COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-00000207-0000
DATE: 2024 02 23
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: )
Michelle Belchior (now Michelle Dias) ) Self Represented
Applicant )
- and - )
Rui Belchior ) Self Represented
Respondent )
) HEARD: January 11, 12, 15-18,
) 2024
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEMAY J
[1] The Applicant, Michelle Belchior (now Michelle Dias) and the Respondent, Rui Belchior, were married on April 15th, 2000 and separated on August 25th, 2019
after an alleged incident of domestic violence. The parties have five children, who currently range in age from 6 to 22. The second-youngest child turned sixteen last month. The youngest is six years old.
[2] The parties spent some considerable time attempting to mediate the issues in this case. However, they were unsuccessful. As a result, at the outset of the trial, there were four issues that were in dispute between the parties: equalization, child support, decision-making authority for the youngest child and post-separation adjustments.
[3] The parties were both self-represented at trial. As we organized the documents and reviewed the materials, the parties were able to agree on the issue of equalization. I was left to decide the issues of both retroactive child support and decision-making authority as well as some of the post-separation adjustments.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the Applicant should have sole decision-making authority for the parties' youngest child, Caden. I have also determined, on consent, that the Respondent owes the Applicant an equalization payment of $31,817.18. I have also determined, not on consent, that the Respondent owes the Applicant, net of any adjustments, the sum of
$67,739.00 on account of arrears of child support and that child support is to be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant on a go-forward basis.
[5] I should also note that the Applicant originally had the surname Belchior but has changed her name back to her maiden name of Dias. I have amended the style of cause accordingly.
Background
a) The Parties and Their Children
[6] At the time of trial, the Applicant was turning 45. She is currently employed with a real estate law firm as a law clerk. When the parties were married, she ran a home daycare business. She closed that business down prior to separation.
[7] She then worked as a part-time bookkeeper for a company prior to COVID. She had started that work, which was for a trucking and haulage business, right around the time that the parties separated. She was laid off during COVID, received CERB benefits and went back to school to become a paralegal. Since 2022, the Applicant has been employed as a paralegal with a real estate law firm. She currently earns a salary of approximately $50,000 per year.
[8] At the time of trial, the Respondent was turning 47. He has been employed at Bell Canada for twenty-seven years, and has worked as a field manager since 2007. His income is usually over $100,000 per year. The Applicant suggested that the Respondent was earning income beyond his employment for Bell Canada. I will address that issue below.
[9] The parties have five children, as follows:
a) Kayla, born February 2001. At the time of separation, she had been enrolled in the University of Toronto. She has explored other educational opportunities and is currently living independently with her boyfriend. Between the separation date and September of 2023, she lived primarily with the Respondent. She is currently independent.
b) Amanda, born February 2004. She is in College. Currently, she resides solely with the Applicant. Prior to September of 2023, she was back and forth between the parties.
c) Alyssa, born October of 2006. She is currently in grade 12. She has resided solely with the Applicant since September of 2003. Prior to September of 2023, she moved back and forth between the parties.
d) Neveah, born in January of 2008. She is currently in Grade 10. She has resided solely with the Applicant since May of 2023. Prior to September of 2023, she was back and forth between the parties.
e) Caden, born June of 2017. He has been in a shared parenting arrangement since June of 2021. Prior to that, he lived primarily with the Applicant.
[1O] The time that the four eldest children have spent with each parent is an issue that I will return to in resolving the calculation of child support.
b) The Procedural History
[11] This action was commenced in 2019. A case conference was held in March of 2020, right before the COVID-19 pandemic began. At that case conference, the parties agreed to involve the Office of the Children's Lawyer ("OCL") in respect of the children. They also agreed to the production of records from the Peel Children's Aid Society ("CAS") from August of 2019 forward. The parties also consented to an order in respect of other disclosure.
[12] In addition, on March 6th, 2020, the parties consented to an order setting out an access schedule for the Respondent, as the children (other than Kayla) were primarily living with the Applicant. That schedule provided primary residency for the children (except Kayla) with the Applicant, and parenting time three times a week with the Respondent.
[13] That access schedule remained in place until the middle three children moved to spending most of their time with the Respondent in June of 2020. Where the children were living and for how much time will be reviewed in more detail below.
(14] In August of 2020, each party brought motions seeking sole decision making authority for the children. That motion was heard by Woollcombe J. on August 13th, 2020. Given the ages of Kayla and Amanda, no order was made in respect of either of them. Woollcombe J. declined to grant sole decision-making authority to either party in respect of the other three children. Woollcombe J. ordered that the primary residence for the three youngest children was to be with the Applicant.
(15] In addition, Woollcombe J. made an order in respect of disclosure, as disclosure remained an issue. The expectation was that the parties would have completed disclosure by September 21, 2020 and that a settlement conference would be held in October or November of 2020. Finally, Woollcombe J. ordered that the matrimonial home should be listed for sale and sold. It is clear from reading Woollcombe J.'s endorsement that the situation had become very acrimonious by that point.
(16] In February of 2021, the parties sold the matrimonial home. At that point, the proceeds were put into trust. Some of the proceeds have been paid out. However, monies remain in trust. The trust ledger from the firm that holds the proceeds of sale, Rutman and Rutman, was included in the evidence. It seems to suggest that there was approximately $150,000 still being held in trust. However, during discussions immediately before the trial commenced, the Applicant and Respondent were advised that the amount that remained in trust was $99,977.20. I will address the payout of the monies in trust below. I am also ordering that Rutman and Rutman provide an updated general ledger to both parties and to the Court as soon as possible after the release of these reasons.
[17] The OCL became involved with the three youngest children as their representatives. The Order of Woollcombe J. was not observed, as the children (other than Caden) lived primarily with the Respondent.
[18] A settlement conference was held before Kumaranayake J. on March 4th, 2021. At that time, Her Honour made a number of orders that were designed to move the litigation forward. She also expressed concern with the failure of the parties to either adhere to the order of Woollcombe J. or to move to have it changed. She also noted that the parties had a further discussion about disclosure and had reached agreements that she included in her Order.
[19] A further settlement conference was held before Price J. on February 2nd, 2022. At that time, His Honour determined that the trial of this matter would take seventeen days and directed the parties to return for a settlement conference in June of 2022. Price J. also placed the trial on the blitz list for January of 2024. Price J. also noted that the parties had resolved the regular parenting time issues.
[20] In the late fall of 2022, the Respondent brought a motion seeking an interim disbursement from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home on the basis of urgent financial distress. By this point, the Applicant was self-represented. When the motion was heard by Fowler Byrne J. on January 19th, 2023, both parties were seeking an interim distribution of the proceeds of sale as well as various disclosure orders, which were outstanding. Fowler Byrne J. ordered an interim disbursement of $25,000 for each party. She also directed both parties to comply with further disclosure orders.
[21] The Respondent became self-represented on August 8th, 2023. The Applicant continued to seek production of documents from the Respondent throughout the fall of 2023. A number of messages from the Applicant to the Respondent were admitted into evidence. These messages were sent through the Our Family Wizard software, and were generally unopened by the Respondent. They showed continuing attempts by the Applicant to obtain disclosure from the Respondent. The Respondent has not meaningfully complied with those Orders, and has not replied to the Applicant's follow-up requests for disclosure. I will
provide some specific examples for that conclusion in my review of the evidence and the issues.
[22] In November of 2023, the Applicant (at this point self-represented), brought an urgent motion seeking records from the CAS. That matter was deemed to be urgent because of the approaching trial and scheduled for a hearing on December 2Pt, 2023. On that date, Barnes J. adjourned the motion to January 3rd, 2024 as the Applicant's materials were not uploaded to Caselines and the Respondent had not filed any materials.
[23] The motion was heard by Bloom J., who ordered the production of CAS records starting November 1st, 2022. Bloom J. also advised the Respondent that an adverse inference might be drawn against him because of the lack of production of other documents in this case. Bloom J. also provided the parties with the guide for self-represented litigants. I am not sure if that document was previously provided to the parties.
[24] As can be seen from this history, the litigation in this case has been acrimonious and disclosure has been an ongoing issue. At the outset of trial, I explained to the parties that my role as a judge was akin to a referee and not a coach. However, I had the Registrar assist the parties with the organization and copying of the various exhibits.
Evidence
[25] The parties were both self-represented. As a result, I spent some time both explaining the rules of evidence and reviewing the documents that they wished to provide to support their case. I also identified some documents that it would be useful to include in the record. In particular, given that decision making authority for Caden was a live issue, I asked for production of his report cards and attendance record for both kindergarten and Grade 1.
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[26] There are some specific points I should address in terms of the evidence that was admitted, as follows:
a) A portion of the CAS records were admitted into evidence. I advised the parties that these records would contain hearsay, and that I would not necessarily accept them for the truth of their contents. I also noted, however, that I would be most interested in any concerns that the CAS had verified.
b) Both of the parties produced charts outlining their positions on the various financial issues. While those were marked as exhibits, the parties were advised that those charts were only as valuable as the underlying evidence.
[27] In reviewing the evidence with the parties, I explained the concept of hearsay to them. In particular, I told the parties that the CAS records had not been admitted for the truth of their contents. For example, there would be records of discussions that the CAS had with the children. Those would be hearsay as neither the child nor the CAS worker was being called as a witness.
[28] The GAS records only covered the time period from November of 2021 to the present. There were records from 2019 and 2020 as well. However, I was not provided with these records. I understand that the CAS had previously provided the parties with access, but the link had expired. The Respondent wanted to rely on these older records, but he had not taken any steps to re-obtain access to them prior to trial, and I was not prepared to adjourn the trial given that the date had been set for two years.
[29] I also note that there were some documents that were not admitted into evidence. I have marked one of those as a lettered exhibit. There are a couple of other documents that were not admitted that I should mention:
a) There was a letter from Kayla to the University of Toronto requesting a deferral of her university in December of 2019. There was no dispute as to the fact that Kayla sought a deferral around this time, and the contents of the letter would have been hearsay. As a result, the letter was not admitted.
b) There was another letter from Kayla in respect of vaccine mandates at the University of Toronto. Again, it was hearsay and was not admitted into evidence.
c) There were submissions from the Respondent's law firm, Kania Buttigeg, that were attached to Exhibit 25. The letter itself was submissions and was removed from the Exhibit.
[30] After having reflected on the matter, I have determined that a couple of these documents should have been marked as lettered exhibits. As a result, I am directing that the letters from Kayla be marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" and that the letter of submissions from Kania Buttigeg dated May 12th, 2021 should be marked as Exhibit "D". I have provided the Court offices with both directions in this respect and copies of the documents.
[31] The parties both provided viva voce testimony. They originally had a number of other witnesses on their witness lists. Prior to the commencement of trial, the Applicant advised that she would only be seeking to call one of the witnesses on her list. She ultimately decided to proceed with her testimony only.
[32] The Respondent had originally wanted to call all of the witnesses on his witness list. I advised the Respondent that he would have to subpoena any witnesses that he wished to call and that I would not be delaying the trial in order for him to take time to find his witnesses. As I noted above, the trial date had been
set for almost two years, and the Respondent was expected to be ready for trial. Ultimately, the Respondent decided not to call any witnesses other than himself.
[33] The Respondent also sought to provide additional documentation throughout the course of his testimony and the case more generally. I admitted the following documentation:
a) Cell-phone bills that were paid by the Respondent on behalf of the children. The bills were ultimately not disputed, and a roll-up of the costs and a sampling of the bills was included as an exhibit.
b) Information about the expenses for Kayla's vehicle that were allegedly paid by the Respondent.
c) Summaries of the money allegedly transferred by the Respondent to the joint account as well as a couple of related receipts.
d) E-mails and other notes respecting the incidents involving Caden at his school in October of 2023.
e) Redacted bank statements. The Respondent did not want to provide the unredacted statements until very late in the trial.
f) Other financial documents.
g) Communications between the parties in respect of the parenting time schedule and disclosure.
h) Other school related documents.
[34] I did not admit the remainder of the documents that the Respondent was seeking to rely upon. As disclosed in the discussion of the history of this case, disclosure has been outstanding for a long time. The Respondent has not, as far
as I can see, complied with his disclosure obligations. He should not be permitted to produce additional documents at this late date. He should also not be permitted to partially disclose documents and potentially present an inaccurate picture of what happened.
[35] An example of some of the evidence the Respondent tried to present included pictures of Caden allegedly showing bruising allegedly caused by the Applicant that the Respondent first mentioned in his examination in chief as well as unredacted bank statements that he had not provided earlier.
[36] As part of her closing submissions, the Applicant directed my attention to the Court of Appeal's decision in Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450. In that decision, like many others, the Court of Appeal noted that "the most basic obligation in family law is the duty to disclose financial information." Failing to disclose this information makes it more difficult for the Court to make a decision, acts to the disadvantage of the opposite party and adversely affects the administration of justice.
[37] The same is true in this case. The Respondent's failure to comply with his disclosure obligations has made this case more difficult to adjudicate. As a result of the Respondent's failure to disclose, where there are gaps in the evidence that require financial information, I have generally resolved them in the Applicant's favour.
[38] I also discussed the concept of relevance with the parties, and explained that the evidence I needed to hear should focus on helping me decide the issues in dispute. For example, the Respondent's evidence about the daycare business and its effect on the parties' relationship pre-separation was generally not relevant to the decisions I had to make. However, on some occasions, it was more efficient to hear the evidence rather than ruling it irrelevant. I have set out the evidence I have considered in the sections that follow.
[39] Finally, I should note that the parties were self-represented in this case and the Respondent did not seem to have much facility with the Caselines system. As a result, all of the exhibits except for the CAS notes were marked in hard copy. The CAS notes were marked electronically and are stored in the exhibits folder on Caselines as they were produced electronically and were over 200 pages in length.
Credibility and Reliability
[40] Credibility and reliability are different, but related, concepts. Credibility is the question of whether the witness is being truthful to the best of their ability.
Reliability is the question of whether the witness can accurately observe, recall and recount the events in question. R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, 244 O.C.A. 288 at para. 41.
[41] In this case, I have concluded that the Applicant's evidence is generally credible, as she provided testimony focused on the facts and the documents. Although the Applicant's dislike for the Respondent was manifest, she also controlled that dislike and focused on the merits of the case.
[42] I had issues with both the credibility and the reliability of the Respondent's evidence. Those issues can be divided into four categories, as follows:
a) The Respondent tended to focus on how he wanted things to be, and had a lack of understanding about how his desires, preferences and actions affected Caden.
b) The Respondent failed to disclose relevant information, which raises questions about the credibility and reliability of all of his evidence on the financial issues.
c) The Respondent had a tendency to overstate things. As an example, as will be discussed below, the Respondent claimed reimbursement for some of Kayla's expenses to attend Beauty College. Ultimately, after cross-examination, the Respondent acknowledged that this tuition was paid for out of a refund from Kayla's U of T tuition.
d) The Respondent had a tendency to make broad, sweeping statements without supporting evidence. For example, he stated in evidence that he should have been given exclusive possession of the matrimonial home in the summer of 2020 and that, if it had been sold later, it would have been sold for $700,000 more than the parties received.
[43] Given these frailties in the Respondent's vidence, where it differs from the Applicant's evidence or the admissible documentary evidence, I have generally preferred other evidence.
Issues
[44] In her evidence, the Applicant advised that she was only pursuing a child support claim and not one for spousal support. In addition, one of the documents that was produced was a Net Family Property statement that had been prepared by the Respondent's previous counsel. Based on that NFP statement, the parties were able to resolve the issue of the equalization payment. That payment is
$41,817.18 less a $10,000.00 amount that was in respect of legal aid. The total equalization payment from the Respondent to the Applicant is, therefore,
$31,817.18 and that amount will be paid from the funds that are currently being held in trust.
[45] As a result, the three issues in this case are:
a) The quantum of child support (both arrears and ongoing) that should be paid to the Applicant by the Respondent;
b) Whether there should be any post-separation adjustments;
c) Whether the Applicant should have sole decision-making authority for Caden.
[46] I will deal with each issue in turn. I should note that, in calculating the quantum of child support. I will also consider various expenses paid by the Respondent to assist the children.
[47] In her closing argument, the Applicant also sought decision-making authority for the two children who are under the age of eighteen. This was the first time that she had raised this issue. Given the evidence that came out during the trial (especially about Caden's schooling), I had some sympathy for the Applicant's position. However, given both the lateness of the request and the ages of the children, I have declined to consider that request.
Issue #1- Quantum of Child Support
[48] The issue of child support requires me to address four separate issues:
a) Which children were living with which party from separation to September of 2023?
b) What is the income of each party from separation to September of 2023? Based on this income and the time spent with each parent, what arrears of child support should be paid?
c) What the quantum of child support should be from September 2023 forward? In this respect, I note that the incomes of each party are set for 2023 and I accept those income numbers for 2024 as well.
d) Should there be any adjustments to the amount of child support paid on the basis of any of the expenses that the Respondent paid for?
[49] I will deal with each issue in turn.
a) Where Did the Children Live?
[50] For most of the time that the parties have been separated, the children have moved around. The one exception is Kayla, who has lived with the Respondent between the time of separation and when she began to live independently in September of 2023. The Applicant accepts that Kayla was living primarily with the Respondent throughout and was a dependent up until September of 2023.
[51] During her evidence, the Applicant provided a chart with the time periods of when the children lived with each parent. The Respondent originally advised that he disagreed with the Applicant's evidence. However, the Respondent did not cross-examine the Applicant and did not provide any of his own evidence to dispute this, with one exception, which I will come to.
[52] There is some connection between the reasons that the oldest four children moved back and forth and both the support calculation and the other issues in this case. Therefore, it is useful to set out that evidence at this point. As of the date of separation, all of the children (except Kayla) lived primarily with the Applicant in the matrimonial home.
[53] The Respondent sought to have sole possession of the matrimonial home by way of a motion he brought in June of 2020. He was unsuccessful in this motion, but all of the children except Caden went to live with him full time. Caden continued to live primarily with the Applicant. While the other children lived with the Respondent, they had very little contact with the Applicant.
[54] The four eldest children remained with the Respondent until the summer of 2021 when a shared parenting arrangement was agreed to as part of a mediation process, through what the Applicant called a 5-way meeting.
understand that this arrangement until the end of 2021. At that point, Kayla continued to remain with the Respondent and the other four children (including Caden) continued to go back and forth between the Applicant and the Respondent.
[55] Then, at the beginning of 2022, the children (other than Kayla and Caden) began to spend more time with the Respondent again. The Applicant testified that this was because the children would get upset with the rules at her house and would then go to their father's house. Caden continued on a shared parenting arrangement and has remained on that shared parenting arrangement until today.
[56] The amount of time spent by each of the three middle children in each parent's home between January and the end of June 2022 is not entirely clear. However, the Court order in force was clear that it was to be shared parenting and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I accept that it was shared parenting in this time period for the youngest four children (including Caden).
[57] In July of 2022, on a day when Rogers service was down across the province, the Applicant was scheduled to pick the children up from the Respondent's home. The parties had been having a dispute over one of the vehicles that they owned during the marriage, a Yukon XL. The Respondent expected the vehicle to be returned to him that day. The Applicant refused to return it, and the Respondent refused to send any of the children with the Applicant.
[58] Caden returned to the shared parenting arrangement almost immediately. However, Kayla (as she has throughout) remained with the Respondent. The other three children also remained with the Respondent until the end of September of 2022.
[59] In October of 2022, the Applicant received a text message from Alyssa, the middle child, asking if she could be picked up. Both Alyssa and Neveah (the fourth child) wanted to go to the Applicant's house. They went back to shared
parenting time at that point. The Applicant testified that she was told by the children that there had been an incident of physical violence at the Respondent's home when Neveah had not been doing well in school.
[60] From October of 2022 to May of 2023, Kayla and Amanda were primarily with the Respondent while the other three children were sharing time between the Applicant and the Respondent. This changed again when there was an incident around the Victoria Day weekend. The altercation allegedly involved the Respondent getting angry at Neveah and Amanda. There was allegedly physical violence in this encounter.
[61] The Respondent seems to deny, or at least minimize, the claims of either physical discipline or yelling. However, in the Respondent's closing argument, he acknowledged spanking Neveah on at least one occasion. When I view the evidence as a whole, I accept that some sort of physical altercation between the Respondent and Neveah took place around the Victoria Day weekend in 2023.
[62] As I have stated elsewhere in this decision, while domestic violence is an important consideration in any case, weighing and determining the allegations of domestic violence in this case in detail does not change the outcome, as I have decided that the Applicant should have sole decision-making authority for Caden.
[63] That being said, I accept that some incidents of domestic violence likely took place. The Applicant's evidence is, as I have explained, more credible than the Respondent's evidence. As a result, I specifically accept that the Respondent threatened the Applicant at the time the parties separated. That incident is described more fully below, at paragraph 139.
[64] As of May of 2023, Neveah asked to go and live primarily with the Applicant. Kayla and Amanda remained with the Respondent, and Alyssa and Caden remained in a shared arrangement. This changed again, for the final time,
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in September of 2023 when both Amanda and Alyssa decided to live primarily with the Applicant. Since September of 2023, the Applicant's evidence was that all of the children except Kayla and Caden were living exclusively with her, and that Amanda, Alyssa and Neveah have had no contact with the Respondent. The Respondent seems to accept this evidence, and I accept it.
[65] This brings me to the one place where the Respondent's evidence (and position) diverged from the Applicant's. The Respondent suggested that Alyssa and Kayla did not leave his home until November 1st. In terms of Kayla, I would note that I view her as having been independent and living with her boyfriend since September of 2023. That was the general thrust of the evidence, and neither party took issue with the fact that Kayla was a dependent until September of 2023, and then independent after that.
[66] In terms of Amanda, I simply prefer the Applicant's evidence for three reasons in addition to my general observations about credibility and reliability. First, as has been detailed throughout my decision, the Respondent has failed to provide documents to support his position. As a result, I am left doubting his evidence on any issue where there may be missing documentation. There may very well be missing text messages on this point. Second, the Applicant's presentation of the evidence and what happened was clear and straightforward and, on this point, the Respondent's was not. Finally, given my findings about the Respondent's conduct and positions in respect of both Caden and other financial information, ·I find it difficult to accept his evidence on this point either.
[67] Kayla was with the Respondent from the time of separation until she became independent in September of 2023. Caden was originally primarily with the Applicant. Then, from June of 2021 to today he was in a shared parenting arrangement. The following chart sets out where the youngest four children were between the date of separation and September of 2023:
Children Location
Time Period
Amanda
Caden
Se t/19-June/20
A licant
Jul /20-June/21
A ltcant
Jul /21-June/22
Shared
Jul /22-Se t/22
Res ondent
Res ondent
Res ondent
Shared
Oct/22-Ma /23
Res ondent
Shared
Shared
Shared
June/23-Sept/23
Respondent
Shared
A licant
Shared
Applicant
Applicant
Shared
[68] I should note that, where I have said that parenting was shared, I have concluded that the child who was listed as "shared" spent at least forty percent of the time with each parent. I will use this chart, along with the parties incomes, to calculate both retroactive and ongoing support. Kayla was with the Respondent for the entire time until she became independent on September 1st, 2023.
b) The Parties' Incomes
[69] During the marriage, the Applicant ran an in-home daycare. By the date of separation, the Applicant had obtained a job with Antonio Tatti and Sons Haulage. She held this job through the parties' separation until she was laid off from that job during the COVID-19 pandemic.
[70] Once the Applicant was laid off in the spring of 2020, she enrolled in a paralegal program at Sheridan College. She completed this program in June of 2022 and immediately obtained work as a paralegaLwith a real estate law firm. She now earns approximately $50,000.00 per year.
[71] The following table sets out the Applicant's Line 150 Income for the years since separation except for 2023, where a pay stub was provided:
Applicant's Line 150 Income
I Year 2019
Income
$34,499
2020
$28,904
2021
$22,221
2022
$24,836
2023 (pay stub)
$50,000
[72] The Respondent disagrees with, in his words, the Applicant's unemployment and why she couldn't find a job. I view this is a claim that the Applicant has been intentionally underemployed since separation. I reject that claim for the following reasons:
a) The fact that the Applicant was laid off in the spring of 2020 is neither surprising nor, on her evidence her fault. The Respondent offered no rationale to reject this conclusion.
b) The Applicant's Line 150 Income in 2019 was only approximately
$34,000.00, which suggests that she was not earning a large income prior to separation and might have needed retraining to become independent.
c) The Applicant was also able to generate some income for 2020, 2021 and the first half of 2022 through a combination of CERB benefits and other income. The Applicant's Line 150 income did not drop below
$22,000 per year at any point. This is not unreasonable for someone who is pursuing education.
d) The Applicant is now earning $50,000.00 per year as a paralegal, and there is the possibility that this income will increase in the coming years. As a result, the Applicant's decision to enroll in the paralegal program to become more financially independent was not only reasonable, it has been amply justified by the results.
[73] I also note that the Applicant did not claim spousal support, although she might be entitled to it for at least some of the time between separation and now. The fact that the Applicant abandoned this claim is, in my view, further indication that the Applicant has taken a reasonable approach to becoming self-sufficient. The Respondent's claim that the Applicant was underemployed is dismissed and the incomes set out at paragraph 71 are the Applicant's incomes for the purposes of these calculations.
[74] The Respondent has worked for Bell Canada for the past twenty-seven years. His income has generally been stable over the past few years. However, he has not filed his tax returns (as far as I know) for any year after the 2019 taxation year. I have used pay stubs and T-4's to calculate the Respondent's income. The following table sets out his income for each year:
Respondent's Income
Year
Income
2019
$101,103
2020 (T-4)
$96,673
2021 (T-4)
$95,929
2022 (Pay stub)
$108,160
2023 (Pav stub)
$116,124
[75] At one point in his evidence, the Respondent seemed to assert that he was not working for a year. However, I had no evidence to support that conclusion. Indeed, the evidence I do have (the T4's, pay stubs and tax returns) seem to suggest that the Respondent worked continuously between the date of separation and the date of trial.
[76] I should also deal with the Respondent's assertion that he is under severe financial stress. There is no persuasive evidence to support that conclusion. Indeed, the evidence at this point supports the conclusion that the Respondent is not under any financial distress. In that regard, I note:
a) The Applicant earned either close to or in excess of $100,000.00 in employment income every year since separation.
b) The Applicant has had access to at least some of the funds from the sale of the matrimonial home.
c) As of the time of separation, the Applicant had approximately $240,000 in net assets, after the equalization payment was accounted for.
d) When the respondent brought a motion for the release of funds in January of 2023 because he was allegedly suffering from financial hardship, he was ordered to produce the lease for his accommodations. This lease would have indicated whether the Respondent's girlfriend was living with him or had otherwise guaranteed the lease. This document was not provided by the Respondent and, from its absence I infer that it would not have assisted the Respondent's position that he is suffering from financial hardship. I also note that the absence of this evidence tends to support an inference that the Respondent is living with his girlfriend, but it is not necessary to make a final conclusion in that regard.
e) More generally, the Respondent's disclosure has been deficient, and he has provided very little evidence to demonstrate severe, or even any, financial hardship.
[77] In her testimony, the Applicant stated that the Respondent has been doing cash renovations, and gave the example of their goddaughter having had her basement apartment renovated by the Respondent. I note that, if the Respondent was earning cash income, it might have appeared on his bank statements as a deposit.
[78] The Respondent produced his redacted bank statements. They were redacted to show only a few samples of expenses for things such as Amanda's tuition, car payments or cell phone bills which were the transactions that the Respondent sought to rely upon.
[79] The Respondent acknowledged that he was paid by Bell twice a month or bi-weekly. The Respondent's September 2022 bank statement showed seven deposits. We could count them because we could see where the redactions were on the statement, although the amounts were blacked out. It is clear that there were deposits beyond the Respondent's salary being added to his account. I also note that September of 2022 was not the only month with multiple deposits. April May of 2021 had five and May-June of 2021 had six.
[80] The Respondent said that this could have been refunds, or he could have been tapping into investments. In the absence of the unredacted statements, he could also have been receiving cash income. The evidence that I have is not sufficient for me to find that the Respondent has been receiving a regular supplement to his cash income although I do have concerns in that regard.
[81] This brings me to the Respondent's evidence about financial duress. He provided two pieces of evidence that I should comment on. First, there is a utility bill dated November 14th, 2022 and showing a past due amount of $422.00. There is no evidence that the Respondent has lost his utilities services or that he continues to have a "past due" balance. Given the Respondent's failure to provide disclosure that was ordered, I infer that there are no current problems with his utilities.
[82] The Respondent's testimony was that this bill came about as a result of his landlord engaging contractors, and that there was no provision to pay for the power that was used. As a result, the Respondent took $400.00 off of the rent.
[83] This brings me to the second piece of evidence that the Respondent advanced in support of his claim of financial distress. The Respondent indicated in his testimony that his landlord was trying to get him evicted and that he might have to move to Erin. There is no evidence to support this assertion, and I reject it. Indeed, unilaterally withholding rent payments might be the reason that the landlord is trying to get the Respondent evicted.
[84] For the foregoing reasons, I see no basis to conclude that the Respondent is suffering any undue financial distress. Support calculations will be based on the Respondent's line 150 income as set out at paragraph 74.
[85] Finally, I should briefly note that there is no evidence as to which parent is receiving the Canada Child Benefit. As a result, it is not necessary for me to consider it.
c) Child Support Going Forward
[86] At this point, the parties' incomes are stable. They are set out in the tables I have provided, and I accept that they are reasonable. As a result, as of September 1st, 2023, the Respondent is required to pay child support for four children, with one child (Caden) offset by shared parenting. The amount of support going forward is $2,106.00 per month, to be paid on the 1st of the month. There are arrears on this amount back to October 1st, 2023.
[87] The Applicant has post-secondary education in that she is qualified as a legal clerk. The Respondent's educational background was not outlined in evidence. In addition, Kayla has already obtained some post-secondary education, although I acknowledge that Kayla's journey to her current course has had its challenges.
[88] Amanda is currently enrolled in a College program for medical esthetics and Alyssa has applied to a number of universities to continue her education next
year. Although Amanda took a year off after school and worked part-time, I heard no evidence to suggest that Amanda had decided to stop going to school and become independent at the end of high school. Indeed, for the 2022-2023 year, the Respondent did not deny that he was claiming child support for the time that Amanda was with him and either taking a gap year or pursuing post-secondary education.
[89] Therefore, I am of the view that post-secondary education of some sort is expected for all of these children and that child support should continue for their first post secondary degree or certificate.
[90] The parties will need a review mechanism in order to determine ongoing child support. To that end, I am ordering as follows:
a) Child support shall be paid until August 3pt in the year in which the child graduates from high school.
b) Child support shall continue, or resume, if a child enrolls in a post secondary program on or before their 21st birthday. The party in contact with the child at the time of their enrolment or the child shall furnish proof of enrollment by no later than July 1st in the year that they are starting a program.
[91] I am not seized to deal with any issues in respect of this mechanism save and except as I have specifically set out below.
d) Section 7 Adjustments- Respondent's claims
[92] The Respondent provided detailed spreadsheets of the expenses that he was claiming. The problem with this evidence is that, while the spreadsheet was very detailed, there were almost no receipts to support the claims that the Respondent was making. For example, the Respondent made a claim for furniture
and children's clothing in the sum of $17,000. There are two problems with this claim:
a) There are no receipts for any of these expenditures.
b) These are the types of expenditures that are subsumed in child support payments. For example, each parent is expected to furnish their own residence after separation.
[93] I am not prepared to treat these items as either a section 7 expense or as a post separation adjustment, and the Respondent's claim is dismissed.
[94] In addition to these items, the Respondent seeks reductions in the support that he owes on the basis of the following expenses that the Respondent says are section 7 expenses:
a) Tuition for Kayla's attendance at the Canadian Beauty College.
b) Cell phone bills for the four eldest children, that were paid for by the Respondent until November of 2023 for Alyssa. He stopped paying the cellphones for the other children earlier.
c) The costs of Kayla's car, including the lease payments and the insurance.
Tuition expenses
[95] The issue of Kayla's tuition is straightforward. In cross-examination, the Respondent confirmed that he had not actually paid these expenses. Instead, they were receipts that he was providing in anticipation that they be paid. This is not a deduction that the Respondent can claim from the support that is otherwise owing.
[96] I am also not prepared to make any order that either party should pay any of Kayla's tuition for this College. The evidence was clear that Kayla paid her tuition for attending at the University of Toronto in 2019, prior to separation. It was also clear from the evidence that both the Applicant and the Respondent made a contribution to this tuition.
[97] It was also clear that Kayla requested a deferment from the University of Toronto in December of 2019. She received some refund for her tuition, although the precise amount she received back is not clear. Indeed, in her evidence, the Applicant testified that she had received no information about either how much money Kayla received as a refund from the University of Toronto or whether Kayla had received any OSAP. In cross-examination, the Respondent ultimately acknowledged that Kayla had funded this tuition out of her refund.
[98] As a result, there is no evidence before the Court to support a claim that Kayla had to pay any additional money to attend College or how much was spent. In the absence of that evidence, I am not prepared to make any order.
[99] The Respondent also asked for reimbursement for Amanda's tuition for a program at Humber College. Text messages were produced showing that certain fees were paid on the Respondent's credit card. However, there is no clear evidence to show that the Respondent did not receive reimbursement from Amanda. Again, in the absence of that evidence, I am not prepared to make any order.
The Cell Phone Expenses
[100] The cell phone bills require more detailed consideration, as the evidence in respect of them was unclear. The Respondent filed a spreadsheet detailing his claim for approximately $1,750.00 of costs that he says that the Applicant owed him on her own behalf and $7,500.00 on behalf of the children for
cellphones. The Respondent confirmed that he had cellphone records for eighteen months, and that the numbers that went back beyond eighteen months were an estimate. The costs allegedly owing by the Applicant on her own account were in respect of an IWatch and for a cellphone.
[101] I start with the IWatch. There are two problems with the Respondent's assertion that the Applicant should pay for the costs of this watch:
a) There was no evidence to support the costs for this watch, as the records do not go back that far.
b) The Applicant disputed the payment for_the watch based on the fact that the Respondent cancelled her Bell services at the time of separation. Given the acrimony in this case, I accept that explanation as being an entirely plausible description of what happened.
[102] As a result, I will not allow the Respondent any recovery for this item. For similar reasons, I also conclude that the Respondent should not be entitled to any reimbursement for the alleged costs of the Applicant's cellphone.
[103] This brings me to the cellphones for the children. First, I accept that these are an appropriate section 7 expense for all of the children except Caden. I note that Kayla was never listed as receiving money from the Respondent for a cellphone and Amanda started to pay for her own in June of 2022.
[104] The Respondent's spreadsheet contains some unexplained entries. For example, in December of 2019, the charge for Neveah was $109.39 instead of $75.00. Similarly, the charges for Neveah in February and March of 2021 were
$180.72 and $130.81. The Respondent alleged that these were data overages. There is no supporting evidence for them, and I am not prepared to allow any extra recovery on account of them.
[105] There was also a very large charge of $2752.66 for "paid off devices" in November of 2021. There was no good explanation of this charge, and I deny it as well. The Respondent also gave Neveah a new phone for her birthday in February of 2021. Again, that charge is denied. One parent is not responsible for contributing to the costs of the other parent's birthday gift for a child.
[106] The Respondent acknowledged that there were some errors in transcribing the data, and he may have been mistaken about part of the Applicant's costs. Given the disclosure issues in this case, I have no confidence that any charges other than the monthly charges should be paid. The Respondent also acknowledged that the cellphone costs were paid out of the joint account until it was closed in December of 2021.
[107] I am not prepared to allow the extra amounts that the Respondent has claimed. I accept that, from January 1st, 2021 to June 30th, 2022 he paid $75.00 per child (Amanda, Alyssa and Neveah) for cellphones, and that he paid the same amount for the younger two children until June 30th, 2023 and for Alyssa's cellphone until November 30th, 2023.
[108] The total for those costs are:
a) January Pt, 2021 to June 30th, 2022- 16 months @$225.00 per month
$4050.00 total.
b) July Pt, 2022 to May 31st, 2023- 11 months @ $150.00 a month
$1,650.00 total.
c) July 1st, 2023 to November 30th, 2023 5 months @$75.00 a month
$375.00
d) Total is $6,075.00
[109] The Respondent seeks to have this cost split on a 50/50 basis. The normal practice is to split section 7 expenses proportionate to income, and I see no reason to deviate from that practice here. There are no special circumstances that would justify a change. Therefore, I accept that the reasonable proportion is for the Respondent to pay 2/3 and the Applicant to pay 1/3. The Respondent is · entitled to a credit of $2,025.00 for the cellphones.
[110] However, the Applicant is entitled, upon proof of payment, to reimbursement from the Respondent of 2/3 of the costs of Neveah and Alyssa's cellphone bills until the end of the month in which each of them turns eighteen. That requirement begins March 1st, 2024.
Cars
[111] The ownership of cars between the parties produces two disputes in terms of either section 7 expenses or post- separation adjustments. It was not clear to me as to which method the Respondent was claiming reimbursement for these expenses, so I have addressed them under both sections. The Respondent is claiming reimbursement for the payment of a car for Kayla as well as a car for himself. The claims for both cars are dismissed regardless of which set of rules are applied.
[112] I begin with the car for Kayla. During the marriage, the Applicant owned and drove an lnfiniti G35. She would sometimes permit Kayla to drive that vehicle to and from her part-time job as a server. However, there would be other times in which she did not permit Kayla to drive the car because Kayla was being irresponsible.
[113] The Respondent argued that, as a result of the Applicant's failure to provide Kayla with the G35 after separation, the Respondent should be entitled to receive reimbursement for this expense. I reject that assertion for three reasons:
a) A car for driving a child to a part-time job or to school is not a reasonable section 7 expense. Further, it should not be treated as a post-separation adjustment.
b) There is evidence to suggest that the Respondent received at least some reimbursement from Kayla for these costs post separation. Again, however, I do not have all of the records and cannot know for sure what happened.
c) The Respondent's evidence more generally on whether he received reimbursement from Kayla for some or all of these expenses was unclear, other than to confirm that he received some money from Kayla to defray these costs. The lack of disclosure precludes a clear consideration of this issue. From the lack of disclosure, I infer that the Respondent received sufficient reimburs ment that there is no merit to this claim, and I dismiss it.
[114] This brings me to the Respondent's claim for reimbursement for his new Toyota Highlander. His position on why he should be reimbursed for the Highlander, as I understand it, is that the Applicant retained the Yukon XL, but that by the summer of 2020 he had the four eldest children with him full time. As a result, he insisted that the Applicant return the Yukon XL to him. When she did not return it, he determined that he should lease a new Toyota Highlander as he needed an eight seater car to transport everyone around. He now claims reimbursement from the Applicant for a portion of the lease and insurance costs.
[115] Under the section 7 rubric, that claim is rejected. It is not a traditional section 7 expense, and transporting the children is something that is paid for out of the support payments that would otherwise be owing. I also note that, at this point, the Respondent's income dwarfed that of the Applicant. Finally, I note that
Kayla also had a car at this point, so I see no reason why an eight seater vehicle was necessary for the Respondent.
[116] The claims for the cars also generally suffer from two significant evidentiary flaws over and above the fact that there is no legal basis to compensate the Respondent for those expenses. First, the costs of the cars are unclear and inconsistent. For example, the Respondent's Financial Statement, sworn June 1st, 2022, shows substantially different numbers for the costs of the cars than the Respondent's bank statements show. Second, there is no indication of what Kayla pays for her portion of her car. Finally, the Respondent also owns a Harley and costs for that vehicle may be included in what the Respondent has claimed.
e) Other Section 7 Expense Issues
[117] Neveah needs braces. This was discovered after a visit to the orthodontist in April of 2021. The Applicant advised the Respondent at the time that she wanted his insurance to pay as much of the braces as possible and then they should split the cost 50/50. Her testimony was that she had made arrangements with the orthodontist, but that the Respondent went in the next day and cancelled them. The estimate filed by the Applicant supported her evidence, as it showed an estimate of $5,795.00 for braces with an amount for insurance and the remainder split 50/50.
[118] The Respondent did not really challenge the Applicant's evidence. Instead, he suggested to her that he wanted confirmation that she had benefits. She was unemployed in 2021, so cannot see how she would have had benefits. At this point, she has benefits and has confirmed that they do not cover orthodontic care.
[119] The Respondent now seems to be prepared to pay for the braces. However, he wishes to have the costs split on a 50/50 basis. At this point, the
Applicant wants the costs split proportionate to income. As I discussed at paragraph 109, I see no basis for departing from the usual rule that these expenses should be split proportionate to income.
[120] As a result, I am ordering that the Respondent shall forthwith submit Neveah's claim for braces to his insurance carrier and shall cooperate in having that claim approved, if possible. I am also ordering that the Respondent shall pay 2/3 of the costs of Neveah's braces that are not covered by insurance. I retain jurisdiction to make sure that this is done.
[121] Other section 7 expenses are to be divided proportionate to income, with the Respondent paying 2/3 of the expense and the Applicant paying 1/3 of the expense. In this respect, I note that the individual receipts for a number of school related expenses were filed by the Applicant. These are activity fees, commencement fees (presumably for graduation) and fees for the prom. They are section 7 expenses and are to be split proportionately.
f) Conclusion
[122] The directions that I am providing in respect of child support are as follows:
a) From October 1st, 2023 onwards, Kayla is independent and is no longer a child of the marriage for the purposes of calculating support.
b) From October 1st, 2023 forward, the Respondent is to pay the Applicant the sum of $2,106.00 per month. This payment is due on the 1st of each month and is to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.
c) Child support shall be paid on account of each child until August 31st in the year in which the child graduates from high school.
d) Child support shall continue, or resume, if a child enrolls in a post secondary program on or before their 21st birthday. The party in
contact with the child at the time of their enrolment or the child shall furnish proof of enrollment by no later than July 1st in the year that they
are starting a program.
e) Subject to my disposition of the arrears question, the Respondent is entitled to an adjustment for the cellphone bills that he has paid for the children in the amount of $2025.00.
f) Commencing March 1st, 2024, the Applicant is entitled, upon proof of payment, to reimbursement from the Respondent of 2/3 of the costs of Neveah and Alyssa's celphone bills until the end of the month in which each of them turns eighteen.
g) The Respondent is to forthwith apply for reimbursement from his insurance carrier for Neveah's braces.
h) The Respondent is to pay 2/3 of all of the costs of Neveah's braces that are not covered by his insurance plan.
[123] This brings me to the question of arrears for support. I have used the income numbers and location of the children set out above to perform a detailed calculation of arrears as set out in Schedule "A" to these reasons. The total arrears are $67,739.00. Interest would be owing on these arrears at a rate of 3% per annum.
[124] As of December 3Pt, 2020, the Respondent owed the Applicant approximately $20,000.00 in retroactive support. Three years of interest on that amount alone is $1,800.00, and the amount of retroactive support owing (and therefore the interest) has only gone up since then. Rather than calculating the interest, I have determined that the amounts owing to the Respondent on account
of the cellphone bills should be set off against the interest that the Applicant would otherwise be entitled to, and I so order. This will be reflected by excluding both the adjustment for the cellphone bills and the retroactive interests from the final order. Interest shall accrue on the amounts payable from today's date.
Issue #2- Post-Separation Adjustments
[125] The Respondent is seeking a number of post separation adjustments as follows:
a) The cars described in the previous section.
b) More generally, the claims around who paid what for the matrimonial home. It is common ground that the Applicant lived in the property between the date of separation and when the matrimonial home was sold in February of 2021.
Cars
[126] In terms of the cars, the analysis as to why they are not section 7 expenses applies with equal force to whether I should include them as post separation adjustments. In addition, they should not be post-separation adjustments for the following reasons:
a) Each party keeps their own assets at the. time of separation. Adjustments are made through equalization.
b) Each party is usually expected to become independent after separation. Any issues of dependency are addressed through the payment of support and not through the payment of extra expenses. In addition, the Respondent's income was much larger than the Applicant's income.
[127] For these reasons, I have dismissed the claim for payment for the cars as a post-separation adjustment.
Matrimonial Home
[128] The Applicant provided a spreadsheet outlining the payments he made on account of his 50 percent of the mortgage and of other expenses. The Respondent alleges that he paid a total of $44,650 into the joint account before it was closed at the end of December 2020.
[129] The Respondent has asserted that there were "transfers by [the Respondent] into joint accounts over and above his share of the mortgage, property tax and home insurance." The amount claimed by the Respondent as an adjustment is approximately $26,000.00. I reject this claim for three reasons:
a) The Respondent has not provided any receipts to support the payment of these expenses.
b) The Respondent has failed to lead any of the bank statements in evidence to demonstrate that he actually made these transfers into the joint account and/or that they were used for purposes other than his portion of the mortgage and/or other house related expenses.
c) The Applicant's evidence differs from the Respondent, in that she asserts any additional transfers that were made were made for his personal expenses.
[130] In the absence of records to illustrate either that these transactions were made or that the money was expended in the manner described by the Respondent, I decline his request for any reimbursement.
[131] In terms of the property taxes, there is very little actually in dispute. The 2020 and 2021 taxes were paid out of the sale proceeds and were, therefore, split equally. The rest, from the time of separation, were paid by the Applicant. Her testimony is undisputed on this point, and I accept it. This is another reason for refusing the Respondent's request as there would have to be a deduction from any adjustment paid to the Respondent to account for the Applicant's overpayment of property taxes.
Conclusion
[132] For the foregoing reasons, there are to be no adjustments to either the equalization payment or support payments on account of any post-separation payments.
[133] I should note that no claim for occupation rent was advanced by the Respondent. Even if one had been, however, it would have been difficult to address without considering the Applicant's entitlement to spousal support.
Issue #3- Decision 'Making Authority
a) Caden's History and Parenting Arrangements
[134] Caden is currently in Grade 1. In Junior Kindergarten, he was enrolled in a couple of other schools. There was a dispute between the Applicant and the respondent as to whether the Applicant enrolled Caden in one of these schools unilaterally. I note that the documentation that was filed showed a tendency on the part of both parents to attempt to unilaterally manage Caden's schooling. It does not reflect well on either of them.
[135] In senior Kindergarten, Caden was enrolled in St. Daniel Comboni Catholic School in the Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board and he remains
at that school. His report cards, which were only available up until last November, show that Caden is generally a good student and is generally attentive in class.
[136] With the exception of a couple of incidents of overholding on the part of the Respondent, one of which is described at paragraph 57, Caden has been on a shared 2/2/3 parenting schedule since the parties agreed to that schedule in the summer of 2021.
[137] That arrangement was not initially challenged by either party in this case. However, in closing argument, the Applicant asked that the Respondent's parenting time be limited to supervised parenting time.
b) The Interactions Between the Parties
[138] The various e-mail and text message exchanges that were filed by the parties at trial make it clear that they have a negative relationship. I start by observing that the Applicant testified that there had been a history of domestic violence in the household prior to separation.
[139] The marriage ended in August of 2019 when the Respondent was charged with uttering threats after an altercation with the Applicant over her job, and the fact that she was working down the street instead of in their home. The Applicant decided that it was necessary to call the police about this interaction, and the Respondent was criminally charged.
[140] In addition, there was an incident in September of 2021, when the Applicant picked up Neveah for parenting time and she was demonstrating symptoms of COVID. The Respondent texted the Applicant and insisted that Neveah not be tested for COVID or receive the COVID vaccine. Ultimately, Caden also developed symptoms and tested positive. The attending physician advised the Applicant to take the two of them home and quarantine.
[141] The Applicant also suggested, in cross-examination, that the Respondent pressured her to bring both children to his house and have them quarantine with him. In his own evidence, the Respondent did not really deny that suggestion. This incident is another example of the difficulties the parties had working together.
[142] The difficulties in the parties' ability to work together can also be seen in a couple of disputes over changing the pick-up and drop-off schedule. First, after the Applicant got a job as a paralegal in the summer of 2022, she asked the Respondent if she could change the pick-up time from 3:45 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. Then, in January of 2023, the Applicant was given an opportunity to train to be a law clerk. Again, she sought a change in the pick-up time. She testified that he was not agreeable to this change and, as a result, she got her boyfriend to do the pick ups.
[143] As discussed above, I also had access to the CAS notes from November of 2021 to the present. There have been a number of cases that discuss the weight to be given to these records. There is support in the case law for the conclusion that these are business records and may be admissible in some circumstances even if the author is not called as a witness. Sears v. Corstine, 2020 ONSC 7968.
[144] Generally, how reliable the CAS records are will be determined based on whether the GAS records record something being said directly by a witness being interviewed or whether the statements are second or third hand hearsay or an opinion. See O.G. v. A.M., 2022 ONSC 2478
[145] The CAS records would be subject to more scrutiny in a child protection case, where the CAS was a party. This would be especially true in a case where the GAS was seeking to end a parental-child relationship. See The Children's Aid Society of Carleton v. V.M., 2020 ONSC 221.
[146] In this case, while the records were not attached to an Affidavit, they were produced by the CAS in response to a production order of this Court. Both parties received them, and both parties acknowledged that they were the CAS's records for the time period in question. As a result, I am satisfied that the CAS records are sufficiently reliable that I can use them for some limited purposes.
[147] Ultimately, I view these notes as being useful for two purposes:
a) As confirmation (or not) of evidence that the parties provided to me about what they told each other and what they told the CAS.
b) Some consideration should be given in respect of the circumstances where the CAS found that a concern was "verified".
[148] I will return to the first point in my consideration of Caden's current schooling circumstances. In respect of the second section, I would note that the incident involving Neveah from May of 2023 (described at paragraphs 60-61) was verified by the CAS after extensive interviews. The CAS concerns were both physical discipline and the Respondent's inability to see the effect of his actions on the children. These are both troubling concerns that are echoed in both the Applicant's evidence and my own conclusions about the Respondent's approach to Caden's schooling. I accept these concerns but note that the other issues in this case are even more significant.
[149] Finally, the Respondent was cross-examined about his knowledge of Caden's medical treatment and, more specifically, his eczema. From this cross examination, it became clear that the Respondent has not spoken to Caden's doctor since the fall of 2022 and that the Respondent has not taken Caden to medical appointments in that time either. This raises questions about the Respondent's knowledge of Caden's needs.
[150] The Respondent also raised a concern in respect of the Applicant's friendship with a woman named Sonia Sousa. Ms. Sousa was described by the Respondent as a medium who was trying to help the Applicant contact one of her deceased parents back in 2007. The Respondent also described Ms. Sousa as a heavy smoker and testified that he viewed her influence on the children, through the Applicant, as being significant and negative. Ms. Sousa also apparently cut the children's hair, and the Respondent viewed the haircuts (particularly for Caden) as being substandard. The Applicant did not seem to dispute that Ms. Sousa was a smoker. However, she was of the view that the haircuts were fine and that Ms. Sousa had been cutting the children's hair for years.
[151] I do not share the Respondent's concerns in respect of Ms. Sousa. First, given my findings in respect of the credibility and reliability of the Respondent's evidence leave me with concerns about his evidence on this point as well. Second, over and above the fact that Ms. Sousa was a smoker, all I heard is that Ms. Sousa was a negative influence on the children, information that was not put in context except for the Respondent saying that the Applicant and Ms. Sousa would badmouth the children.
[152] These concerns, even if they were substantiated, would not be sufficient to persuade me that the Applicant should not have decision making authority. The mere factthat Ms. Sousa might be a bad influence on the children (a finding that I am not making) is of limited significance given the other issues at play in this case.
c) The Events of October, 2023 and Caden's Current Schooling Situation
[153] In considering this issue, I start by noting that Caden has missed in excess of 25 days of school since an incident in October. The Respondent is simply not taking Caden to school on the days when he has parenting time. I will now outline how this came to pass.
[154] Caden began Grade 1 at St. Daniel Comboni in September of 2023. One of the children in his classroom apparently had a life-threatening dairy allergy. The Applicant and the Respondent disagree as to how that- should have been managed.
[155] Both parties agree that Caden loves pizza and yoghurt. As a result of this life-threatening allergy that one of his classmates has, Caden is not able to eat either of these foods at school. The parties disagree about how this issue should be handled. The Applicant believes that Caden should remain in this school. The Respondent has wanted to move Caden from this school since the start of the school year, even before the Respondent had an altercation with the Principal.
[156] Part of the Respondent's reason for wanting to change schools is that St. Daniel Comboni is "past" the Applicant's house, which means that the Respondent has to drive further than the Applicant's house to get there in the morning. The Respondent would prefer to send Caden to St. Lucy's, which is between the two houses.
[157] The Respondent also described an incident, when he was taking Caden to school, when he picked up Caden from school early. There was a dispute between the Respondent and the Principal as to which parent, if it was a changeover day, would be responsible for picking Caden up if he was sick.
[158] When I asked the Respondent how he knew that Caden was sick, it became clear that on this occasion Caden was not actually sick. Instead, the Respondent wanted to remove Caden from school early so that he could spend some time with him. I received no good explanation as to why removing Caden from school on this day was necessary. The evidence I have suggests that this incident took place on October 4th, 2023 and that the Respondent talked to the Superintendent about the incident on October 12th, 2023.
[159] There was a further altercation with the Principal a couple of weeks later. It has its genesis in both the incident over removing Caden from school early and from the dairy incident. In respect of the dairy incident, the Respondent testified that he emailed the Vice-Principal about his concerns about cheese and yoghurt and did not get a reply. He then contacted the Principal.
[160] On October 17th, 2023, while he was not fully speaking to the Principal, the Respondent walked Caden through the school to his class on the 2nd floor. On the Respondent's evidence, he got into an altercation with the school principal who "aggressively" told him that he should not be here. This was a concern to the Respondent because, on his evidence, many other parents were doing the same thing.
[161] I do not have a complete picture of all of the interactions between the Principal and the Respondent. However, it is sufficient for the decisions I have to make to note that the Respondent was walking Caden to his classroom on the second floor of the school and was told by the Principal that he was not supposed to be inside the school.
[162] The Respondent alleged that it was the Principal who was aggressive towards him and told him that he could not walk Caden to class because he was a stranger. The Respondent, on his evidence, told the Principal that he was not a stranger to his son. The Principal's response was that he was a stranger to other children and he was not to walk Caden to class. The Respondent immediately raised the issues with the Superintendent and, ultimately, the Director of Education.
[163] The following day, the Respondent received a trespass notice for the school that prevents him from attending at the school except for specified areas and times for drop-offs. This notice is to be reviewed in June of 2024 for the 2024- 2025 school year.
[164] In cross-examination, he also made two additional observations. Those observations, and my findings about them, are as follows:
a) He believed that the Applicant had shared some things about him with the Principal and that was why she was "aggressive" with him. I disagree with this statement for two reasons. First, the Principal had the Court order in terms of parenting time and decision-making authority shared with her. There was nothing wrong with that. Second, even if the Principal was aggressive with the Respondent, it was as a result of her direct interactions with him.
b) He also observed in cross examination that he did not see any harm in him walking his child to class. Again, I disagree with that observation. The harm was that the Respondent was disobeying a directive issued by the Principal on a matter of student safety.
[165] Since the Respondent was "trespassed" from the school, he has refused to take Caden to school during his parenting time. The one exception to this was at the end of October, when Caden wanted to go to the Hallowe'en dance and the Respondent's partner took him.
[166] The issue was of concern to both the Applicant and to the CAS. The Applicant reluctantly agreed to a meeting with the Respondent, in the presence of the CAS. That meeting was held in November of 2023. In that meeting the Applicant advised the Respondent that she was prepared to pick Caden up and take him to school on the days that Caden was in the Respondent's care, so that Caden did not fall behind. The Respondent refused this request.
[167] The Respondent has simply refused to send Caden to school on the days when Caden is in his care. As of the date of trial, Caden has been absent
from school for 25 days, and I am sure that the number has increased since the trial was completed.
[168] The CAS has provided a letter in which they state:
a) That the CAS initiated a Child Protection Investigation on December 19th, 2023 in respect of concerns about Caden's attendance at school while in the care of his father.
b) That the CAS verified concerns related to the Respondent not meeting Caden's educational needs.
c) That the CAS has advised the Respondent that it is his "legal parental responsibility to ensure that [Caden] is attending school while [Caden] is in his care."
[169] In his evidence, the Respondent gave no indication that he had heard the CAS's concerns or understood their significance. Instead, the Respondent took the position, in final argument, that had the Applicant allowed Caden to go to St. Lucy's, Caden would be going to school on a daily basis and we would not have this problem. The Respondent advised me that he honestly believed that it was the Applicant's responsibility for not signing the transfer papers.
[170] This position is consistent with the position that the Respondent took in a meeting with the DPCDSB Superintendent, as well as in meetings with the CAS. Indeed, when the Respondent was told by CAS staff that he was interfering with Caden's right to an education, the Respondent advised that the Principal and the Applicant should be held accountable as they were contributing to the problem.
[171] The Respondent suggested to the Applicant in cross-examination that St. Lucy's was closest to her and that the no PLASP program there was false.
. - 46 -
These points were advanced in support of the Respondent's position that Caden should have been enrolled in St. Lucy's in the first place.
[172] Having set out this factual summary, I now turn to the legal tests that apply in this case.
d) The Legal Test To be Applied
[173] In order to assist the parties in their understanding of the legal issues, I provided them with three cases. Bartucci v. Bartucci, 2023 ONSC 3336, Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, (2005) ON CA, 249 D.LR. (4th) 620 and E.M.B. v. M.F.B, 2021 ONSC 4264.
[174] At the outset of trial, I was only advised that decision-making authority for Caden was an issue. At the conclusion of the trial, on the other hand, I was advised that the Applicant was seeking an order for sole decision-making authority for all of the children who were under eighteen years old. She was also seeking to reduce the Respondent's parenting time to supervised access at a supervised access centre.
[175] At this point, I am only prepared to make an order in respect of decision-making authority for Caden and provide the parties some basic directions in respect of the other children. The relief should generally be limited to the relief that the parties were seeking at the outset of trial. However, for reasons that I will explain, I am going to provide some interim directions on the management of parenting time going forward. As a result, I will set out the law that guides me in making orders on both decision-making authority and parenting time.
[176] This case is being decided after the amendments to the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.3 (2nd Supp), as am., came into effect. These amendments are mirrored in amendments to the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12. However, I will focus on the Divorce Act provisions.
[177] Section 16.1 of the Divorce Act allows me to make an order in respect of parenting time and/or decision making authority. In making that Order, the best interests of the children are the only consideration. However, there does not appear to be anything in the statute that supersedes the older authorities about when joint decision-making would be appropriate. In that respect, Kaplanis states (at paras 11 and 12):
[11] The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate with the other parent does not, in and of itself, mean that a joint custody order cannot be considered. On the other hand, hoping that communication between the parties will improve once the litigation is over does not provide a sufficient basis for the making of an order of joint custody. There must be some evidence before the court that, despite their differences, the parents are able to communicate effectively with one another. No matter how detailed the custody order that is made, gaps will inevitably occur, unexpected situations arise, and the changing developmental needs of a child must be addressed on an ongoing basis. When, as here, the child is so young that she can hardly communicate her developmental needs, communication is even more important. In this case there was no evidence of effective communication. The evidence was to the contrary.
(12] Insofar as the ability of the parties to set aside their personal differences and to work together in the best interests of the child is concerned, any interim custody order and how that order has worked is a relevant consideration for the trial judge and any reviewing court. At trial the father testified that an interim custody order made prior to trial on August 1, provided that the mother have custody and that the father have access on Mondays and Thursdays from 11 to 4
p.m. The father testified that during the time he was with his child, they visited his parents, his niece, Woodbine Centre, McDonald's and Burger King. He also testified that he had sought increased access and had not received it.
[178] This brings me to the factors that the Court is to consider in determining the best interests of the child. Those factors are set out in section 16(3), which states:
(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including
(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each spouse, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;
(c) each spouse's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child's care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
[179] This case also has allegations of family violence, both at the time of separation and more recently. Section 16(4) sets out factors that guide my consideration of how I should consider the impact of the family violence. The allegations of violence in this case, particularly as it concerns the 2023 allegation involving Neveah, are serious. However, it is not necessary for me to delve any further than I already have into those allegations, as the concerns I have in respect of both Caden's schooling and the Respondent's conduct in managing issues between himself and the applicant are even more significant.
e) Conclusions in Respect of Decision-Making Authority for Caden
(180] I start by noting that there are grounds to criticize both parents in this case. As both Woollcombe J. and Kumaranayake J. noted in their endorsements, "the parents have to do better". I have concerns about the Applicant in terms of her rigidity in addressing issues.
(181] However, those concerns are dwarfed by my concerns ab.out the Respondent's ability to either see or act on what is in Caden's best interests. I am also concerned about the Respondent's ability to either see when he is wrong about an issue or to put Caden's interests ahead of his own interests. I will now explain my concerns.
(182] One of the most basic responsibilities of a parent is to ensure that their . child receives an education. In a country where we are blessed with a universal, taxpayer funded public education system to Grade 12, all this responsibility requires is for parents to ensure that their children attend school regularly especially when they are young. The Respondent is failing badly in fulfilling his basic responsibilities to Caden.
(183] He has decided to keep Caden home from school during his parenting time because he has received a trespass order from the school. The Respondent says that this Order is unfair. For my purposes, it does not matter whether the trespass order is fair or unfair, and I make no final determination on that issue as I understand that the Ontario College of Teachers is investigating the matter.
[184] However, the altercation that led to the trespass order came about because the Respondent was walking Caden through the school to class when he had been told by the Principal not to do so. It was put to the Respondent in cross examination that other parents do not walk their children to school and that the school is locked.
[185] It requires no great leap of logic to accept that, in this day and age, schools are locked and that entrance to and exit from them is controlled for the safety of the students, especially in elementary schools. The Respondent should have been able to comprehend the Principal's concerns and avoid the conflict. I am also not persuaded that at least portions of the Respondent's testimony are accurate. For example, his assertion that many other parents were also walking their children to the classroom door is not credible.
[186] What is more troubling, however, is the Respondent's approach to the issue since he was given a Trespass Notice. This behaviour is troubling in two respects.
[187] First, the Respondent has put his own desire to be right above Caden's best interests. The Respondent either does not understand that his desire to prevail in this "fight" with the Principal is having a significant negative impact on Caden's ability to get an education or he does not care about the effect it is having on Caden.
[188] Second, the Respondent has sought to blame the Applicant and/or the Principal for what has happened. In respect of the Applicant, the Respondent has said words to the effect of this whole problem of Caden not going to school would be solved if only the Applicant would agree to send Caden to St. Lucy's. I view this as both a deflection of responsibility for the problems and an attempt by the Respondent to achieve the outcome he wants (Caden's attendance at St. Lucy's) without regard for the negative effects that it will have on Caden.
[189] In terms of the Principal, the Respondent has referred to her as aggressive, has said that she was confrontational and has said that he does not see how he has done anything wrong. I have already set out at paragraph 185 why I disagree with the Respondent's position. The more important point, however, is that the Respondent is ignoring Caden's best interests by keeping him
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at home until the Respondent "wins" his fight with the Principal and with the Applicant.
[190] This conduct alone makes the Respondent completely unsuitable as a parent with even joint decision-making authority. However, the other points that I have outlined in the section on the parties relationship also support my conclusion that the Respondent is unsuitable to have decision making authority over Caden. In that respect, I note that he has been rigid and uncooperative with parenting decisions, has removed Caden from class "to spend time with him" and has generally been unable or unwilling to put Caden's interests ahead of his own interests and desires.
[191] As a result, I am directing that the Applicant shall, on a final basis, have sole decision-making authority for Caden. Given the approach that the Respondent has adopted to decisions as a whole, I am also not persuaded that the Applicant should be required to consult with the Respondent about any decisions in respect of Caden. Given the Respondent's desire to be right about issues and to deflect responsibility, I am persuaded that his input would be unhelpful, to put it mildly. The Applicant has a duty to inform the Respondent in respect of decisions about Caden in advance of making them, and this direction expressly excludes any ability by the Applicant to unilaterally move Caden.
[192] I have made no order in respect of parenting time vet, as it was not an issue that was raised by the parties at trial. However, I do have parens patriae jurisdiction in these circumstances, and I am also directing that, during his parenting time, the Respondent must take Caden to school except if he is sick. I am also required to direct that the Respondent must not remove Caden from school unless he is sick.
[193] I retain jurisdiction over this case until at least September 15th, 2024 to ensure that Caden is attending school regularly. In the event that Caden misses
more than three days of school (either full or partial), then an appointment may be made by the Applicant for a hearing before me to determine whether the Respondent's parenting time should be reduced or eliminated. I also expressly retain jurisdiction to address any issues of which school Caden will attend in Grade 2.
f) Other Decision Making Issues
(194] At the outset of the case, I was advised that there were no issues in respect of the other children. However, at the close of the case, the Applicant asked for sole decision-making authority over those children. I decline to make that order for two reasons. First, the youngest child other than Caden turned sixteen between the hearing of this case and the release of these reasons and the second youngest child turns eighteen in October. A sole decision-making order . would be of no real assistance. Second, it was not relief that was sought at the outset of the trial. As a result, it would be prejudicial to provide orders that were not sought and that the Respondent had no notice of.
(195] That being said, the evidence revealed two discrete points where directions should be provided to ensure protection of the best interests of the children. First, in respect of Amanda, she is currently applying for University and has also applied for OSAP. The Applicant testified that the Respondent had only partially completed the OSAP forms and that Amanda now needs proof that she no longer lives with the Respondent. The Respondent is directed to furnish that proof, and all other evidence necessary to ensure the completion of Amanda's OSAP application. I retain jurisdiction to deal with any issue in that respect for the same time period and in the manner described for the issues in respect of Caden.
(196] Second, the children's passports. The children are now living primarily with the Applicant. As a result, she should be able to apply for passports
for all of them and the Respondent is required to cooperate in that process. I retain jurisdiction over that issue as well.
Conclusions
[197] For the foregoing reasons, I am ordering as follows:
a) The Applicant shall be entitled to be paid out half of the money being held in trust from the sale of the matrimonial home.
b) The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant the sum of $31,817.18 on account of equalization.
c) The Respondent shall pay the net amount of $67,739.00 on account of arrears for child support.
d) The amounts set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be satisfied in the first instance from the Respondent's proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home, with the equalization payment being satisfied first.
e) Any remaining retroactive amounts owing by the Respondent shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.
f) The Respondent shall pay the sum of $2,106.00 per month to the Applicant on account of child support commencing on March 1st, 2024.
g) From October 1st, 2023 onwards, Kayla is independent and is no longer a child of the marriage for the purposes of calculating support.
h) Child support shall be paid on account of each child until August 31st in the year in which the child graduates from high school.
i) Child support shall continue, or resume, if a child enrolls in a post secondary program on or before their 2pt birthday. The party in
contact with the child at the time of their enrolment or the child shall furnish proof of enrollment by no later than July 1st in the year that they are starting a program.
j) Commencing March 1st, 2024, the Applicant shall be entitled, upon proof of payment, to reimbursement from the Respondent of 2/3 of the costs of Neveah and Alyssa's celphone bills until the end of the month in which each of them turns eighteen.
k) The Respondent shall forthwith apply for reimbursement from his insurance carrier for Neveah's braces.
I) The Respondent shall pay 2/3 of all of the costs of Neveah's braces that are not covered by his insurance plan.
m) On a final basis, the Applicant shall have sole decision-making authority for Caden.
n) The Respondent shall ensure that Caden attends at his current school, St. Daniel Comboni, on all days when Caden is in the Respondent's care unless Caden is ill.
o) The Respondent shall not remove Caden from school during his parenting time unless Caden is ill and the school has requested Caden's removal.
p) In the event that Caden misses three or more days or part days from school while having parenting time with the Respondent, then the Applicant may request a review of the current parenting time arrangement.
q) The Respondent shall provide the necessary approvals and documents, and shall assist the Applicant in completing Amanda's application for OSAP.
r) The Respondent shall cooperate in the application process for all of the children to obtain passports. The Applicant shall retain control of the passports.
s) I retain jurisdiction to address any issues that may arise in terms of the orders in paragraphs (n), (o), (p), (q) and (r) until at least September 15th, 2024.
t) The parties are to split the costs set out in Exhibit 19, in the sum of
$425.00, with the Applicant paying 1/3 of the expense and the Respondent paying 2/3 of the expense.
u) I also retain jurisdiction to address any issue in respect of which school Caden is attending for the 2024-2025 school year.
v) The monetary amounts owing under this Order bear interest at a rate of 3 percent per annum from today's date forward.
w) The_ law firm of Rutman and Rutman shall forthwith provide the trust ledger to the parties and the Court.
x) The parties shall, within twenty-one (21) days of today's date, agree on the form and content of the Order flowing from these reasons. Failing agreement, each party shall provide their proposed order.
[198] In addition, there is the question of whether costs should be paid and, if so, in what amount. The time periods when the parties were represented by counsel are governed by the principles set out in Rules 18 and 24 of the Family
Law Rules. For the assistance of the parties, I will set out a couple of the most relevant points from those Rules:
a) The successful party is usually entitled to costs on a partial recovery basis, which means that they can receive reimbursement from the other side for some of their legal costs.
b) Bad faith, which requires a party to meet a very high test, will change the rules in respect of costs. See Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556.
c) Time spent by counsel that has already been addressed by the Court, such as for a motion where the Court made a costs award, is not compensated twice and cannot be claimed now.
d) Costs awards usually consider what is within the reasonable expectations of the other side.
[199] Then, there is the time period when the parties were self-represented. The principles are different and have been described in Fong v. Chan 1999, as follows:
I would also add that self-represented litigants, be they legally trained or not, are not entitled to costs calculated on the same basis as those of the litigant who retains counsel. As the Chorley case, supra, recognized, all litigants suffer a loss of time through their involvement in the legal process. The self-represented litigant should not recover costs for the time and effort that any litigant would have to devote to the case. Costs should only be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate that they devoted time and eff01i to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct the litigation and that, as a result, they incurred an opportunity cost by forgoing remunerative activity. As the early Chancery rule recognized, a self represented lay litigant should receive only a "moderate" or "reasonable" allowance for the loss of time devoted to preparing and presenting the case. This excludes routine awards on a per diem basis to litigants who would ordinarily be in attendance at court in any event. The trial judge is particularly well-placed to assess the appropriate allowance, if any, for a self-represented litigant, and accordingly, the trial judge should either fix the costs when making such an award or provide
clear guidelines to the Assessment Officer as to the manner in which the costs are to be assessed.
[200] These principles have recently been applied in Benarroch v. Fred Tayar and Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228. I have provided the parties with the Caselines cites for these matters. Caselines cases for Ontario can be found at this link: https://www.canlii.org/en/on/
[201] The parties shall each have twenty-one (21) days from the release of these reasons to provide their costs submissions. Those submissions are to be no more than three (3) single-spaced pages, exclusive of case-law, bills of costs and offers to settle.
[202] The parties will then have fourteen (14) further days to reply to the costs submissions of the other side. The Reply submissions are to be no more than two (2) single-spaced pages, exclusive of case-law.
[203] In addition, there may be calculation errors in the amounts that I have set out in the detailed calculations of support. In the event that either party notices a calculation error, they may make submissions of no more than two (2) single spaced pages within twenty-one (21) days of today's date.
[204] The parties are to upload their materials through Caselines as they have access to it. They are also to file any materials through BramptonSCJCourt@ontario.ca and provide copies of those submissions only to my judicial assistant at susan.pickels@ontario.ca
[205] Finally, as noted, I retain jurisdiction to address any issues that may arise in respect of parenting time for Caden and Amanda's application for OSAP until September 15th, 2024. If an appointment is necessary, one may be made
through the Trial Office. The parties are reminded that they are not to contact my judicial assistant other than to provide submissions on costs and calculation errors.
Released: February 23, 2024
COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-00000207-0000
DATE: 2024 02 23
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Michelle Belchior (now Michelle Dias)
Applicant
- and -
Rui Belchior
Respondent
REASONSFORJUDGMENT
LEMAY J
Released: February 23, 2024
Schedule "A" - Support Arrears Calculation
Time Period
Child Support Payable R to A Table Amount (# Children x #
Months)
Child Support Payable A to R
Totals
Net Payable (Receivable) by R
Sept - Dec 2019 4 with A, 1 with R
2308 X 4
304 x4
9232 - 1216
$8,016.00
Jan - June 2020 4 with A, 1 with R
2226 X 6
246 x6
13,356 - 1476
$11,880.00
July - Dec 2020 4 with R, 1 with A
884 x6
730 X 6
5304 - 4380
$924.00
Jan - July 2021 4 with R, 1 shared
878 X 7
478 X 7
6146 - 3346
$2,800.00
Aug - Dec 2021 4 shared, 1 with R
2211 X 5
478 X 5
11,055 - 2390
$8,665.00
Jan - June 2022 4 shared, 1 with R
2440 X 6
583 X 6
14,640 - 3498
$11,142.00
July - Sept 2022 1 shared, 4 with R
9745 X 3
583 X 3
2925 - 1749
$1,176.00
Oct - Dec 2022 3 shared, 2 with R
2049 X 3
583 X 3
6147 - 1749
$4,398.00
Jan - May 2023 3 shared, 2 with R
2174x5
1338 X 5
10,870 - 6690
$4,180.00
June - Sept 2023 1 with A, 2 with R, 2
shared
2174x4
1167 X 4
8696 - 4668
$4,028.00
Oct 2023 - Feb. 1st, 2024
3 with A, 1 shared
2587
461
2106
$10,530.00
Total Arrears
$67,739.00