CITATION: Badar. v. Danish, 2026 ONSC 88

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00037415-0000

DATE: 20260106

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Danish Badar

Applicant

– and –

Madiha Danish

Respondent

Self-Represented

Self-Represented

HEARD: December 1^st, December 2^nd, December 3^rd, December 4^th, December 5^th Decembre 8^th, December 9^th and December 10, 2025.

M. KRAFT, J.

Overview

1This eight-day trial initially concerned the primary residence of the parties' eight-year-old son, who has lived with the mother in Scarborough since the March 2023 separation. The father, residing in Keswick, sought primary residence. However, the parties ultimately consented to the child remaining primarily with the mother (now in Markham) under a shared parenting schedule, finishing the school year in Scarborough before moving to the mother's catchment area in September 2026. The Court must now decide on decision-making responsibility, child and spousal support, and equalization.

2This has been a high-conflict case involving the Children’s Aid Society and the police. A total of 12 orders have been issued by this Court since September 5, 2023.

3Pursuant to the consent Order of Black J., dated January 30, 2024 (the “Black Order”), the father was granted parenting time on Tuesdays overnights and three consecutive weekends. This schedule was modified by the Order of Diamond, J., dated May 14, 2024 (“Diamond Order”), which extended the first two weekends to Monday mornings and the third to Sunday at 7:00 p.m. Consequently, I. spends 12 overnights with the father in Keswick, ON and 16 with the mother in a 28-day cycle, with school holidays shared equally.

4The mother, now remarried, resides in Markham but retains the rented matrimonial home in Scarborough, where she sublets a room. The parties have agreed to maintain the parenting schedule which has been in place for the last two-years: I. will reside primarily with the mother in Markham, spending 12 overnights per 28-day cycle with the father in Keswick. PA days and school holidays will be shared equally. I. will complete Grade 4 in Scarborough before transferring to a school in the mother’s Markham catchment area in September 2026. The mother is expecting a child in March 2026.

5The mother seeks sole decision-making for the child’s education and health, asserting that their relationship history makes joint decision-making unworkable. She is open to joint decision- making for religion only. To address the father's abusive communication, she asks that all contact be moved to a co-parenting app. Finally, she seeks an annual two-week travel provision to allow her to take I. to Pakistan, contingent on providing 30 days’ notice to the father.

6The father requests sole decision-making for education and joint decision-making for all other major issues, or a full joint-decision-making regime as an alternative. He is agreeable to using a co-parenting application. However, he opposes travel to Pakistan because it is not a signatory to Hague Convention on Child Abduction and asks that he be granted possession of I.’s government documents.

7Beyond parenting relief, the mother seeks retroactive and ongoing child support, spousal support, and equalization. While acknowledging potential child support arrears, the father contends that these are largely satisfied by direct rent payments he made post-separation. He further requests that any remaining arrears be set off against costs owed to him by the other under three prior court orders. The father denies that the mother has spousal support entitlement, seeks an equalization payment of $133,954.90, and argues that $71,000 in income should be imputed to the mother for support purposes.

Issues to be Decided at Trial

8The issues for me to decide at this trial are as follows:

a. Which decision-making regime is in the child’s best interests?

b. How should the parties communicate about the child, hold the child’s government issued documentation and address travel with the child to Pakistan?

c. Does the father owe the mother retroactive child support, both table and s.7 expenses and if so, in what amount? What is the father’s ongoing child support obligation?

d. Is the mother entitled to spousal support and if so, in which amount for what duration?

e. Which party owes the other an equalization payment and in what amount?

f. Which party owes the other costs of this Trial?

Factual Background

9The parties met on Facebook when the father was living in Toronto and the mother was living in Pakistan.

10They were married on November 11, 2013, in Islamabad, Pakistan. They have one child of the marriage. I. was born in December of 2016. He is now 9 years old.

11After ten-years of marriage, the parties separated on March 1, 2023. They were divorced by the order of Nakonechny, J., on February 14, 2025.

12The father sponsored the mother to immigrate to Canada. She arrived in Canada on October 15, 2015. When the mother arrived in Canada, the parties resided in an apartment with the father’s siblings and parents.

13The parties moved to Pickering when I. was born in December 2016. In April 2017, they moved to 88 Corporate Drive in Etobicoke, Unit 609, in a one-bedroom unit with one washroom. This was the matrimonial home.

14The father is employed as a Business Expertise Advisor for the Old Age Security Department by Service Canada and earns $78,634.90 annually. His T1 form for 2024 lists his line 15000 income at $81,000 which he claims includes a retroactive pay adjustment. He has no other income. The father suffers from ulcerative colitis - a chronic auto immune disease.

15The mother worked part-time for the YMCA and Toronto District School Board (“TDSB”) during the marriage. She denies the father’s assertion that she operates an ongoing Pakistani handicrafts business, called Studio Pakistan, characterizing it as a past sale of $500 worth of goods. She claims that the venture has no business name, website, or bank account, and that the sale of her remaining inventory has ended any income generation. She acknowledges that there is an Instagram page for this venture.

16Shortly after I.'s birth, the mother was charged with assaulting the father following an altercation she attributed to post-birth struggles and his criticism. The father reported scratches, leading the mother to leave temporarily with the infant. According to the father, he wrote to the Crown and begged them to drop the charges. The mother submitted the charges were dropped because she had just given birth and there was no merit to the charges. The parties reconciled.

17The father claims that he was the primary parent to I. throughout the marriage. He took 11 months parental leave when I. was born. The mother denies that the father was I.’s primary caregiver. While she agrees that the father took parental leave, she asserts that he spent that time with friends and family and did not assist with childcare responsibilities for I.

18The father describes a relationship where he was a victim of family violence at the hands of the mother. He describes suffering verbal abuse at her hands and being sexually assaulted by the mother.

19The mother also describes a relationship where the father was engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour toward her including physical violence, psychological name calling and financial control. The mother testified that the father would regularly belittle her and verbally abuse her for posting pictures on social media. The mother testified that the family violence took a toll on her physical and mental health, particularly after the birth of I. The mother testified that the father would tell her that his mother did not think she knew how to feed the baby properly, would not help her when the baby would be up in the middle of the night, even just after the birth when she was physically exhausted. The mother asserts that after separation, the father and his sister threatened to release intimate texts and photographs of her to her family if she did not comply with his demands. The mother describes that the father hit her, punched walls, broke her property and threatened to take the child away from her and tell everyone that she is “mental.”

20On June 11, 2021, the mother and I. travelled to Pakistan to visit her critically ill father, who passed away while they were flying to Pakistan. The mother’s permanent residence card expired and, as a result, she needed to apply to IRCC to obtain a Permanent Residence Travel Document before she could return to Canada which caused a delay for her return to Canada. The mother and I. remained in Pakistan and did not return to Toronto until May of 2022. She and I. attended a family wedding for her brother and then returned to Toronto. Throughout this trial, the father referred to the mother’s time in Pakistan with I. as being a unilateral decision on her part to withhold I. from him. The mother disputed that she unilaterally stayed with I. in Pakistan. Instead, she submits that the father was aware that they were in Pakistan, he came to Pakistan for 45 days while they were there, they agreed to enrol I. in school there and she returned with I. as soon as she was able to do so.

21The father asserts that when the mother and I. were in Pakistan, he travelled there to spend time with them and to attend the mother’s father’s memorial. He testified that he was in Pakistan for 45 days. The father testified that when he was in Pakistan, the mother prevented him from spending time with I. The mother vehemently denies this. She asserts that when the father came to Pakistan, he informed her that he was taking a second wife and told her about the other woman. The father testified that when he was in Pakistan, the mother’s brother, Muhammad Hamid, held the father hostage in his home for 3 hours at gun point. The father’s evidence is that this occurred because of accusations about him wanting a second wife. The father claims that the mother’s brother is an assistant director at the Federal Government of Pakistan, and he was terrified and then returned to Canada. The wife denies this story. There is no corroborating evidence about these events.

22When the mother returned from Pakistan in May 2022, she returned to working part-time for the TDSB as a lunchroom supervisor.

23There was a lot of tension between the parties and the relationship become toxic. The mother claims that this toxicity arose from her feeling humiliated by the father wanting to or having a second wife and the ongoing family violence she suffered at his hands.

24On March 1, 2023, the father was charged with assault. At this time, the mother fled the matrimonial home with the child. This is the date of separation. The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (“CAST”) had an open protection file with the family from March 1, 2023, to April

19, 2023, and June 2, 2023, to June 9, 2023, both of which arose from referrals from Toronto Police following domestic assault, with the second time period arising from historical reports of domestic assault incidents.

25On May 8, 2023, the father asked the mother to provide an affidavit to drop the criminal charges and threatened that if she did not do so, there would be consequences. The mother did not agree. There were messages admitted into evidence as Exhibits corroborating the father’s attempts to reconcile with the mother after these charges, despite the no-contact provisions.

26On June 6, 2023, the mother initiated proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”), in which she sought primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for I., child support and spousal support. The father was served with the mother’s OCJ claim on June 7, 2023, and the first court attendance was scheduled for September 7, 2023.

27On June 19, 2023, the mother was charged with two counts of assault and one count of uttering a death threat against the father arising from the father reporting historical assaults which predated the separation. The mother believes that these charges emanated from the father having been served with her OCJ court proceeding.

28The father then issued the within proceeding on June 25, 2023, in which he sought a divorce, sole decision-making responsibility, an equal time-sharing parenting schedule; child support, equalization of net family property and costs. As a result of this application being commenced, the mother’s OCJ proceeding was stayed.

29The father claims that he did not have parenting time with I. for 6 months, namely, from March 1, 2023, to September 2023. This matter first came before this court at a To Be Spoken To court on September 5, 2023, at which time an urgent case conference date was scheduled. At the urgent case conference on September 19, 2023, the parties agreed to a temporary parenting schedule, and the father agreed to pay the mother’s rent for October 2023 on a without prejudice basis.

30In October 2023, the mother started volunteering at Hasnain Law office, which opportunity she was given because Mr. Hasnain was a family friend. She had no prior knowledge of the practice of law. In January 2024, the mother started to work at Hasnain Law office as a part- time employee as a “runner”, someone who goes to the bank and picked up cheques for real estate transactions.

31On January 31, 2024, the consent Black Order was made with respect to parenting at a combined Settlement Conference/Trial Management Conference (“TMC”). On June 12, 2024, the Diamond Order was made modifying the parenting order, which sets out the current parenting schedule for I. Diamond, J. also severed the divorce from the corollary relief and arranged for the mother to provide the father with an Islamic divorce. A TMC was scheduled for October 9, 2024.

32In July 2024, the mother brought a motion to allow her to travel with I. to Pakistan from August 1, 2024, to August 22, 2024. The father would not consent to the trip out of concern that the mother would abduct the child to Pakistan and not return. Relying on Zafar v. Azeem, 2024

ONCA 15, 97 R.F.L. (8^th) 3, the motions judge, Ramsay, J., did not permit the trip, noting Fairburn A.C.J.O.’s statement in Zafar, at para. 41:

“Canada does not recognize Pakistan as a signatory to the Hague Convention, While Pakistan acceded to the Convention on March 1, 2017, Canada has not acknowledged its accession. This fact is agreed upon by both parties. It means that the terms of the Convention do not apply.”

33On October 16, 2024, the parties had a TMC, and the trial of this matter was scheduled to start on December 1, 2025.

34Starting June 1, 2025, Hasnain Law Office hired the mother as a full-time employee at a rate of $20 for 35 hours of work a week. In September 2025, the firm’s real estate business had slowed considerably and she was let go.

35On August 21, 2025, the father brought a motion to change the temporary parenting order to change I.’s primary residence to be with him in Keswick and change his school to one in his catchment area. He claimed that the mother had unilaterally moved to Markham from Scarborough. Mathen, J. found that the father had not established on a balance of probabilities that the mother had relocated permanently to Markham and, therefore, there was no basis to consider a change to I.’s school placement.

36On October 27, 2025, the mother obtained a full-time position as a law clerk at Mills and Mills LLP. Her offer to employment lists her salary as $60,000 a year.

37For child support purposes, the father claims that his table child support obligation should be based on his annual income, which he asserts is $78,500 a year. On that level of income, the father’s Table child support obligation is $729 a month. He asks the court to impute the mother with an income of $71,000 and to set-off the child support he and the mother would owe each other under the Child Support Guidelines, given the shared parenting schedule.

38On the mother’s current level of income of $60,000 a year, her Table child support obligation for 1 child is $554 a month. The set-off of the parties’ Table child support obligations would result in the father paying the mother child support of $230 a month.

39The father testified that he paid $1,560 a month to the parties’ landlord for rent for the matrimonial home from March 1, 2023, to and including February 1, 2024. This is not disputed. The parties signed an interim separation agreement on January 25, 2024 (Exhibit 35 at trial), which provided that for the period from March 1, 2023, to February 1, 2024, the father is to be given credit for having paid a total of $10,974 in respect of spousal support as third party payments and $658 a month as periodic child support. These third-party payments were not deductible by the father nor taxable in the mother’s hands.

40The father paid some child support in 2024. He has paid no child support in 2025 to the mother. The father has not contributed to any of I.’s s.7 expenses since separation. The mother seeks retroactive child support from the father, both Table and s.7 expenses.

41The father claims that he is owed an equalization payment of $133,954.90 by the mother. The parties do not agree on the value of land owned by the mother in Pakistan on the date of separation or on the mother’s date of marriage deductions.

42The mother seeks retroactive and ongoing spousal support. The father denies that she has entitlement to spousal support. The mother asserts that her entitlement is both a compensatory and needs based claim.

Issue 1: Which decision-making regime is in the child’s best interests?

43Section 16(1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.3 (2^nd Supp.) (“DA”) dictates that the only consideration the Court shall consider in making a parenting order is the best interests of the child. The court is required to give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being: s.16(2) of the DA.

44The best interest factors are set out in s.16(3) of the DA and include the following:

a. the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

b. the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

c. each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

d. the history of care of the child;

e. the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

f. the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

g. any plans for the child’s care;

h. the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

i. the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

j. any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

i. the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

ii. the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

k. any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

45The father seeks sole decision-making responsibility for I.’s education decisions and joint decision-making for decisions relating to I.’s health, religion and extra-curricular activities. The mother seeks sole decision-making responsibility for education and health-related decisions affecting I. She is agreeable to the parties having joint decision-making responsibility over religious decisions. The mother argues that there is no history of her and the father being able to communicate effectively regarding any issues relating to I. and there is a history of family violence, particularly related to the manner in which the father communicates with her.

46Applying the best interest factors set out in s.16(3) of the DA that relate specifically to decision making, I make the following findings:

s.16(3)(i): The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

a. There was a great deal of evidence at trial demonstrating that after separation, the mother would message the father about a child-related issue and would be met with abusive responses from the father about her character and her abilities as a parent. These responses came not only from the father but, from his sister, Ambreen, who was acting as the conduit between the parties when the restraining order arising from the father’s criminal charges after separation did not permit them to have direct conduct. I find that the texts sent by both the father and his sister were mean- spirited, denigrating, threatening from a financial perspective, and amount to family violence.

b. Some examples of such messages between the mother and father and between the mother and Ambreen, demonstrating the abusive manner in which they communicated with the mother include the following:

i. On Dec. 3, 2024,

1. Ambreen texted the mother, “The only garage that we have to unfortunately communicate with is you so thoughts naturally come.”

2. The mother texted Ambreen about pick up arrangements for I. and stated, “3:30 in front of 88” [“88” means 88 Corporate Drive, the matrimonial home in Scarborough]

3. Ambreen responded with “We don’t have an atom worth of care for your pathetic low life, we are focused on the little King – “ I.D.” the name says it all. You are deplorable.” “As always dropped and picked. We are not coming in father doesn’t trust you.”

ii. On Feb. 16, 2024,

1. Ambreen texted the mother, “Today was day to keep I. as it was a PA day. Please advise what time the father can pick him from home.”[the word between “was” and “day” was not readable]

2. The mother responded, “3:00 p.m. and later, You can pickup at 6:00

p.m. since you are picking up personal belongings for Mr. Danish too.” The mother was trying to arrange drop off for I.

3. Ambreen responded, “Please be advised this is your official notice of lease termination for unit 609-88 Corporate Dr. 1. The landlord has indicated that she does not want to be contacted by you. If you contact her, she will have a restraining order issued. 2. You have to move by Feb. 28, 2024. 3. Since you have indicated the lawyers are off, this information is being relayed to you here. The father will have his lawyer communicate this information to your lawyer. Have a nice day.”

4. To which the mother responded “We are talking about I. not the house. Tell me the time you are dropping him off. If you can’t I can pick him from near your place.”

iii. On February 25, 2024,

1. Ambreen states, “Landlord is asking for the condo keys, fob, locker keys, mail room as the lease is over end of this month. Please provide those prior prior [sic] March and as well as your updated residence in scarborough Landlord has provided statement in writing she is not leasing the condo to you as told to your lawyer. This is important as the father doesn’t want I. to be homeless, so please make sure you provide these details by today.”

2. The mother responded, “I. and his mother will never be homeless IA because of father irrational behaviour I. is going to miss…”

3. Ambreen states, “Without this information there is safety concern.

4. The mother responded, “Harassment is when you are sending the texts to hand over the keys. There are no safety concerns for I. father is just trying to play games unsuccessful. Use that energy focusing on him I’s well being. Stay child focussed.

5. Ambreen responded, “There are no games being played, we are all greatly concerned for I. So please provide details for March 1 of I.’s residence.

6. The mother responded, “Residence will remain the same.”

7. Ambreen states, “The lanord [sic] has informed of eviction as you are not on leas, you need to find a place before March 1^st. you were provided 1 year to find a place and 2 months notice via lawyer. You lied to the judge that you have secured a lease with the landlord as per court minutes. So this is very concerning. Downstairs.”

iv. On December 3, 2025,

1. Ambreen states “And Don’t let me catch u slipping next time with my name in your mouth or any of my family. Grow up and mind your business. Drama queen. Otherwise ur nudes are one email away to your auntys and ur fam.”

2. The mother responded “Actually now since its out I will talk openly about it. And let’s see how u catch me slipping. That’s cyber crime. I dare you to do that.”

v. The father texted the mother [date unknown],

1. “Gonna talk to ur friends.”

2. She stated “sure.”

3. He responded, “Time for exposure.”

4. She responded “Ajao most welcome.”

5. ​He stated, “I didn’t tell u want to wear u psycho. Don’t be a randi¹. Please. Ugly.”

vi. The father texted the mother [date unknown],

1. “ur the e fuckin piece of lying shit. Not him. I’m done with u. talk to me. Dafa ho magairat insaan. Go to hell that’s where u belong.”

c. These messages indicate that the father and his representative, in this case Ambreen, his sister, are joined in a campaign to force the mother out of the rented matrimonial home by making threats to her. They also prove that the father and his sister threatened to expose intimate pictures of the mother to her family members unless she did as they asked. In all of these messages, the mother is placed in a difficult position of facing threats, intimidation and denigration, when all she is trying to do is make childcare arrangements and parenting transitions. Despite her asking the father and his sister to be focussed on I., the abusive messages continue,

¹ In answer to a question from the Court, the parties explained that the term “randi” in Urdu means “whore” in English.

confirming that the father is unable and unwilling to cooperate with the mother on matters affecting I.

s.16(3)(c): The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

d. I find that the father demonstrated an inability to make decisions that were child- focussed after separation. This pattern of decision-making demonstrate that the father had an inability to place I.’s best interests ahead of his own needs. For example, in the summer of 2024, the mother requested several times if she could have a brief, private daily call with I. while he was in the father’s care. The mother believed that it was important for I. to have daily contact with the non-resident parent while he is in either parent’s care given his age and stage of development. The mother had been trying to speak to I. for days when he was with the father and was not permitted by the father to speak with him. Through counsel, the mother made a formal request after the father denied her phone calls with I. for these phone calls to take place while I. was in her care. The response from the father, through his counsel was as follows: “I think he has responded before, he is not agreeable to daily calls. When I. asks to call his mother, this is facilitated.”

e. I find that the father’s refusal to facilitate calls between I. and the mother to be a decision that was centred on either what was easier or better for him or on not cooperating with the mother in some effort to punish her. Either way, this decision on the father’s part was made without any regard for I.’s needs. This is particularly the case since the mother had been facilitating such calls for I. with the father when he was in her care.

f. Another example of a decision made by the father which contributes to my finding that the father is not able to place I.’s needs and best interests at the forefront, arose from a recommendation made by the CAST in a letter dated July 9, 2024, regarding therapy for I. On June 30, 2024, I. made a disclosure to a teacher at school that the mother had slapped him. As a result, a mandatory report was made by the school to the CAST. The CAST investigated the situation in the first week of July 2024. During that week, I. was in the care of the father. The mother and Ambreen agreed that the father would facilitate video calls between I. and the mother, since the parties had agreed that I. would reside with them on a week on/week off basis in the summer and video calls would be facilitated with the non-resident parent. The evidence is that I. was in the father’s care for the 7 days prior to the CAST delivering a letter to the parties, dated July 9, 2024. The CAST letter stated that I. had told them that he reported the mother slapped him because the father told him that if he did not make that report, the mother would kidnap him and take him to Pakistan. At the end of the letter, the CAST stated that I. had been showing signs of anxiety and recommended that he could benefit with therapeutic support. The school principal also testified at trial that she had told the parents that I. could benefit from therapy. Through counsel, the mother made suggestions for a therapist for I. to the father and asked the father to consider her choice. She also invited the father to choose a therapist for I. The father’s lawyer’s response was “My client is

not agreeable to therapy at this juncture.” There were no reasons given. There was simply a complete refusal to allow I. to have access to therapy. I find that the father’s refusal to follow suggestions from the CAST and I.’s school about arranging therapy for I. demonstrates a complete inability to consider I.’s best interests and needs.

g. Further, the CAST letter warned the father about continuing to make denigrating comments about the mother to I. When asked by the Court what steps the father took to address I.’s anxiety, the father answered that “he fought to have more parenting time with I.” When asked by the Court what steps the father took to stop denigrating the mother to I., the father answered, “I was careful with my words when I talked about the mother.” The father’s evidence was that he enrolled I. in extra-curricular activities during his time with him, to help with his anxiety, develop skills and build more community in Keswick. While there are many benefits to a child being enrolled in extra-curricular activities, it was clear that the father did not appear to have insight into how his own behaviours contributed to I.’s anxiety and his blanket refusal to allow I. to engage in therapy is further evidence of this lack of insight.

s. 16(3)(h): Each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse.

h. There was a significant amount of time spent in this trial by the father testifying that the mother has unilaterally moved I. from Scarborough to Markham and improperly relocated him to that region. It is correct that the mother remarried and moved into a home with her husband, his son and I. in Markham, however, the mother also maintained the rented home in Scarborough and spent time with I. there, while they slowly transitioned into their new home. I do not find, however, that the mother “unilaterally” moved I. to Markham, as the father alleges. Rather, the correspondence between the parties and between the mother and the father’s counsel was clear that the mother gave the father notice that she was moving, she proposed that I. move schools to the school in her new catchment area and the father’s refused to consent. What then ensued was a campaign on the father’s behalf, where he contacted teachers and the principal at I.’s school making broad statements of the mother’s “unilateral enrollment” in I. in a new school against his consent. However, there was no attempt on the mother’s part to do this. The mother, like any parent who moves, advised the father and attempted to get his consent for

I. to attend a new school closer to her home. The father’s response was to take every opportunity to paint the mother in a bad light to I.’s school, and to bring proceedings for I.’s primary residence to be moved to Keswick. Although the parties settled this issue on the last day of trial, I raise this issue and how it was handled by the father as another example of the father engaged in a pattern of behaviour that was focused on his own need to vilify the mother and to denigrate her to third parties involved in I.’s life, without any regard for I.’s needs or best interests. Further, and equally as important is that this pattern of behaviour, demonstrates that the father is not prepared to support I.’s relationship with his mother.

i. The mother did not move I.’s school once the father declared that he did not consent to I. living in Markham. She agreed that I. could remain at the school he had always attended in Scarborough and, furthermore, she maintained her rented condominium in Scarborough, to ensure that I. was properly enrolled in a school in that catchment area. Instead of acknowledging that the mother’s decision to keep the rented condominium in Scarborough was helpful because it ensured that I. could remain at his school, the father took every opportunity to demonstrate that the mother was “lying” and not staying overnight with I. in that condominium. He admitted into evidence CCTV footage of the floor of the apartment building in Scarborough during the morning hours to prove the mother was not sleeping at the apartment in Scarborough with I. but rather, they were staying in Markham. While that may be true, it is not relevant to a parenting issue before the Court. What is relevant, however, is that the mother took steps to ensure that I.’s school placement was not disrupted until this school placement issue was resolved at trial or by agreement. What is also relevant is that the father was on a campaign to label the mother as a “liar” for no productive purpose. Again, these efforts demonstrate that the father has not been willing to support the maintenance of the mother’s relationship with I.. His focus, instead, has continued to be to denigrate the mother’s character, despite being told one year earlier by the CAST, namely on July 9, 2024, that doing so was directly not in I.’s best interests.

s.16(3)(g): Any plans for the child’s care

j. The father’s position at trial was that I.’s primary residence should be moved to Keswick. However, the father had not researched any schools in Keswick where I. would begin attending despite taking this position prior to his testimony. During his testimony, the father was not able to recall the name of the school in his catchment area where I. was to attend. He had not put forward any evidence regarding whether it was an elementary school only, an elementary and middle school, or how many years I. would remain at the school if he started there in September 2026. In an answer to a question from the Court, whether I. would be at the school for grades 5 and 6 and then have to move again for middle school, the father was not able to answer the question. After a break in the court day, once the father had clearly looked up that information, he then advised the court of the answer. However, he was insistent that he, and not the mother, should be the parent responsible for education decisions. The Court was quite concerned that other than wanting I.’s primary residence to be with him in Keswick, the father had not taken the necessary steps to familiarize himself with the school I. would attend yet asserted that the mother as not capable of making education-related decisions for I. because he came to school late on many occasions in the year of separation, when the mother was struggling. Again, the issue of school tardiness was addressed with the mother by the school and despite the mother having made significant improvements on I.’s timely attendance, the father focused only on her lateness. Again, most of the father’s evidence focussed on the mother’s inability to make appropriate education decisions for I.. By contrast, the mother tendered evidence in writing and testified about the school in Markham, where she proposed I. attend, demonstrating thoughtful consideration on the school placement issue.

k. The mother’s move to Markham means that she now moved into the same York Region where the father resides. In fact, her move is closer in terms of kilometre distance to the father’s home in Keswick. The father’s main complaint to I. moving from Scarborough to Markham was that his commute and I.’s commute would be longer because the route requires some driving through city streets. The father testified that he co take the HOV lanes from Aurora to McCowan which makes his drive from Keswick to the Scarborough condominium about 35-45 minutes. He testified that the drive from Keswick to Markham would be between 50 minutes and 1 hour. I find that the addition of 5-15 minutes to the commute between the father’s residence and the mother’s residence is not a reason to have had a trial about the mother’s move to a new home in Markham. The father’s focus throughout this aspect of the trial was about his needs, without regard to the benefits I. would be gaining by moving to a bigger home with the mother, his step-father and step- brother. Rather, it was solely focussed on the increased length in a drive. The father did not object to the neighbourhood or home into which the mother was going to move with I.. He was not able to raise any concerns about safety for I.. The father did not raise any objection to the school being proposed by the mother for I. to attend. His only objection was the potential increase to the commute which was, on his own evidence, going to take about 15 minutes longer, at most.

47There is no doubt that both parents love and cherish I. There is also no doubt that I. is closely bonded with both parents, the father’s extended family, and the mother’s new spouse and step- brother. The Court was impressed with the attention both parents place on I., his activities and his growth and development. The Court does not question either parent’s love or devotion to I., his growth or development. The issue before me is whether they can make decisions about

I. jointly.

48I do not find that there is evidence of historical communication between the parents that is appropriate and child focussed. It has not improved on the part of the father over time. While the mother has shifted in the way she messages the father, by attempting to have brief communication that is focussed on the child only, the father has not been able to do so. He has continued to make threats, denigrate the mother and threaten her with litigation.

49The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, [2005]

O.J. No. 275, sets out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:

a. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.

b. It can’t be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.

c. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.

d. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.

e. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.

f. The younger the child, the more important communication is.

50Mutual trust and respect are basic elements for a joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively. See: G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511; T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022.

51While courts do not expect communication between separated parties to be easy, comfortable or free from conflict, the issue is whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place and is achievable in the future so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis: see Warcop v. Warcop.

52In my view, it is in I.’s best interests that the mother has sole decision-making responsibility over the education, extra-curricular activities and health-related decisions that impact his life. The mother ought to consult with the father about these decisions, as she has tried to do since the separation, and if the parties can agree on these decisions that would be preferable. However, if they cannot agree, the mother shall have ultimate decision-making responsibility.

53The parties shall share decision-making responsibility of I.’s religion as the mother proposes.

Issue 2: How should the parties communicate, hold the child’s government issued documentation and address travel with the child?

54In terms of how the parties should communicate going forward, I am ordering them to communicate on a co-parenting application, such as Our Family Wizard, AppClose or 2Homes. This will ensure that all future text messages are preserved if needed and will eliminate the parties receiving an onslaught of text messages from one another daily. The father agreed to this proposal made by the mother. Further, I have made a detailed communication protocol order setting out how the parties shall communicate on a going-forward basis to ensure that I. is not exposed to any ongoing conflict and to provide the parties with specific guidelines for the manner in which they communicate in an effort to break existing negative communication patterns.

55Both parties seek to be the parent who holds I.’s government issued documentation. Given that

I. resides primarily with the mother, it makes sense that she will hold I.’s health card, SIN card, passport, birth certificate, Pakistan identification documents and other any government issued documentation. The mother shall provide the father with a copy of I.’s health card, birth certificate and passport so he has an available copy. When and if I. travels with the father, the mother shall provide the father with I.’s government issued identification along with her travel consent and the father shall return the documents when the trip ends.

56The mother wishes to be able to be able to travel with I. to Pakistan to visit with members of her immediate and extended family who reside there. She has proposed that she will provide the father with at lest 30 days of any intended travel to Pakistan and that she will not travel there for more than 2 weeks in duration. The father does not agree. He opposes travel to Pakistan because it is a non-Hague Convention country and he states that he is fearful that the mother will not return I.

57I note that the evidence clearly establishes that I. has travelled with the mother to Pakistan and returned to Toronto, albeit that father claims the mother unilaterally kept I. in Pakistan much longer than to which he agreed.

58There are decisions where courts have declined to permit out-of-country travel with a child to non-Hague Convention countries: Ndju v. Fort, 2011 ONSC 1716, and Hamid v. Mahmood, 2012 ONCJ 474. However, generally these cases are for travel that is limited to a specified, planned trip. This is not that situation. In this case, the father simple objects to any travel by the mother to Pakistan with I. I do not accept that the mother is a flight risk. She has established roots in Canada. In addition to living here for more than ten years, she now has full-time employment. She has remarried and is pregnant and expecting a newborn in three months. There is nothing in her circumstances that leads me to believe that she will not return

I. in accordance with the planned travel. See Gare v. El Nashar, 2018 ONSC 477.

59I find that the mother is permitted to travel to Pakistan with I. for up to two weeks each year when I. is not in school, provided the mother is in compliance with the terms of all appliable court orders. That travel is not restricted to Hague Convention countries. All such travel is subject to the following terms:

a. The dates will be arranged and the father shall be advised of the trip at least 30 days in advance.

b. The mother shall provide the father with a copy of the travel itinerary including flight information and places where they will be staying.

c. The mother will arrange specific times not less than twice each week for I. to skype or call the father for not less than 15 minutes at a time with I..

d. The mother will promptly notify the father of any change in travel plans via email.

e. The mother will advise the father of the names of those also travelling or staying with I. when the trip is proposed.

f. In the event of any injury or illness on the trip, the mother will promptly advise the father of same.

g. The mother will ensure the safety and security of I. and will not endanger his health on any trip.

Issue 3: What amount of child support is owing by the father to the mother retroactively and prospectively?

60Pursuant to s.15.1(1) of the DA, the court may make an order for child support and shall do in accordance with the applicable guidelines: s.15.1(3).

61The objectives of the Federal Child Support Guidelines (“FCSG”) are:

a. to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation;

b. reduce conflict and tension between spouses by making the calculation of child support orders more objective;

c. to improve the efficiency of the legal process by giving courts and spouses guidance in setting the levels of child support orders and encouraging settlement; and

d. to ensure consistent treatment of spouses and children who are in similar circumstances.

62In making a child support order under the FCSG, the most current information must be used: s.2(3).

Table child support and s.7 expenses

63The amount of child support for children under the age of majority is the amount set out in the applicable Tables, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the spouse against whom the order is sought: s.3(1).

64In addition to the table amount of child support, the court may provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of s.7 expenses, after taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to separation:

a. childcare expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment of the spouse who has the majority of parenting time;

b. that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

c. health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;

d. extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;

e. expenses for post-secondary education; and

f. extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.

65The guiding principle in determining s.7 expenses is that they are to be shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child: s7(2). The court is also required to take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions of credits relating to an expense if there are any: s.7(3).

Child support when there is shared parenting

66Pursuant to s.9 of the FCSG, if a spouse exercises not less than 40% of parenting time with a child over the course of a year, the amount of child support order must be determined by taking into account:

a. The amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses;

b. The increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and

c. The conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

Retroactive child support

67In D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v. T.A.R; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37, [2006] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court of Canada outlined several

fundamental principles governing orders for child support and requests for retroactive child support. These include:

a. Child support is the right of the child and cannot be bargained away by the parents.

b. Child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when the parents were together.

c. Child support is to be calculated based upon the income of the payor parent. The obligation exceeds merely furnishing the “necessities of life.”

d. Retroactive awards are not truly “retroactive”. They reflect an obligation which existed at the time, based on ability to pay.

e. Retroactive awards are not limited to exceptional or rare cases.

68In D.B.S. the court identified four primary considerations:

a. Whether the recipient spouse has provided a reasonable excuse for his or her delay in applying for support.

b. The conduct of the payor parent.

c. The circumstances of the child.

d. The hardship that the retroactive award may entail.

69None of the above factors are decisive or take priority and all should be considered in a global analysis. In determining whether to make a retroactive award, a court will need to look at all of the relevant circumstances. The payor’s interest in certainty must be balanced with the need for fairness and flexibility.

70In Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, the Supreme Court recently revisited these principles. The commentary includes the following:

a. Parents know they are liable to pay support in accordance with the Tables, based on their actual income. They know they will be held accountable for underpayment, even if enforcement of their obligations may not always be automatic.

b. The obligation to support your child exists even if the other parent has not (yet) started a court case.

c. Retroactive child support is a debt. It represents money that should have been paid. Presumptively, the money is owing and should still be paid, unless there are strong reasons not to do so.

d. Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations.

e. The court must be aware of the gender and social dynamics which permeate child support law. When we assess the reasonableness of actions and behaviours by support recipients – and the reality is that they are predominantly women – we must take into account all of their experiences, challenges, vulnerabilities, financial limitations, fears, danger, and perceptions as to their actual options.

f. The neglect or refusal to pay child support is strongly linked to child poverty and female poverty.

g. There is nothing exceptional about judicial relief from the miserable consequences that can flow from a payor’s indifference to their child support obligations.

71In Michel, the Supreme Court suggested that rather than ordering retroactive support back to the date of effective notice, it may now be time to simply start ordering payors to pay what they should have paid, as a matter of course.

72Payors have an absolute – not a contingent – obligation to support their children in the amount set out in Child Support Guidelines, pursuant to a now long-standing, well-publicized family law regime.

73If the obligation by the payor and the entitlement by the child are both absolute and unconditional, it makes little sense to invite more complication – and litigation – by adding a condition that “mandatory payments” are only “payable” if the recipient does certain specific things to ask.

Application

What child support was paid by the father?

74The parties separated on March 1, 2023. From that date until February 1, 2024, the father paid rent for the matrimonial home of $1,560 a month. To address these ongoing payments of rent, the parties signed an interim separation agreement on January 1, 2024, which states that the total payments he made on the mother’s behalf for rent amounted to $10,974 in respect of spousal support. The agreement sets out that for the period from March 1, 2023 to September 1, 2023, the father made without prejudice payments on account of spousal support of $902 a month to third parties on behalf of the mother; and for the period from October 1, 2023 to and including February 1, 2024, he made without prejudice payments of $923 a month on account of spousal support for third parties on behalf of the mother. These third-party payments were not deductible by the father nor taxable in the mother’s hands. I find that the father should be given credit for having made these payments. The father should be given credit for these payments as against spousal support.

75The interim separation agreement also provides that the father should be given credit for having paid $658 a month for child support from March 1, 2023, to February 1, 2024. This is to represent a portion of the monthly rent he paid which the parties agreed to attribute to I. Accordingly, he shall be given credit for having paid $7,896, being 12 months of child support at the rate of $658 a month.

76In terms of direct child support payments made by the father to the mother, the parties agree that from March 1, 2024, until December 3, 2024, he paid total child support of $4,023, as follows:

a. On March 1, 2024, he paid $650;

b. On April 2, 2024, he paid $666;

c. On May 1, 2024, he paid $658;

d. On June 2, 2024, he paid $658;

e. On July 5, 2024, he paid $279;

f. On August 9, 2024, he paid $279;

g. On September 6, 2024, he paid $279;

h. On November 4, 2024, he paid $277

i. On December 3, 2024, he paid $277.

77These child support payments were initially based on the father’s 2023-line 15000 income as listed on his 2023 income tax return, of $81,755, which corresponds to $658 a month in Table child support, and later reduced unilaterally by him. The father submits that he reduced the child support payments in July 2024 because that is when the parties had a shared parenting schedule and he set-off his Table child support obligation of $658 a month with what he believes the mother owed him in Table child support to come to a set-off amount of child support of $279 a month.

78The mother calculates that the father owes her child support arrears totalling $10,453 for the period from January 1, 2024, to and including December 1, 2025. She testifies that she based this calculation on the Endorsement of Akazaki, J., dated September 19, 2023, which states in paragraph 8 that the father’s table child support obligation was $658 a month. In that Endorsement, the court acknowledged that instead of paying child support, the father was paying the rent for the matrimonial home of about $1,500. Akazaki, J. ordered on consent, among other things that the father pay the October 2023 rent for the matrimonial home without prejudice to the characterization of the payment as combined child and spousal support. The mother’s calculation of arrears, however, does not consider the shared parenting schedule and her obligation to pay child support for I. pursuant to s.9 of the FCSG.

79The mother argues that her income for child support purposes should be that which she reported on her income tax returns for 2023, and 2024. The father, however, submits that the Court should impute income to the mother because she was underemployed in the sum of $71,000 a year.

80The mother’s 2023 Notice of Assessment lists her Line 15000 income as $9,002. During 2023, the mother worked for the TDSB part-time as a lunchroom supervisor. She also had child tax

benefit income. The mother’s 2024 Notice of Assessment lists her Line 15000 income as

$8,894. During 2024, the mother worked for the TDSB as a part-time lunchroom supervisor. She testified that in October 2024, she started to volunteer at the Hasnain Law firm to obtain experience in that field. She acknowledges that she has a small business selling Pakistani Handicrafts which yielded minimal income. In answer to a question from the Court as to what her position is about income to be imputed to her, she answered that she felt it was appropriate to impute her with an income of $10,000 for the year.

Law on Imputation of Income

81Section 19 of the FCSG allows the court to impute income to a payor spouse if the payor is unemployed or underemployed. Sections 19(1)(a) allows the court to impute income to a spouse if he or she is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under- employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse.

82Drygala v. Pauli, 61 O.R. (3d) 711, remains the leading authority on imputation of income. Drygala stands for the proposition that the court does not need to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations before income can be imputed by the court. The parent required to pay is intentionally under-employed if that parent chooses to earn less than he or she is capable of earning. That parent is intentionally unemployed when he or she chooses not to work when capable of earning an income. The word "intentionally" makes it clear that the section does not apply to situations in which, through no fault or act of their own, spouses are laid off, terminated or given reduced hours of work. There is no requirement of bad faith in s. 19(1)(a), nor is there language suggestive of such a requirement: see paras. 28 and 29.

83Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this legal obligation, a parent must earn what he or she is capable of earning: Drygala, at para. 32.

84However, section 19 of the Guidelines is not an invitation to the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court's discretion must be grounded in the evidence: Drygala, at para. 44.

85When imputing income based on intentional under- employment or unemployment, a court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances. The factors to be considered have been stated in a number of cases as age, education, experience, skills and health of the parent. See, for example, Hanson, supra, and Cholodniuk v. Sears (2001), 2001 SKQB 97, 14

R.F.L. (5th) 9, 2001 SKQB 97, 204 Sask. R. 268 (Q.B.). Other considerations are availability of job opportunities, the number of hours that could be worked in light of the parent's overall obligations including educational demands and the hourly rate that the parent could reasonably be expected to obtain: Drygala, at para. 45.

86The father asks the court to impute the mother with an income of $71,000. However, there is no basis on which he seeks that amount. I decline to impute the mother with an income of

$71,000 in 2023, 2024 or 2025. I am not persuaded that she had any ability to earn that level of income in those years.

Child Support for the period March 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023

87Given the mother’s past work experience as a lunchroom supervisor, I find that it is appropriate to impute her with a minimum wage income in 2023 which amounts to $35,766 a year. Until the Diamond Order was made on May 12, 2024, I. was residing primarily with the mother. The parties were not in a shared parenting arrangement. Using the father’s 2023 Line 15000 income from his Notice of Assessment of $81,755, his Table child support obligation was $762 a month, using the 2017 FCSG Tables which were in place at that time. I find that the father owes the mother retroactive child support of $7,620 for 2023, being $762 a month for 10 months from March 1, 2023, to and including December 1, 2023, when he did not pay child support.

88After giving the father credit for having paid $658 a month for these 10 months, as per the interim separation agreement, dated January 25, 2024, of $6,580, the father owes the mother retroactive child support of $1,040 for 2023.

2024 Calendar Year

89Given the mother’s past work experience as a TDSB lunchroom supervisor, I find that it is appropriate to impute the mother with a minimum wage income in 2024 which was $17.20 an hour, or $35,776 a year. On that level of income, for one child, the mother would be obliged to pay the husband Table child support of $312.85.

90Using the father’s Line-15000 income set out in his 2023 Notice of Assessment of $81,755, his table child support obligation in 2024 would have been $762 a month for one child. The father argued that his Line 15000 income in 2024 included a one-time retroactive payment of a specified amount which ought not to be considered part of his income for child support purposes. However, the father provided no evidence of that to the Court. I am not persuaded that his Line 15000 income should be adjusted downward for a retroactive pay amount for child support purposes.

91The parties began a shared parenting arrangement in May 2024, after the Diamond Order was made. Accordingly, the father should have paid full Table child support for the months January 1, 2024, to and including April 1, 2024. Starting May 1, 2024, the parties were in a shared parenting arrangement and the set-off should be applied.

92Accordingly, if I apply the set-off calculation contemplated by s.9(1)(a) of the FCSG, the father would have owed the mother set-off child support of $449 a month ($762 - $312.85= $449.15) from May 1, 2024, to and including December 1, 2024. In making these calculations, I have applied the November 22, 2017, Table version since that was in force until the updated Table figures came out on October 2, 2025.

93Based on the calculations set out in the chart below, I find that the father is in arrears of child support of $1,929.30 for 2024. After giving him credit for paying $658 a month for January

and February 2024 as per the parties’ interim separation agreement, the total retroactive child support owing by the father to the mother for 2024 is $613.20:

Month

What the father paid in Child Support

What the father should have paid in child support: Full Table for Jan-April and set-off based on s.9 of the FCSG from May-Dec.

January 1, 2024

Nil

$762.00

February 1, 2024

Nil

$762.00

March 1, 2024

$650

$762.00

April 2, 2024

$666

$762.00

May 1, 2024

$658

$449.15

June 2, 2024

$658

$449.15

July 1, 2024

$279

$449.15

August 1, 2024

$279

$449.15

September 1, 2024

$279

$449.15

October 1, 2024

Nil

$449.15

November 1, 2024

$277

$449.15

December 1, 2024

$277

$449.15

Totals

$4,023

$5,951.20

AMOUNT OWING

$1,929.30

Less credit under interim separation agreement of $658 x

2 for Jan and Feb 2024

($1,316.00)

Retroactive amount of child support owing

$613.30

2025 Calendar Year

94In 2025, the father has paid no child support. He submits that his income for child support purposes should be $78,500 a year. In terms of the mother’s income, she began working at Mills and Mills LLP starting on October 30, 2025, earning a salary of $60,000. For the months January 2025 to October 1, 2025, the mother was able to earn about $25,000. She then earned 2 months of a 12-month annual salary of $60,000, which means the mother earned an additional

$10,000, making her annual gross income $35,000. If she were imputed with minimum wage income for 2025, at an hourly rate of $17.60, 40 hours a week, x 52 weeks, she would have earned $36,608 a year. Again, I find it appropriate to impute the mother with a minimum wage income of $36,608 for 2025. At that level of income, the FCSG tables produce a child support obligation of $321.44 for the months January 1, 2025, to and including September 30, 2025, for the mother. Starting October 1, 2025, the updated Federal Tables came into effect, dictating that the mother’s table child support obligation for October 1, 2025, to and including December 31, 2025, is $297.44 a month. For the 2025 calendar year, therefore, the mother’s child support obligation came to $3,785.28 ($2,892.96 + $892.32).

95Using an income figure of $78,500 for the father for 2025, his table child support obligation for the period January 1, 2025, to and including September 30, 2025, is $731.40 a month and for the period October 1, 2025, to and including December 31, 2025, is $729 a month, for a total of $8,769.60 ($6,582.60 + $2,187).

96Using the set-off calculation under s.9(1)(a) of the FCSG, I find that the father owes the mother set-off child support arrear for 2025 of $4,984.32, calculated as follows:

Month

What the father should have paid in child support based on his income of

$75,800

What the mother should have paid in child support based on an imputed minimum wage income of

$36,608

Set-off of Table Amounts

Jan 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

Feb. 1, 2025

$731.40

$321,44

$409.96

Mar. 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

April 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

May 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

June 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

July 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

August 1, 2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

September 1,

2025

$731.40

$321.44

$409.96

October 1,

2025

$729.00

$297.44

$431.56

Nov. 1, 2025

$729.00

$297.44

$431.56

December 1,

2025

$729.00

$297.44

$431.56

Total

$8,769.60

$6,582.60 + $2,187

$3,785.28

$2,892.96 + $892.32

$4,984.32

$3,689.64 + $1294.68

97Therefore, for 2023, 2024 and 2025, the father owes the mother retroactive child support of

$7,121.03, being arrears of $1,523.51 in 2023, $613.20 in 2024 and $4,984.32 in 2025.

98For 2026, the father’s Table child support obligation is $729 a month based on his income

$78,500, which he claims to be earning. If, when the father files in 2025 income tax return, his income is more or less than $78,500, the child support will be adjusted.

99The mother’s income of $60,000 from Mills and Mills LLP, dictates a table child support obligation of $554 a month. The father, therefore, will owe the mother set-off table child support of $175 a month starting on January 1, 2026, and on the first day of each following month until further court order.

Section 7 Expenses

100There are also s.7 expenses for I. for which the parties are to share responsibility on a proportionate basis.

101Given my findings regarding both parties’ incomes for 2023, 2024 and 2025, the parties’ respective proportionate responsibility for the I.’s s.7 expenses are:

a. In 2023, the father’s proportionate responsibility is 70% and the mother’s proportionate responsibility is 30% (the combined incomes of the parties =

$117,531, such that the father’s income of $81,755 = 70% and mother’s imputed income $35,766 = 30%).

b. In 2024, the father’s proportionate responsibility is 69% and the mother’s proportionate responsibility is 31% (the combined incomes of the parties =

$117,109, such that the father’s income of $81,343.08 = 69% and mother’s imputed income $35,766 = 31%).

c. In 2025, the father’s proportionate responsibility is 68% and the mother’s proportionate responsibility is 32% (the combined incomes of the parties =

$115,108, such that the father’s income of $78,500 = 68% and the mother’s income of $36,608 = 32%).

d. Starting January 1, 2026, the father’s proportionate responsibility is 57% and the mother’s proportionate responsibility is 43% (the combined incomes of the parties

= $38,500, such that the father’s income of 78,500 = 57% and the mother’s income of $60,000 = 43%

102The father admitted during cross-examination that he has not contributed to any of I.’s s.7 expenses since separation.

103The mother gave evidence of having incurred s.7 expenses for I. totalling $2,192.78 from 2023 through to 2025:

a. Bazooka Kickboxing receipt of $146.89 on August 1, 2023, and October 1, 2023 =

$293.78.

b. Rouge River Soccer receipts of $250.00 dated January 10, 2024; $250.00 dated May 29, 2024 = $500.00;

c. Before and after school childcare fees in 2024 of $1,144 from BGC East Scarborough, receipt dated February 27, 2025;

d. Z3 Education Centre receipts for Math and English class of $125 x 2 in July 2025 for math and English classes = $250.00;

104The father owes the mother retroactive s.7 expenses in the total sum of $1,523.51, made up of the following amounts:

a. 69% of the kickboxing for I. incurred in 2023 in the sum of $202.71;

b. 70% of the soccer for I. incurred in 2024, in the sum of $350.00;

c. 70% of the before and after school childcare for I. incurred in 2024, in the sum of

$800.80;

d. 68% of the Z3 Education costs for I. incurred in 2025, in the sum of $170.00 [105] The mother shall be given ten days from the release of this Judgment to forward any additional

receipts for s.7 expenses paid by her during the 2023, 2024 and 2025 years. Upon production of the receipts and proof that the mother paid these expenses, the father shall pay the mother 69% for I.’s s.7 expenses in 2023, 70% of I.’s s.7 expenses for 2024, and 68% of I.’s s.7 expenses for 2025. The father shall pay these additional retroactive s.7 amounts within 10 days of receiving the receipts from the mother, or these sums shall be set off against amounts owing by the mother to the father under this Judgment.

106On a going forward basis, starting on January 1, 2026, and on the first day of each following month, the father shall pay the mother 57% of I.’s s.7 expenses provided the mother advises the father of the expenses before they are incurred and obtains his consent to same, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. Within 5 days of being presented with a receipt for a

s.7 expense, the father shall pay the mother his proportionate share of I.’s ongoing s.7 expenses.

107For as long as child support is to be paid, the parties shall provide updated income disclosure to the other each year on June 1^st, starting on June 1, 2026, in accordance with section 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines. The child support can be adjusted on a going forward basis starting on July 1^st, 2026.

Issue 4: Is the wife entitled to spousal support and if so, in what quantum and for what duration?

108The mother seeks spousal support from the father on a compensatory basis and needs basis. The father argues that the mother has no entitlement to spousal support since she is earning

$60,000 a year and his income is $78,500 a year. Further, the father argues that there is no economic dependence arising from the marriage or its breakdown and, as a result, there is no entitlement to spousal support.

The Law

109There are three bases for spousal support entitlement: compensatory, non-compensatory (also known as a needs-based claim), or contractual. Spousal support is driven by both compensatory and non-compensatory or needs-based considerations: Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, 1

S.C.R. 303, at para. 201.

110Non-compensatory support entitlement centres on the needs of the spouses and their respective means; compensatory support recognizes an entitlement to support as compensation for the economic disadvantages to the recipient spouse or the economic advantages conferred on the payor spouse as a result of the roles assumed by the parties during their marriage: Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 41. An approach to spousal support grounded entirely on needs excludes the compensatory nature of support: Droit de la famille – 1221, 2012 QCCA 19, at paras. 44, 56.

111Entitlement to spousal support is a threshold issue that must be determined first by the court, before income, quantum and duration of support can be addressed: Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, 138 O.R. (3d) 671, at para. 108.

112In determining spousal support entitlement, the starting point is the objectives which the Divorce Act, set out in s.15.2(6) which include not only recognizing any economic disadvantage but also economic advantage:

Objectives of a spousal support order

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage.

113No single objective is paramount; all must be borne in mind. Against the background of these objectives the court must consider the factors set out in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, which include non-compensatory factors, like need and means and other circumstances of each spouse, including a) the length of the time the spouses cohabited, b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. The law is clear that in considering an award of spousal support, a trial judge is obliged to consider all the factors listed in the Divorce Act. No one factor is paramount: Gonabady-Namadon v. Mohammadzadeh, 2009 BCCA 448, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 23,

at para. 51; Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 852; Miglin, citing Bracklow, at para. 35.

114There is no hard and fast rule. The judge must look at all the factors in the light of the stipulated objectives of support and exercise his or her discretion in a manner that equitably alleviates the adverse consequences of the marriage breakdown and strikes the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case. The DA is not confined to one type of marriage or one type of support.

115Further, there is no presumptive entitlement to spousal support: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 208. Nor does income disparity alone determine entitlement to spousal support: Aquila v. Aquila, 2016 MBCA 333, 397 D.L.R. (4th) 102, at para. 51; [Farrar

v. Farrar (2003)](https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2003/15943), 63 O.R. (3d) 141 (C.A.), at para. 60.

Application to the Facts

116These parties were married for 10 years. During the marriage, I. was born and the mother worked in very part-time, minimum wage paying roles given that she was primarily looking after I.. The father claims that he was the primary caregiver to I.. I am not persuaded that the father is accurate in his perception, since, although having taken a paternity leave, he returned to his full-time position at Service Canada and the mother was home with the child, allowing him to continue to advance in his career and contribute to his pension.

117After the separation, the mother experienced a significant decline in her standard of living. In order to make ends meet, she incurred significant credit card debt and borrowed money from friends. For the first year, the father was paying her rent in lieu of support but then he paid sporadic child support for parts of 2023 and 2024 only. He paid no child support to the mother in 2025. The mother was left to manage financially on her own. In contrast, the father moved into his brother’s home in Keswick and admitted that he has not paid rent to him sine March 1, 2023. While the father claims to have an ongoing debt to his brother, the fact remains that after separation, the father’s standard of life remained the same, and possibly, improved since he no longer had housing expenses, and once he stopped paying rent for the mother, he only paid sporadic child support and failed to contribute to I.’s s.7 expenses.

118The father is, however, to be given credit for having paid rent on the mother’s behalf as per the parties’ interim agreement dated January 15, 2024, Exhibit 35 at trial. As per paragraph 2.1 of this interim agreement, the father made a total of $10,974 in respect of spousal support from March 1, 2023, to and including February 1, 2024, for which he shall be given credit.

119To her credit, the mother has now obtained full-time employment at a law firm and her offer of employment lists her income at $60,000 a year. She remains in the probationary period of work and, accordingly, she does not have job security. This does not take away from the fact that at the time that this Application commenced, there was also significant income disparity between the parties. The mother has not had the benefit of contributing to a pension or to build her career. I find that the mother has a past entitlement to spousal support on both a compensatory and needs basis, and there were compelling financial circumstances at the interim stage of this Application when she did not receipt any spousal support, except for the

$10,974 for which the father shall be given credit.

120Given that I have found that the mother is to be imputed with minimum wage income in 2023, 2024 and 2025, and using an income for the father of $81,755 in 2023, $81,343 in 2024 and

$78,500 in 2025, and the fact that I. is in a shared parenting arrangement starting May 1, 2024, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAGs”) produce the following ranges:

a. In 2023, when the father earned $81,755 a year and the mother earned minimum wage of $36,755, and I. was residing primarily with the mother, the “With Child Support” formula produces nil spousal support at the low- and mid-range and $170 a month spousal support at the high-end of the range, because the father is obligated to pay full Table child support of $762 a month.

b. In 2024, when the father earned $81,343 a year, and the mother earned minimum wage of $36,755, and I was residing in a shared parenting arrangement starting May 1, 2024, the “With Child Support” formula produces nil spousal support at the low- end of the range; $316 a month at the mid-range and $815 a month at the high-end of the range, with the high-end of the range leaving both parties with 50% Net Disposable Income (“NDI”) of $4,322 a month, since the father was obliged to pay set-off child support of $435 a month.

c. In 2025, when the father earned $78,500 and the mother earned minimum wage of

$36,755 and I. was residing in a shared parenting arrangement, the “With Child Support” formula produces nil spousal support at the low-end of the range; $215 a month at the mid-range and $692 a month at the high-end of the range, with the high-end of the range leaving both parties with 50% Net Disposable Income (“NDI”) of $4,256 a month, since the father was obliged to pay set-off child support of $408 a month starting October 2025, given the new Tables.

See SSAG calculations attached to these Reasons as Schedules “A”, “B” and “C”.

121For the period from March 1, 2023, to and including December 31, 2025, I find that the father has a retroactive spousal support obligation totalling $13,618, calculated as lump sum spousal support of $1,356 for 2023; $6,595 for 2024; and $5,667 for 2025. This represents the midpoint between the father’s after-tax cost and the mother’s after-tax benefit if he paid the mother spousal support at the high-end-range of the SSAGs for that period of time, which would result in the parties’ each being left with 50% of the NDI. After giving the father credit for having paid spousal support of $10,974 net, the father would owe the mother retroactive spousal support of $2,644.

122On a going forward basis, since the mother’s current income is $60,000 and the father’s current income is $78,500, after paying child support and his proportionate contribution to I.’s

s.7 expenses, the SSAGs produce a $0 range of spousal support at the low-end and mid-end of the range. At the high-end of the range, the SSAGs produce a figure of $270 a month, which leaves the parties with an equal amount of net disposable income, being $4,781 a month.

123On a going forward basis, I find that the mother has an ongoing entitlement to spousal support for a transitionary period, at least until I. completes high school and she attains job security. Accordingly, starting on January 1, 2026, on the first day of each following month, which shall be reviewable if there is a material change in circumstances, the father shall pay the mother spousal support in the sum of $200 a month which is lower than the high-end range of the SSAGs.

Issue 5: Which spouse owes the other an equalization payment?

124Pursuant to s.5(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3 (“the FLA”) the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them. This is also known as the equalization payment (“EP”).

125Net family Property (“NFP”) is defined in s.4(1) of the FLA and means the value of all the property, except that described in (2), that a spouse owns on the valuation date, after deducting,

a. The spouse’s debts and other liabilities, and

b. The value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, other than debts or liabilities related directly to the acquisition of significant improvement of a matrimonial home, calculated as of the date of marriage;

c. Excluded property, meaning property that a spouse owns on the valuation date which does not form part of the spouse’s net family property, includes property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift or inheritance from a third party after the date of marriage.

The father’s position

126The father submits that he is owed an EP from the mother of $133,954.90 as per his NFP statement.

127The father testified that his NFP was $89.836.41, comprised of the following assets and debts owned on the date of separation being March 1, 2023:

a. His total assets on the date of separation came to $111,410.87 made up of:

i. An RBC account ending in #3131 of $1,968;

ii. An RBC account ending in #675 of $15,751.35

iii. A TSFA account ending in 208 of $8,228.56;

iv. His Public Service Pension with the Government of Canada worth

$85,462.90

b. The father’s total debts on the date of separation came to $21,574.11 comprised of

i. A personal loan from Abdul Manna Anwar of $3,000;

ii. Visa debt of $626.91

iii. Contingent taxes on the pension at a rate of 21% of $17,947.20

c. The father claimed no Date of Marriage deductions, (“DoM deductions”);

d. The father claimed no Exclusions.

128According to the father’s NFP statement, the mother’s NFP totals $354,246.21, comprised of the following:

a. The mother’s total assets on the date of separation came to $369,646, made up of:

i. Land in Pakistan that has a value of $368,814;

ii. An RBC chequing account of $332

iii. General household items of $500

b. The mother’s total debts on the date of separation came to $279.79 which was a credit card debt.

c. The mother claimed a DOM deduction of $6,120, being a bank account in Pakistan of $6,120.00

d. The mother claimed two Exclusions being gold gifted to her from her parents of

$5,000 and cash given to her from her parents of $4,000.

129Despite having submitted an NFP statement that reflects what was set out above and made an Exhibit at trial, during his testimony, the father made submissions that he did not agree that the mother should receive a DoM Deduction for a bank account in Pakistan or an Exclusion for gold or cash gifted to her from her parents since she did not meet her onus and prove the existence of these assets as at the date of marriage or the fact that gold or cash she claims was gifted to her after the marriage, on the date of separation.

130I find that the mother did not meet her onus demonstrating that any gold or cash gifted to her from her parents after the marriage was traceable to gold or cash that continued to exist on the date of separation. Further, if the gold or cash were assets the mother had on the date of separation, she is required to have included those items in the calculation of her assets on March 1, 2023, and then Exclude them pursuant to s.4(3) of the FLA. Instead, the mother simply Excluded the $9,000. Accordingly, I have not allowed these Exclusions.

131To arrive at a value for the mother’s land in Pakistan on March 1, 2023, the father averaged three different valuations, being 70 million PKR which is equivalent to $349,086 CAD; 73 million PKR which is equivalent to $379,008 CAD; and 74 million PKR which is equivalent to $369,034 CAD. The exchange rate from PKR to CAD is 0.0050 PKR to $1 CAD.

The mother’s position

132The mother’s NFP calculations were different than the father’s. She lists her NFP as

$4,389.63, the father’s NFP at $45,836.38 and seeks an EP from the father of $20,723.38. [133] According to the mother, her assets as of March 1, 2023 totalled $14,774.83, comprised of:

a. Land in Pakistan worth $15,385.62;

b. Gold inherited from her parents of $5,000;

c. Bank account at RBC of $456.64;

134According to the mother, her debts on the valuation date of March 1, 2023, amounted to

$1,452.63 comprised of

a. a credit card debt to RBC of $452.63

b. a debt to her friend Uzma Shaheen of $1,000.

135She claimed a DoM Deduction of $15,0000, comprised of $5,000 she claims the parties used to purchase the father a car and $10,000 her father gifted her at the time of the wedding.

136She did not claim any Exclusions, despite having listed her gold as having been inherited during the marriage.

137The mother’s position is that the father’s NFP is $81,872.75, comprised of the following:

a. Bank account at RBC of $1,968.06;

b. Bank account at RBC of $15,751.35;

c. TFSA of $8,228.56

d. Pension of $83,195.92

e. Debt on the pension of $17,471.14

138When the Court asked the mother why she claimed a DoM deduction in her NFP statement but did not claim a DoM deduction in her sworn financial statement and likewise with the Exclusions, the mother was not able to answer why that was the case.

Differences in the Parties’ NFP calculations

139The items at issue between the parties are as follows;

i. The value of the mother’s land in Pakistan on the date of separation; and

ii. Whether the mother has a legitimate DoM deduction or Exclusion for the gold she claims to have inherited from her parents after the date of marriage?

Value of Land in Pakistan

140The mother owns a plot of land near or on the Grand Turk Road in Tarnol, Islamabad. The property is 1 Kanal, which is 50 square metres and it is a commercial property. It is vacant land, without possession.

141The parties agree that when the land was purchased in 2018, it cost them about $7,000 CAD.

142Both parties obtained valuation reports as to the current value of the mother’s land. These witnesses appeared at the trial via zoom. The parties each presented their valuator as a litigation expert, meaning a person engaged for the purposes of litigation to provide expert opinion: see.

r.20.2 of the Family Law Rules. However, neither party followed the FLRs in terms of either expert report as required by r. 20.2(2). Specifically, neither party’s expert report set out

a. The expert’s qualifications, including his or her employment and educational experiences in his area of expert;

b. An acknowledgement of expert’s duty (Form 20.2) signed by the expert.

143Given that the parties were self-represented, neither party sought to exclude the other party’s expert’s testimony even though the report in question did not meet the requirements of Rule

20.2 of the FLRs.

144I allowed the testimony of each party’s witness in as “participant expert” meaning a person who is not engaged to provide expert opinion evidence for the purpose of the litigation but who provides expert opinion evidence based on the exercise of his skills, knowledge, training or experience while observing or participating in the events at issue: see r.20.2(1) of the FLRs.

145Each party’s witnesses report was akin to a party obtaining a letter of opinion as to the fair market value of the mother’s land in Pakistan.

146The mother’s valuator, Malik Mudassar, owns a company, Malik Enterprises. Mr. Mudassar prepared his opinion of the fair market value of the land in Pakistan on August 27, 2024, which was made an Exhibit at trial. He testified that the fair market value of the mother’s land as of the date of his letter was 3.5 million PKR, less the taxes that would be charged on the value of the land as determined by the District Collector (“DC”) at 8%. His evidence is that the DC value of the land is 4.25 million PKR, less 8% taxes. Mr. Mudassar testified as follows:

a. Vacant land generally has a very low market value and the Capital Development Authority (“CDA”) who develops societies will list land at a higher market value so they can take possession of the land.

b. It is extremely hard to find a buyer of vacant land in Pakistan particularly because the area in which the land is located is not yet developed.

c. The land is located in a CDA sector – F-15, and the District Collector, DC, decides the value of the land which impacts the taxes associated with the land. When calculating the taxes associated with the land, the taxes are calculated using the DC value of the land.

d. The DC rate or evaluation of the property was $2,060,000 PKR as at August 2024 and today it is $2,250,000 PKR. He translates this into $20,000 - $30,000 CAD.

e. The DC rate for land valuation is the value the Revenue Department places on properties. The DC rate is generally lower than the fair market value of a property because it is essentially the rate the government is willing to pay for the land.

f. The mother did not direct Mr. Mudassar to provide an opinion as to the fair market value of the land as at the date of separation, March 1, 2023, which is what the FLA dictates is the valuation date.

g. However, he testified that if the mother’s land was sold on the open market, he believed it would be worth somewhere between $40 and $50 million PKR as at the date of the trial.

h. The land transfer tax is 8%.

147During cross-examination the father was able to establish that Mr. Mudassar was not asked to provide an opinion as to the fair market value of the mother’s land, but rather, to focus on the DC rate of the land, which is generally a lower value. In cross-examination, Mr. Mudassar stated the market value of the land is between $3.5 to $5 million PKR.

148I found Mr. Madassar’s testimony difficult to follow. On the one hand, he testified that the land in Pakistan is vacant and, therefore, the DC rate is the correct value and that would be worth about $20,000 to $30,000 CAD. On the other hand, he stated the fair market value of the land would be between $40-$50 million PKR, less the 8% land transfer tax.

149After Mr. Mudassar testified, the mother presented a letter from him, dated December 8, 2025, in which he states that the value of her land as of March 1, 2023, was 3,000,000 PKR.

Since this letter was presented to the Court after the trial started and after Mr. Mudassar testified, there was no opportunity for the applicant father to cross-examine Mr. Mudassar as to how he arrived at that value and the court gave no weight to this letter.

150The father also produced a land valuation report for the mother’s land in Tarnol from a valuator named Touseef Shafique.

151Mr. Shafique testified by Zoom. He is a legal practitioner who provides his expert opinion on the value of new housing societies in Pakistan that are in the process of development. The land was purchased in 2018. Mr. Shafique testified that the DC rate of the property in 2024 was $2,060,000 PKR per Marla and in 2025 it was $2,025,000 PKR per Marla. Mr. Shafique testified as follows:

a. The land is 1 Kanal, which is 500 square metres and is a commercial property located in Tarnol. It was purchased in 2018.

b. The DC value of the land was $2,060,000 PKR per 250 square meters, with the total value being $4,120,000 PKR.

c. The market value of the land which he obtained from two different agencies was

$3.8 million per square meters or a value of $3.5 million PKR.

d. The area in which the land is located has not yet been administered or taken under the control of the CDA. It is a commercial property.

e. The land is located in the vicinity of a new housing society and the industrial zones are being developed.

f. If land has not yet been administered by the Capital Development Authority (“CDA”), it generally does not attract many buyers, then the market value of the property would usually be the DC rate.

152When asked by the court as to what his opinion was regarding the fair market value of the land as of March 1, 2023, he testified that he estimated it was worth 50 million PKR. There was no report, however, to corroborate that value.

153As between each party’s participant witnesses, I find Mr. Shafique to be more credible than Mr. Mudassar. I am persuaded that based on the evidence before me on record, the most accurate value for the mother’s land in Pakistan is $38 million PKR which is the equivalent to

$198,284 CAD, using the exchange rate from PKR to CAD as of March 1, 2023, being Rs.1 PKR = 0.005218 CAD. I note that neither the mother nor the father calculated the contingent taxes associated with the Pakistan property as a debt on the mother’s side of the ledger. Both experts commented that the total tax upon the sale of the property would amount to 8%. Accordingly, the mother also has to include contingent property taxes of 8% of $198,284 of ($15,862.72).

154I find that based on the best evidence before the Court, the value of the mother’s lank is Pakistan is $182,421.25, being $198,284 less land transfer tax of ($15,862.72).

DoM Deduction / Exclusions claimed by the Mother

155According to the mother, she has a DoM deduction of $15,000 as at the date of marriage – November 11, 2013. However, the mother did not meet her onus of demonstrating the existence of these assets on the date of marriage. Accordingly, the DoM Deduction of $15,000 is not permitted.

156The mother did, however, produce a bank statement from the Bank Alfalah Limited in Islamabad of 600,000 PKR as of December 13, 2013. The bank account statement shows that she deposited 100,000 PKR in December 2013. There are no bank statements as of November 11, 2013, and, as a result, there is no evidence on the record as to the balance of funds in the account as at the date of separation. If I assume that there were 500,000 PKR on November 11, 2013, that would have amounted to $4,850 CAD using the exchange rate from PKR to CAD as of November 11, 2013, being Rs1 PKR = 0.0097 CAD. I am persuaded that the mother has proven a DoM deduction of $4,850 CAD.

157The mother claims to have inherited gold of $5,000 which she had on the date of separation. The mother did not satisfy her onus of proving the inheritance, the existence of the gold on the date of separation, or the basis upon which she valued the gold at $5,000. Accordingly, I do not include the gold in her assets on the date of separation. Nor do I allow an exclusion for the golf.

158Accordingly, I find that the mother’s NFP is $176,575.29 and the father’s NFP is $89,836.41. The difference between both parties’ NFP is $86,739.49. Accordingly, the mother owes the father an EP of $43,369.74, calculated as follows:

NET FAMILY PROPERTY CALCULATION

Assets owned on March 1, 2023

Mother

Father

Land in Pakistan

$198,284

Bank account - RBC

$456.64

RBC account ending in #3131

$1,968

RBC account ending in #675

$15,751.35

TFSA account ending in #208

$8,228.56

Public Service Pension with Govt of Canada

$85,461.90

Subtotal of Assets on V-date

$198,740.64

$111,409.81

Debts on V-date

RBC credit card debt

($452.63)

A personal loan from Uzma Shaheen

($1,000.00)

Contingent taxes on the lank in Pakistan at the rate of 8%

($15,862.72)

A personal loan from Abdul Manna Anwar

($3,000.00)

Visa Debt

($626.91)

Contingent taxes on the pension at a rate of 21%

($17,947.10)

Subtotal of debts on V-date

$17,315.35

$21,574.01

DoM Deductions

Pakistan Bank Account

$4,850.00

None claimed

Exclusions

None claimed

None claimed

NFP

$176,575.29

$89,835.80

Difference

$86,739.49

EP to be paid to father

$43,369.74

159Pursuant to s.9(1) (c) of the FLA, I order the mother to pay the EP owing to the father over a four-year period at the rate of $10,842.43 a year starting on February 1, 2026, and on February 1, 2027, 2028 and 2029. As security for the mother’s obligation to pay the EP, the mother shall place a lien on title to the land in Pakistan in the sum of $32,527.31, being the remaining 3 payments of the EP owing to the father, until the EP is satisfied, pursuant to s.9(1)(b) of the FLA. Once the motion pays the EP in full to the father, the lien on title to the land in Pakistan shall be lifted and released.

Outstanding costs awards

160The mother owes the father costs from the following three orders: 1) the costs order, of Ramsay, J. dated October 10, 2024, in the sum of $8,800; the costs order of Hood, J., dated November 22, 2024, of $6,500; and the costs order of Mathen, J., dated August 21, 2025, of

$1,779.75. Other than making one payment of $500 in October 2025, the mother admits that she has not satisfied these costs orders. She asks the court, however, to waive the outstanding costs she owes because of financial hardship.

161Court orders are not suggestions and must be followed. There was no appeal made of these costs orders and I cannot now adjust the amounts that the mother was ordered to pay. Accordingly, the mother owes the father costs of $16,579.75 which shall be set off against the retroactive child and spousal support owed by the father to the mother.

Disposition

162This court makes the following order:

Decision-Making Responsibility

a. Pursuant to s.16.1(4)(b) of Divorce Act, the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility over the education, extra-curricular and health-related decisions for the child, after consultation with the father.

b. Prior to a major decision being made about an education-relation issue, the following protocol shall be followed:

i. The mother shall advise the father in writing of her intended decision, giving at least 30 days’ notice of the decision being implemented to consult with him and obtain his viewpoint. Education-related decisions may include, but

not be limited to, choice of school, educational issues such as tutoring or extending curriculum, or academic accommodations that may be needed.

ii. The father shall respond to the mother’s communication about an intended education-related decision within 5 days of being told about it and advise as to his opinion regarding the intended decision.

iii. The parties shall then attempt to communicate in writing or in person, if both consent to do so, to discuss the education-related issued.

iv. The parties shall follow the advice of any third parties involved with the child’s education, such as his teachers, the principal at his school, or any doctor or third-party involved with the child, such as a psycho-educational consultant.

v. If, after consultation with the father, the parties are unable to agree on an education-related decision, the mother shall have final decision-making authority and advise the father of the decision made.

c. Prior to a decision being made about an extra-curricular activity decision for the child, the following protocol shall be followed:

i. The mother shall advise the father in writing of her intended decision, giving at least 30 days’ notice of the decision being implemented to consult with him and obtain his viewpoint. Extra-curricular activity-related decisions may include, but not be limited to, the child’s participation in extra curricular activities that cross over both parents’ parenting schedules, such as involvement in tournaments or competitions or team related activities.

ii. The father shall respond to the mother’s communication about an intended extra-curricular activity-related decision within 5 days of being told about it and advise as to his opinion regarding the intended decision.

iii. The parties shall then attempt to communicate in writing or in person, if both consent to do so, to discuss the extra curricular activity-related issued.

iv. The parties shall follow the advice of any third parties involved with the child’s extra curricular activities, such as teachers or coaches.

v. If, after consultation with the father, the parties are unable to agree on an extra curricular activity- related decision, the mother shall have final decision-making authority and advise the father of the decision made.

vi. Each parent shall be free to enrol the child in extra curricular activities during his or her parenting time that do not interfere with the child’s schedule when he is with the other parent.

d. Prior to a major decision being made about a health-related decision for the child, the following protocol shall be followed:

i. The mother shall advise the father in writing of her intended decision, giving at least 30 days’ notice of the decision being implemented to consult with him and obtain his viewpoint. Health-related decisions may include, but not be limited, to medical treatment, special dietary needs, any health care need, such as allergy treatment, eyecare treatment, dental or orthodontic treatment, involvement of specialists, therapy, etc.

ii. The father shall respond to the mother’s communication about an intended health- related decision within 5 days of being told about it and advise as to his opinion regarding the intended decision.

iii. The parties shall then attempt to communicate in writing or in person, if both consent to do so, to discuss the health- related issued.

iv. The parties shall follow the advice of any and all health-professionals involved with the child’s health, including his family doctor, dentist, eye doctor, or any specialist.

v. If, after consultation with the father, the parties are unable to agree on a health -related decision, the mother shall have final decision-making authority and advise the father of the decision she made.

e. Pursuant to s.16.1(4)(b) of the Divorce Act, the parties shall have joint decision- making responsibility over religious decisions impacting I.. They shall consult on any decisions. If they cannot agree, they shall mediate the issue through 361Mediate, prior to either party starting an application before a Court of competent jurisdiction.

f. Day-to-day decisions shall be made by the resident parent with the child at the relevant time. These decisions include such matters as homework, bedtime routines, chores, etc. It is preferable for the parties to consult and communicate with each other, as well as involving the child, so there is consistency and predictability in both households. However, each parent has the right to set “house rules” in his/her home.

g. Emergency decisions shall made by the resident parent with the child at any given time. The resident parent shall advise the other parent of an emergency immediately when it happens through the co-parenting application and by text. In a health emergency, the parent with care of the child at that time shall make the treatment decision, on the advice of medical personnel. If a parent makes an emergency health decision, the parent who has made the decision must immediately contact the other parent.

Co-parenting Communication

h. Pursuant to s.16.1(4)(c) of the Divorce Act, the parties shall, within 5 days of the release of this Judgement, subscribe to one of the following co-parenting applications, the choice to be made by the mother, such as Our Family Wizard, AppClose or 2Homes. The mother shall advise the father by text which co- parenting application she chooses and both parties shall subscribe to the application. The parties shall follow the below communication protocol:

i. The parties shall keep the child out of their conflict. They shall not ask him to pick sides, carry messages, or hear their complaints about the other parent.

ii. The parties shall not speak with the child directly or indirectly about specific disagreements they may have, including any disagreements about child support, property or any financial issues.

iii. The parties shall not share or provide the child with access to their documents related to their disagreements or legal proceedings.

iv. The parties shall not tell the child to ask or question the other parents about parenting arrangements that are agreed to ordered by this Judgement.

v. The parties shall communicate in a civil manner with each other and they shall encourage the child to respect the other parent.

vi. The parties shall not speak negatively about the other parent in the presence of the child and they shall encourage the child to spend time with his step- brother, the other parent and his extended family. The parties shall discourage family members and friends from speaking negatively about the other parent in the presence of the child.

vii. The parties shall exchange educational, medical, religious and extra- curricular information the child using the co-parenting application.

viii. The parties shall exchange contact information including parents’ addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, so they can communicate effectively and exchange information about the child.

ix. The parties shall share information with each other on a regular basis about the child’s welfare, including his education and school work, medical needs, health and dental care, counselling, religious, extra-curricular activities and other important aspects of his life.

x. The parties shall both ask for and be given information directly from the child’s teachers, other school officials, health care providers and other person or institution involved with the child. Each parent shall sign all necessary consent for the other parent to receive such information.

xi. The parties shall exchange the names, addresses and phone numbers of professions or organizations associate with the child, including, health care, education, and extra curricular activities.

xii. The parties shall be polite and respectful to each other at all times, especially in the presence of the child. At transition times, the parties shall only exchange pleasantries or immediately needed information. If one parent considers that a discussion is not courteous, that parent shall simply say, “we will talk about this later” and at that point, both parties shall discontinue the conversation and take the issue up at a different time.

xiii. All communications between the parties shall be child-focused, cordial, brief, clear, and to the point. The parties shall remain courteous and polite in communications with each other at all times.

xiv. Communications between the parties shall be devoid of profanity, insults, threats, and inflammatory or threatening comments.

xv. Neither party shall use exclamation points, words in bold or capital letters, repeated question marks, unnecessary adjectives, emojis, sarcasm or rhetorical questions in communication to ensure emails remain cordial and respectful.

xvi. Communications shall avoid rehashing, blaming, criticizing or making personal judgments of the other parent or past events. Communication shall pertain to the child only. The communication should be either:

1. Future-focused regarding an emerging problem; or

2. Informative, such as providing information about a medical appointment or a medication that the child needs to take.

xvii. Communications shall be limited to no more than 3 times a week through he co-parenting application, except for emergencies. All communication shall be guided by the following notations in the subject line of communications:

1. PR (please reply; the other parent shall reply within 24 hours or sooner)

2. FYI (for information only, no reply required)

3. TS (Time Sensitive; response required within x hours)

xviii. The parties shall respect each other’s privacy, and towards that end, they shall refrain from initiating discussion or questioning the child about the other parent’s personal life and activities.

xix. The parties shall respond to each other’s messages within 24 hours of receiving a message. If a reply requires more time, owing to the need to gather more information or consider the situation, an email shall be sent within the 24 hours acknowledging receipt of the email and advising the other parent that a full reply cannot be given within the 24-hour time frame. The parent shall advise the other parent when a full reply can be expected.

xx. The parties shall each arrange their own parent-teacher meetings.

xxi. The parties may attend school events and extra-curricular activities.

Child’s Government-Issued Documentation

i. Pursuant to s.16.1(4)(d) of the Divorce Act, the mother shall keep the passport issued in the child’s name, his SIN care, his birth certificate and his NICOP identification card from Pakistan at her home. These documents shall be made available to the father as needed. The mother shall ensure that the father is given copies of these important documents within 5 days of the release of this Judgment.

Travel to Pakistan

j. Pursuant to s.16.1(4)(d) of the Divorce Act, the mother shall be permitted to travel to Pakistan with the child for up to two weeks each year, such travel to occur when the child is not in school, provided the mother is in compliance with the following terms:

i. The dates shall be arranged and the father shall be advised of the trip at least 30 days in advance.

ii. The mother shall provide the father with a copy of the travel itinerary including flight information and places where they will be staying

iii. The mother shall arrange specific times not less than twice each week for the child to skype or call the father for not less than 15 minutes at a time.

iv. The mother shall promptly notify the father of any change in travel plans via email;

v. The mother shall advise the father of the names of those also travelling or staying with the child when the trip is proposed;

vi. In the event of any injury or illness on the trip, the mother shall promptly advise the father of same;

vii. The mother shall ensure the safety and security of the child, and shall not endanger his health on any trip;

Travel with the Child

k. If either parent plans a vacation with the child, that parent shall give the other parent at least 30 days’ notice before the planned trip, providing the flight information, the trip itinerary, as well as the contact information for the child during the trip. If a parent plans international travel with the child, that parent shall prepare, for the signature of the other parent, a consent letter proving that the child has permission to travel. The other parent shall not unreasonably refuse to sign the consent letter.

Child Support

l. Pursuant to s.15.1(1) of the Divorce Act, Starting on January 1, 2026, and the 1^st day of each following month, the father shall pay the mother set-off Table child support in the sum of $175 a month, based on the following calculation:

i. The father owes the mother Table child support of $730 a month based on his 2025 income of $78,500 a year;

ii. The mother owes the father Table child support of $175 a month based on her 2026 income of $60,000 a year;

m. Pursuant to a.15.1(1) of the Divorce Act, starting on January 1, 2026, and on the 1^st day of each following month, the father shall pay the mother 68% of the child’s s.7 expenses, within 15 days of receiving a receipt of such expenses from the mother and proof of payment. Such expenses may include, but not limited to, childcare to enable the mother to work, extra-curricular activities, uninsured medical and dental expenses in excess of $100, etc.

Child and Spousal Support Arrears

n. Pursuant to s.15.1(1) and s. 15.2(1) of the Divorce Act, in satisfaction of retroactive child support (Table and s.7 expenses) and retroactive spousal support for the period March 1, 2023, to and including December 1, 2025, the father owes the mother the total sum of $10,805.13, broken down as follows:

i. Table child support arrears of $1,040 in 2023, based on the father’s line 15000 income on his 2023 Notice of Assessment of $81,755 for the period March 1, 2023, to and including December 1, 2023, and applying the credit to which he is entitled under the parties’ interim separation agreement.

ii. Table child support arrears of $613.30 in 2024, based on the father’s line 15000 income in 2024 of $81,343.08 for the months January 1, 2024 to and including April 1, 2024, and set-off child support for the months May 1, 2024 to and including December 1, 2024, based on mother’s 2024 income being imputed at $35,776 a year, and applying the credit to which he is entitled under the parties’ interim separation agreement..

iii. Table child support arrears of $4,984.32 in 2025, based on the mother 2025 income being imputed at $36,608 a year and the father’s 2025 income being

$78,500 as he testified.

iv. Section 7 expense arrears in the sum of $1,523.51 from March 1, 2023, to and including December 1, 2024.

v. The father owes the mother retroactive spousal support of $2,644 for the period March 1, 2023, to and including December 1, 2025, after giving him credit for having paid spousal support pursuant to the parties’ interim separation agreement, dated January 25, 2024.

o. The mother owes the father outstanding costs orders of $16,579.75

p. After setting-off (n.) and (o.) above, the mother shall pay the father the balance of

$5,774.62 over 6 months, at the rate of $962.44 a month starting February 1, 2026, to and including July 1, 2026.

q. Within 10 days from the release of these Reasons, the mother shall forward any additional receipts for s.7 expenses paid by her during the 2024 and 2025 year. Upon production of the receipts and proof that the mother paid these expenses, the father shall pay the mother 70% of I.’s s.7 expenses for 2024, and 68% of I.’s s.7 expenses for 2025. The father shall pay these additional retroactive s.7 amounts within 10 days of receiving the receipts from the mother, or these sums shall be set off against amounts owing by the mother to the father under these Reasons.

Spousal Support

r. Pursuant to s.15.2(1) of the Divorce Act, starting on January 1, 2026, and on the 1^st day of each following month, the father shall pay the mother spousal support in the sum of $200 a month which is just slightly less than the high-end range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines attached as a Schedule “D” to this Judgment.

Equalization Payment

s. Pursuant to s.7 and s.9(1)(c) of the Family Law Act, in satisfaction of the father’s property claims under Part I of the Family Law Act, the common law, in equity or otherwise, the mother shall pay the father an Equalization Payment of $43,369.74, payable over four years at the rate of $10,842.43 a year payable on February 1^st, 2026, February 1^st, 2027, February 1^st, 2028, and February 1^st, 2029.

t. Pursuant to s.9(1)(b) of the Family Law Act, as security of the EP owing to the father, the mother shall place a lien/charge on title to the property in her name in Pakistan in the sum of $32,527.31 until she discharges the EP obligation owing by her to the father under subparagraph t. above. Once the EP is paid in full by the mother, the father shall sign any necessary documentation to lift/release the charge on title to the mother’s land in Pakistan.

Support Deduction Order

u. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid

to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A support deduction order will be issued.

v. The parties shall provide to each other and the Director of the Family Responsibility Office notification of any change in address or employment, including full particulars about the change, within ten (10) days of the change taking place.

Costs

w. Success is divided. Given that both parties are self-represented, incurred significant legal fees earlier in this proceeding, and both took eight complete days off work to attend this trial, there shall be no costs payable by either party.

Released: January 6, 2026

CITATION: Badar. v. Danish, 2026 ONSC 88

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00037415-0000

DATE: 20260106

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Danish Badar

– and –

Madiha Danish

Applicant

Respondent

RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Honourable Justice M. Kraft

Released: January 6, 2026

Calculation lnput Annual $

ayor 0 Resident of

Income

Employment income 81,755

ecipient 0 Resident of

Income

Employment income 36,755

Children

Age

Lives with

Table Amt

Claimed by

Child 1

0

Recipient

Yes

Recipient

Youngest child attends full time school 5 years and finishes high school 18 years from the date of separation.

Dependant credit claimed by Recipient.

Cautions/Overrides

Child Support (Table) - 2017 CSG Table Amount specified

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $

Payor Recipient

Annual Guidelines Income 81,755 36,755

CSG Table Amount (2017) 762 0

Child Support (Table) 762 0

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 10 years

Recipient's age at separation: 0 years

"With Child Support" Formula

Required input for duration: Age of Recipient at Separation

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $

A. SSAG Low

B. SSAG Mid

C. SSAG High

Payor

Recipient

Payor

Recipient

Payor Recipient

Gross Income

6,813

3,063

6,813

3,063

6,813 3,063

Taxes and Deductions

(1,709)

(102)

(1,709)

(102)

(1,658) (162)

Benefits and Credits

0

876

0

876

0 850

Spousal Support

0

0

0

0

(170) 170

Child Support (Table)

(762)

762

(762)

762

(762) 762

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

3,332

3,599

3,332

3,599

3,223 3,683

adult in household

child in household

shared/summer child in household

Payor's NDI/Contribution

ercent o2 34l

56.67

51.57

56.67

51.57

57.57 52.67

CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %

69.0%

31.0%

69.0%

31.0%

67.3% 32.7%

After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support

0

0

0

0

(119) 109

v. 2025.9.15 (c) 2025 DivorceMate Software Inc. Page 1 of 1

ayor 0 Resident of N

Income

Employment income 81,343

ecipient 0 Resident of N

Income

Employment income 36,755

Children

Age

Lives with

Table Amt

Claimed by

Child 1

0

Shared

Yes

Recipient

Youngest child attends full time school 5 years and finishes high school 18 years from the date of separation.

Dependant credit claimed by Recipient.

Cautions/Overrides

Child Support (Table) - 2017 CSG Table Amount specified

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $

Payor Recipient

Annual Guidelines Income 81,343 36,755

CSG Table Amount (2017) 758 323

Child Support (Table) 435 0

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 10 years

Recipient's age at separation: 0 years

"With Child Support" Formula

*High end of the range extended to include 50/50 split of ND/ (as defined by SSAG)

Required input for duration: Age of Recipient at Separation

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $

A. SSAG Low

B. SSAG Mid

C. SSAG High

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Gross Income

6,779 3,063

6,779 3,063

6,779 3,063

Taxes and Deductions

(1,699) (102)

(1,605) (206)

(1,444) (368)

Benefits and Credits

208 429

220 407

237 377

Spousal Support

0 0

(316) 316

(815) 815

Child Support (Table)

(435) 435

(435) 435

(435) 435

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

4,853

3,825

4,643

4,015

4,322 4,322

adult in household

child in household

shared/summer child in household

Payor's NDI/Contribution

ercent o4 56l

55.78

44.18

53.68

46.48

50.08 50.08

CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %

68.9%

31.1%

65.7% 34.3%

60.6% 39.4%

After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support

0

0

(223) 213

(561) 548

v. 2025.9.15 (c) 2025 DivorceMate Software Inc. Page 1 of 1

ayor 0, Resident of ON

Income

Employment income 78,500

Recipient 0, Resident of ON

Income

Employment income 36,755

Children

Age

Lives with

Table Amt

Claimed by

Child 1

0

Shared

Yes

Recipient

Youngest child attends full time school 5 years and finishes high school 18 years from the date of separation.

Dependant credit claimed by Recipient.

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 10 years

Recipient's age at separation: 0 years

"With Child Support" Formula

*High end of the range extended to include 50/50 split of ND/ (as defined by SSAG)

Required input for duration: Age of Recipient at Separation

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $

A. SSAG Low

B. SSAG Mid

C. SSAG High

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Gross Income

6,542 3,063

6,542 3,063

6,542 3,063

Taxes and Deductions

(1,622) (102)

(1,558) (176)

(1,404) (316)

Benefits and Credits

216 429

224 413

241 387

Spousal Support

0 0

(215) 215

(692) 692

Child Support (Table)

(430) 430

(430) 430

(430) 430

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

4,706

3,820

4,563

3,945

4,257 4,256

adult in household

child in household

shared/summer child in household

Payor's NDI/Contribution

ercent o3 45l

55.26

44.76

53.66

46.46

50.06 50.06

CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %

68.1%

31.9%

65.9% 34.1%

60.9% 39.1%

After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support

0

0

(151) 141

(475) 478

v. 2025.9.15 (c) 2025 DivorceMate Software Inc. Page 1 of 1

ayor 0, Resident of ON

Income

Employment income 78,500

Recipient 0, Resident of ON

Income

Employment income 60,000

Children

Age

Lives with

Table Amt

Claimed by

Child 1

0

Shared

Yes

Recipient

Youngest child attends full time school 5 years and finishes high school 18 years from the date of separation.

Dependant credit claimed by Recipient.

badar: 2026 calculation

Prepared by: January 2 2026

Child Support Guidelines (CSG)

Monthly $

Payor

Recipient

Annual Guidelines Income

78,500

60,000

CSG Table Amount (current)

729

554

Child Support (Table)

175

0

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 10 years

Recipient's age at separation: 0 years

"With Child Support" Formula

*High end of the range extended to include 50/50 split of ND/ (as defined by SSAG)

Required input for duration: Age of Recipient at Separation

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $

A. SSAG Low

B. SSAG Mid

C. SSAG High

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Payor Recipient

Gross Income

6,542 5,000

6,542 5,000

6,542 5,000

Taxes and Deductions

(1,622) (845)

(1,622) (845)

(1,542) (925)

Benefits and Credits

216 277

216 277

226 261

Spousal Support

0 0

0 0

(270) 270

Child Support (Table)

(175) 175

(175) 175

(175) 175

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

4,961

4,607

4,961

4,607

4,781 4,781

adult in household

child in household

shared/summer child in household

Payor's NDI/Contribution

ercent o1 23l

51.45

64.25

51.45

64.25

50.05 50.05

CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %

56.7%

43.3%

56.7%

43.3%

54.3% 45.7%

After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support

0

0

0

0

(190) 190

v. 2025.9.15 (c) 2025 DivorceMate Software Inc. Page 1 of 2

2026 calculation I January 2 2026

Support Scenarios Monthly $ D. $200 Spousal

Payor Recipient

Gross Income

6,542 5,000

Taxes and Deductions

(1,563) (904)

Benefits and Credits

223 265

Spousal Support

(200) 200

Child Support (Table)

(175) 175

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

4,827

4,736

adult in household

child in household

shared/summer child in household

Payor's NDI/Contribution

Percent of NDl

50.5%

49.5%

CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %

54.9% 45.1%

After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support

(141) 141

v. 2025.9.15 (c) 2025 DivorceMate Software Inc. Page 2 of 2