CITATION: Kim v. McIntosh, 2026 ONSC 3215
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ANITA KIM
Applicant
– and –
ADAN MCINTOSH
Respondent
Self-Represented
Self-Represented
HEARD: May 25-27, 2026, In Chambers
K. Sah, J.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
1Within this family law matter, the court, on its own initiative, commenced this vexatious litigant proceeding pursuant to r. 2.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “RCP”).
2Pursuant to r. 1(7) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “FLRs”), if the rules do not cover a matter adequately, the court may give directions, and the practice shall be decided by analogy to these rules, by reference to the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the “CJA”) the Act governing the case and, if the court considers it appropriate, by reference to the RCP. Accordingly, reliance on r. 2.2 of the RCP flows from FLRs.
3This process began following the service and filing of my Endorsement/Written Direction to Registrar Pursuant to Rule 2.2.04(1) and Form 2.2C – Registrar’s Notice Proposing Consideration of Vexatious Litigant Order, both dated March 6, 2026.
4In response, Mr. McIntosh submitted a “Response from Potential Subject of Vexatious Litigant Order” dated March 16, 2026. The court did not require Ms. Kim to serve or file any material for this proceeding.
5After an initial review, a Form 2.2F – An Order Following Initial Review Under Rule 2.2 dated April 22, 2026 was prepared setting this matter down for a hearing in writing.
6For the reasons that follow, Mr. McIntosh is declared a vexatious litigant. Mr. McIntosh will not be precluded from pursuing a proceeding in this court; however, to do so he must first satisfy this court that the claim or relief he seeks to advance is brought in good faith and has an arguable legal and factual foundation.
Issues to Be Determined
7This court is required to determine:
Whether Mr. McIntosh is a vexatious litigant.
If so, what are reasonable measures required to protect the administration of justice from Mr. McIntosh’s vexatious conduct?
Legal Principles
8Section 140 of the CJA states:
140 (1) If a judge of the Superior Court of Justice or of the Court of Appeal is satisfied that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may make an order that includes any of the following terms:
No further proceeding may be instituted by the person in any court, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
No proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court shall be continued, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
Any other term that is just.
9Section 140(2) provides that an order under s. (1) may be made on a judge’s own initiative.
10Rule 2.2 of the RCP provides a structured multi-staged process which empowers the court to manage proceedings efficiently and proactively, even when a party has not raised the vexatious litigant claim.
11The court is required to establish a pattern considering the overall history of the litigant’s conduct before considering whether the individual is vexatious.
12Several courts have discussed the purpose of making an order declaring a party to be a vexatious litigant. Generally, such orders are to prevent litigants from harassing others, and to protect the vexatious litigant from squandering their own resources: Foy v. Foy 1979 1631 (ON CA), [1979], 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (Ont. C.A.).
13The purpose of a vexatious litigant order is also to protect judicial resources and the integrity of the justice system.
14When objectively determining if actions brought by the potential vexatious litigant are futile, I take the view that the court should consider:
a) the importance of protecting the finality of the court’s decisions;
b) the need to prevent litigation brought in retaliation;
c) that a disregard for the court’s authority and persistent non-compliance may justify a vexatious litigant order; and
d) the need to avoid cascading proceedings and the creation of endless process.
15An important secondary objective of a vexatious litigant order is to protect the opposing party from persistent litigation, intimidation, or persecution.
16Several courts have identified hallmarks of vexatious proceedings and vexatious litigants. These include:
a) bringing one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction;
b) commencing one or more actions where it is obvious that the action cannot succeed, or would lead to no possible good, or where no reasonable person can expect to obtain relief;
c) initiating one or more actions that roll forward grounds and issues raised into subsequent actions where they are repeated and supplemented, often with actions against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in the earlier proceedings;
d) conducting proceedings in a vexatious manner, regardless of whether there was originally a good cause of action;
e) failing to pay cost orders made in earlier steps of a proceeding or in earlier proceedings;
f) making inappropriate submissions in form and content; and
g) persistently launching unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.
Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, 1987 172 (ON HCJ), [1987] 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (Ont. S.C. H.C.J.); see also, Van Sluytman v. Muskoka (District Municipality), 2018 ONCA 32, 26 C.P.C. (8th) 130; Toronto Hospital v. Nourhaghighi, 1999 CarswellOnt 1633; Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario v. Chuang, 2007 34853 (Ont. S.C.).
17For a litigant to be declared vexatious, it is not necessary that the litigant's conduct fall within each of the factors enunciated above: GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. v. Hicks, 2019 ONSC 4942(Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 58.
18The court in Winkler v. Winkler, 1990 11079 (MB QB), [1991] 70 Man R (2d) 47, aff’d 1991 11793 (MB CA), [1991] 70 Man R (2d) 45 (Man. C.A.), explains that a vexatious litigant order is exceptional, stating it “should be used in only the rarest of circumstances. It is difficult to think of a more fundamental human right than the right to access to our justice system. No one should have that right restricted except for the clearest and most compelling of reasons”: at p. 374.
19The court in Winkler addresses and emphasizes the particular tension that arises in family law proceedings: on one hand, the need for flexibility, particularly in matters involving parenting and to ensure continued access to the court when circumstances change; and on the other, the need to prevent the litigation process from being used as a tool of harassment: at p. 375.
20I view this balance as central to the court’s responsibility to manage family litigation and ensuring that parties do not misuse the process under the guise of ongoing parenting disputes.
Litigation History
21To determine if Mr. McIntosh is a vexatious litigant, the court is required to review the litigation history which is extensive and is summarized below.
22Most of the litigation history involves Ms. Kim. Mr. McIntosh is an Australian citizen, and Ms. Kim is a Canadian citizen. Mr. McIntosh and Ms. Kim are the parents of four children, who were born in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2017. Mr. McIntosh and Ms. Kim were never married. They separated in August 2019.
Currently Active Family Law Proceedings with Ms. Kim
FS-19-000012193 (“193”)
23This court file has a long history. This proceeding started in September 2019. After approximately six court attendances and endorsements in the span of 13 months, a final order was made at an uncontested trial.
24Prior to the uncontested trial, the court granted Ms. Kim a restraining order against Mr. McIntosh which restrained him from applying for the children’s passports, dismissed Mr. McIntosh’s stay motion, and dismissed Mr. McIntosh’s motion to vary an order and question Ms. Kim.
25In addition to this proceeding, Mr. McIntosh commenced a proceeding under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (the “Hague Convention”) in the Ontario Court of Justice, which was then traversed to the Superior Court of Justice (under court file FS-20-00016188).
26At the same time, various family members of Mr. McIntosh commenced three separate actions against Ms. Kim for contact with the children.
27Notably under court file 193, between September 2019 and January 2021, five costs orders were made against Mr. McIntosh in the total sum of $26,500.
28At the uncontested trial heard in October 2021, the court ordered sole decision-making in favour of Ms. Kim, restricted Mr. McIntosh’s ability to travel with the children or apply for their passports, ordered up to eight weeks of parenting time, imputed Mr. McIntosh's income to $65,000, and ordered that he pay retroactive child support of $16,104 and monthly ongoing support of $1,533. Mr. McIntosh was ordered to pay Ms. Kim costs of $3,500 plus outstanding costs owing in the amount of $33,625, for a total of $37,125.
29The uncontested trial decision was unsuccessfully appealed as set out further below.
30Approximately 14 motions and conferences were held after the final order was made. Mr. McIntosh brought a motion challenging service of the documents that led to the trial decision. The motion was dismissed and the court ordered him to pay $500.
31In addition, the court, in its Endorsement dated December 2, 2021, directed that Mr. McIntosh could not obtain any further orders without leave. This was to restrict him from seeking future motion dates or bringing or filing any notice of motion without first obtaining leave of the court. Any motion for leave was required to be served on Ms. Kim with 30 days’ notice. A similar order was made in court file FS‑20‑00016188 in April 2021.
32Despite the requirement to seek leave, Mr. McIntosh continued to bring motions. This included a motion to set aside all orders made by Shore J. under two court file numbers, the uncontested trial decision, and to stay the restraining order. The motions were dismissed, and Mr. McIntosh was ordered to pay costs of $250.
33By March 2023, Mr. McIntosh brought a motion for leave to file a motion for:
a) Contempt against Ms. Kim;
b) Enforcement of the uncontested trial decision;
c) The release of audio recordings of court appearances in September 2019, and July and October 2022;
d) To set aside an order reiterating Mr. McIntosh’s requirement to seek leave and ordering the court staff to not accept any further material from Mr. McIntosh unless it is a motion for leave brought on 30 days’ notice to Ms. Kim; and
e) To recuse Justices Smith, Sutherland, Shore, Associate Chief Justice McWatt and (then) Chief Justice Morawetz.
34By June 2023, the court decided to address Ms. Kim’s alleged contempt, compliance with the trial decision, and the children’s removal from public school. The court noted that the parties agreed to terms and conditions of an Interim Order which detailed the dates and times of Mr. McIntosh’s parenting time with the children while he was in Canada in the summer of 2023 in line with the trial decision. The court verified that the children were exchanged and ordered Mr. McIntosh to disclose the address he was staying at while in Canada.
35In December 2023, the court granted leave allowing Mr. McIntosh to bring a Motion to Change to vary the parenting order set out in the trial decision.
36Mr. McIntosh continued to bring motions relating to parenting time pending the return of the Motion to Change. The motions were dismissed.
37The Motion to Change was heard in July 2024 and it was ultimately dismissed. The dismissal of the Motion to Change was unsuccessfully appealed. The uncontested trial decision remains the operative order to date.
38On August 8, 2024, the court dismissed one of Mr. McIntosh’s previous motions seeking 21 heads of relief.
39In April 2025, Regional Senior Justice Firestone ordered that I hear all motions on the six files involving Ms. Kim and Mr. McIntosh.
40Under this court file I dealt with two motions in July 2025. I also heard a motion in August 2025, one motion in September 2025, one in March 2026. I dismissed Mr. McIntosh’s request to amend the endorsement and order dismissing his Motion to Change. Mr. McIntosh brought all the motions within this file. He was unsuccessful in all but one wherein I directed Ms. Kim to comply with the parenting schedule set out in the trial decision.
41I also instituted this vexatious litigant proceeding under court file 193.
FS-20-00016188-0000 (“188”)
42Mr. McIntosh initiated this proceeding under the Hague Convention.
43A half-day Hague Convention hearing took place in April 2020 after it was adjourned for a month at Mr. McIntosh’s request.
44The Hague Convention hearing order was released on June 1, 2020. Mr. McIntosh’s application for the return of the children to Australia was dismissed and he was ordered to pay Ms. Kim her costs in the amount of $18,000.
45Mr. McIntosh proceeded to bring a motion to set aside the costs order in October 2020. This request was repeated in September 2025.
46At a conference, he also took the position that his outstanding claim for access pursuant to the Hague Convention hearing order required discussion. At that attendance, the court noted that it previously declined to make an order allowing Mr. McIntosh’s motion for parenting time as he did not take any steps to pay outstanding costs and security of costs in the amount of or $6,000 which was previously ordered.
47In September 2025, I heard and dismissed Mr. McIntosh’s motion for an order setting aside the Hague Convention hearing cost order.
48Mr. McIntosh subsequently brought a motion for my recusal, originally returnable in December 2025 but ultimately heard in January 2026. I dismissed the recusal motion.
FS-20-00016188-0001 (“188-01”)
49This court file was opened in the Superior Court of Justice in October 2020, after it was transferred from the Ontario Court of Justice on consent of the parties.
50In this application, Mr. McIntosh, inter alia, asked for parenting time and a prohibition on the mother taking the children outside of Toronto.
51This proceeding was not pursued in the Superior Court of Justice until April 2025 when Mr. McIntosh requested an uncontested trial.
52Leave was granted for Mr. McIntosh to bring a motion before me seeking parenting time with the children in Australia over the Winter holidays. There was no motion put before the court, nor any materials due to an issue with filing, and therefore, no orders were made.
53In January 2026, I made an order for Mr. McIntosh’s benefit setting out the procedural steps of filing documents in all files to which he is a party.
54The following month, Mr. McIntosh sought an order directing that a named individual (an employee of the Ministry of the Attorney General) not be involved in any of his proceedings. I dismissed this motion finding that the judiciary does not have jurisdiction to direct assignments to employees of Ministry of the Attorney General.
55In March 2026, Mr. McIntosh brought a second motion seeking my removal as case management judge alleging misconduct on my part which was denied. I dismissed the motion.
56Also in March 2026, Mr. McIntosh brought a motion requesting the enforcement of parenting time with the children over the March Break. Based on the trial order, the parties were required to agree to dates no later than November 1 of the year prior. There was no evidence that the parties came to such an agreement, and the motion was dismissed.
57In April 2026, Mr. McIntosh brought another two motions. Under file 193, he sought leave to bring a motion for the change of the final order made at the uncontested trial in 2021. Under file 188-01, Mr. McIntosh sought my recusal from all matters pertaining to him. It was agreed that the 188-01 motion had to be heard before the 193 motion.
58I dismissed the second motion for my recusal, and, as of this date, the motion on 193 has yet to be scheduled.
FS-19-00012193-0001 (“193-01”)
59The creation of this proceeding, specifically, the extension 01 to the original 193 court file is unexplained.
60In an endorsement dated April 16, 2021, the court noted that this proceeding was not a Motion to Change, it was an entirely new application for the Hague Convention where Mr. McIntosh was the applicant and Ms. Kim was listed as the respondent, and therefore, the court file number should not be 01 extension but rather a new court file.
61Five endorsements were prepared under this court file and they are largely duplicative with those prepared under court file 193. The last order in this file was the final order prepared at the uncontested trial heard in 2021 under court file 193.
Proceedings Initiated by Mr. McIntosh’s Family Members
FS-20-000015656 (“656”), FS-20-00015651 (“651”), and FS-20-00015654 (“654”)
62Court file 656 lists Mr. McIntosh’s mother, Nerrida McIntosh, as the applicant and Ms. Kim as the respondent. Nerrida McIntosh is the children’s paternal grandmother.
63This action was commenced in 2020, at the same time as Mr. McIntosh’s other proceeding and around the same time that Mr. McIntosh’s sister, Natasha McIntosh-Berry (court file 651), and father, Michael McIntosh (court file 654), also initiated proceedings against Ms. Kim.
64For some time, the three applications travelled together and proceeded to conferences together.
65The three court files proceeded to a trial management conference in January 2022 at which time, the court scheduled three motions. First, the applicants’ motion to recuse any judge who was involved and/or received communications that they consider to be prejudicial or disparaging against Mr. McIntosh. The motion was set for February 10, 2022. Second, the court scheduled Ms. Kim’s motion for summary judgement seeking a dismissal of all three applications and for security for costs. Lastly, the court scheduled the paternal grandparents’ and aunt’s motion for April 5, 2022 to obtain an order for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to prepare a Voice of the Child Report.
66In March 2022, the court heard a motion brought by the paternal aunt requesting decision-making responsibility. Ms. Kim requested the dismissal of the paternal aunt’s application. The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring trial surrounding the following questions:
a) Whether the paternal aunt should have contact with the children only when her brother, Mr. McIntosh is exercising his parenting time with the children in Ontario;
b) Whether the paternal aunt should have contact with the children independent from that of her brother, Mr. McIntosh;
c) If the paternal aunt is to have contact with the children independent of parenting time with her brother, Mr. McIntosh, whether the paternal aunt should be allowed to have contact with the children outside of Ontario?
67The court dismissed the paternal aunt’s claim for decision-making and limited the trial to the following issues set out above. The court also ordered the paternal aunt to pay $6,500 as security for costs in the court file 651.
68It is noteworthy that in this decision, the court stated:
53…the paternal aunt’s request that she have contact with the children outside of Ontario gives rise to there being good reason to believe that this request is a waste of time or a nuisance claim. This is so even though I have found this to be a genuine issue for trial. It is not for this court to find, on this motion, that this request is a nuisance or a waste of time. My finding is that it appears to me, on the evidence, that there is a good reason to believe this is the case.
69By April 2022, the paternal aunt wanted to continue her motion regarding the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, bring a motion to set aside all previous orders made by Toronto judges, and seek clarification regarding Ms. Kim’s request to admit. The court held that she could not take any of these steps until after the security for costs and costs were paid.
70On a motion heard in July 2022 by Sutherland J., an order was made which also referenced court file 193. The order dismissed the paternal aunt’s contempt motion, and allowed her physical contact with the children on terms which included: a requirement for her to deposit her passport with Ms. Kim’s lawyer, that Mr. McIntosh not be present and remain at least 200 metres away from the children, and various other incidental orders relating to the contact/visitation order. In a separate endorsement, Sutherland J. also ordered the paternal aunt to pay $5,000 within 30 days.
71The next month, Mr. McIntosh brought a motion wherein he sought Sutherland J.’s order be set aside and Sutherland J.’s recusal from the matter.
72The judge assigned to case manage the proceeding determined the motion would not proceed because Mr. McIntosh was not a party to the proceeding before Sutherland J.
73In reply, Mr. McIntosh advanced another notice of motion in files 193-01 and 188. The court noted that the parties to the proceeding, the paternal aunt and Ms. Kim, were the only people permitted to make submissions on costs. As a result, Mr. McIntosh’s notice of motion dated September 20, 2022 was dismissed.
74The application commenced by the paternal grandfather has not been actively or recently pursued.
75The application commenced by the paternal grandmother proceeded to a summary judgement motion brought by Ms. Kim. The paternal grandmother did not attend on the day of the scheduled motion and it was adjourned to the trial management conference set for April 25, 2022. It is unclear what happened on the return of the motion.
76The paternal grandmother’s action remained inactive until 2025 when she indicated an intention to proceed with a motion for the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. At a conference held in September 2025 and on consent, Mr. McIntosh was added as a party to the paternal grandmother’s action, and the court directed the parties to a conference before a dispute resolution officer. Since then, there has been no recent activity in this proceeding.
Various Appeals to Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal of Ontario
77The first time Mr. McIntosh argued before the before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, he advanced three issues: Kim v. McIntosh, 2023 ONCA 356. First, he appealed the final trial order made at the uncontested trial. This request was dismissed.
78Second, he sought an order vacating the order of Nordheimer J.A., dated November 8, 2022 wherein Nordheimer J.A. refused to stay the final trial order pending appeal. This request was dismissed.
79Third, he brought what was described to be an omnibus motion, seeking a wide variety of orders, including an order directing the recusal of any judge who received or saw a certain case note made by Shore J. of the Superior Court of Justice (Toronto Region) on all matters pertaining to these proceedings claiming a reasonable apprehension of bias. In addition, Mr. McIntosh asked the Court of Appeal to set aside any order made by any judge of the Toronto Superior Court who may have seen or read Shore J.’s case note before he or she made an order in this proceeding. These motions were all dismissed.
80It is worth quoting directly from the Court of Appeal:
4Unfortunately, the proceedings have been marred by [Mr. McIntosh’s] repeated non-compliance with numerous court orders and a seemingly interminable stream of motions and appeals brought by [Mr. McIntosh] at various court levels.
81The Court of Appeal in this instance ordered costs payable to Ms. Kim in the amount of $5,000.
82Mr. McIntosh also appealed the dismissal of his Motion to Change parenting time and decision-making: Kim v. McIntosh, 2025 ONCA 469. The Office of the Children’s Lawyer supported his appeal. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal on the merits at the hearing, without calling on Ms. Kim. At paras. 16 and 17 of their decision, the Court of Appeal wrote:
16Finally, we observe that Mr. McIntosh’s obdurate refusal to get gainful employment despite his education and obvious talents has impoverished his family, and his relentless litigation has worn Ms. Kim out financially and emotionally. He has unaccountably been permitted to litigate despite his refusal to pay any outstanding costs awards and to pay outstanding support orders…
17The lengthy record shows that Mr. McIntosh is ungovernable. Had we not dismissed the appeal on its merits, we would have quashed it because of Mr. McIntosh’s utter failure to pay costs or support, on the principles set out in A.(A.) v. G.(Z.), 2016 ONCA 660, 134 O.R. (3d) 232; see also Dickie v. Dickie, 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346. Mr. McIntosh is familiar with the consequences of not paying cost orders: Kim, at paras. 22-25.
83Mr. McIntosh also made several appeals to the Divisional Court, including but not limited to the following.
84On November 22, 2019, he brought a motion before a Panel of Divisional Court judges seeking leave to appeal a decision in his action against the Toronto Police Services Board and the City Solicitor’s Office. Leave to appeal was granted.
85In July 2022, he brought a motion for a stay pending appeal in his action against Ms. Kim. The motion was dismissed, and shortly thereafter, his motion for leave to appeal was also dismissed.
86In August 2022, a Panel of Divisional Court judges dismissed his motion for leave to appeal a January 2019 costs order of Nakonechny J. Before that, a single judge of the Divisional Court had dismissed his motion for a stay pending the appeals of the orders of Audet J. made in April and May 2022.
87In response, Mr. McIntosh brought two motions to set aside the Divisional Court orders and sought to have the Panel recuse itself. The motions were dismissed, and the Divisional Court found Mr. McIntosh’s claims lacked a legal basis, were abusive of the court process, and constituted a vexatious proceeding: Kim v. McIntosh, 2022 ONSC 6452.
88In September 2025, a Divisional Court judge released an endorsement on Mr. McIntosh’s motion, brought in two matters, seeking: (a) to set aside the decision of Audet J. dated April 22, 2022; (b) an order precluding a named Registrar from any involvement; and (c) an order precluding six named judges from hearing the motion.
89The motion was dismissed under r. 2.1.02 of the RCP because: (a) it had no prospect of success on the substantive issue properly before the court (r. 59.06(2)(a)) and was therefore meritless; (b) it was not reasonably purposeful; and (c) it was vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. The court found that Mr. McIntosh’s motion fell within the “clearest of cases,” warranting the application of the summary procedure under rr. 2.1.01 and 2.1.02 of the RCP: Kim v. McIntosh, 2025 ONSC 5373.
Claims Against Judges
90Mr. McIntosh brought an action against Justice Sharon Shore, Associate Chief Justice Faye McWatt and (then) Chief Justice Geoffrey Morawetz.
91In this action, he alleged that he was denied access to his four children for over three years due to the deliberate and intentional conduct of judges of the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario. He alleged that a judge made defamatory remarks and disseminated these remarks to other judges, influencing their impartiality and resulting in adverse decisions in his family law matters. Mr. McIntosh claimed nominal damages, findings of defamation and lack of jurisdiction, and a six-month leave of absence for the defendants.
92The defendants requested a dismissal of proceedings pursuant to r. 2.1.01(1) of the RCP.
93While the court acknowledged Mr. McIntosh’s pleadings for the defamation claim were deficient, the court did not dismiss the defamation claim. However, all other claims within the action were dismissed after finding they lack a legal basis, merit, and were not reasonably purposeful, and were abusive in nature: McIntosh v. Shore et al, 2023 ONSC 3124.
94Within the same proceeding against three judges of our court, Mr. McIntosh brought a motion requesting “an order to recuse [a judge] and any judge who is acting at the direction of any of the defendants or is represented by the [sic] any member of the Attorney General of Ontario” The court dismissed the motion finding it to be moot since the court had dealt with the matter, and because the recusal motion is “frivolous and should be dismissed under Rule 2.1”: McIntosh v. Shore et al, 2023 ONSC 3575.
95This same proceeding then advanced to a motion in writing pursuant to rr. 21.01(1)(a) and (b) and 25.11(c), for an order striking out the statement of claim against the judge who allegedly defamed Mr. McIntosh and a dismissal of the action.
96The court found there to be no reasonable cause of action, concluding Mr. McIntosh’s claim would likely fail due to the unanswerable defences of judicial immunity and absolute privilege. The deficiencies in Mr. McIntosh’s pleading, including the failure to specify the allegedly defamatory statements, further supported striking the claim. The court, therefore, struck his statement of claim and did not give him leave to amend his pleading: McIntosh v. Shore, 2024 ONSC 1767. Mr. McIntosh was ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs on the motion in the amount of $1,000: McIntosh v. Shore, 2024 ONSC 2755.
97Mr. McIntosh also brought an action against Sutherland J, following Sutherland J.’s decision in McIntosh Berry v. Kim (court file no. 651 set out above). In that motion, Justice Sutherland did not permit Mr. McIntosh to make submissions because he did not have standing as a non-party to the motion.
98The action against Justice Sutherland was found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process within the meaning of r 2.1.0 of the RCP, and it was dismissed. In this case the court found that:
a) Mr. McIntosh’s core complaint is his dissatisfaction and disagreement with the July 2022 motions to which he was not a party;
b) He is using the proceeding as a guise to personally redress against a judge whose decision he disagrees with;
c) He now seeks relief for a time period that has passed by 10 months and as such, it is an abuse of process to seek that Justice Sutherland’s order is of no force and effect;
d) The pleading has various cases that only have argument and lack substantive allegations; and
e) His reliance on s. 142 CJA is misguided: McIntosh v. Sutherland, 2023 ONSC 2788.
99Mr. McIntosh’s current action against me has not yet been determined. In his claim, Mr. McIntosh seeks nominal damages in the amount of one dollar and an order that I be granted a leave of absence for a period of six months. He alleges that I acted without jurisdiction and deliberately acted in a manner to cause him and his children harm. He claims relief for emotional and mental stress.
100A Statement of Defence has been issued on my behalf, denying all allegations of wrongdoing as set out in the Statement of Claim and requesting that the action be dismissed.
Various Other Claims
101Mr. McIntosh has brought claims against the:
a) Ontario Judicial Council, under court file SC-15-00012996-0000
b) Toronto Police Services Board, under court files SC-19-00007800-0000, CV-17-00589244-0000, SC-15-00012992-0000
c) Toronto Police Services Board City Solicitors Office, under court file DC-19-00000406-00ML
d) Attorney General of Canada, under court files T-234-23, T-234-23, T-787-25
Mr. McIntosh’s Position
102In his response to this proceeding, Mr. McIntosh asserts that I am acting in retaliation against him. He raises several accusations in his written materials and in his Statement of Claim issued against me. Those allegations are denied.
103I do not accept Mr. McIntosh’s characterizations of me. I disagree that I have acted in retaliation. Rather, Mr. McIntosh has, on several occasions, brought motions to recuse judges whose decisions he does not agree with, and after failed attempts to appeal, has moved to set aside decisions.
104It is improper for Mr. McIntosh to claim that the court’s decision to proceed on its own initiative under r. 2.2 constitutes retaliation or is improper conduct on my part. I am acting under the authority of the RCP which flows from the FLRs.
105Mr. McIntosh further submits that the grounds for this proceeding are vague, and that the grounds listed in Form 2.2C are generalizations lacking specificity, reference, submissions, rulings, or evidence. He argues that, without such detail, he cannot meaningfully respond to the allegations. He analogizes the situation to being charged with murder “for the death of some person, at some place, at some time,” and being expected to defend the charge.
106He relies on r. 25.06 of the RCP, which requires that every pleading contain a concise statement of the material facts on which a party relies. This reliance is misplaced. A notice under r. 2.2 is not a pleading, nor does it function as one.
107Rule 2.2 provides for a streamlined summary mechanism for the court to address vexatious conduct without requiring the level of detail formal pleadings demand. Form 2.2C requires the judge initiating the proceeding to specify grounds and to list, to the best that can be determined, ongoing and finally disposed of proceedings in any Ontario court.
108The notice provided to Mr. McIntosh identifies the nature of the concerns, lists the proceedings to which he has been a party, and also sets out the potential consequences of a vexatious litigant order. He was afforded a full opportunity to respond, which he has done, at length.
109Mr. McIntosh questions which orders the court refers to in its allegations that he has not complied with court orders. He states that child support orders are now within the jurisdiction of the Australian family court, with a trial scheduled for October of this year. However, Ms. Kim has repeatedly stated that he has not paid child support. This finding was made in some of the older decisions of this court. Mr. McIntosh has not demonstrated that he has fulfilled his obligations to pay support made in Ontario orders. Not doing so is clear non-compliance with a number of court orders.
110Mr. McIntosh further asserts that he made efforts to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings by proposing a schedule for his multiple motions, and by requesting the adjournment of his matters before the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Australian court, pending the outcome of his proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice. Those efforts do not diminish the sheer volume of relentless proceedings brought every time he disagrees with a decision from the court.
111With respect to costs, Mr. McIntosh states that he has paid some costs and further claims that the Court of Appeal for Ontario found him to be impecunious when he appeared before that court in March 2021. The statement was unproven. There is no evidence to substantiate that any costs were paid.
Discussion
112Having regard for the non-exhaustive and non-conjunctive list of factors informing a determination of a vexatious litigant as set out above, I make the following findings.
113The legal issues in Mr. McIntosh's case with Ms. Kim involve parenting and decision making as determined under the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 and child support under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
114It would be entirely appropriate and acceptable for motions and actions to be brought for the resolution of legitimate disputes involving parenting time, decision-making, and child support.
115However, those discreet issues are not always being litigated. Instead, Mr. McIntosh's disputes suggest that his goal is to question any order he disagrees with and is suggestive of an ulterior motive. His countless motions to set aside orders and his actions claiming bias and for the recusal of twenty judges are distractions from the issues central to his case involving the parties’ children.
116Mr. McIntosh has challenged every substantive decision made by this court.
117Given the sheer volume of prior proceedings and orders, a comprehensive summary is impractical. Mr. McIntosh perceives himself as a victim of judicial injustice, and he has ultimately weaponized the legal system in an effort to prove it.
118After the uncontested trial decision was released, Mr. McIntosh returned to the court challenging service of the documents that led to the decision, he also attempted to set aside several previous decisions of this court made before the uncontested trial decision was released.
119Mr. McIntosh eventually appealed, and when his appeal was not successful, he brought a further motion seeking to set aside the uncontested trial decision.
120A recent example includes his behaviour surrounding the Motion to Change the final uncontested trial decision. After being granted leave to bring a Motion to Change, Mr. McIntosh brought several motions, pending the return of the variation proceeding.
121When he was dissatisfied with the decision on the Motion to Change, he appealed it. When the appeal was not successful, he brought a motion to amend the reasons for decision to dismiss his Motion to Change.
122Mr. McIntosh has a clear disrespect for the finality of the court’s decisions.
123In addition to repeatedly challenging this court’s decisions, Mr. McIntosh has made accusations against court staff and judges. This conduct reflects an individual who calls every aspect of the process into question and who structures his claims to expand in scope, resulting in an abuse of the judicial system. It diverts attention from the issues that matter – issues involving his children – and does so across multiple proceedings.
124The issues in dispute are not particularly complex. However, Mr. McIntosh has created unnecessary procedural complexity by initiating multiple distinct proceedings and by repeatedly raising and carrying forward the same issues and claims across different actions.
125By proceeding in this manner, he has been able to repeat requests for the same relief, including his attempts to set aside the costs order arising from the Hague Convention hearing, first in 2020 and again in 2025.
126Mr. McIntosh has also repeatedly alleged judicial bias, a pattern commonly seen among vexatious litigants who seek to undermine the judicial process by attacking the integrity of the decision‑maker.
127Mr. McIntosh’s allegations of bias are, in my view, rooted in his dissatisfaction with the court’s decisions. His various disagreements with those decisions have never amounted to the finding of bias. Instead, his repeated assertions have very likely impeded the court’s ability to give timely attention to meritorious matters.
128In the past year, Mr. McIntosh has sent me seven direct emails, brought two motions seeking my recusal, and commenced civil action against me. This is not the conduct of an individual who is litigating for the purpose of resolving disputes, rather, it reflects a retaliatory response to unfavourable rulings.
129Mr. McIntosh is well aware that direct communication with judges is inappropriate and that the rules prohibit such contact. His refusal to comply with these restrictions, and his wilful disregard of them, is further evidence of vexatious conduct.
130The evidence outlined above firmly establishes that Mr. McIntosh persistently pursues several procedural actions with disregard for the finality of a decisions or the impact of his conduct on Ms. Kim and the use of judicial resources.
131He has moved to set aside several temporary and final orders made by this court to rehash issues already decided.
132Mr. McIntosh has insisted on challenging and reviewing several orders made by this court, demonstrating an unwillingness to accept final orders in his relentless approach to litigation.
133Mr. McIntosh has a lengthy vexatious procedural history. He has instituted proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice, Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court Branch of the Superior Court of Justice, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Federal Court, and Small Claims Court.
134The evidence has established that he instigates a multiplicity of proceedings, often in an attempt to relitigate issues and sometimes brings proceedings for a purpose other than asserting legitimate rights.
135There have been numerous specific instances of judicial condemnation about Mr. McIntosh’s approach, as set out in paragraphs 80 and 82 above.
136In addition, over five years ago, in an endorsement dated December 17, 2020, at para. 16, the court noted:
16In addition to the litigation above, the Respondent has either appealed (to Divisional Court and/or the Court of Appeal) or sought to change the following orders:
a. Order of Myers, J., dated August 30, 2019;
b. Order of Paisley, J., dated September 12, 2019;
c. Order of Favreau, J., dated March 6, 2020;
d. Order of Hood, J., dated March 13, 2020; and
e. [the] order dismissing the Hague Application, dated March 20, 2020.
137Mr. McIntosh has failed to pay significant costs orders as outlined above. I have calculated costs as ordered to a total of more than $60,000 payable to Ms. Kim. It is possible that there are additional costs awards not captured in my calculation. If his behaviour is not curtailed by ensuring he is required to demonstrate merit before bringing a further proceeding before the courts, the amount of outstanding costs may grow.
138A vexatious litigant finding against Mr. McIntosh should not prevent him from having any access to the court to deal with the best interests of his children; however, reasonable measures are required to ensure he can continue or initiate meritorious proceedings.
139Mr. McIntosh has made repeated and unsuccessful allegations against several judges claiming bias or a denial of procedural fairness. These allegations have wasted Ms. Kim’s and the court’s resources.
140The additional court proceedings initiated by various members of Mr. McIntosh’s family required Ms. Kim to respond and imposed further strain to judicial resources. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. McIntosh was very likely the driving force behind each of these proceedings. Although he was not always named as a party, he frequently participated and the issues his family members raised involved and impacted his parenting time.
141This conduct is relevant in the court’s attempt to protect the misuse of the court’s processes and to prevent unnecessary or duplicative litigation. This conduct reflects the exact type of cascading proceedings that r. 2.2 of the RCP and s. 140 of the CJA seek to curtail.
142In her factum filed for the second motion brought for my recusal, Ms. Kim submits that Mr. McIntosh owes over $100,000 in child support. She states that she has been the main caregiver for all four children until recently, when one of the four children began residing with Mr. McIntosh. Mr. McIntosh’s residency status in Canada remains unidentified and, therefore, the permanence of the current arrangement is also unknown.
143Ms. Kim states that she has been unable to retain counsel because of the sheer volume of work generated by these proceedings. She further asserts that Mr. McIntosh has weaponized the judicial system against her in an effort to create a battle of attrition. I find these claims to be accurate.
144Litigants such as Mr. McIntosh impose a disproportionate burden on the court’s resources and must be restrained within the bounds of reasonable litigation conduct so that other matters may also proceed in an orderly and timely manner. This will ensure that the court’s limited resources are not consumed by vexatious or abusive proceedings to the detriment of other litigants.
145Having reviewed the full record and Mr. McIntosh’s submissions, I am satisfied Mr. McIntosh’s conduct demonstrates a pattern of vexatious and abusive litigation behaviour, including repeated attempts to relitigate matters, the initiation of collateral proceedings, non‑compliance with court orders, and the use of the court process in a retaliatory manner. Court intervention is necessary and required to protect judicial resources, prevent further misuse of the litigation process, ensure that other litigants have fair access to the court, and to shield Ms. Kim.
146Mr. McIntosh is declared a vexatious litigant.
Terms of the Vexatious Litigant Order
147I recognize that such a declaration is aimed at the litigant, rather than the specific litigation. I further acknowledge that making such a declaration has the potential to deny Mr. McIntosh access to the courts. Such declarations should only be used in the rarest of circumstances because they limit an individual’s right to access our justice system.
148I also find it appropriate to make an order to insulate Ms. Kim from the potential of further harassment and to protect limited judicial resources from being squandered, so that other cases may proceed through our justice system in a timely fashion.
149The intent of the order is not to prevent Mr. McIntosh from having any access to the justice system, particularly when dealing with the best interests of the parties’ children. However, he will be required to first obtain leave to bring any new proceeding or motion in any of the currently active and inactive court files.
150Parenting issues are known to be evolving, and this is no different in this case. Because of the evolving nature of parenting issues, Mr. McIntosh ought not be restricted from pursuing a legitimate claim, brought in good faith and with a strong factual and legal foundation.
151Family law matters are unique in that final orders are subject to variation since cases involving children are rarely fixed with any finality. What is in the best interests of a child might vary over time. It is a common understanding that family law litigants must have access to the courts on a frequent basis to allow them to pursue a variation.
152The evidence before the court is that one of the children now resides with Mr. McIntosh. This change in circumstance may warrant a variation to the final order made at the 2021 uncontested trial.
153However, the court cannot ignore that Mr. McIntosh’s vexatious behaviour extends beyond issues relating to the children. For example, he has brought numerous motions seeking the recusal of various judges; by his own evidence, he has brought recusal motions against approximately 20 judges.
154The passage of time has not eliminated Mr. McIntosh's vexatious conduct. There continues to be a risk of vexatious conduct.
155Section 140 of the CJA outlines terms that might be imposed if the court is satisfied that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner.
156In accordance with rr. 1(7.2), 14(21), and 2(2) to 2(5) of the FLRs, and consistent with the s. 140(1)3 of the CJA, I find that a detailed and specific leave procedure is required to be articulated and followed. This approach, in my view, allows the court to be forward-looking in its gatekeeping function.
157In 2021, when the court first implemented a leave procedure, the multiplicity of proceedings, the number of judges involved, and the sheer volume of material filed made it impossible to establish an organized path forward. These factors, combined with Mr. McIntosh’s conduct, make the imposition of a clear and structured leave procedure necessary and proportionate. It will also prevent repetitious filings while preserving access to justice.
158I have adopted an approach taken by the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador in a decision of Chief Justice Whalen in Memorial University of Newfoundland v. Oleynik, 2024 NLSC 42. The leave procedure in this decision is far from minimalistic. It is expansive and tailored to the vexatious litigant.
159A detailed and comprehensive request for leave procedure is necessary to protect the court, Ms. Kim, and Mr. McIntosh himself. A detailed leave procedure will ensure fairness, predictability, and a workable process that keeps the focus on the parties’ children and their best interests.
160Most of Mr. McIntosh’s proceedings are family law matters. I have familiarity with the files and issues, and judicial continuity is required in these proceedings. Therefore, any request for leave within or relating to a family law matter to be commenced or continued in the Superior Court of Justice anywhere within the Province of Ontario shall be directed to me, or my designate, at the Superior Court of Justice, in Toronto, Ontario. If the appropriate jurisdiction of the case falls outside of Toronto, I will direct a transfer if leave is granted. The request for leave shall presumptively be in writing.
161Any request for leave within or relating to a civil law matter, to be commenced or continued in the Superior Court of Justice shall be directed to the Civil Team Lead(s) or the Local Administrative Judge in the Region where the action is sought to be commenced or continued. The request for leave shall presumptively be in writing.
Disposition and Orders
- THIS COURT DECLARES THAT Adan McIntosh:
a) has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner within the meaning of section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act; and
b) is a vexatious litigation pursuant to section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.
- THIS COURT ORDERS as follows:
a) Adan McIntosh is prohibited from instituting or continuing any proceeding in any court in the Province of Ontario, except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice as provided for in this order, pursuant to subsection 140 (3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
b) All proceedings previously instituted by Adan McIntosh in any court in the Province of Ontario that are not yet finally disposed are hereby stayed except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice as provided for in this order, pursuant to subsection 140 (3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
c) Adan McIntosh shall deliver a copy of this Order, and the reasons for decision, to any person or body against whom he institutes or continues any proceeding in any court, administrative body and/or tribunal, regulatory body, the police and the Crown.
d) Any proceeding instituted by Adan McIntosh without leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice as provided for in this order and in violation of this order shall be a nullity ab initio.
e) Adan McIntosh’s request for leave shall follow the following procedure:
i) For any family law matter, Adan McIntosh shall file a Motion Form 14B and affidavit for each Request for Leave (“RFL”) to Sah J., or her designate, at the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto, Ontario.
ii) For any civil law matter, Adan McIntosh shall file a Notice of Motion, in writing, to the Civil Team Lead(s) or Local Administrative Judge in the Region where the action is sought to be commenced or continued.
iii) The motion for RFL shall presumptively be in writing, and shall not exceed a total of eight pages double-spaced (excluding attachments), and shall not contain any attachments other than the affidavit described in subparagraph iv, below.
iv) Any RFL to commence or continue any proceeding shall be accompanied by an affidavit:
(1) attaching a copy of this Order;
(2) attaching a copy of the pleading (i.e., Application, Notice of Motion, Motion to Change, Statement of Claim) that Adan McIntosh proposes to issue, file, or continue;
(3) deposing fully and completely the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it;
(4) indicating whether Adan McIntosh has ever commenced an action or proceeding against the respondent(s) or defendant(s) in any jurisdiction or court, and, if so, providing full particulars of that action or proceeding;
(5) disclosing all costs awards made against Adan McIntosh in any proceeding in this Court or in any jurisdiction involving the respondent(s) or defendant(s) or any other party and specifying if such costs awards in any proceeding not under appeal have been paid;
(6) undertaking that, if leave is granted:
(a) the authorized pleading, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendant(s) or respondent(s); and
(b) the proceeding will be diligently prosecuted.
(7) the affidavit shall have no attachments other than those referenced in this part.
v) The judge considering the RFL may, but shall not be obliged to:
(1) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to:
(a) the potential parties; and to
(b) other relevant persons identified by the Court;
(2) hold the motion requesting leave in open Court where it shall be recorded;
(3) dispose of the RFL motion in writing by Endorsement which may be circulated to:
(a) the potential parties; and to
(b) other relevant persons identified by the Court.
vi) Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs, and/or providing proof of payment of all or some prior costs and/or child support awards.
vii) An RFL that is dismissed may not be made again directly, or indirectly.
f) This Order is subject to the right of appeal in accordance with subsection 140 (2.3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
g) The requirement for Adan McIntosh to approve, as to form and content, this or any other draft order herein is dispensed with.
h) Adan McIntosh does not require leave of this court to appeal my order declaring him vexatious pursuant to section 140(2.3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
i) A copy of the Order and these Reasons for Decision shall forthwith be delivered to every Region of the Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court, and Small Claims Court.
JUSTICE K. SAH
Released: June 2, 2026