthiness. I am satisfied that his release after serving only one-third of his sentence would undermine the primary sentencing objectives in this case and fall short of the response that I consider necessary to fulfill them.

Ancillary Orders

95I am making an Order pursuant to section 490.012 of the Criminal Code requiring A.G. to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years. Count one is a designated offence; it was prosecuted by indictment; and A.G. received a sentence of over two years.

96I am also making an order across all counts pursuant to section 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code that a sample of A.G.’s DNA be taken forthwith for inclusion in the National Data Bank. Counts one and seven are primary designated offences and counts two and six are secondary designated offences.

97Further, I am imposing a weapons prohibition pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code. A.G. shall be prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, or explosive substance for a period of ten years. Pursuant to that same section of the Criminal Code, A.G. is further prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life.

98There shall also be an order pursuant to section 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of 20 years. Section 161 terms must be crafted carefully, and the specific conditions must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk an offender poses to the community. Put another way, the content of the order must carefully respond to the offender’s circumstances given that section 161 orders can have a significant impact on the liberty and security of the offender: see R v K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31. A.G. is not opposed to a twenty-year order but submits that there is no basis upon which to make an order pursuant to subsections (a) and (c) given the offending behavior occurred within his home and not in public areas.

99Though I have no expert evidence before me regarding A.G.’s risk of recidivism, I am not precluded from drawing reasonable and commonsense inferences from the evidentiary record concerning the risk he poses to children in the future. Sentencing judges are routinely required to assess future risk based on the offender's conduct, circumstances, insight, and prospects for rehabilitation. I assess that risk to be at least moderate given the record before me. A.G.’s sexual abuse of S.R. was not isolated, impulsive, or opportunistic. It was repeated over a period of approximately two years, highly invasive in nature, and directed at a vulnerable child who was approximately twelve years old during the offending. Further, there is no evidence before me that A.G. has sought counselling, treatment, or other therapeutic intervention to address the sexual attitudes, impulses, or predisposition reflected in his offending conduct.

100Repeated, prolonged, and highly invasive sexual abuse of a young child, particularly where the offender occupies a position of trust, constitutes conduct of such gravity that it may, on its own, justify the imposition of certain s. 161 conditions. As noted above, a sentencing court is entitled to approach this assessment with a measure of common sense and draw reasonable inferences from the nature, duration, and circumstances of the offending without the necessity of expert evidence. The sustained sexual exploitation of a vulnerable child over a two-year period, coupled with the profound breach of a caregiving role, supports the inference that the risk of future harm to children cannot be regarded as merely remote or speculative. That concern is significantly heightened where, as here, the offender has neither sought nor participated in treatment and continues to deny the abusive conduct, demonstrating an absence of insight, accountability, and rehabilitative progress. In these circumstances, and having regard to the statutory objective of protecting children and preventing future offences, I am satisfied that an order pursuant to both subsections (a) and (c) is necessary and proportionate to address the risk posed.

101For a period of 20 years, I prohibit A.G. from attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of sixteen are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground, or community center, unless accompanied by someone over the age of eighteen years that A.G. has informed of these convictions in writing. I appreciate that A.G. did not meet S.R. at any of these enumerated places, nor did the sexual acts perpetrated by A.G. on S.R. occur at any such place. However, in R v L.T., 2022 ONCA 623, the Court of Appeal held that “it is not necessary before imposing a s. 161 order that the offender committed the offence in one of the prescribed circumstances of the section”: para. 3; see also R v R.J.H., 2021 BCCA 54, at paras. 19-30.

102A.G. has demonstrated a sexual interest in children through his repeated and highly invasive sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old child over a period of approximately two years. In my view, the absence of any evidence that he has undertaken counselling, treatment, or other rehabilitative intervention to address that conduct gives rise to a continuing concern about the risk of re-offending. Common sense suggests that individuals who are sexually interested in children do not pose a risk solely to children within their own household. In other words, the fact that A.G.'s abuse occurred within the home does not permit the conclusion that any future risk is confined to children residing there. As a matter of common sense, his offending reflects a sexual interest in children, not merely a situational opportunity unique to his household. A person who has sexually abused a child over an extended period may seek access to children wherever access can be obtained. A child in the home may simply have provided the most convenient opportunity. However, the absence of children within the home, without more, does not eliminate the underlying risk. In the absence of treatment, demonstrated insight, or other evidence of rehabilitation, I am satisfied that A.G. presents a risk not only to children within a family setting but also to children in the broader community.

103That said, if A.G. engages in counseling in a meaningful way, thereby reducing the risk of re-offending, he may apply to have the terms or the duration of the Order varied. However, based on the evidence before me today, the protection of children must take priority over any inconvenience or hardship that may arise from the terms of the Order.

104A.G. is further prohibited from attending within 500 metres of S.R.’s residence, school, place of employment, or any other place A.G. knows S.R. to be.

105A.G. is further prohibited from seeking, obtaining, or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years. Finally, A.G. is prohibited from having any contact—including communicating by any means—with a person under the age of 16 years, except in relation to his biological children and any adopted children still in his care, or except for the purpose of a lawful retail or service transaction in a public or online establishment.

106Pursuant to section 743.21 of the Criminal Code, A.G. is prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, with S.R., T.G., A.G., N.R. and N.N.N. during the custodial period of his sentence.

107Finally, A.G. is receiving a global sentence of ten years. Upon his release from custody, his focus must be on his rehabilitation and reintegration. Further, A.G. has struggled financially since he was charged in November 2023. In the circumstances, I find it appropriate to waive the victim surcharge.

McVey J.

Released: July 28, 2026

CITATION: R. v. A.G., 2026 ONSC 4367