CITATION: Monte v. Monte, 2026 ONSC 4300

COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-00043450-0000

DATE: 20260723

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Ernesto Monte

Applicant

– and –

Rosanna Monte

Respondent

Leonardo Mongillo, for the applicant

Feven Gaizghi, for the respondent

HEARD: June 22 and 23, 2026

Robert CentA J.

1Ernesto Monte (age 62) and Rosanna Monte (age 60) married each other on October 18, 2018. Ernesto commenced an application seeking a divorce and other related relief. Rosanna filed an answer and asserted claims of her own. By the time the dispute came to a two-day trial before me, there were very few matters remaining in dispute.

2First, I dismissed Rosanna’s pre-trial motion to withdraw her deemed admissions to the facts asserted in Ernesto’s request to admit. Rosanna did not respond to the request to admit within the deadlines set out in the Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99. Rosanna failed to demonstrate that her failure to answer the request to admit was inadvertent and she did not provide a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a response within the deadline.

3Second, I dismiss Ernesto’s claim for an order requiring Rosanna to pay $20,000 to him in respect of chattels belonging to him that she allegedly removed from the condominium when she moved out. Ernesto did not prove that the items in question existed in the condominium or that they belonged to him. He also did not prove the value of any particular item he claimed.

4Third, I find that Rosanna is entitled to spousal support on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. She has a compensatory claim because she worked in a series of family businesses for about six years. I find that Rosanna suffered economic loss and disadvantage because of the roles she adopted during the marriage. She sacrificed employment opportunities and conferred economic benefits on Ernesto without adequate compensation. Rosanna is also entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis. Rosanna and Ernesto lived together in a conjugal relationship for a total of 12 years and integrated their finances. Rosanna has suffered a loss in her standard of living after the end of the marriage. Rosanna is, therefore, entitled to spousal support on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis.

5Fourth, I have imputed $80,000 of employment income to Ernesto because it would not be appropriate to rely on his declared income for spousal support purposes. Ernesto did not make full and fair disclosure of the records necessary to determine his income for spousal support purposes. Indeed, I find that he deliberately obfuscated the true picture of his finances in an attempt to avoid paying spousal support. He did not file a personal tax return for 2025. He did not require his accountant to reconcile the general ledgers of his business for 2025. He did not produce 2025 financial statements for his business. He refused to prepare a valuation of his business. He did not produce bank account records or financial statements for another, somewhat mysterious corporation controlled by him. His claim that the company is worth nothing more than its debt is difficult to reconcile with unexplained general ledger entries showing retained earnings in excess of $1 million. I do not accept Ernesto’s claim that he has earned no income and received no benefit from the corporation from 2024 to 2026. In my view, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to impute $80,000 in annual employment income to Ernesto for spousal support.

6Fifth, I award Rosanna spousal support in the amount of $971 from the date of separation to judgment. I also award Rosanna go-forward spousal support in that amount on an indefinite basis because of “The Rule of 65”.

1. Rosanna’s motion to withdraw an admission is dismissed

7On April 23, 2026, Ernesto delivered a request to admit to Rosanna. Pursuant to rule 22(4), Rosanna’s response was required to be delivered on May 13, 2026. Rosanna did not deliver her response until June 1, 2026. Pursuant to r. 22(4), Rosanna was deemed to accept that the facts set out in the request to admit were true. At the commencement of trial, Rosanna brought a motion to withdraw her deemed admissions. Ernesto opposed the motion. These are the reasons for the bottom line decision I delivered in court that dismissed Rosanna’s motion.

8Rule 22 of the Family Law Rules permits a party to request that the other party make admissions that dispense with proof at trial of certain facts. Pursuant to rule 22(4), unless the recipient party responds within 20 days, that party is deemed to admit that the facts asserted by the requesting party are true. The relevant provisions of the rule provide as follows:

Request to admit

22(2) At any time, by serving a request to admit (Form 22) on another party, a party may ask the other party to admit, for purposes of the case only, that a fact is true or that a document is genuine.

Response required within 20 days

(4) The party on whom the request to admit is served is considered to have admitted, for purposes of the case only, that the fact is true or that the document is genuine, unless the party serves a response (Form 22A) within 20 days,

(a) denying that a particular fact mentioned in the request is true or that a particular document mentioned in the request is genuine; or

(b) refusing to admit that a particular fact mentioned in the request is true or that a particular document mentioned in the request is genuine, and giving the reasons for each refusal.

9A recipient party may withdraw a deemed admission only with the consent of the requesting party or with the court’s permission:

22(5) An admission that a fact is true or that a document is genuine (whether contained in a document served in the case or resulting from subrule (4)), may be withdrawn only with the other party’s consent or with the court’s permission.

10Rosanna submits that the court should apply the test from Forget when deciding whether to permit her to withdraw her deemed admissions.¹ In Forget, the applicant wished to amend his application to amend the pleaded separation date from January 12, 2001, to December 9, 2000. Justice Rogers articulated the test as follows, at para. 17:

This court finds that in a case under the Family Law Rules the test for allowing the withdrawal of an admission in a pleading is as follows:

1. the proposed amendment is on a triable issue.

2. the admission was a mistake and the party offers a reasonable explanation for the change of position and

3. any prejudice caused by the withdrawal can be cured or compensated for in costs.

11I observe that Rogers J. articulated a rule that specifically applies to “the withdrawal of an admission in a pleading.” Rule 22(5) applies to admissions whether contained in a document served in the case or resulting from a request to admit under r. 22(4). The second element of the Forget case applies more readily in a case where a party seeks to amend their pleading rather than avoid the effect of a deemed admission.

12In Smith v. Noel, Jarvis J. articulated a slightly different test for when the court should relieve a party from a deemed admission.² Justice Jarvis emphasized looking at all of the circumstances giving rise to a recipient party’s failure to respond, including whether there is satisfactory evidence of inadvertence or mistake:

A fact deemed true may, in certain circumstances, be withdrawn. The scope of the court’s discretion over the deemed admissions to which effect should be given will vary according to the circumstances giving rise to a party’s failure to respond and whether the admission involves fact, mixed fact and law, or a question of law. Where, for example, the failure to respond is due to satisfactory evidence of inadvertence, a mistake, or there is a reasonable explanation for the change in a party’s position, a deemed admission may be withdrawn. Where a Request involves minute details of marginal value to the larger issues in the case, a court may refuse to consider the Request or any deemed admissions arising from it.³

13In my view, Smith provides a better framework for considering whether to exercise my discretion to permit Rosanna to withdraw her deemed admission. As I will explain, Rosanna did not provide satisfactory evidence of inadvertence or mistake. In the circumstances of this case, it is not appropriate to permit Rosanna to withdraw her admission.

14Rosanna was represented by counsel until May 2025, when she became self-represented. Over five months later, the parties attended the trial management conference before Stevenson J. At the time of the TMC, Rosanna was still self-represented. At the TMC, Stevenson J. ordered:

a. the trial to be held on June 21-22, 2026;

b. the parties to serve their request to admit (if any) 60 days before trial (April 23, 2026);

c. each party to respond to any request to admit 40 days before trial (May 13, 2026);

d. the parties to deliver updated financial statements, exhibits, and trial affidavits 30 days before trial (May 25, 2026); and

e. set the exit pre-trial to be held on May 29, 2026.

15On April 23, 2026, in accordance with the deadline set in the TMC, Ernesto delivered his request to admit, which contained 110, single-fact statements. Ernesto’s requests do not involve minute details of marginal value to the rest of the case. Ernesto’s counsel delivered the request to admit to Rosanna by email at 3:59 p.m.

16Three hours later, counsel for Rosanna, Feven Glaizghi, wrote to counsel for Ernesto to advise that she was retained and to confirm that she would not be seeking an adjournment of the trial date:

I am new counsel for Rosanna as her previous lawyer fell ill and can no longer assist her. I understand there may be a court date very soon. Unfortunately, I am not able to attend in-person and am in a trial next week. Can you provide me with all of the materials your office currently has on this matter?

I do intend on assisting her with the trial. However, I need to know the trial dates and confirm those dates. We will not be seeking an adjournment of the trial date so you need not worry about that.

17The next day, a law clerk working for counsel for Ernesto wrote back to Ms. Glaizghi. The clerk asked Ms. Glaizghi to deliver a notice of change in representation, and he would send her an invite to Case Center once she did so. He also attached a copy of the TSEF and the TMC endorsement of Stevenson J. to his responding email.

18Ms. Glaizghi responded that day as follows:

I will be in a trial next week and will send you the Form 4 thereafter. I am glad the next court date is not until May 29, 2026. However, I am going to need to request an extension to any deadlines attributed to my client for the upcoming trial. We will not seek to adjourn the trial and I am certain I can serve you with materials well in advance of the scheduled trial.

19In fact, Ms. Glaizghi did not serve her Form 4 until May 22, 2026. In any event, as of April 24, 2026, Ms. Glaizghi had the TSEF and was aware of the court-ordered timelines that it contained. In addition, Rosanna had received a copy of the request to admit. Rosanna’s affidavit does not indicate when she provided the request to admit to Ms. Glaizghi.

20Rosanna admits that she did not respond to the request for information by the deadline of May 13, 2026.

21The parties attended the exit pre-trial before Kraft J. on May 29, 2026. Justice Kraft’s endorsement records that Rosanna had complied with none of the deadlines in the TSEF and that Ms. Glaizghi advised that she was not aware of the deadlines, despite having received the TSEF on April 24, 2026. Justice Kraft’s endorsement reads, in part, as follows:

2 There is a two-day trial scheduled to begin on June 22, 2026.

3 [Rosanna] was present but her counsel was in British Columbia and appeared on zoom. [Rosanna’s] counsel served a Notice of Change in Representation on Friday, May 22, 2026.

4 [Rosanna] has not complied with any of the timelines set out in the TSEF of Stevenson, J. dated October 22, 2025. Her Exhibits were due 30 days before trial. They were not served. The affidavits in chief from [Rosanna’s] witnesses were due 30 days before trial and they were not served. [Rosanna] did not file a financial statement or net family property statement 30 days before trial.

5 Further, [Rosanna] did not respond to [Ernesto’s] Request to Admit resulting in her being deemed to admit these facts. [Ernesto] prepared for trial based on these admissions.

6 [Rosanna’s] counsel advises that she was not aware of the deadlines set out in the TSEF, even though the TSEF was sent to her by the [Ernesto’s]counsel on April 24, 2026.

22Justice Kraft ordered Rosanna to deliver a draft response to the request to admit by June 1, 2026, so that the facts in dispute could be identified, and granted leave to bring a motion at the commencement of trial to address the deemed admissions.

23I pause here to emphasize that as of the exit pre-trial, Rosanna had breached every single deadline in the TSEF, which was signed by Stevenson J. over six months before the exit pre-trial. Rosanna had not delivered her trial affidavit, her updated financial statement, her net family property statement, or her response to the request to admit. The justice system cannot operate properly when parties fail to abide by court ordered deadlines. Such conduct means parties can not prepare properly for trial, makes meaningful negotiations impossible, jeopardizes scarce trial dates, and denies fairness is to the non-breaching party.

24Rosanna admits that she did not file the response to the request to admit by the deadline set out in the TSEF. As an explanation, Rosanna states that Ms. Glaizghi advised that she was busy with other work and would not be able to assist her until May 29, 2026, which was after the exit pre-trial and after all the trial deadlines had passed. In her affidavit, Rosanna attempted to explain her inaction this way:

8. When I did ultimately locate the lawyer, who is presently my counsel, she advised that she would not be able to assist me in any event until after May 28, 2026 as she was tied up with other matters, including a trial out of province during the week of May 25, 2026.

9. I cannot recall the exact date but at some point I had provided my counsel with a screenshot of the Caselines page. The page indicated May 29 2026, was set for a trial management conference. My counsel, again advised, that she would not be able to assist me in any way nor attend the court attendance of May 29, 2026 for the above provided reason. …

10. My counsel advises, which I verily believe to be true, that she reviewed the Court Endorsement alone and was able to glean the next court date and trial dates to confirm her availability as she was not fully retained yet. Furthermore, she had always indicated that she would not be able to look at the file until after May 29, 2026 as she was in trials and/or away until then.

11. My counsel advises, which I verily believe to be true, that she responded the same day to Applicant counsel and advised that she would be requesting an extension for filing deadlines for my trial materials and repeated that she would not be seeking to adjourn the trial.

12. I did not respond to the request to admit within the timelines imposed as I continued to believe that my counsel could complete it upon her return at the end of May without issue. I have been self-represented since my last counsel fell ill and have felt overwhelmed with the information I have had to absorb every time we are in court. It is for this reason that I have had a support person present to help me deal with my anxiety attacks every time I have attended court for this matter.

13. I did not understand the legal ramifications nor that my failure to respond would result in me being ‘deemed to have admitted’ the ‘facts’; the Applicant sent to me in his Request to Admit. I truly believed I would have an opportunity to respond and that the document only stated what he claims were true facts and he would be found to be lying anyways.

25In my view, Rosanna has not provided a satisfactory explanation for her failure to meet the court ordered deadlines.

26It appears that Rosanna was content to retain counsel who, from the initiation of the solicitor-client relationship, indicated that she would not be able to provide any assistance to Rosanna until after she had missed all of the court-ordered deadlines.

27Ms. Glaizghi wrote to counsel for Ernesto on April 23, 2026, mere hours after Ernesto delivered the request to admit. Ms. Glaizghi said she was “new counsel” who “intend[ed] on assisting her with the trial.” When asked to deliver a Form 4, Ms. Glaizghi demurred and stated that she was in a trial next week and would do so thereafter. Respectfully, completing and delivering a Form 4 takes virtually no time at all. If she truly was “new counsel,” there is no plausible reason why Ms. Glaizghi could not have immediately delivered a Form 4, regardless of an upcoming trial. Indeed, as noted, Ms. Glaizghi did not deliver her notice until May 22, 2026, which was more than a week after the deadline to respond to the request to admit had passed. There is no reasonable explanation for such a delay.

28Equally, Ms. Glaizghi or Rosanna could have easily completed the Form 22A: Response to Request to Admit and denied the facts set out in the request to admit. Rosanna could then have decided whether to amend her answers and concede some of the facts at a later date. In the alternative, Ms. Glaizghi or Rosanna could have explicitly sought Ernesto’s consent to extend the deadline for the response to a specific, mutually agreeable date. None of these straightforward steps were taken.

29Rosanna could have (and should have) obtained legal advice from Ms. Glaizghi about the “legal ramifications” of failing to meet court ordered deadlines. Even if Rosanna was content to have Ms. Glaizghi not engage with her file until May 29, 2026, she remained responsible for meeting her obligations under the TSEF and accountable for her failure to meet them. What Rosanna could not do was simply assume that she and her lawyer could ignore all of the deadlines, engage with the file when it suited them, and then be relieved of any consequences of that non-compliance.

30In my view, the primary objective of the Family Law Rules does not require granting Rosanna leave to withdraw her admissions. Rule 2 provides, in part, as follows:

2(2) The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.

(3) Dealing with a case justly includes,

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

31Rosanna emphasizes that she is not asking to adjourn the trial. That concession, however, does not address the unfairness to Ernesto. Dealing with a case justly includes ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties. There is obvious prejudice to Ernesto in not knowing until the first morning of trial which facts are contested, and which facts are admitted. It would be patently unfair to Ernesto for me to allow Rosanna to withdraw her admissions and then direct Ernesto to open his case and call his first witness. It is unfair to expect Ernesto to prepare for two different trials and only to learn which adventure is his on the first morning of a two-day trial. Avoiding such unfairness is why the court sets deadlines for the delivery of requests to admit and the responses far in advance of trial. That is the only way that parties can prepare thoughtfully for the commencement of trial and engage in serious, meaningful attempts to resolve the case.

32Parties who default on their obligations to meet court ordered deadlines impede the ability of the civil justice system to provide the fair, timely, and cost-effective adjudication of family law disputes on their merits. Failing to meet court ordered deadlines promotes the culture of complacency that threatens to strangle our justice system and undermines the efforts of justice system participants to shift the litigation culture to provide more accessible and timely justice.⁴

33I accept that not permitting Rosanna to withdraw her deemed admissions is, at one level, unfair to her. She is prevented from contesting and challenges facts that she believes to be incorrect. She will be burdened with certain admissions even if she wished to lead evidence that might permit a different inference. On balance, I do not think that unfairness justifies setting aside her deemed admissions. In every case where a party seeks to set aside deemed admissions, there will be prejudice to them if the court declines to do so. Here, I see no particular prejudice to Rosanna beyond that present in every case.

34If the request to admit process is to serve its intended purpose of streamlining trials and promoting access to justice, parties must take it seriously. Parties will not take it seriously if they are confident that they can show up at trial and be relieved of the consequences of not providing timely responses to a proper request to admit. In my view, Rosanna has neither demonstrated that her failure to answer the request to admit was inadvertent nor provided a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a response within the deadline.

35For these reasons, I dismissed Rosanna’s pre-trial motion to withdraw her deemed admissions pursuant to rule 22(5).

2. Background facts

36At the beginning of trial, Rosanna confirmed that she was abandoning her claim to equalize the net family properties. This concession significantly reduced the number of facts in dispute. The trial affidavits of both parties contained significant evidence that was only relevant to the property issues. To the extent it is necessary for context, it is fair to say that the parties had creditors foreclose or force the sale of several properties owned by the parties.

37Many of the background facts were not in dispute or Rosanna was deemed to admit the truth of the facts.

38Ernesto was born on January 7, 1964, and had previously been married. Rosanna was born on October 23, 1965, and had previously been married two times. Each had adult children from their prior relationships, but the children were not relevant to the matters in dispute. The parties were married on October 12, 2018.

39Ernesto was a butcher and part owner of Royal York Meats. He earned income through the company of about $145,000 per year in 2020 and 2021. This income, along with some personal expenses run through the company, provided the bulk of the resources for Ernesto and Rosanna. In 2022, Ernesto’s business partner forced him out of the business, and Ernesto did not succeed in the ensuing litigation. Thereafter, Ernesto worked as a butcher for some friends in the industry.

40In 2014, Rosanna began receiving CPP disability payments. In her affidavit, Rosanna explained that this was “due to long-term injuries, sustained from my 30-year career as a hairdresser and for mental health challenges, which include diagnoses of severe anxiety, PTSD, and depression.” Although she was in receipt of CPP disability payments, Rosanna provided services to Royal York Meats and Ernesto’s subsequent business, which is described below. She did not declare income for her provision of services. Instead, she received a corporate credit card on which she made personal purchases that were paid for by the company.

41On February 14, 2023, Ernesto incorporated Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. Ernesto borrowed to fund the business and Rosanna provided unpaid services to the business. According to its financial statements for 2023 and 2024, the business operated at a loss. The business has also been sued by at least one of its creditors, resulting in a garnishment order. As I will explain below, Ernesto went to great lengths to obfuscate the true financial state of the business and his own personal finances.

42In October 2023, Rosanna declared personal bankruptcy. At the time, she owed approximately $144,000 to the mother of one of her friends and $44,788 in tax arrears.

43Rosanna lived for a time in a property the parties owned in Florida and then in the parties’ condominium in Toronto from May to November 2024, separate and apart from Ernesto. As set out in the application and response, the parties agree that they separated on November 24 or 25, 2023.

3. The witnesses, credibility and reliability

44Ernesto and Rosanna filed affidavits that stood in place of an examination-in-chief. Each of Ernesto and Rosanna were cross-examined. In addition, Ernesto called Sean Franklin, a CPA, who introduced the general ledgers for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. and discussed the bookkeeping and accounting for the company. Rosanna called one witness, Roy Meleca, a real estate salesperson who sold the parties’ Toronto condominium.

45Given the factual dispute between the parties, it is necessary to consider the reliability and credibility of the witnesses at trial using the usual legal principles.⁵

46I did not find either Ernesto or Rosanna to be credible witnesses. Both witnesses evaded straightforward questions that they appeared to believe were harmful to their interests. Both witnesses were prone to exaggeration and overstatement. Both witnesses claimed not to recall information in circumstances that caused me to doubt their claims. Both witnesses frequently argued with counsel.

47Ernesto’s evidence demonstrated that he was prepared to play fast and loose with various obligations.

48For example, on cross-examination, counsel asked Ernesto if he would agree that he never paid Rosanna for her work for Royal York Meats. He vehemently denied that suggestion. Ernesto said that Rosanna was paid because he gave her a company credit card that she used for personal expenses, that were then paid for by the company. In this way, he testified, Rosanna was paid for her work for the company. Ernesto did not appear troubled by these under-the-table payments to Rosanna.

49To take another example, Ernesto testified that his corporate bank account was garnished by a creditor with a judgment against the store. Ernesto testified that this meant that he “had to” use another bank account for another corporation to avoid the effects of the garnishment.

50For her part, Rosanna refused to acknowledge certain objectively demonstrable facts. For example, Rosanna denied that she received a rental subsidy, even when she was shown her current lease that demonstrated she paid geared-to-income rent that included a rent subsidy of $1,098 per month. She also freely admitted to working under the table while collecting CPP disability payments, because she knew that receiving employment income might affect her collection of disability benefits.

51In my view, Rosanna’s sworn financial statement is impossible to reconcile with the statement she swore in her bankruptcy proceeding. I cannot determine whether that is the product of carelessness, or an intention to tell different versions of events to different audiences. In either case, it causes me concern about the reliability and credibility of Rosanna’s evidence.

52Both Ernesto and Rosanna claimed that the other committed acts of abuse or violence toward them. Neither party spent much time at trial on these allegations. Given their general lack of credibility and the lack of detailed and precise evidence about the allegations, I find that neither party proved their allegations of abuse.

4. Ernesto’s claim related to missing chattels is dismissed

53Ernesto sought an order that Rosanna pay $20,000 to him in respect of chattels belonging to him that she allegedly removed from their condominium when she moved out. I dismiss this claim.

54In his trial affidavit, Ernesto provided the following evidence:

I solely request that Rosanna be deemed to have received $20,000 in value against any potential claim she may have. Rosanna took my sofa; 3 laptop computers; an iPad; dishes; cutlery; pots and pans; watches and jewellery belonging to me; dining room chairs; bedroom dresser and night tables; patio furniture, television, coffee table and the chattels which we had in Florida. I believe she sold items from Florida when she was there for four months.

55Rosanna was deemed to admit the following facts contained in the request to admit delivered by Ernesto:

37. Upon Rosanna’s return from Florida in 2024, she removed chattels from the condominium.

38. Ernesto returned home on November 8, 2024 to find a virtually empty condominium.

39. Rosanna removed many of Ernesto’s chattels from the condominium.

40. Rosanna removed Ernesto’s chattels from the condominium.

41. Rosanna removed all of Ernesto’s chattels except for a few minor items.

56In her testimony, Rosanna denied taking any items that were not her own and testified that she left many items behind when she left. I give no weight to her evidence where it is inconsistent with the deemed admissions.

57Ernesto did not raise his chattels claim in his closing argument and very little time at trial was devoted to it.

58I find that Ernesto has not proven on a balance of probabilities that Rosanna is liable to him for removing chattels belonging to him. The list of items he provided in his affidavit is not sufficiently specific to identify the allegedly missing items. Moreover, even if those items existed in the condominium, he has not provided sufficient evidence to prove that those items belonged to him and not to Rosanna or to both of them. For example, he has provided no receipts or other evidence to make out his claim of ownership in any specific item that he claims Rosanna removed without his permission or agreement.

59Even if Ernesto had proved that Rosanna removed certain items belonging to him, and he has not done so, he has not proved the value of any particular item. In these circumstances, even if Rosanna was found liable, I would award him only nominal damages.

60I dismiss Ernesto’s claim for damages for removal of chattels.

5. Spousal Support

61As the parties are married and seeking a divorce, spousal support is to be determined under the provisions of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), and the federal Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2008).

62Section 15.2 of the Divorce Act authorizes the court to make an order requiring a spouse to pay sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. In making such an order, the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs, and circumstances of each spouse, including the length of time the spouses cohabited, and the functions performed by each spouse.⁶ An order for spousal support should:

a. recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b. apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

c. relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d. in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.⁷

63These objectives are to be considered together, cumulatively not alternatively, in establishing the economic consequences of the dissolution of the spousal relationship.⁸

64The mere fact that one spouse has a higher income than the other does not automatically entitle the spouse with the lower income to an order for spousal support.⁹ Entitlement to spousal support can be based on compensatory or non-compensatory principles.¹⁰

A. Rosanna is entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis

65Compensatory claims for spousal support are based either on the recipient’s economic loss or disadvantage because of the roles adopted during the spousal relationship, or on the recipient’s conferral of an economic benefit on the payor without adequate compensation. Its purpose is to share equitably the economic advantages and disadvantages that accrued because of the spousal relationship and its subsequent breakdown.¹¹ Sometimes, spouses sacrifice their own employment opportunities or advancements for the sake of the relationship and family unit. Sometimes, these sacrifices may enhance the earning potential of the other spouse.¹²

66According to the Revised User’s Guide, common markers of a compensatory claim include: being home with children full-time or part-time, being a secondary earner, having primary care of children after separation, moving for the payor’s career, supporting the payor’s education or training, and working in a family business.¹³

67In my view, Rosanna has a strong compensatory claim for support. I accept Rosanna’s evidence that she provided assistance to Ernesto as he ran the Royal York Meat Market from 2016 until approximately May 2022. Ernesto did not seriously challenge Rosanna’s evidence, which I accept, that she assisted him with bookkeeping, staff training, working the cash registrar, preparing stocks and sauces for sale in the store, and delivering purchases to customers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

68I also accept Rosanna’s evidence that she assisted Ernesto in 2023 to set up and open Monte’s Premium Meats. Rosanna trained on the scale and point-of-sale system, trained the staff on those systems, and provided training to the store manager on operational issues. Rosanna testified that she did bookkeeping and cooking for the store. I also accept that she sewed cloth tote bags that the store sold and gave to customers who made large purchases.

69Rosanna testified that she was not a paid employee of either Royal York Meat Market or Monte’s Premium Meats. She conceded that if she declared employment income, that would affect her receipt of CPP disability benefits. Ernesto agreed that he gave Rosanna a credit card that she could use for personal expenses and that would be paid by the business. These arrangements flatter neither Rosanna nor Ernesto. Rosanna was clearly working under the table, without disclosing that fact to the federal government. Ernesto and the businesses benefitted from Rosanna’s deception by obtaining her labour without paying for it. To top it off, Ernesto then knowingly allowed Rosanna to run personal expenses through the company, although there is no evidence that these personal expenses adequately or fairly compensated Rosanna for her labour.

70Nevertheless, I am satisfied that there is clear evidence that Rosanna suffered economic loss and disadvantage because of the roles she adopted during the marriage. She conferred economic benefits on Ernesto’s corporation without adequate compensation. Rosanna sacrificed employment opportunities during the marriage by working in the family business to provide economic benefits to Ernesto and the companies he controlled.

B. Rosanna is entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis

71Non-compensatory support (sometimes called needs-based support) is based upon economic interdependency and a post-relationship loss of standard of living. Need alone, unconnected to any disadvantage arising from the spousal relationship, may be sufficient to require spouses to contribute to the needs of their former partners when they have the capacity to pay.¹⁴

72While an inability to achieve a subsistence existence needs certainly qualifies, the concept of need must be understood in broad, relative terms. In determining need, the court “ought to be guided in part by the principle that the spouse receiving support is entitled to maintain the standard of living to which they were accustomed at the time the cohabitation ceased.”¹⁵ A significant income disparity will often give rise to a non-compensatory claim based on a loss of the spousal standard of living.¹⁶ In such cases, the recipient spouse is entitled to “a degree of comfort well beyond ‘basic needs’.”¹⁷ The health of a disabled claimant is relevant to the assessment of the claimant’s needs.¹⁸

73Common markers of non-compensatory claims include the length of the relationship, the drop in standard of living experienced by the claimant after separation, and the economic hardship experienced by the claimant.¹⁹

74The merger of the parties’ economic lifestyles creates a joint standard of living which must be considered in the spousal support analysis.²⁰ The length of the spousal relationship then determines the extent of the claim to be protected against this loss of standard of living achieved during the spousal relationship.²¹

75A recipient spouse may be disadvantaged by the breakdown of the spousal relationship, having lost to some degree the standard of living they enjoyed, given the length of the relationship and the lifestyle the parties maintained.²² Non-compensatory support may arise from the fact that a person who formerly enjoyed inter-spousal support now finds themselves without it and a party’s accustomed standard of living is an appropriate part of the context in which to assess need.²³

76As I explain below, the parties lived together in a conjugal relationship for 12 years. Rosanna and Ernesto integrated their financial lives over the duration of their relationship. In addition, Rosanna has suffered a significant decline in her standard of living since the separation. She is currently getting by solely on her CPP disability payments and lives in subsidized housing (where she pays only $425 per month because she enjoys the benefit of a $1,098 a month government rent subsidy). Her expenses are extremely modest.

77Rosanna has clearly suffered a loss in her standard of living after the end of the marriage. Even if the marriage had not ended, her standard of living may have diminished due to Ernesto’s business setbacks. However, I find that she is worse off having to support herself alone than if the parties had remained married.

78I am satisfied that Rosanna has a non-compensatory, or need-based, entitlement to spousal support.

C. Duration of support

79To determine the duration of support payments, I must first determine the length of Rosanna and Ernesto’s relationship. The without child support formula under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for determining amount and duration and support includes the length of the marriage and any pre-marital cohabitation:

7.3 Determining the Length of the Relationship

The without child support formula relies upon length of marriage for determining both amount and duration of support. While we use the convenient term “length of marriage”, the actual measure under the Advisory Guidelines is the period of cohabitation. This includes pre-marital cohabitation and ends with separation. Inclusion of pre-marital cohabitation in determining length of marriage is consistent with what most judges do now in determining spousal support. This way of defining length of marriage also makes the Advisory Guidelines more easily used under provincial spousal support laws, which apply to non-marital relationships.

80I accept Ernesto’s evidence that he and Rosanna commenced an affair when he was still married to his former wife. Ernesto testified that he left his wife and moved in with Rosanna in 2010 or 2011. For this reason, I do not give effect to the request to admit that stated the parties commenced living together in 2015. Rosanna pinpointed the date they started living together as October 1, 2011. I accept Rosanna’s more precise recollection, which falls within the date range provided by Ernesto during his evidence. The parties then married on October 12, 2018, and separated on November 24, 2023. I find that the parties lived together in a 12-year conjugal relationship (from October 1, 2011, to November 24, 2023).

81Given their ages and the length of the relationship, I must determine whether the Rule of 65 applies. In Climans, the Court of Appeal explained the Rule of 65 as follows:

The Rule of 65 applies where the length of cohabitation in years plus the recipient's age at the date of separation equals or exceeds 65: Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2008), (the “SSAGs”), s. 7. If the Rule of 65 applies, indefinite spousal support is appropriate: Djekic v. Zai, [2015] O.J. No. 239, 2015 ONCA 25, at para. 9.²⁴

82Rosanna was 58 when the parties separated after a 12-year period of conjugal cohabitation. The sum of Rosanna’s age and the length of the relationship exceeds 65 and I find that she is entitled to indefinite spousal support.²⁵

D. Amount of support

83In making an order for spousal support, the Divorce Act, requires me to take into consideration the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse.²⁶

1. Determining Ernesto’s income for spousal support purposes

84The most challenging question is this case is accurately determining Ernesto’s means to pay spousal support to Rosanna. The accurate determination of spousal incomes is critical to the proper application of the federal Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines do not solve issues of income determination that can arise in cases, such as this one, involving self-employment income and other forms of non-employment income. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines make clear that the starting point for determining income for the purposes of ordering spousal support is the definition of income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175 federal Child Support Guidelines, and the framework it provides for calculating and imputing income:

6.1 The Starting Point for Income Determination

The starting point for the determination of income under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines is the definition of income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Federal Child Support Guidelines provide an expansive definition of "income" for child support purposes, one that reflects and clarifies much of the pre-Guidelines law on income determination. Sections 15 to 20 of the Child Support Guidelines, along with Schedule III, create a framework for income determination. Prior to the release of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, most courts used the same definition of income for both child support and spousal support purposes and that practise has continued since January 2005.

The Child Support Guidelines use a "gross" income measure, income before taxes and other deductions. This same gross income provides the basis for the calculations under all the formulas found in the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Some of the technicalities of Schedule III are sometimes forgotten in spousal cases. The income imputing provisions of section 19 are, if anything, even more important than in child support cases. In every spousal support case, two incomes are in issue. Income may need to be imputed to a payor spouse, but in addition a spousal support case may also require that an income be imputed to the recipient spouse, because of self-sufficiency issues. In these cases, income is imputed to the recipient under s. 19(1)(a), for under/unemployment.²⁷

85Courts in Ontario have frequently relied on the framework set out in ss. 16 to 20 of the Child Support Guidelines to determine income for spousal support purposes, whether or not child support is also at issue.²⁸ I will also rely on the framework under the Federal Child Support Guidelines to determine Ernesto’s income.

2. Ernesto did not provide required income information

86Ernesto asks me to find that his income for spousal support purposes is $0. Ernesto did not provide all of the financial information he was required to provide. As I will explain, Ernesto’s failure causes me to impute income to him.

87Ernesto was required to produce a copy of every personal income tax return that he filed, along with every notice of assessment or reassessment that he received for the three most recent taxation years.²⁹ Ernesto produced and filed at trial his personal income tax returns and notices of assessment for the years 2020 to 2024, inclusive. In his trial affidavit, Ernesto stated that he did not earn an income in 2025 and that he has not filed a tax return for that year, despite his legal obligation to do so. If, in fact, he did not earn any income for the 2025 year, it is difficult to understand why he did not prepare and file an income tax return to see if he qualified for any government benefits, credits, or potential refunds. This is particularly true since Ernesto testified that he owes $20,728.01 in back taxes, penalties, and accumulated interest.

88Where a spouse controls a corporation, for its three most recent taxation years, the spouse is required to produce:

a. the financial statements of the corporation and its subsidiaries, and

b. a statement showing a breakdown of all salaries, wages, management fees or other payments or benefits paid to, or on behalf of, persons or corporations with whom the corporation, and every related corporation, does not deal at arm’s length.³⁰

89Ernesto owned and operated Royal York Meats Inc. from no later than 2018 until May 2022.³¹ In his trial affidavit, Ernesto states that his business partner then forced him out of Royal York Meats Inc. in a dispute. Ernesto filed unaudited financial statements for Royal York Meats Inc. for the period ending September 30 for the years 2017, 2019, and 2020.

90On February 14, 2023, Ernesto incorporated Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. Ernesto attached the financial statements for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. to his affidavit for the years ending December 31, 2023, and December 31, 2024. It is important to note that the financial statements were prepared under a compilation engagement and that the accountant did not perform an audit engagement or a review engagement.

91Ernesto testified that he has not completed the 2025 year end for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc., despite the passage of time and the fact that this trial was looming. Because he had not completed the year-end, financial statements for 2025 could not be produced.

92Ernesto provided no explanation for why he had not completed the year-end or financial statements. There is no evidence that there was any impediment to completing these basic tasks and I infer that they did not happen because Ernesto did not want them to happen.

93Ernesto did not comply with his legal obligation to produce financial statements for the most recent year. This omission is troubling given Ernesto’s insistence that the business is earning no money and that he has no ability to pay spousal support. I conclude that Ernesto deliberately did not close the year and prepare the financial statements to obscure the true state of the company’s finances. His failure to do so deprives the court of important information to assess his claim that he is earning no income and obtaining no benefits from the business.

94In addition, it was revealed at trial that Ernesto controls another corporation, which he described as the “Monte Group.” Ernesto admitted that he was using a bank account for “Monte Group” to evade a garnishment freeze on the bank account for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. However, he did not produce any financial statements or bank account records for the Monte Group. Mr. Franklin testified that he believed the bank account for the Monte Group was opened in January 2025. There is no independent, documentary confirmation of what, if any, cash might be held in that account or what, if any, income was earned by that company.

95Ernesto failed to meet his disclosure obligations with respect to the corporations under his control. His failure to make full disclosure obscured his income and undermined the court’s ability to make a fair and accurate determination of his income for spousal support purposes.

96In addition, Ernesto refused to provide an opinion on the value of his business for income purposes. On December 20, 2024, Rosanna delivered a request for information that included a request that Ernesto value his business. He refused to do so in his response dated February 6, 2025:

28. Request: A business evaluation of Monte's Premium Meats conducted by a reputable business valuator.

Response: This is not a relevant request. The company just started at the date of separation. There is no value except debt. The Respondent is welcome to waste her resources on such an ill-advised exercise.

97As noted, to make a fair and accurate determination of Ernesto’s support obligations rquires clarity regarding his income for support purposes.³² Ernesto’s available income for spousal support purposes is a function of the operation of his solely held corporations Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. and the Monte Group. To determine the income fairly attributed to Ernesto from the operation of these corporations requires an assessment of the corporations earnings and whether any expenses paid by the corporations have a sufficiently personal component that they should be added into his income.

98As the owner of the corporations, Ernesto bears the burden of proving the value of his assets and the quantum of his income.³³ This onus may extend to providing an expert evaluation of the value of his corporations.³⁴ As Bale J. explained,

in family court proceedings the owner of an asset bears the burden of establishing the applicable value of the asset, and the earner of an income bears the burden of establishing his or her level of income. In some cases, this obligation extends to the creation and production of formal written expert reports, including formal business valuations and income analysis reports see for example Michi v. Michi, 2008 CanLII 728 (ONSC), Meeser v. Meeser, 2011 ONSC 6517, and Casdie v. Caskie, 2020 ONSC 7010 as referenced by the Applicant.³⁵

99An income report would have provided clarity about Ernesto’s income for the purpose of determining spousal support. Absent such a valuation, it is difficult to interpret the information that is before the court or to assess the credibility of Ernesto’s claim that the company has “no value except debt” and that he has no income for spousal support purposes.

100Instead of providing an income report or business valuation, Ernesto produced 955 pages of general ledger statements for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. As I will explain, these were not an adequate substitute for an income report or business valuation.

101On February 6, 2025, Ernesto produced to Rosanna what he described as the general ledger of Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. for the years ending December 31, 2023, and 2024. On May 31, 2026 (about three weeks before trial), he also produced incomplete and unallocated general ledgers as of December 31, 2025, and for the period January 1, 2026, to May 31, 2026.

102The general ledgers were prepared from Quickbooks by Mr. Franklin. He explained that when he does the year end for the businesses, he goes through the accounts to identify personal expenses that are not properly expenses of the company. Mr. Franklin then moves those expenses to the shareholder account to reduce the amount of the shareholder account. Mr. Franklin described the shareholder account as a loan from Ernesto to the company. So, when Mr. Franklin moves a personal expense of Ernesto from the company to the shareholder account, it has the effect of reducing the amount the company owes to Ernesto by the amount of the personal expense.

103Mr. Franklin candidly admitted that he had not completed that task for either the 2025 or 2026 year-to-date general ledgers. He testified that he had not added or reconciled the bank information or identified any personal expenses and allocated them to the shareholder account for 2025 or 2026. Neither Ernesto nor Mr. Franklin offered any credible explanation for why this task was not completed by May 31, 2026, particularly with a looming trial date.

104I find that it would be unsafe to draw any firm conclusions from the unreconciled general ledgers for 2025 and 2026.

105The general ledgers alone do not provide me with accurate insight into the health of the corporation or Ernesto’s true income for the purposes of spousal support. First, as noted, even if the general ledgers had been reconciled, there were no financial statements to help me understand the financial status of Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. at the 2025 year end. Second, as noted, Ernesto did not produce any financial statements or bank account records for the Monte Group, so there is no independent, documentary confirmation of the value of that business or what, if any, cash might be held in that account.

106In conclusion, I find that Ernesto has failed to provide income information that he was obliged to provide to Rosanna. In my view, Ernesto did so deliberately in order to make it more difficult to disprove his claim that he has no means to pay spousal support.

3. Using Ernesto’s total declared income for tax purposes would not be the fairest determination of his income

107As a starting point, s. 16 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines provides that Ernesto’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total Income” in the T1 general form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency. As noted, Ernesto produced and filed at trial his personal income tax returns and notices of assessment for the years 2020 to 2024, inclusive. These returns provide as follows:

Year

Income

2020

$146,016

2021

$148,824

2022

$80,901

2023

$15,000

2024

$0

2025

$0 (no return filed)

108If I were to accept Ernesto’s declared income of $0 as his income for the purposes of determining spousal support, he would not be required to pay spousal support to Rosanna, despite her entitlement. However, as I will explain below, the determination of Ernesto’s income pursuant to s. 16 would not be the fairest determination of his income.

109Ernesto’s income in 2020, 2021, and the first half of 2022 was derived from Royal York Meats, the business he lost to his partner. Pursuant to the deemed admissions arising from the request to admit, the parties agree that Royal York Meats was valued at $357,119.55. In his affidavit, Ernesto states that after he was forced out of Royal York Meats Inc., he went to work at an hourly rate “with some acquaintances in the industry.” This may have contributed to his 2022 income.

110On February 14, 2023, Ernesto incorporated Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. He described the business as follows:

In 2023, I started Monte Premium Meats [sic] which has been running at a loss and operating under difficulty over its first three years; however, I do not believe I have ever started a business that simply started to make money from the beginning. The company has been the subject of lawsuits over the purchase of equipment and product. I continue to strive to make ends meet and grow what is ultimately my last attempt as a business owner given my age. I have a lot riding on making a go of this store, in particular trying to repay the people who lent me money to make this work.

111Rosanna is deemed to admit the following facts about Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. to be true as of the separation date, November 24, 2023:

87. On the date of separation, Ernesto was no longer the owner of Royal York Meats Inc.

88. On the date of separation, Ernest was the owner of a business called Monte's Premium Meats Inc.

89. On the date of separation, Monte's Premium Meats Inc. had no value.

90. On the date of separation, Monte's Premium Meats Inc. had a negative value.

112In his trial affidavit, Ernesto stated that he did not earn any income in 2025, but he has not filed a tax return for that year, despite his legal obligation to do so. Mr. Franklin testified that the company has not paid a salary to Ernesto in 2024, 2025, or 2026. However, in the absence of an income report, financial statements for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. for 2025 or 2026, any financial statements or bank account information for the Monte Group, current year tax returns for Ernesto or any of his companies, it is difficult to take his claim at face value for the period after separation.

113It is difficult to understand how or why Ernesto would have stayed in a business for over three years that provided him with no income and no benefits of a personal nature. Even accepting that the business was encumbered by some debt, it strikes me as unusual that he would, as he testified, employ 8 or 9 people in his business but obtain no benefit for himself.

114In fact, there are entries in the general ledgers that are difficult to reconcile with Ernesto’s evidence. For example, the general ledgers record retained earnings for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. Retained earnings are the cumulative net earnings of a company since its inception, less dividends paid out.

115In his February 6, 2025, sworn response to the request for information, Ernesto attached a copy of the company’s unreconciled general ledger as of February 4, 2025. The general ledger contained the following entries:

Retained earnings

Closing Entry 2023-12-31 102,304.23

Closing Entry 2024-12-31 1,434,607.75

Total Retained Earnings 1,536,911.98

116I note that the financial statement for Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. as of December 31, 2023, shows $0 retained earnings and a $180,755 loss for the year.

117In the general ledgers filed at trial, there are a number of entries listing point-in-time values for retained earnings:

a. December 31, 2023, Total Retained Earnings of $0

b. December 31, 2024, Total Retained Earnings of $180,754

c. December 31, 2025, Total Retained Earnings of $312,864.74

d. December 31, 2026, Total Retained Earnings of $1,920,257.69

118Mr. Franklin did not testify about these entries during examination-in-chief or cross-examination. On their face, these entries are difficult to reconcile with other evidence in the case.

119Retained earnings are not cash ready to be withdrawn and do not necessarily represent money that the shareholder can take out as income.³⁶ A corporation may have legitimate business reasons to accumulate retained earnings. If and when to take money out of a corporation is an exercise of business judgment made by the directors and shareholders of a company. However, those choices are reviewable by the court when considering a payor’s true income for spousal support purposes.

120My task is to determine an income level that fairly reflects Ernesto’s financial means or put differently, the compensation that is available to him for support purposes.³⁷ In the circumstances of this case, I conclude that it is not appropriate to determine Ernesto’s income using his total T1 income under s. 16 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

121First, I am of the view that Ernesto’s annual income as determined under s. 16 does not reflect all the money available to him for the payment of spousal support. The references to retained earnings in the general ledgers, the fact that he admits to paying for some or all of his vehicle and insurance through the company, the lack of reconciled general ledger accounts for 2025 and 2026, and the use of the Monte Group bank account all suggest to me that his tax returns do not fairly reflect the money available to him to pay spousal support.

122Section 18 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines provide as follows:

18 (1) Where a spouse is a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the spouse’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the spouse’s annual income to include

(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or

(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporation’s pre-tax income.

(2) In determining the pre-tax income of a corporation for the purposes of subsection (1), all amounts paid by the corporation as salaries, wages or management fees, or other payments or benefits, to or on behalf of persons with whom the corporation does not deal at arm’s length must be added to the pre-tax income, unless the spouse establishes that the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.

123In my view, Ernesto has not provided reliable and credible evidence to permit me to complete the calculations required by section 18 of the Child Support Guidelines. To take only one example, Ernesto has not completed the financial year end statements for 2025.

124In the circumstances of this case, I conclude that it is appropriate to impute $80,000 per year of income to Ernesto pursuant to s. 19 of the Child Support Guidelines. In my view there are three related paragraphs of s. 19 that support my decision to impute income to Ernesto:

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these Guidelines;

(f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

(g) the spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(g), the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act.

125For the reasons set out in paragraphs [86] to [106], I find that Ernesto failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so. I do not believe any of the information he tendered at trial paints a complete and accurate picture of the income available to him for spousal support purposes. This justifies imputing income to Ernesto under s. 19(1)(d) of the Child Support Guidelines.

126For the reasons set out in [114] to [119], it appears that Ernesto has diverted income into the retained earnings of his business. Ernesto’s failure to make full financial disclosure exacerbates this problem. Absent any justification for retained earnings on the scale identified in the general ledger, it appears that Ernesto is attempting to reduce his income for the purpose of reducing or eliminating spousal support payments to Rosanna. If Ernesto caused dividends to be paid to him, his income would be much higher for the purposes of calculating spousal support. This justifies imputing income to Ernesto under s. 19(1)(d) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

127For the reasons set out in paragraphs, the absence of reconciled general ledger accounts, financial statements, and an income report make it impossible to determine if Ernesto is unreasonably deducting expenses from income by causing the corporation to pay his personal expenses.³⁸ However, based on his past practice of permitting his corporation to pay personal expenses for Rosanna and his evidence that he has had the corporation pay for his groceries, cellphone, and other expenses, it seems likely to me that he is receiving benefits from the corporation that are not captured in the nil income he claims to earn.

128I accept that Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc. appears to be involved in litigation with its creditors and that its bank account appears to have been garnished. Ernesto’s evidence is that he is living modestly, behind on his rent, and living with a family member. I am not prepared to accept Ernesto’s evidence that he is not able to pay spousal support, due to his deficient financial disclosure. The documents that he has produced cast significant doubt on his claims.

129Rosanna asks me to find that Ernesto is deliberately underemployed. I decline to do so. Ernesto worked on his own account both before and after the separation. I do not think that his current entrepreneurial efforts amount to deliberate unemployment.

130Rosanna asks that I impute $150,000 in income to Ernesto. In my view, that number is too high and is not rooted in the evidence before me. In my view, it is appropriate to impute $80,000 of income to Ernesto for spousal support purposes. This represents about 54% of the income he earned in 2021, when he was running Royal York Meats, a business of roughly similar size in the same line of business. Even accounting for the additional debt Ernesto claims funds the current business, it seems reasonable to me to impute this amount of income. $80,000 is very close to the income Ernesto earned in 2023, despite not working at Royal York Meats for even half that year. I also think $80,000 in income is reasonable given Monte’s Premium Fine Meats Inc.’s gross margin of over $430,000 in 2024, Ernesto’s failure to provide any subsequent financial statements, and the unexplained notations for retained earnings.

131I am not picking the number $80,000 out of the air. I am attempting to determine what is fair and reasonable in light of the evidence before me. The fact that I do not have better evidence to accurately determine the income available to Ernesto for spousal support purposes is a result of choices he made. It would not be fair to Rosanna to simply take his word and accept that spousal support should be determined on the basis of his declared taxable income. To do so would undermine the purposes of the support regime set out in the Divorce Act and shift the consequences of inadequate disclosure from Ernesto to Rosanna.

4. Calculations under the Spousal Support Guidelines

132For the reasons set out above, I will impute income of $80,000 to Ernesto.

133According to her financial statement, Rosanna receives monthly CPP disability payments of $1,273, or $15,276 per year. CPP disability payments are properly included in income for support purposes.³⁹

134Under the without child support formula under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, Rosanna is entitled to monthly spousal support in the range of $971 to $1,133 to $1,294 per month.

135In her submissions, Rosanna sought ongoing spousal support in the low to mid-level range. In my view, it is appropriate to award at the low end of the range.

136Rosanna lives in a building where she pays geared-to-income rent. Under the tenancy agreement entered into evidence, the monthly market rent of Rosanna’s unit is $1,563 per month. Rosanna pays $435 in monthly rate, which means she receives a subsidy of $1,098 per month. Her monthly rent includes all charges for heat, hydro, water, hot water, and one parking spot.

137Lower housing costs for a recipient can reduce the recipient’s need and can point toward an award lower in the range.⁴⁰ A recipient living in a rent-geared to income rental unit has a reduced need for support that may justify an award at the low end of the range.⁴¹

138In all the circumstances of this case, including the age and income of the parties, the fact that I have imputed income to Ernesto, and the fact that the support will be for an indefinite duration, I think it is appropriate to set spousal support at the low range of $971 per month.

139Rosanna is entitled to monthly spousal support from the date of separation (November 24, 2023) to the date of judgment in the total amount of $31,072. I order that Ernesto pay this amount to Rosanna within 30 days of this judgment and that the order be registered with the Family Responsibility Office.

140Rosanna is entitled to go-forward spousal support in the amount of $971 on an indefinite basis. Neither party asked me to impose a review period, so I decline to do so.

6. Order and costs

141Pursuant to the Divorce Act, I make a final order that:

a. Ernesto Monte and Rosanna Monte, who were married on October 16, 2018, be divorced and that the divorce take effect 31 days after the date of this order.

b. Mr. Monte shall pay $31,072 to Ms. Monte for spousal support owing for the period November 24, 2023, to July 30, 2026, and he shall make this payment within 30 days of the date of this order.

c. Starting on August 1, 2026, and on the first day of each following month, Mr. Monte shall pay $971 each month for spousal support based on him having an imputed income of $80,000 per year.

d. The orders described above and a support deduction information form shall be registered with the Family Responsibility Office.

e. All other claims advanced in the application and the response are dismissed.

142If the parties are not able to resolve costs of this application, Rosanna may email her costs submission of no more than three double-spaced pages to Theresa.finelli@ontario.ca on or before July 30, 2026. Ernesto may deliver his responding submission of no more than three double-spaced pages to Theresa.finelli@ontario.ca on or before August 7, 2026. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.

Robert Centa J.

Released: July 23, 2026

CITATION: Monte v. Monte, 2026 ONSC 4300

COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-00043450-0000

DATE: 20260723

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Ernesto Monte

Applicant

– and –

Rosanna Monte

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

R. Centa J.

Footnotes

1. 1Forget v. Forget, [2001] O.J. No. 3691 (S.C.).
2. 2Smith v. Noel, 2023 ONSC 6682.
3. 3Smith, at para. 8.
4. 4Falcon Lumber Limited v. 2480375 Ontario Inc. (GN Mouldings and Doors), 2020 ONCA 310, at para. 54, citing Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 27; Mihoren v. Quesnel, 2021 ONCA 898, 65 R.F.L. (8th) 21, at para. 78, per Brown J.A. (dissenting, but not on this point).
5. 5I described the applicable legal principles in La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 1783, 28 R.F.L. (9th) 362, at paras. 17-25.
6. 6Divorce Act, s. 15.2(4).
7. 7Divorce Act, s. 15.2(6).
8. 8Racco v. Racco, 2014 ONCA 330, 44 R.F.L. (7th) 348, at para. 23.
9. 9Berger v. Berger, 2016 ONCA 884, 85 R.F.L. (7th) 259, at para. 53; R.L. v. M.F., 2025 ONCA 595, 19 R.F.L. (9th) 39, at para. 36, citing Farrar v. Farrar (2003), 2003 CanLII 15943 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 141 (C.A.), at para. 60.
10. 10Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 15; R.L., at para. 27, citing Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 201; Berger, at para. 95. While contractual grounds is a third possible basis for support, it is not relevant to this case.
11. 11Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, 122 O.R. (3d) 337, at para. 38.
12. 12Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 861.
13. 13Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016), at p. 6 (“RUG”).
14. 14Kalaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA), 23 R.F.L. (6th) 235 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 81, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 144.
15. 15Gray, at para. 27, citing Marinangeli v. Marinangeli (2003), 2003 CanLII 27673 (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40 (C.A.), at para. 74.
16. 16RUG, at p. 8.
17. 17R.L., at para. 42.
18. 18Gray, at para. 28, citing Bracklow, at para. 48.
19. 19Smith, at para. 71, citing RUG, at p. 6.
20. 20R.L., at para. 34, citing Linton v. Linton (1990), 1990 CanLII 2597 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 79.
21. 21R.L., at para. 33, citing SSAGs, at s. 7.2.
22. 22R.L., at para. 37.
23. 23MacIntyre v. Winter, 2020 ONSC 4376, at para. 53, var’d 2021 ONCA 516, 59 R.F.L. (8th) 253.
24. 24Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554, 152 O.R. (3d) 369, at para. 3.
25. 25Divorce Act, s. 15.2(3).
26. 26Divorce Act, s. 15.2(4).
27. 27SSAGs, s. 6.1.
28. 28Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, 138 O.R. (3d) 671, at para. 90; Siebert v. Siebert, 2014 ONSC 4481, at para. 117, citing Brophy v. Brophy (2002), 2002 CanLII 76706 (ON SC), 32 R.F.L. (5th) 1, at para. 35 (Ont. S.C.); Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2013 ONSC 784, 33 R.F.L. (7th) 331, at para. 151, aff’d 2014 ONCA 827, 52 R.F.L. (7th) 17; Thompson v. Gilchrist, 2012 ONSC 4137, 27 R.F.L. (7th) 83, at para. 44, citing Murray v. Murray (2003), 2003 CanLII 64299 (ON SC), 66 O.R. (3d) 540 (S.C.), at para. 57, rev’d on other grounds (2005), 2005 CanLII 30422 (ON CA), 76 O.R. (3d) 546, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31182 (February 23, 2006).
29. 29Federal Child Support Guidelines, s. 21(1)(a) and (b).
30. 30Child Support Guidelines, s. 18(1).
31. 31According to the unaudited financial statements of the company, it was incorporated on September 29, 2016.
32. 32Sundberg v. Sundberg, 2023 ONSC 5518, 94 R.F.L. (8th) 487, at para. 4.
33. 33Tonogai v. Tonogai, 2021 ONSC 2366, 53 R.F.L. (8th) 330, at para. 22.
34. 34Michi v. Michi, 2008 CanLII 728 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 55; Di Luca v. Di Luca (2004), 2004 CanLII 5044 (ON SC), 1 R.F.L. (6th) 162 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 10; Tonagai, at para. 22.
35. 35Tonogai, at para. 22; cited in Sundberg, at para. 4(g).
36. 36Mayer v. Mayer, 2013 ONSC 7099, at para. 60, citing Bembridge v. Bembridge, 2009 NSSC 158, 73 R.F.L. (6th) 147, at paras. 14, 33-39.
37. 37Ludmer, at paras. 151-57.
38. 38Ludmer, at paras. 151-57.
39. 39Truscello v. Truscello, 2014 ONSC 4590, at paras. 22-24.
40. 40RUG, at p. 46.
41. 41Guignard v. Guignard, 2011 ONSC 7078, at para 46.