CITATION: Nowrouzi v. Soltani, 2026 ONSC 3178

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-1272-04

DATE: 20260605

BETWEEN:

Shapour Nowrouzi

Applicant

– AND –

Afsaneh Soltani

Respondent

Self-represented

P. Mahdi, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: May 25, 26, 27 and 28, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION¹

1The moving party on the Motion to Change is the Respondent wife. She seeks an order for spousal support retroactive to the date of the parties’ Separation Agreement dated April 28, 2022.

2Spousal support was terminated, on consent, by way of the final order of Justice MacPherson dated March 20, 2023, retroactive to June 1, 2022.

3The Applicant husband disputes that spousal support is payable, stating that he has no ability to pay and that the wife does not have need.

4For the reasons that follow, the wife’s Motion to Change is dismissed.

II. PRELMIMARY ISSUES

1. Financial Disclosure Issues

5The parties were not well prepared for this hearing. They both failed to provide timely disclosure and certain evidence was not before the court, even though the case was adjourned from the November 2025 trial sittings to enable them and their lawyers to address disclosure and properly prepare for the trial.

6At the disclosure motion on January 21, 2026, when both parties had counsel, Finlayson J. was critical of both parties. He noted that the parties were still arguing, after a Trial Scheduling Conference, about relevant disclosure including: the husband’s efforts to find employment, (or lack thereof) and the extent of that effort, the wife’s health (she was injured) and her disability insurance (or lack thereof).

7Finlayson J. ordered that disclosure be produced within 30 days. Some but not all of the disclosure was given by each of the parties, but it was late.

8At an exit pre-trial in mid-May 2026, the Dispute Resolution Officer (“DRO”) noted that additional disclosure had only recently been exchanged, as recently as May 2026. Neither party had served or filed their trial materials. The wife only filed her materials on May 22, 2026.

9At trial, the husband testified that there were documents he had not seen before. The husband served his affidavit and proposed exhibits on the weekend just before the trial. His materials were not sworn. The husband also failed to serve or file any sworn Financial Statement after 2025. I directed him prepare one on the evening after the first day of trial.

10There were many other disclosure issues.

11During the litigation and continuing through the trial, the wife failed to properly serve and file fulsome medical evidence to support her position that she could not work in any capacity after her March 2023 accident. Nor did she file any evidence that she tried to work and that no potential employer (such as the Markham Stouffville Hospital) would accommodate her needs (or whether any requested needs were reasonable).

12The wife provided no documentary evidence to support the quantum of funds that she received for the payment of the Mahr in 2025, nor a tracing of how the funds were spent or if any funds remain today.

13The husband testified that his counsel requested financial disclosure on September 2, 2024. As stated above, significant disclosure remained outstanding until shortly before this trial.

14The husband’s disclosure was also problematic. He failed to provide full disclosure from shortly after the MacPherson J. Order (March 2023) and through the commencement of the trial.

15In August 2023, the husband failed to disclose that he obtained new employment with Verso Global (“Verso”), even though he had promised to do so.

16The husband, who was represented by counsel until January 2026, failed to serve or file evidence as to his employment situation and income in 2020/2021, when he was employed in the Dominican Republic.

17He provided no evidence of his termination from the Ontario company where he was employed at the time the Separation Agreement was signed in April 2022.

18In or about March 2023, when the husband approached the wife to execute the consent terminating spousal support, he advised her that he was unemployed and financially destitute. The husband failed to disclose that he was remarrying about five months later. At trial the husband admitted that, after remarrying, his expenses reduced as the couple shared expenses. I do not accept that the husband did not know he would re-marry when he asked the wife to terminate spousal support.

19The husband did not file any job search records, although he testified being unemployed from June 2024 to the present, except for some work as an Uber driver from August 2025. He did not provide fulsome evidence about his Uber income and expenses. The husband failed to properly serve or file any medical evidence to support any inability to work. He says that he applied for 1,000 jobs with no evidence submitted at the trial.

20Finally, there is a significant gap in the husband’s evidence. After considering the husband’s stated income for 2023 to 2026, taking into consideration the $200,000 in funds that he obtained after re-financing the matrimonial home in 2022, and examining his debts, it is unclear how he has been paying all of his expenses.

21The disclosure issues are made worse by my findings that there are serious credibility and reliability issues with each party.

22The decision of Crightney v. Garcia² provides a good example of the difficulties courts face when parties fail to provide fulsome disclosure, and the available evidence contradicts a party’s listed expenses and/or lifestyle.

23I have done my best with the problematic evidence presented to deal with his matter.

2. The Husband is a Self Represented Litigant

24The husband became self-represented after the January 21, 2026 disclosure motion. I have complied with the directions provided by the Ontario court of Appeal in Grand River Conservation Authority v. Vidhya Ramdas³.

25For example, I explained various aspects of the hearing, and I permitted the husband to serve and file a new sworn Financial Statement after the start of the trial.

26I also accepted the husband’s opening statement as evidence. I swore him (and the wife) into the record at the start of the trial. Therefore, everything said formed part of the evidence, to the extent that it was relevant and admissible.

27I engaged in active adjudicating by clarifying and asking questions. I suggested that the husband bring any other documents he may want to rely on to court, and that I would consider whether they could be admitted. He brought certain documents and I accepted some of them as exhibits.

3. Credibility and Reliability

28As summarized in Belchior v. Belchior,⁴

“Credibility and reliability are different, but related concepts. Credibility is the question of whether the witness is being truthful to the best of their ability.”

“Reliability is the question of whether the witness can accurately observe, recall and recount the events in question: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 244 O.C.A. 288 at para. 41.”

29There are serious credibility and reliability issues with each party’s evidence.

30For example, the wife’s evidence about the funds that she received from the Mahr was contradictory. The wife testified that she received $20,000 after paying the lawyers 30% of the available funds. It is unclear how much she gave her sister for cancer medication, whether the funds she gave to her sister still exist and earn interest, whether she paid one or two lawyers, how she paid the other expenses listed above (since she reportedly used $15,000 on elective surgery for herself in Iran), and what amount she brought back to Canada to pay debts and use as part of her expenses. This evidence contradicts the DRO’s endorsement. It states that the wife gave her sister $20,000 for cancer treatment in Iran.

31The wife claimed to be unable to work after the March 2023 car accident. The wife testified that she never completed the psychotherapy degree that she started prior to the accident. However, she failed to address an admission made to the Cooperators group, being that she completed her Master of Psychology after the accident by after taking 12 hours of virtual classes per week (and never missed any classes).

32The wife also failed to properly explain why she promoted herself on Instagram as a psychotherapist under supervision and a Registered Nurse with over 24 years of experience in Canada.

33The wife declined to make various admissions, claimed not to remember certain facts and was evasive.

34The husband’s evidence was also problematic.

35When the parties signed the consent, in or around March 2023, to terminate support, he promised to tell her when he found a job and to pay spousal support. However, when the husband started working in August 2023, he did not tell her about the job. He paid no spousal support.

36The husband testified that if the wife had not taken his father’s inheritance, he would have voluntarily paid half of the amount to the wife. That is not credible given the non-payment of spousal support. Prior to the trial the husband never advised the wife of his stated intention to share the inheritance.

37The husband’s explanation as to how he supported himself from 2023 is problematic. Given that he was not working it is unclear how he paid the expenses from mid-2024 and into 2025.

38The husband’s evidence was also unreliable. He could remember where he worked in various years, where he travelled or when he separated from his second wife. The husband declined to make various admissions and was evasive.

III. BACKGROUND FACTS

39The facts as I find them are set out below and will provide context for the analysis. Further facts will be referred to in the analysis as required.

40The parties married on September 3, 1980 and separated on December 1, 2021. They were married for 41 years and have two adult children.

41On the date of separation, the wife was 60 years of age, and the husband was 61.

42The wife was the children’s primary caregiver, primarily responsible for the home, and she also worked full-time.

43During the marriage, the wife was employed as a Registered Nurse and retired with a pension from her full-time position in 2018. She subsequently worked part-time with increased hours during the COVID-19 pandemic.

44The husband worked in call centers, with increasing responsibility over time. He managed call center employees. He changed jobs frequently and was unemployed at times.

45The wife’s counsel prepared the Separation Agreement that was signed by both parties in April 2022. The parties waived financial disclosure. Ms. Mahdi did not execute a Certificate of Independent Legal Advice (ILA) with the wife. The husband did not obtain legal advice.

46The parties met with the adult children who encouraged the husband to sign the agreement. After some discussions, the parties signed the agreement which was witnessed by the adult children. There are no ILA certificates attached to the agreement.

47The fundamental terms of the Separation Agreement are as follows:

The husband will pay $5,938 per month in periodic spousal support and 50% of any bonus or commission net of tax.
The parties shall exchange their ITR and NOA annually on June 1.
Spousal support may be changed if there is a material change in circumstances. The change may be: either party’s financial position, child support, the wife’s remarriage, either party’s retirement or any similar circumstance.
The net proceeds of sale of the Aurora home, which was held in the husband’s name, was sold and the wife will receive $200,000 as the money owing to her from the proceeds of sale.
The matrimonial home (Oneida condo) will be sold with the net proceeds of sale divided. (However, the husband ultimately purchased the wife’s 50% interest instead).
There will be no equalization paid by either party.
Each party will keep all assets in his/her name free from any claim by the other spouse.
Both parties forfeit any/all future claims from each other after this settlement in Canada or Iran.
The joint bank account will be closed.
The wife’s Hoop pension will not be divided.
Within one month, either party can commence a divorce application in Canada, and the parties shall cooperate to obtain an Iranian divorce.
Neither party requests financial disclosure and each is satisfied with the financial information he/she has and has waived further financial disclosure.
Standard releases are included.
The agreement was prepared jointly by the parties.

48As stated above, the husband released his interest in the wife’s Hoop pension. The family law value states that the gross value is $488,225. The wife testified that this part of the agreement accounted for the fact that her father bought the parties a home in Iran that they later sold to purchase a home in Ontario. The pension was already in pay at the date of separation.

49I have no evidence as to whether this deal more or less favorable to either of them from an equalization and/or support perspective as the parties opted not to provide financial disclosure, and there is no Net Family Property Statement.

50The Separation Agreement included an agreement that the parties would not pursue any/all future claims in Iran. The wife testified that she initiated an action to deal with the Mahr on the date of separation in 2021. She also testified that the Iranian court actively dealt with the Mahr in 2025. The wife did not list the Mahr as money owed to her, or funds received, on any of her sworn Financial Statements.

51I decline to accept the wife’s argument that she properly pursued her rights to the Mahr as she commenced that action prior to signing the agreement. I prefer the husband’s evidence being that he was not informed the Mahr was being enforced until he was notified in October 2025, and a travel ban was put in place.

52If the wife wished to pursue the Mahr after executing the Separation Agreement, she should have identified that issue in the agreement. I find, instead, she declined to cooperate with the husband to obtain the divorce in Iran as the Mahr was outstanding. Active enforcement of the Mahr was delayed after the husband’s father died and there was an inheritance to pursue.

53The wife testified that she ultimately received approximately $20,000 from the sale of a property, after paying one or two law firms. The husband stated that the wife sold the inherited property at a 50% discount and overpaid her lawyers.

54I prefer the husband’s evidence that they spoke about the Mahr and the Iranian divorce before he agreed to sign the Separation Agreement. He only signed the agreement once it was clear that all issues were resolved.

55The Separation Agreement required the husband to pay spousal support of $5,938 per month commencing May 1, 2022, based on an income of $235,000 plus 50% of the net amount of any annual bonus. At that time the husband was employed with a company in Ontario, with a base income of $235,000 (and a possible bonus).

56The husband was terminated in June 2022, and only earned $100,000 from that position. The husband paid less than two months of spousal support. He informed the wife about the job loss stating that he could not afford to pay. The husband produced no documentary evidence about that position or any Record of Employment (“ROE”) to confirm that he was terminated.

57Approximately two months later, the wife applied to FRO, who then took steps to enforce the amounts payable in the Separation Agreement.

58The wife commenced a proceeding to deal with spousal support. The husband explained that he also commenced a Motion to Change seeking spousal support. The wife does not recall that proceeding or agreeing to resolve the two disputes.

59The husband testified that the litigation between the parties ended with the consent that was signed by the parties, and formed the Order of MacPherson J. dated March 20, 2023. The Order terminated spousal support as of June 1, 2022, and set the arrears at zero.

60The wife testified that she signed the consent without obtaining legal advice from Ms. Mahdi or another lawyer as she trusted the husband since they had had a good marriage, although it ended when she learned he was having an affair. The wife signed the consent in good faith on the understanding that the husband would resume paying spousal support once he obtained new employment.

61Given that the wife had legal assistance in the drafting of the agreement and was an educated professional who previously understood the need to consult with a lawyer, her evidence is not credible.

62I prefer the husband’s evidence, being that the parties agreed to terminate spousal support retroactive to June 1, 2022, as he was not working and had made a claim of spousal support in his own Motion to Change. At that time the wife’s annual income was $87,172.

63Given that neither party filed materials from the prior proceedings or the consent, I have no further evidence than as stated here. However, I note that this court file ends in number four. Therefore, this is the fifth case involving the parties.

64When I queried as to why no materials were filed relating to the prior case(s) or the consent, the wife’s counsel advised as follows: the wife does not contest the fact that she signed the consent that formed the final order. Therefore, the materials that lead to the final order are not relevant.

65I note that neither party seeks to set aside the Separation Agreement or the Macpherson J. final consent order.

66In mid-2023, the wife learned that the husband secured new employment. As of August 2023, the husband was employed full-time with Verso but failed to respond to her request (and her lawyer’s request in September 2023) for financial disclosure. Ms. Mahdi requested the husband’s most recent pay stub, a job search record if he was unemployed and all bank statements for the past six months.

67While the husband testified that this was a mistake, I disagree. He consciously failed to inform her about the new position or the renumeration and he did not pay spousal support. The husband also failed to inform the wife that he remarried in August 2023, which reduced his expenses by half.

68The husband was employed for 10 months, from August 2023 to June 2024. His annual income was $89,000.

69In March 2023, the wife was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident after she fainted and drove into a light post. In her affidavit dated May 22, 2026, the wife stated that she suffered a subdural hematoma, being a brain bleed. The wife testified that she broke several ribs and had a concussion. Her driver’s licence was suspended for six months.

70The wife described suffering from balance issues and memory impairment. She stated that she suffered extensive brain damage as a result of the accident and could not work as a nurse. The wife stated that she suffered from depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. She takes medication to address some of these issues.

71The wife submitted no medical evidence to support her claims at the trial.

72The wife commenced the Motion to Change on December 11, 2023, which she served on the husband in May 2024.

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Material Change

73The law on material changes in the context of a request to vary a spousal support order is as follows. As stated in the decision of Assayag-Shneer v. Shneer⁵:

18The threshold question on a motion to change a spousal support order is set out in s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), which provides that before the court makes a variation order the court must satisfy itself that a change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse has occurred since the making of the order, and in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

19Both parties agree that s. 17 of the Divorce Act allows the court to vary, rescind or suspend, prospectively or retroactively a support order or any provision thereof.

20Where a motion to change is bought to vary a spousal support agreement incorporated into a court order there is a two-step analysis. First, has there been a material change in circumstances and second, if there has, what variation of the existing order ought to be made in light of those circumstances? A material change in circumstances is one, which if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms. To suggest that an agreement was unfair in the first place is inappropriate. The court is not to second guess the original agreement. Where an agreement is incorporated into an order it is presumed to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act, :Droit de la famille - 091889., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775 (S.C.C.) , at paras. 31-33.

74In addition to the above considerations, the SCC held in L.M.P. v. L.S.⁶:

(a) The test is whether any given change “would likely have resulted in different terms”;

(b) What will amount to a material change will depend on the actual circumstances of the parties at the time of the order; and,

75I find that there have been several material changes in circumstances since the MacPherson J. order as follows:

(a) The husband secured employment;

(b) The wife was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident that impacted her ability to work, at least for some period of time; and

76Since I have found that there has been a material change in circumstances in respect of parenting and child support, the court must conduct a fresh analysis of the issues.⁷

77As stated above, the commencement date for any change in spousal support is March 20, 2023 as that is the date of the final consent order.

Spousal Support

78Pursuant to the DRO endorsement dated May 19, 2026 from an exit pre-trial, the issue for the Motion to Change is the amount of spousal support, if any, and duration, but not entitlement.

79At the commencement of the trial both parties agreed that this statement is correct.

80Given that the parties were married for 41 years and raised two children, it was reasonable for both parties to agree that entitlement is not an issue. The wife is clearly entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.

81The Separation Agreement provided for a high level of monthly spousal support, being almost $6,000 plus a 50% sharing of any bonus. That support level, which was based on the mid-range of the SSAG, reasonably addressed the wife’s claims for compensatory and non-compensatory support.

82However, after the husband lost his job and stopped paying support, the wife received no compensatory or non-compensatory support.

83It is the husband’s position that he cannot afford to pay spousal support. He has a limited employment income as an Uber driver. His only other income is Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”),Old Age Security (“OAS”) and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (“GIS”). He is age 66 and is at risk of losing his GIS if his Uber income increases. He may no longer be able to drive an Uber for health reasons.

84The husband takes the position that the wife could have returned to work as a nurse for only 10 hours per week and would have received LTD benefits of $12,000 net of tax. Alternately, she could have sought employment as a psychotherapist under supervision, as admitted by her.

85The husband argues that the wife does not have financial need because she has recently increased her equity in the home that she shares with the daughter. The wife had available funds to increase her equity. Also, the increase in equity should mean that the wife can reduce her monthly contribution towards the expenses. The wife now owns 50% rather than 33% of that home.

86Also, the wife voluntarily contributes to her adult children’s expenses and paid for her sister’s cancer treatment, rather than using available funds to support herself. Finally, the wife has a steady income from her Hoop pension and will now receive CPP, OAS and perhaps the guaranteed income supplement.

87Finally, the husband submits that the wife inappropriately received the payment of the Mahr of at least $20,000, which could have been up to $50,000, in breach of the parties’ Separation Agreement. He said that they discussed and agreed that the Separation Agreement was a global deal of all assets and all claims in Iran and Canada.

88While Ms. Mahdi drafted the agreement on behalf of the wife, and he had no legal advice. The husband testified that he would not have signed the agreement if he understood she would pursue the Mahr in Iran. He followed up several times after April 2022 to obtain a divorce in Iran and Canada as per the Separation Agreement, but the wife would not cooperate.

89The husband also testified that he applied for more than 1,000 jobs and has had only six to 10 interviews. On January 21, 2026, he advised Finlayson J. that he could not provide any supporting documentation as he applied for positions on LinkedIn. He agreed to provide a list of positions without supporting documentation. The husband testified that he served that list twice, however, it is unclear if the wife’s counsel reviewed the disclosure. The husband did not file evidence of any attempts to secure employment.

90The husband seeks to impute an income to the wife but not to himself. He seeks a finding that the wife has no need, and he has no ability to pay.

91The wife seeks a finding that the husband is underemployed. She argues that he failed to provide evidence of his attempts to secure employment after being terminated by the Ontario company. The husband provided no disclosure about his employment at Verso until this litigation.

92She also takes the position that the husband should be imputed an income as he must have a source of hidden income or assets, given his considerable living expenses.

93The wife also argues that she has financial need. She cannot contribute to the mortgage as she did in the past. She has a materially lower income now than prior to her accident in 2023. She denies being able to work in any capacity.

94The wife denies inappropriately enforcing the Mahr in breach of the Separation Agreement. She testified that she took steps to commence enforcement in 2021, such that her right to pursue the relief in Iran continued after the agreement.

95My findings are discussed later in the Reasons.

The Parties’ Incomes for Spousal Support

96The wife requests that the parties’ incomes for support be based on the prior year’s income. I am not prepared to do so. A better and more accurate approach is to set each party’s income for the year based on the evidence available for that year.

97I now consider the requests by each party to impute an income to the other for the following years: 2023 to 2026.

98The starting point for this analysis is s. 19 and Schedule III of the Child Support Guidelines⁸. The relevant subsections are as follows:

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse.

99The leading case that defines intentional under-employment in Ontario is Drygala v. Pauli.⁹ “Intentionally” means a voluntary act. The person required to pay support is intentionally under-employed if that person chooses to earn less than he or she is capable of earning. The person required to pay support is intentionally unemployed when he or she chooses not to work when capable of earning an income. A recipient may also be intentionally under-employed.

100Other cases such as Moul v. Moul,¹⁰ remind the judge to consider evidence such as the age of the parties, expert opinion evidence about a party’s medical issues and the impact on one’s ability to work when such evidence is tendered at the trial.

101When imputing income based on intentional under-employment or unemployment, a court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances.¹¹ The factors include age, education, experience, skills and health of the party. The availability of job opportunities, number of available work hours (in light of the party’s overall obligations including educational demands) and a reasonable hourly rate may be considered.

The Husband’s Income – 2023 - 2026

102The wife requests that the husband be imputed an income based on the gross-upped expenses after subtracting his declared income and the increase in his debt.

103The wife raises concerns about the husband’s evidence, particularly as it relates to income that he earned in the Dominican Republic from September 2020 to some time in 2021. The husband’s evidence that he left the family and moved to the Dominican Republic, but was paid no income, is not credible. The wife’s income was not sufficient to meet the family’s needs at that time without any contribution from him. She testified that he sent some funds home, which is more credible.

104Moreover, the husband admitted that he signed an agreement listing him as a consultant for Acquire BPO Inc. (“Acquire”). The document states that he will receive periodic compensation of $12,666 per month, which was paid in US dollars. The husband admitted to having a bank account in the Dominican Republic that was used by the company to deposit funds. He testified that the company paid his living and related expenses but nothing more. The husband did not recall receiving the sum of $10,000 in moving expenses or $600 in medical expenses per month. He denied receiving any income.

105The husband’s evidence that the payment of $12,666 per month was solely used to pay his employees or for operational expenses (such as lunch for 1,000 employees) is not credible. I do not accept that the husband moved to the Dominican Republic, paid his employees but not himself, with the hope of getting stocks if he was successful. Periodic compensation is just that – compensation.

106The husband declared a low business income to Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) of $37,000 for 2021. He claimed expenses of $18,000 for rent and travel. Given that Acquire paid his travel and living expenses, and he provided no evidence that he paid rent for an office, these expenses do not appear to be legitimate.

107I have no evidence as to what funds were paid by Acquire.

108As stated above, in 2022 the husband was expected to earned an annual income of $235,000 plus a potential bonus. The Separation Agreement was based on that income. However, the husband lost that position by June 2022. Therefore, his total 2022 income was $104,000.

109With respect to 2023, which is the first year that I am considering, the husband’s income as declared to CRA was $36,000, from a position that he held with Verso starting in August 2024.

110The husband declared a rental income loss of $4,000 on account of the Oneida condominium (“Oneida”) as the expenses exceeded the rent.

111The wife argues that the husband continued to live a lavish lifestyle during that year, as evident from his sworn Financial Statement dated August 14, 2024, which lists expenses of $154,000 after tax dollars.

112The husband denied living a lavish lifestyle. He denied a lavish lifestyle but admitted to paying for his Audi, which he leased after separation when he was employed. He admitted to travelling to Greece after his wedding. He testified that he and his second wife shared expenses.

113While the parties had a nice lifestyle, owned two properties and leased two luxury vehicles, I am not persuaded that they enjoyed the level of lifestyle relied on in the Reyes v. Rollo¹² decision, or the Benevento v. Benevento¹³ decision. As stated previously, both during and after the marriage, the husband’s working life was unstable. He moved from position to position and was sometimes unemployed.

114I am not prepared to impute the husband’s income to the grossed-up income he would have had to earn to pay his stated expenses of between $147,000 and $154,000 in the years in question.

115Having reviewed the husband’s Financial Statements, it is now apparent that there is a material error that results in a gross exaggeration of the deficit between his income and expenses. The husband failed to include his rental income in his stated income, which was a negative $537 per month. In March 2025, he listed the mortgage on his expenses as $3,083 per month, the taxes at $280 per month and condo fees at $954 per month. Therefore, the form reads as if he received no income but incurred over $4,000 in expenses each month.

116The husband effectively double counted the mortgage, taxes and condo fees. The correct approach is to list the entirety of the gross rent on the income portion and then set out the expenses, or list just the negative income and not list the expenses.

117If the husband had completed the form correctly, the deficit between his income and expenses would have shrunk materially.

118With respect to how the husband covered the deficit in 2023, he testified that he had access to funds after refinancing the matrimonial home when he bought out his wife’s interest in Oneida. He received $225,300 in May 2022. By the date that he swore his first Financial Statement, June 14, 2024, the funds were gone.

119I accept that the husband had access to more than sufficient funds to cover the deficit in his expenses through 2023.

120I turn now to what the husband should have reasonably earned as employment income in 2023.

121In 2023, the husband was unemployed until August. He then earned employment income from Verso of $3,461 which was paid bi-weekly. That amounts to an annual income of $89,000.

122I am imputing an income to the husband of $89,000 for 2023, as that is a reasonable income based on his historical income earning capacity, and his skills as a call center manager. It is the annual income he would have been paid if he had been employed for the entire year.

123In the absence of evidence of his attempts to secure employment, I draw an adverse inference against the husband. I am not persuaded that he made reasonable attempts to find an employment position after losing his position with the Ontario company in June 2022.

124The husband’s income for 2024 is more challenging. I accept his testimony that by November 2024, he had returned his Audi and was contributing 50% of the monthly BMW payments to his second ex-wife, as they were continuing to reside together in a shared home.

125The husband’s Notice of Assessment lists an income of $51,299. The husband testified that after he dissipated his savings, he increased the debt on his home line of credit. He was able to do so by accessing, on a monthly basis, the equity part of the mortgage payment on Oneida.

126However, the husband’s sworn Financial Statement dated March 20, 2025, does not include a material increase in debt. From June 2024 to March 2025, the husband’s debt increased only $16,000.

127The husband would have needed to earn considerably more than $51,000 in 2024 to cover his expenses, even after I adjust for the error described above.

128I do not know if the husband had hidden funds from the Dominican Republic position, although I note that he did not work there for a considerable period of time. I do not know if the husband was earning a cash income or if there are other mistakes in his Financial Statement.

129In the absence of this information, and in consideration of the employment income that I imputed to him for 2023, I find that the husband should be imputed an income of $100,000 for 2024. This includes $10,000 of unexplained income.

130The husband turned age 65 in March 2025, which is a typical retirement age. He testified that his declared income of $27,000 included CPP, OAS and GIS.

131The husband explained that he has also earned some income from August 2025 onwards driving an Uber. His son in law works for Nissan. By listing his rental income on the application, and with the son in law’s assistance, he was able to lease the vehicle for $550 per month. I note that the husband failed to file his lease application although he was ordered to produce it by Finlayson J. Since he failed to produce this evidence at trial, I have no idea what income he provided to Nissan.

132The husband’s May 2026 trial Financial Statement provides that he has dramatically decreased his expenses. He now resides in the Oneida condo.

133From March 2025 to May 2026, the husband’s Financial Statement lists debts increased by $72,000. In other words, he is increasing his debts by an average of $4,800 per month. This explains how he is covering his deficit.

134The husband’s May 2026 Financial Statement lists his current total annual income at $56,000 before deducting Uber expenses.

135Having considered the errors in the husband’s Financial Statements from 2024 and 2025, the dissipation of his savings account from 2022 to 2024, the limited time that he worked for the Dominican Republic from which he may have earned a hidden income, his increase in debt from March 2025 and his age in 2025, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to continue to impute an income of $89,000 for 2025, 2026 and onwards.

136I am imputing his income at $50,000 for 2025 and 2026, which includes the government benefits and either a reasonable income from Uber or part-time employment in a call center.

137In conclusion, the husband’s income for spousal support purposes is as follows: 2023 - $89,000; 2024 - $100,000; 2025 - $50,000; and 2026 - $50,000.

The Wife’s Income 2023 - 2026

138The husband states that the wife has the ability to work and that an income should be imputed to her.

139The wife retired from her position as a nurse at Mackenzie Health in 2018. She receives the sum of $2,533 gross from her pension each month.

140After retiring, the wife obtained a part-time position as a nurse at Markham Stouffville Hospital because the husband had lost his job and only earned an income from consulting jobs. She also secured part-time work as a dental sedation nurse but did not like the work.

141During the Covid-19 pandemic, the wife increased her work hours as there were very few nurses working and she wanted to help the patients.

142The wife’s ITR line total 150 income is as follows: 2019 - $52,919; 2020 - $119,005; 2021 - $76,247; and 2022 -$87,172.

143The wife’s motor vehicle accident took place in March 2023. She stopped working. Her total income for that year was $55,470 which includes employment income prior to the accident, Allstate Insurance (“Allstate”) car insurance income replacement benefits from March 2023, Employment Insurance sickness benefits from March 2023 to October 2023, non-taxable long-term disability from Cooperators Insurance (“Cooperators”) with payments from July to November 2023 and the Hoop pension payments. I accept that the wife’s income for spousal support in 2023 is $55,470.

144The wife’s 2024 declared income was $42,481 as per her Notice of Assessment. This includes her Hoop pension payments and the Allstate income replacement of $800 every two weeks.

145The wife did not receive any Long Term Disability (“LTD”) benefits from Cooperators in 2024 or later. By letter dated July 2, 2025, Cooperators concluded that, based on the medical evidence, she was able to return to work in her occupation.

146The letter also states that the wife reported that she did not miss any classes and completed her Master of Psychology virtually (12 hours per week) after the accident. This refuted her claim of cognitive impairment (and is an admission against interest).

147Cooperators declined to pay further benefits having concluded that the wife was not totally disabled from performing the usual and customary duties of a Registered Nurse.

148Cooperators also explained that the wife would qualify for benefits in the amount of $1,000 per month (net) if she returned to nursing and worked 10 hours per week. She declined to do so.

149The wife failed to serve the required Evidence Act¹⁴ notices of her intention to submit two medical reports and some medical clinical notes at the trial. She also declined to call the professionals as witnesses at the trial.

150Therefore, there was no medical evidence before the court to support the wife’s claims that various medical conditions that existed before the accident and/or arose after the accident, impeded her ability to work in any capacity as a nurse.

151Even if the wife asked Markham Stouffville Hospital for a part-time position with accommodations, and there is no evidence to support that claim, there is no evidence as to whether such accommodations were reasonable. There is no evidence of any attempt to find a part-time nursing position in another setting.

152The only evidence about the wife’s ability to work is contained in the Cooperators letter, being that they had terminated her LTD benefits as of November 2022 and that she could receive partial benefits of $1,000 per month (net) if she worked 10 hours per week.

153The wife was underemployed in 2024. She could have worked 10 hours per week, with an annual part-time income of $22,500 and would have received an additional $12,000 (net) per year in LTD.

154The wife’s income for 2024 is imputed at $42,481 + $12,000 + $22,500 for a total amount of $76,981.

155The wife’s declared income for 2025 was $31,871. It was less than 2024 as Allstate terminated the income replacement in March 2025.

156For the reasons set out above in 2025 the wife’s income is imputed at $31,871 + $12,000 + $22,500 for a total amount of $66,371.

157The wife turned 65 years of age on March 21, 2026. Age 65 is a typical retirement age. Therefore, the wife’s estimated 2026 income is: $27,200 (2025 ITR income – estimated Allstate payments) + $5,625 employment + imputed $3,000 LTD + OAS + CPP for eight months – estimated from the wife’s Chat GPT research at $10,400. The total income is estimated at $46,225.

158The wife’s income for spousal support purposes is approximately: 2023 - $55,000; 2024 - $76,000; 2025 - $66,000 and 2026: $46,000.

The Wife’s Claim for Spousal Support

159The husband argues that the wife does not have a need for spousal support, as she has been using her funds to support family members and recently increased her equity in the daughter’s home.

160I disagree.

161The parties enjoyed a nice lifestyle, owned two properties and drove luxury vehicles including a Lexus (wife) and an Audi (husband).

162The wife’s need is not limited to her basic needs but should reflect, as much as possible, the lifestyle she enjoyed during the marriage.

163If I equalized the parties’ incomes, there would be some, but not considerable, spousal support payable for 2023 and 2024. There is no support payable for 2025, 2026 or on an ongoing basis.

164A significant issue in this case is that the husband, on the income that I have imputed to him, has no ability to pay spousal support. His only asset of value, the Oneida condo, has no equity. He was unsuccessful at his attempts to sell the unit which was listed for sale for five months. The May 2026 Financial Statement provides that the husband has a negative $85,000 net worth. I accept his evidence that he increased debts to support himself.

165The husband’s inability to pay does not change the fact that the wife has a compensatory claim to support as described earlier in the Reasons. The parties were married for 41 years, and it was the wife’s uncontradicted evidence that she was primarily responsible for the children and the household in addition to being employed.

166If the wife had continued to receive the amount of spousal support contemplated by the Separation Agreement, at least until the husband reached retirement age, her compensatory and non-compensatory entitlements would have been met. That is not what happened here.

The Mahr

167I turn now to the issue of the Mahr. I agree with the husband that the parties’ Separation Agreement was a global deal that barred the wife from pursing this claim in Iran.

168The wife breached the terms of the agreement and used self-help to scoop the husband’s inheritance. The value was either $28,500 (before the wife paid her lawyer),or as much as $50,000, (the husband’s estimate if the property had not been sold at a significant discount).

169I do not condone the wife’s actions to enforce the Mahr in Iran.

170However, the funds received by the wife serve two purposes in this litigation:

(a) If I have erred in my imputation calculation, it is remedied by the lump sum that she received; and,

(b) Whether I have erred, or not, the funds satisfy her entitlement to compensatory spousal support.

Conclusion

171The wife’s Motion to Change is dismissed.

V. COSTS

172Cost rules are designed to foster three fundamental purposes (a) to indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (b) to encourage settlements, and (c) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants. As noted by the Ontario court of Appeal, two touchstone considerations must be applied to costs decisions: 1) proportionality, and 2) reasonableness.

173Pursuant to Rule 24(12), a judge fixing costs shall consider the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party's behaviour in the case; the lawyer’s rates; the time properly spent on the case, expenses properly paid or payable; and any other relevant matter. A court has discretion to award an amount of costs that is just in all of the circumstances after taking into account the factors set out in Rule 24(12).¹⁵

174The husband is the successful party as the Motion to Change is dismissed.

175He incurred legal costs of $10,113 from August 2024 through January 2026. This includes costs of approximately $1,500 for the attendance before Finlayson J., who ordered no costs. There was no offer to settle, nor any reason to consider full or substantial indemnity costs. At best, this would be a case to consider partial indemnity costs of approximately $6,000.

176However, I make an order for no costs.

177The wife commenced the Motion to Change due to the husband’s failure to provide financial disclosure after he secured employment in August 2023. He previously agreed to provide disclosure and pay spousal support when the wife signed the consent in or about March 2023. He also remarried (which reduced his living expenses) and traveled to Greece, during a period when he paid no spousal support.

178I cannot sanction that behaviour.

VI. DISPOSITION

179The wife’s motion to change the final order of MacPherson J. is dismissed, without costs.

The Honourable Justice A. Himel

Date: June 5, 2026

Footnotes

The Reasons for Decision (“Reasons”) were delivered orally on May 29, 2026. Minor edits made in the written reasons do not affect the substance.
2024 ONCJ 431.
2021 ONCA 815, 160 O.R. (3d) 348, at paras. 18 - 21.
2024 ONSC 967, at para. 40.
2021 ONSC 2075, at paras. 18 – 20.
2011 SCC 65, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, at paras. 33-35.
Skinner v. Skinner, 2019 ONSC 6949, at para. 5, aff’d 2021 ONCA 658, citing Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670 at p. 688 and citing L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 65, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775.
O. Reg. 391/97.
Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (C.A.), at para. 28.
2016 ONSC 4758.
Ibid, at para. 45.
2001 28260 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 5110 (S.C.).
2015 ONSC 6707.
R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 23.
Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, 143 O.R. (3d) 519, at paras. 4 and 12; Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99.