CITATION: Bloomberg v. Burnett, 2026 ONSC 3863

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00052854-0000

DATE: 20260703

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JONATHAN BLOOMBERG

Applicant

– and –

EMILY BURNETT

Respondent

Heather Hansen, Sophia Dales and Maura O’Sullivan, for the Applicant

Harold Niman, Richard Niman and Hanna Kofman, for the Respondent

HEARD: June 11, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

DIAMOND J.:

Overview

1On May 12, 2026, the respondent’s motion seeking interim child and spousal support was scheduled to proceed before me for a full day hearing. The respondent primarily brought her motion to seek the regularization of child and spousal support between the parties, as up to that date there had been a series of substantive payments (some uncharacterized and others explicitly characterized) made by the applicant to the respondent.

2The applicant requested an adjournment of the respondent’s motion for the purpose of (a) allowing cross examination on both parties’ affidavits, and (b) permitting him to serve and file sur-reply material from his financial expert to address and respond to a reply affidavit (containing an income report for the first time) from the respondent’s expert.

3By Endorsement dated May 12, 2026, I adjourned the respondent’s motion, on specific terms, for approximately one month to allow for the above steps to be completed.

4Those steps were completed, and the respondent’s motion ultimately proceeded before me on June 11, 2026. At the conclusion of that full-day hearing, I took my decision under reserve.

Summary of relevant facts

5The parties began dating in 2006, and were married on November 11, 2009. They separated on a final basis in or around September 2024 after nearly fifteen years of marriage.

6The applicant attended the Wharton School of Business and obtained his MBA. He then attended Tufts University to obtain his undergraduate degree, and later attended Oxford University. He was previously employed in both Toronto and New York in various senior roles at several asset management firms.

7The respondent graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania, and later obtained a Bachelor of Science and Economics from the Wharton School of Business.

8The respondent was employed at Secor Consulting in Toronto until the parties began trying to have a child. The parties now have four children who are currently 8, 10, 12 and 14 years of age respectively.

9Several years ago, and with the assistance of his father, the respondent founded BloombergSen Inc.(“BSI”), which is currently a very profitable fund enterprise owned and managed by the respondent and one business partner.

10From the date of the parties’ marriage onwards, the parties’ family wealth increased immensely as a result of the fund units invested in and performance of BSI.

11The respondent has not worked outside the home since early 2012. There is no dispute between the parties that while the applicant was and remains very active in the lives of the parties’ four children, the respondent was and remains the primary caregiver for the children. As stated by the applicant himself, the respondent was an “enormous contributor” to the care of the parties’ children, managing the children’s day to day lives.

12As stated, the applicant worked consistently and diligently at BSI, growing the fund into an (approximate) $200,000,000.00 asset.

13In addition to the BSI fund, the parties own three other major capital assets: (i) the matrimonial home located in the Forest Hill neighbourhood worth approximately $11,000,000.00, (ii) vacant land in the Forest Hill neighbourhood worth approximately $16,000,000.00, and (iii) a Muskoka cottage valued at approximately at $30,000,000.00.

14While the Forest Hill and Toronto properties are owned jointly by the parties, the Muskoka cottage property (which is in the late stages of construction) is owned solely by the respondent.

15The record is clear that the parties lived a very affluent lifestyle during their marriage. Luxury purchases were somewhat common, and many high-end family vacations were taken with the parties staying in luxury accommodations.

16All of the parties’ children attend different private schools, in part due to each private school addressing (in the parties’ view) their children’s specific needs.

17The breakdown of the parties’ marriage began in 2022. While the issue of the respondent’s spending will be addressed in greater detail hereinafter, it is the applicant’s position that since 2022, the respondent’s monthly and annual purchases have increased exponentially, and over his consistent protestations.

18The respondent’s budget (prepared in support of her motion) contains items and amounts which, according to the applicant, were never representative or illustrative of the parties’ historical lifestyle prior to the marriage’s deterioration. The applicant states that the respondent’s exorbitant spending has only continued to increase year over year post-separation.

19As alluded to above, since the parties’ separation there has been no regularized child or spousal support structure. Instead, since May 2025 the applicant has transferred the sum of $4,300,000.00 to the respondent through several separate advances. While some of the $4,300,000.00 in advances have been uncharacterized, the last tranche of $3,000,000.00 transferred to the respondent in May 2026 was explicitly described by his counsel as “on account of capital”.

20On this motion, the applicant initially took the position that from 2023 to date, he has redeemed over $43,000,000.00 of BSI fund units to generate cash to fund post-separation expenses. However, as raised during the hearing of the respondent’s motion, the majority of that money was in fact used to fund the construction of the parties’ Muskoka cottage. As a result, approximately $10,000,000.00-$13,000,000.00 generated by the sale of BSI fund units were used by the applicant to fund payment of (a) advances he made to the respondent, and (b) payment of other significant expenses incurred on the respondent’s credit cards, other credit cards used for the children’s expenses, and various fixed expenses associated with the parties’ properties. This was especially so in light of the fact that the respondent unilaterally precluded the use of Muskoka cottage’s line of credit to service its continuing renovation and carrying costs.

The parties’ income

21The respondent earns approximately $200,000.00 per annum paid to her by BSI. This salary is for the purpose of income splitting. BSI continues to maintain the respondent’s salary post-separation.

22With respect to the applicant’s income, each party has retained their own expert to produce income reports. Each income report provides a series of calculations based upon two scenarios. The first scenario uses all available sources of income for the applicant. The second scenario excludes non-recurring income to the applicant.

23Not surprisingly, both experts’ respective income reports are very different. It can be argued that the income figures put forth by both experts in the first scenario are somewhat in the same universe. However, the figures both experts concluded in the second scenario are in different galaxies. For example, the 2025 income figure calculated by the respondent’s expert is approximately six times the figure proposed by the applicant’s expert.

24Neither expert was cross-examined upon their respective opinions.

25For nearly the entire time since separation, the applicant has made with prejudice offers to advance an equal division of capital in order to maintain the current financial status quo. Specifically, the applicant has proposed that the BSI fund be split through a (proverbial) “butterfly transaction”, which is the most tax-advantageous method for the respondent to receive her equal share of BSI.

26According to the valuations obtained by the applicant, proceeding by way of a butterfly transaction would leave the respondent with approximately $90,000,000.00, which according to the applicant would provide the respondent with unfettered access to her wealth at any time and on her own terms.

27At this time, there have been no substantive discussions between the parties with respect to the equalization or disposition of the remaining three real properties, only two of which are in fact owned jointly and subject to a potential partition and sale if necessary.

28For her part, the respondent has been somewhat ambivalent towards the applicant’s butterfly transaction proposal(s). While the respondent has not explicitly rejected any such proposal, she has not necessarily agreed to one either. Obviously, it would be in both parties’ interests to divide the value of BSI in the most tax-beneficial way possible. However, it is within the respondent’s rights to further negotiate the terms of the butterfly transaction, and perhaps obtain her own valuation(s).

Issues to be decided

29In my view, based upon the positions taken by the parties at the hearing of the respondent’s motion, this Court is charged with determining the following issues:

1. Is the respondent’s motion premature given that she will be receiving, at a minimum, $90,000,000.00 from the equalization of BSI?

2. If the respondent’s motion is not premature, is the respondent entitled to interim spousal support?

3. If the respondent is entitled to interim spousal support, what is the proper assessment of the amount of interim spousal support due to the respondent?

4. What is the proper assessment of the amount of interim child support due to the respondent?

5. Should retroactive support be ordered payable on this motion, and if so in what amount?

30I will now proceed to address each of the above issues in turn.

Issue #1 Is the respondent’s motion premature given that she will be receiving, at a minimum, $90,000,000.00 from the equalization of BSI?

31In resisting the respondent’s motion for interim child and spousal support, the applicant submits that the motion is premature given that the respondent has “refused to receive her capital which, once received, will meet the objectives of the Divorce Act, and render any compensatory entitlement moot”.

32In support of his position, the respondent relies upon appellate jurisprudence mandating the Court to consider the impact of equalization upon a spouse’s support entitlement. As held by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Greenglass v. Greenglass 2010 ONCA 675:

“Section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), provides a list of circumstances to consider when determining spousal support. This list includes the means of the parties. When determining a party's means, all pecuniary resources must be taken into account, including capital assets: Leskun v. Leskun (2006), 2006 SCC 25, 34 R.F.L. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 29.

As will be seen, in the circumstances of this case, Mr. Joseph is correct. That said, the amount of the equalization payment and the impact of any potential income-generating potential associated with the assets with which each party is left will almost invariably affect the support analysis. As a matter of law, therefore, the calculation of the division of assets and resulting equalization payment must always precede any support analysis.”

33In Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that when dealing with a payor’s income above the $350,000.00 threshold, any individualized, fact-specific analysis requires consideration of the effects of an equalization payment. This includes an assessment of the question of entitlement.

34In Plese v. Herjavec, 2020 ONCA 810, the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that an assessment of a dependent spouse’s capital base resulting from an equalization payment (and the potential investment income therefrom) was in line with principles set out in Halliwell:

“Ultimately, the error in Halliwell was the trial judge’s failure to fully consider the effects of the equalization payment, beginning with the question of entitlement. Here, in her analysis of entitlement, the trial judge looked at the respondent’s capital base resulting from the equalization payment and the potential investment income. The trial judge understood that the ability of the respondent’s capital base to meet her future needs could not be examined in isolation. She attributed some of the respondent’s capital base to the costs of residences, which were not income-producing, and the remainder to income-generating vehicles at an appropriate rate of return. She also compared the capital base of the respondent to that of the appellant. She found that, after the equalization payment, the appellant still had a substantial capital base through THG, his income of more than $5.5 million per year, his “luxurious” home in California, and other assets and savings.”

35The applicant argues that any compensatory entitlement on the part of the respondent will be fully satisfied by the equalization of the parties’ assets, and that given their wealth, the “aims of compensatory support will be achieved through a division of wealth generated during the marriage”. As the respondent has remained ambivalent in response to the applicant’s butterfly transaction proposal(s), she should thus “not be allowed to use her own opportunistic and manufactured lack of capital to ground a claim for extraordinary levels of support on an interim basis”.

36While I am cognizant of the fact that the respondent is very likely due an extremely large equalization payment, I cannot agree with the applicant’s position for two principal reasons.

37First, the jurisprudence relied upon by the applicant sets out various principles arising from trial decisions. The Court’s determination of equalization (and for that matter, income and support thereafter) is obviously based upon a much more fulsome and detailed record at the trial stage of any proceeding. Presumably, all parties at trial will have had the opportunity to obtain and exchange complete financial disclosure, conduct questioning, pursue any motions arising from disclosure and/or questioning, retain financial experts, and cross-examine the parties, witnesses and/or financial experts.

38Once all of those steps are completed, the finality of an equalization payment is what should inform the Court’s assessment and disposition of support, as the Court would then (and only then) be in a position to consider a recipient spouse’s financial status going forward post-separation.

39This proceeding is, effectively, in its infancy. Apart from an attendance in To Be Spoken to Court (“TBST”), and an urgent case conference arising from that TBST attendance, the respondent’s motion seeking interim support is the only substantive step taken in this application to date.

40Interim support is designed to provide income to dependent spouses from the date a proceeding is commenced until trial. As held in Kowalski v. Grant, 2007 MBQB 235, on a motion for interim support the Court need not conduct a complete inquiry into all aspects and details to determine to what extent either party suffered an economic advantage or disadvantage as a result of the relationship. That task is left to the trial judge.

41If the dependent spouse is able to present a triable case for an economic disadvantage, interim support is simply a holding order to maintain the parties’ accustomed lifestyle, if possible, pending final disposition. In Giglio v Giglio, 2015 ONSC 8039, Justice LeMay held that when assessing motions for interim support, the Court will not embark upon an in-depth analysis of the parties’ circumstances. This is an exercise best left to the trial judge. The Court simply seeks to achieve rough justice at best.

42Accordingly, while a large equalization payment due to the respondent is arguably inevitable, at this stage of the proceeding I do not find the respondent’s motion to be premature, as to hold otherwise would effectively hamstring the respondent from regularizing support until trial (which could be several years from now).

43Secondly, and related to the findings above, there is no evidence before this Court that the applicant could force the respondent to enter into a butterfly transaction. This is unlike a situation where a party asks the Court to consider a pending partition and sale of jointly owned property generating large sale proceeds. In such circumstances, as the Court has jurisdiction to order partition and sale of a jointly owned property, the fallout from a sale could impact a dependent spouse’s request for support, as a court-ordered “advance on equalization” could be taken into account.

44This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any request mandating the parties to “butterfly” the BSI asset. As such, no “advance on equalization” is available, and the respondent’s motion is not premature.

45Accordingly, the answer to Issue #1 is “no”.

Issue #2 If the respondent’s motion is not premature, is the respondent entitled to interim spousal support?

46As the party seeking interim spousal support, the respondent has the onus of establishing that there is a prima facie case with respect to both entitlement and quantum. As held in Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, 2012 ONSC 6689, if a claimant cannot establish an arguable case for entitlement, even on an interim motion for spousal support, then the claimant’s request should be dismissed regardless if the claimant has need and/or the other party has the means to pay.

47In determining whether a claimant is entitled to spousal support, the starting point is a review of the objectives set out in section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, which includes an assessment of the presence of any economic advantages or disadvantages to spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage. Against the background of those objectives, the Court must then consider the factors set out in section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act including non-compensatory factors such as the means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, the length of time the spouses cohabited, and the functions performed by each spouse during the marriage. While the Court is mandated to consider all of the section 15.2(4) factors, no one factor is paramount.

48As held by Justice Kraft in Badar v. Danish 2026 ONSC 88, the Court must examine all of the relevant factors in light of the stipulated objectives of support, and exercise its discretion in a manner that “equitably alleviates the adverse consequences of the marriage breakdown and strikes the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case”.

49While income disparity alone does not determine entitlement to spousal support, the respondent properly admits that “this is a paradigmatic case”.

50As Issue #1 has been decided against the applicant, his principal alternative argument is that on the record tendered by the respondent, she has not established a prima facie entitlement on the basis of need. The applicant argues that need is not established by simply filing a “sky-high budget” and showing an income deficit.

51The applicant further points to the fact that he has advanced a total of $4,300,000/00 to the respondent since May 2025, and the respondent’s latest sworn financial statement indicates that she has approximately $2,300,000.00 in the account where the applicant transferred his payments.

52In my view, for the purpose of her motion for interim support, the respondent has demonstrated a case for entitlement. This was a lengthy marriage, and the record on this motion discloses that the respondent took steps to place her career on hold in order to support the applicant’s financial and business goals in starting and developing BSI into the very successful undertaking it is today. As put by the respondent, her assumption of domestic and family responsibilities freed the applicant to dedicate long hours to further his career. I find at this stage of the proceeding that the applicant’s significant business successes were made possible through, inter alia, the respondent’s sacrifices and contributions to their family.

53As a result of the parties’ separation, the respondent finds herself out of the work force for approximately 15 years, and it is clear that she cannot earn an income herself that will allow her to maintain her and the children’s lifestyle to which they have all been accustomed.

54With respect to the applicant’s submission that his $4,300,000.00 advanced to the respondent to date effectively precludes her need for interim spousal support, I note that $3,000,000.00 of that sum was explicitly advanced by the applicant on account of capital, and not on an uncharacterized basis. It is trite to state that the respondent’s need for spousal support should not be fulfilled with her own capital assets.

55For these reasons, the answer to Issue #2 is “yes”.

Issue #3 If the respondent is entitled to interim spousal support, what is the proper assessment of the amount of interim spousal support due to the respondent?

56The Divorce Act does not address how the Court is to calculate spousal support, but provides legislative guidelines for the Court to consider in making any spousal support award.

57The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAGs”) were published with the goal of bringing more predictability to the determination of spousal support under the Divorce Act. The SSAGs formulas take various factors into account, including the parties’ income, child support and any section 7 expenses under the Child Support Guidelines.

58As held by the Divisional Court in Carrubba-Gomes v. Gomes 2025 ONSC 6377 (Can LII):

“Unlike the CSGs, the SSAGs “are neither legislated nor binding; they are only advisory”: Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, 88 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 95; see SSAGs, at p. xi. However, as set out in recent decisions on appeal from final spousal support orders, the Court of Appeal for Ontario has described the SSAGs as the “presumptive starting point” for determining spousal support.

As stated in Rathee v. Rathee, 2024 ONCA 912, 8 R.F.L. (9th) 251, at paras. 32-33:

‘In McKinnon v. McKinnon, 2018 ONCA 596, van Rensburg J.A. stated at para. 24:

The SSAGs are the presumptive starting point for awarding support. Any departure from them requires adequate explanation: Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272 at paras. 105 and 106.

In Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272, Simmons J.A. explained the rationale for this requirement, at para. 105: "without [the SSAGs], it is very difficult to establish a principled basis for arriving at a figure for spousal support.”

59In Driscoll v. Driscol, 2009 Can LII 66373 (ONSC), Justice Lemon set out a helpful list of principles governing interim motions for spousal support, including the principle that any interim order for spousal support should fall within the range suggested by the SSAGs unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise.

60The jurisprudence is clear that when a parent’s level of income lands over the presumed ceiling of $350,000.00, the Court shall consider certain principles including but not limited to:

a. The SSAGs formulas are no longer presumptive,

b. The ceiling is not a “hard cap” as spousal support typically increases for payor incomes above $350,000.00,

c. The SSAGs formulas are not to be applied automatically above the $350,000.00 ceiling, although the formulas may provide an appropriate method in determining spousal support in an individual case, and

d. When addressing income above the $350,000.00 ceiling, the Court’s determination of spousal support requires an individualized fact-specific analysis.

61While the SSAGs formulas are routinely considered in high income cases, this does not necessarily mean that those formulas are presumptive or mandatory when the payor’s income is above the $350,000.00 ceiling. As held in Carrubba-Gomes, this is especially so in the context of a motion for interim spousal support that is subject to reconsideration, and if necessary adjustment, at trial.

62As the respondent submits, the first step in assessing the issue of the quantum of spousal support is to determine a payor’s income. The applicant reminds this Court that the corollary to the respondent’s entitlement is the applicant’s ability to pay, and no interim support order should be made if it is beyond a payor’s ability to pay. Even the highest income earner is not presumed to have unlimited means. As stated in Hall v. Galbraith 2023 ONSC 2161 (Can LII), a support order which “pulls the financial rod from under the payor risks the relevant comfort enjoyed by the family members he left behind”.

63As noted above, the two income reports produced respectively by the parties come to very different conclusions. During argument of the respondent’s motion, counsel for both parties took turns attacking and defending the income reports of the experts retained by the opposite party.

64No cross-examination of the experts upon their income reports has taken place, as that is apparently a step which will not proceed until the trial of this proceeding (if same occurs).

65Each income report addresses two different scenarios, namely whether to include or exclude non-recurring income to the applicant. While the applicant has the obligation to establish his income for support purposes, as the party proposing that corporate pre-tax income be attributed to the applicant, the respondent bears the onus of demonstrating a factual and legal basis for such an attribution.

66While I have concluded that the respondent has an entitlement to support, this Court is simply not in any reasonable position to make findings, even on an interim basis, as to the respondent’s current income. There is obviously a range upon which the respondent’s current income will fall at trial on a proper evidentiary record. For now, at this early and interim stage of the proceeding, I can simply conclude that the applicant has an ability to pay, and the respondent has a need to receive support.

67I am thus mandated to conduct the case-specific factual analysis as described by Justice Shore in Hopkinson v. Hopkinson 2023 ONSC 1583 (Can LII). One of the underlying objectives of this exercise is to try and maintain the lifestyle to which the parties were accustomed during the marriage (on the assumption that the payor maintains the ability to pay).

68The applicant submits that the budget prepared by the respondent in support of her motion is very exaggerated, fantastical and not illustrative of the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties and their children during their marriage.

69In the record before this Court, there is only one pre-2022 example tendered by the applicant in his responding motion materials evidencing him taking issue with the respondent’s spending/expenses. This exchange between the parties took place in 2016, and appears to be rather isolated. As such, the lack of protestation on the part of the applicant during that period leads to an interim finding that whatever expenses were being incurred by the respondent then were likely in line with the parties’ lifestyle.

70However, since 2022 (ie. when the marriage began to deteriorate), there are numerous examples of the applicant taking great issue with an increase in the amount of expenses being incurred by the respondent. These protestations were consistent, and have continued from 2022 until the present day. A review of the text message exchanges between the parties, along with the historical and current financial documentation, confirms at this interim stage that the expenses incurred by the respondent since 2022 have continued to increase.

71As such, it is the applicant’s position that the budget prepared by the respondent is more in line with the respondent’s recent increased spending than the parties’ historical lifestyle during their marriage. Based upon the record before this Court, it appears that the Applicant’s position has some merit, although this issue will be substantively fleshed out at the trial of this proceeding.

72The applicant vigorously challenges the quantum of spousal support sought by the respondent, arguing that such an amount ($400,000.00 per month) is literally unprecedented and it would be the highest interim spousal support award to be ordered to date in Canada. The applicant argues that the quantum sought by the respondent is simply her “wish list” rather than a reasonably acceptable and interim solution until the trial of this proceeding.

73In principle, the Court will not examine all of the expenses listed in a budget with a fine-toothed comb, but rather strive to fashion an interim support order that maintains a dependent spouse’s reasonable standard of living pending further examination at trial. That said, on an interim without prejudice basis I agree with the applicant that the respondent’s monthly expenses are, in part, likely inflated. While a trial judge will be in a better position to assess the reasonableness and reliability of the respondent’s monthly expenses, the budget proposed by the respondent does not seem to accurately reflect the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the marriage. Some of the budget entries which lead me to such a conclusion are as follows:

Expense

Monthly Amount

Gardening

$7,013.84

Audio Video Maintenance

$5,517.92

Property Maintenance/Concierge Service

$12,572.08

Household Supplies

$24,072.44

Personal Chef

$11,070.33

Personal Transportation (Uber and Personal Driver)

$3,380.66

Concerts

$1,466.59

Meals Outside the Home (No children)

$2,363.25

74The above expenses either started around or after the time the parties separated, or increased from 2022 to the present date.

75On cross-examination, the respondent gave evidence that several items in her budget are non-recurring, and were not “monthly needs”.

76As Justice Nakonechny qualified in the unreported decision in Wynn v. Wynn (FS-22-30497, September 26, 2025), the respondent’s budget is grounded in some places, but aspirational in others. It does not seem to properly reflect what the parties enjoyed and incurred during their marriage.

77In my view, an appropriate and reasonable result on this interim motion is to award the respondent monthly spousal support (taxable to the respondent and tax deductible to the applicant) in the sum of $200,000.00 commencing on August 1, 2026. This will be over and above the respondent’s BSI salary which the applicant gave evidence he is still paying.

78While the parties agree that the respondent shall continue to maintain exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, as a joint owner she is responsible for 50% of the carrying costs, and 100% of the day-to-day expenses, going forward on an interim and without prejudice basis.

79Finally, and on agreement of the parties, the applicant shall continue to maintain the carrying costs and other expenses associated with the Muskoka cottage, but the line of the credit registered against title to the Muskoka cottage shall be released and available to the applicant for the above specific purpose.

Issue #4 What is the proper assessment of the amount of interim child support due to the respondent?

80To begin, the applicant has agreed to continue funding 100% of the children’s agreed upon section 7 expenses, which principally includes their summer camp fees, annual school tuition, and extracurricular activities. This undertaking shall form part of the Order arising from this Endorsement.

81I have undertaken the same exercise in analyzing the respondent’s budget with respect to the children’s expenses, as the applicant’s income obviously exceeds the threshold set out in the Child Support Guidelines. I agree with the applicant that a straightforward application of the Child Support Guidelines would be inappropriate in these circumstances and it is preferrable on an interim basis to arrive at a quantum of child support that reflects the children’s actual and recurring needs in light of the parties’ respective financial circumstances. This is especially so given the current shared parenting arrangement between the parties.

82Both parties cite and rely upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal case of Francis v. Baker 1999 Can LII 659 (SCC), and in particular the finding that in deciding whether to award child support that departs from the Child Support Guidelines, a proper balance is struck requiring a payor to demonstrate that the proposed child expenses are so high as to exceed the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.

83As this Court cannot come to any conclusions with respect to the applicant’s annual income, an analysis of the children’s condition, means, needs and other circumstances is plainly necessary. The respondent acknowledges this reality, and has provided her detailed budget setting out the children’s expenses for that purpose.

84In reviewing the respondent’s budget for the children’s expenses, there are several entries therein which, in my view, approach being exorbitant. Some of those expenses include the following:

Expenses

Monthly Amount

Nannies (five) and Assistants (two)

$33,902.08

Clothing

$25,000.00

Birthday parties for each Child

$5,967.75

Bar/Bat Mitzvahs for Children

$28,138.58

Home IT Maintenance

$3.078.33

Travel with Children

$66,172.00

Family Photographer

$4,264.58

Sports Tickets

$2,066.00

85In my view, the Respondent’s proposed budget is sufficiently inflated to “exceed the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible”. As such, I find that an appropriate monthly amount for child support, reflecting a budget and lifestyle which would not risk having any deleterious effect on the children, is $75,000.00 commencing on August 1, 2026.

86In addition, since the children’s various nannies and assistants have been in place for several years, I believe this expense should be carved out from the monthly child support amount, but with the respondent be required to contribute a reasonable percentage of the collective salaries of the nannies and assistants she wishes to maintain. I am thus ordering the applicant to pay the sum of $27,000.00 per month (ie. approximately $325,000.00 per year) towards those salaries also commencing on August 1, 2026.

Issue #5 Should retroactive support be ordered payable on this motion, and if so in what amount?

87While retroactive spousal and child support from separation to date may be payable, in my view, it is not appropriate for this Court to conduct such an analysis at this interim and early stage.

88As held by the Supreme Court of Canada in DBS v. GSR 2006 SCC 37 in assessing the appropriateness of a retroactive child support order, the Court must consider the following four factors to achieve a fair award that balances a child’s interest with the payor’s circumstances and the overall need for fairness and flexibility:

a. Whether the recipient has an understandable reason for the delay in seeking relief,

b. The payor’s conduct,

c. The children’s circumstances, and

d. Whether a retroactive award would result in any hardship to the payor.

89While the Court should apply a holistic view and not rely on any one of the above four factors as being decisive, the factual matrix required for this task is far better raised and argued at trial. The sum of $4,300,000.00 has already been advanced to the respondent, and there are significant funds still in the account which the respondent can access. In such circumstances, I do not believe it appropriate to craft a retroactive support order and reserve that issue to the trial judge.

90Accordingly, the answer to Issue #5 is “no”.

91Finally, at the conclusion of the hearing of the respondent’s motion I proposed to the parties that once my decision was complete and released, I could act as the case management judge for this proceeding with a view to conferencing the issues, scheduling any further interim motions or attendances, and hopefully assisting the parties with a potential settlement.

92Both parties agreed with my proposal, and as such I am appointing myself the case management judge for this proceeding. The Family Trial Office shall be advised by the parties accordingly.

Costs

93In my view, success has arguably been divided on this motion. The parties, however, may take a different view and may have settlement offers to share with the Court.

94As such, if either party wishes to seek costs of this motion, they may serve and file written costs submissions, limited to 5 pages (including a Costs Outline), in accordance with the following schedule:

a. The respondent’s written cost submissions to be served and filed within 14 business days of the release of this Endorsement; and,

b. The applicant’s responding written cost submissions to be served and filed within 14 days of the receipt of the respondent’s written cost submissions.

Diamond J.

Released: July 3, 2026

CITATION: Bloomberg v. Burnett, 2026 ONSC 3863